Patriotism is the will to national individuality. What justification for its existence is there in the groundwork of fact? Is there really any individuality for the will to rest itself upon? Is the country an individual?

There are those who deny that patriotism really has anything objective to feed upon. It is hard, they say, to find anything that the flag stands for or to which one addresses his choral chant when he sings, “My Country! ’tis of thee.” They ask what one’s country can mean to him. When one speaks of country, is he not thinking of that spot of earth which he calls home, those activities and institutions which he has seen working in his own community, or perhaps only the map? A country as big as the United States, for example, can hardly be said to be appreciated by the mind of a single man. Most of the country no one has ever even seen. The “collective mind” is shown to be a fiction. A people does not form a “person,” but remains only a group of individuals. And the corollary seems to be that the only ground on which to posit a nation has been taken away. The state is said to be unreal and artificial. Peoples may be the product of history; a state can be made in a day. Ponsonby looks upon a nation as such a construction: “A nation is not in its composition primarily a geographical nor a racial, but a political unit. ... It must be able to uphold its independent political sovereignty.”[166] Without the necessity for a common defense, that is, there would be no nation. Charles Kingsley remarked in the preface to one of his books that while there can be loyalty to a king or a queen, there cannot be loyalty to one’s country.[167] And so it is that a “country” is an abstraction. For the ordinary patriot at least there really is no such thing. The country is not an individual, and there is no individuality in it for the citizen to rest his patriotism upon. Patriotism is thus left up in the air.

Now one is not driven to the extreme view of the nation as a “person” in order to answer the criticisms suggested in the foregoing. That the state is a “person” is a well-known theory. It is held by those impressed by the philosophy of Hegel. It is reflected everywhere in the terms they use. They talk constantly of such things as a “collective mind” and a “general will.” But the state is not personal in the sense in which human beings are personal. We expect a person to have a body, a brain, and a nervous system. A state or nation has none such. But a thing does not have to be a person in order to be an individual. Not all individuals are personal. All individuals have inner unity. The nation has such unity, and it is this which the philosophers feel whose theory has just been described. They are the “unity philosophers.” And they feel a unity in a state which they seek to describe in terms of personality. We all feel the unity. For instance, we assume a continuity as existent in a country. Even a democratic country must through successive administrations employ the same policy abroad. Only we do not feel it necessary to describe the unity in terms of personality. The conception of organization will serve to explain the unity we find in the nation. What the organization is like is further to appear.

An indication that a great people forms a unit is the fact that it is a growth. The ties that bind the nation together are, in a larger sphere, very much like those that bind together the family and the tribe. The ties of kinship were likely the first that bound together associations of men. Perhaps what first appeared was an undifferentiated horde. But at least the family must have been the first of any close associations of men. The great majority of students are united on this point. McDougall says: “Primitive human society was probably a comparatively small group of near blood relatives.”[168] Green says, “Every form of right first appeared within societies founded on kinship, these being naturally the societies within which the constraining conception of a common well being is first operative.”[169] Sumner’s words reflect his view: “The kin tie, which had been the primitive mode of association and coherence in groups, began to break down in the sixth century, B. C., in Greece. It was superseded by the social tie of a common religious faith and ritual. The Pythagorean and Orphic sects developed this tie.”[170] The religious bond succeeded the kin tie in this case. The well-knit state or polis seems to have come even later. At any rate, civil units come later than kin units, and grow out of them. The Eskimos now have no civil organization outside of the family. But it is only in backward areas that no larger unit than that of the family has arisen. A process of integration has been working, and it is a process which has resulted in nations. Spencer speaks on this point, “... In the earliest stage of civilization, when the repulsive force is strong and the aggressive force weak, only small communities are possible; a modification of character causes these tribes, and satrapies, and gentes and feudal lordships, and clans, to coalesce into nations.”[171] Friction and growing interests between families would in some cases draw them together into a tribe; the same process would draw tribes into a nation. The conception that holds these societies together is that of a common well-being. But the conception first arose in a natural group, the family, and was gradually extended through the tribe and up to the nation. Green points out that while force has been used in the formation of states, “it has only formed states as it has operated in and through a pre-existing medium of political, or tribal, or family rights.”[172] A people is a natural product of natural forces. It at least is not an artificial creation.

Now a nation is formed when a people is organized under an institution, a state. What of the state? Is it an artificial creation? It is charged that states come to be ends in themselves, cut themselves off from the people, and cause wars over artificial values.

Some philosophers, those who uphold the high sovereignty of the state, in capital letters, really identify the state with the nation. If this view be accepted the whole case of the critics of the state as artificial is, of course, at once disposed of. But the state is not identical with the nation. A state may embrace several nations. The British empire is such a super-national state. The state is an institutional organization. And yet there is good ground upon which to maintain that the state is not an artificial creation. As a people is a growth so also is the state. It is true, as is sometimes asserted, that states can be made in a day and that there can be artificial states, that is, states not resting upon a homogeneous people, but it is not true that the state was made in a day. As a people, the raw material of a nation, grew out of the family and tribe units, so the state which is the institution of a people, grew out of the political institutions of the family and the tribe. The first institutions of men, as for instance that of the family, were probably the result of natural unreflective coöperation. They resulted almost as do the effects of a natural law. The actions which gave rise to them were in a way like the tropisms of primitive organisms. “Genuinely primitive association must have been blind, without forethought of advantage to those participating.”[173] Upon these unreflective associations states grew, also without forethought on the whole, although some reflection no doubt entered into the process. Spencer says, “Men did not deliberately establish political arrangements, but grew into them unconsciously—probably had no conception of an associated condition until they found themselves in it.”[174] Men did not go about it deliberately to form a state as represented in the contract theory of Hobbes, but waked up to find they were in a state which had grown out of their actions in pursuance of satisfaction for their needs. The state did not precede man’s political character, but arose out of it. Men recognized common rights and duties, and the state arose in their efforts to safeguard and give expression to them. Thus Green says, “The state, or the sovereign as a characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights already existing. It secures and extends the exercise of powers, which men, influenced in dealing with each other by an idea of common good, had recognized in each other as capable of direction to that common good, and had already in a certain measure secured to each other in consequence of that recognition.”[175]

The maturity of nations has come in the modern period. Likewise patriotism, in the strong degree in which we know it, is comparatively modern. The United States, Germany, Italy are modern states. Tribal loyalty was once the strongest bond. But the tribe settled down to and came to rule a definite extent of territory. Localized tribes formed small units of government. The government was not the representative of the will of the whole people, but expressed the will of the man or small group of men strong enough to possess the seat of authority. Gradually government became more representative. In time small states arose. There were such city-states as Athens. These small states did not organize all the people of the same race as those under their jurisdiction. And when they were enlarged by conquest, they were representative of only a comparatively small group near the seat of government. All conquests were ruled from the outside and from the height of superior power. This power became capable of tremendous extension. The city of Rome became ruler of a large empire. Then ensued the mediæval period in which the notion of catholicity was dominant, and in whose political thinking the all-inclusive and sovereign empire was the ideal. The period of nationalism had not yet come. The empires of Rome and of Charlemagne were not nations. Their strength depended not upon the spirit of the whole, but upon the existence of a strong force at the center. The fact should be noted that the dialectic toward nationalism has not been in a simple straight line. Sometimes there have been cases of dissolution on the part of large and strong integrations of government. But on the whole there is a pretty clear movement toward larger and larger governmental integrations, and these integrations have in the main been forced to follow the building up of peoples. The mediæval empires fell. The papacy became distrusted as a corrupt and tyrannical foreign power. The bloody chaos of feudalism became unbearable. The Crusades acquainted men with others who were like or unlike themselves. The Renaissance heightened the emotions of men, and prepared the soil for nationalistic passion. Peoples became welded together, and at the beginning of the modern period nations emerged which took up into themselves the feudalistic establishments and city-states which had flourished during the Middle Ages. These nations met the needs of men, and persisted. They entrenched themselves, and gathered force. Thus they came to the beginning of the nineteenth century when the spirit of nationalism was fanned into a consuming flame by the wars of Napoleon, and when again the nationalistic passion was ministered to by the romantic movement which aroused once more the emotional side of human nature. The crowning height of the process has been reached at the present time when the Great War has made nationalistic loyalty the ruling passion of mankind.

A state, then, is the outgrowth of the life of a people. The people is a growth, and the state is an institution which has grown along with the people. Therefore it would seem as if there were good indications for calling each of them real.

What makes a nation? The elements of a nation show both objective reality and inner unity. There are, roughly, three things which enter into the makeup of a country. The first of these is a people with a common language, customs, traditions, history, and land with its associations. Sometimes religion has been an element. In the case of cultured peoples, literature has also been such. “The dawn of English nationality coincided with the dawn of a truly English literature.”[176] We have already seen how such a people grows. It is a natural group; it is based on instinctive association and the stress of the struggle for existence. The instincts of patriotism are themselves instrumental in forming the objective basis of patriotism. They make for the solidarity of a people. This people doesn’t have to belong to one race, for it may be made up of a fusion of races. There may be a diversity of classes and interests within the nation. It does not have to be absolutely homogeneous, for only a very small group indeed could be such. Similars do not constitute a nation. A country is a qualitative individual. A unity can be obtained in diverse elements. The things that have been named seem to be sufficient to weld together such a unity, a people. A people is an objective reality, and one of the bases of a nation.

The second element is an organization, an institution, in other words, a state. The Poles have a common language, customs, traditions, and land, but they have no government of their own, and do not form a nation. A nation comes into being when a state is formed by a people. The state, if a true one, grows out of the life of the people, and is to the people what the body is to the soul. The state and the people form a unity. Moreover, the institution is just as real as the people and their desires, and with the people forms the objective basis of a nation.

The third element is that of a common consciousness. This is built upon and implied in the conditions already named. A people and a state are both external and internal facts. The raw material of which they are formed is external and objective. But that raw material does not come to its full meaning until there is added to it a consciousness in which it is taken up in unity. There would really be no unified people and no state, as the expression of united political life, in spite of the external elements which are necessary to the being of people and state, unless there existed in the individuals’ minds a common consciousness or consciousness of community. The very existence of a common language testifies to the existence of a common consciousness, as do common customs, traditions, history, literature, and ideals. A land even is something which a people possesses, and which furnishes a common bond between the individuals of the group. There was a time when the land was literally a common possession, in the sense that there was no private property, but ownership is not the only way in which a people can have a common interest in the land; there may be many associations besides that of common ownership connected with it. Esthetic appreciation is one of them. Affection for the scenes of childhood is another. Esenwein, in describing the art of Gogol, the Russian author, uses the following phrases: “Rarely do power and delicacy unite in a stylist as they do in Gogol. For the one [power], we may find an origin in his love for the sun-steeped and snow-blown plains of his native Cossack country....”[177] What gifted writers have felt other more common folk have felt also.

These things, then, imply a common consciousness. This consciousness is a recognition and ratification of existing interrelationships, and such a community of thought and feeling and will is fundamentally important in the unity of a nation. “No mere interaction will constitute a social relation. Nor yet an interaction of otherwise self-conscious agents. Not merely must each agent know himself, he must know the others.... Unless there be on both sides a perfect consciousness of self and of other, and of the relations of self and other—in a word, perfect mutual understanding—there will be, so far, no completely social relation. A social relation is a self-conscious relation.... In other words, society is constituted by mutual understanding.”[178] This understanding is that which enables the group to act as one. “Through this mutual knowledge the group, like the individual, is enabled to assert itself as an independent force.”[179] Mazzini understood that the unity of a country rested upon a sense of oneness in the minds of the people: “Country is not a mere zone of territory. The true country is the Idea to which it gives birth; it is the thought of love, the sense of communion which unites in one all the sons of that territory.”[180] Here we get a suggestion regarding the unity of Switzerland. It is, in large part, a unity in idea. That is not saying that it has no objective basis. The Swiss have a common land and other bonds of oneness. But the strongest bond seems to be that of a conception of common welfare. The unity of Switzerland has, of course, been stimulated from without. One of the most potent reasons for Swiss unity is that of necessity for defence. They must be one to preserve their freedom. But the fact is that whatever the stimulus was, whatever the difficulties that stood in the way, however diverse the original materials may have been, the Swiss are now one in the beliefs of the individual members of the nation, and that feeling of communion is actually unity in fact.

It is true, then, that in one way the essence of an institution is in idea. “Perhaps the Identical, in this matter of groups, is neither a real person nor a nominalist fiction. Let us call it an idea....”[181] All true unity is really contributed by the mind. The external falls apart, and becomes a mere congeries and not a unity when not held together in idea. The external elements form the materials for a unity; they make up the basis of an institution; they aid in giving rise to a common consciousness; but it is the common consciousness itself that is the essence of the unity. In this way the will to individuality as an inner fact will in turn make for individuality in objective reality. Only, it should be noted on the other hand, when the unity is based on external grounds, it is not a mere fiction, and is not left up in the air.

To have a common consciousness, the individuals of a group do not have to be acquainted by sense experience with all their land or its people. Imagination and sympathy are means by which men feel themselves one of a society and parts of an institution. And if, even after imagination and sympathy have come to one’s help, a country and its ideals are said to be abstract and vague, even so, it is such abstract things that become a cause, and it is such vague ideals that have the greatest motive power. They possess us. We think with them rather than of them, and they become a spirit in which we approach all things. It is not necessary that we should have an exact formula of them in order to make them real. Realities do not only then come to exist when we have a clear-cut formula for them, nor do ideas first have being when they are put into formal expression.

One quest of men has been, consciously or unconsciously, to create for themselves a unified world. In doing this they have, among other things, formed themselves into nations. Nations have met their needs, and helped them to feel at home in their world. Countries are real, and come close home. With this in mind we can appreciate the feeling of the traveler abroad who has a sense of the wholeness of his home-land and longs for it. The following quotation is an illustration of this feeling at the same time that it catalogues some of the elements that go into the makeup of a country. “Every time his passport is presented, every time he enters a new dominion or crosses a new frontier, every time he is delayed at the custom-house, or questioned by a policeman, or challenged by a sentinel, every time he is perplexed by a new language, or puzzled by a new variety of coinage or currency,—he thanks his God with fresh fervency that through all the length and breadth of that land, beyond the swelling floods, which he is privileged and proud to call his own land, there is a common language, a common currency, a common Constitution, common laws and liberties, a common inheritance of glory from the past, and, if it be only true to itself, a common destiny of glory for the future!”[182]

Is there anything to indicate that the organizing principles of a nation are permanently necessary ones? The ultimate existence and value of patriotism will be involved in the answer to that question. Is patriotism called for by the fundamental order of reality?

One of the essential centers of life is a community, a neighborhood, those who live near enough to one another that the interests of their lives are closely interwoven by the fact of association in space. This would seem to be a self-evident proposition. Mazzini hit the truth when he said that mankind had been placed in groups or nuclei upon the face of the earth. The community is an irreducible minimum of association among mankind. It is a permanent association, and the sentiments that grow out of it will be permanent. There is true reason why one of the fundamental virtues is that of being a good neighbor. And Veblen was right in saying, “Even with no patriotism, love of country, and use and wont as it runs in one’s home area and among one’s own people, would not pass.”[183] Patriotism seems to be vitally connected with a permanent sentiment, community spirit.

A community is attached to the soil. It has its basis in a local area. That is what makes a community. In other words, it is organized upon the geographical principle. The geographical principle is one of the permanently necessary principles of human association. Now a nation is so associated. A country must have a territory, and it is the only institution of which this can be said. “A nation ... is primarily a group of men and women related physically.... The state represents not the common interests of those who are intellectual, or musical, or religious, but chiefly the common interest of those who live in the same district.”[184] Patriotism is loyalty to one’s native land. At least one fundamental principle of a country is a permanent one, the geographical principle. We have here a suggestion as to why the soil is so important in patriotism. Patriotism is nourished by the soil. The soil not only is what sustains the vital economic interests of those who live upon it, but is the basis of the existence of the nation itself. Without the land, and land is country, there would be no patriotism.

There has arisen of late the contention that it would be better to do away with the geographical principle of government. Russell says, “There is no reason why all governmental units should be geographical.”[185] It is felt that if geographical frontiers were destroyed the cause of peace would be furthered. “When civil war breaks out in a country, no real fighting is possible until the contending factions are organized on separate territory.”[186] It is worse when trouble with another country arises. “In domestic affairs we live with and know the men who disagree with us; in foreign affairs the opposition lives behind a frontier, and probably speaks a different language.”[187] But it is not clear that we shall gain anything by heeding these suggestions to obliterate national frontiers. The substitute planned is that of syndicalistic organizations. But under such an arrangement frontiers would be infinitely multiplied. Men of conflicting loyalties and interests would be in touch everywhere. It would simply be an exchange of one antagonism for another. And class wars would be no better than nationalistic wars. It would be no better to have class against class than nation against nation. So what we come back to is governmental organization upon the geographical principle. And this means that we come back to some such unit as the nation. And why not? Environment makes people alike, and to have a homogeneous people is one of the necessities of a successful government. Moreover, we must form an attachment somewhere, else live entirely alone. And it is right to begin where we are.

“God gave all men all earth to love,
But since our hearts are small,
Ordained for each one spot should prove
Beloved over all.”

We have said that the territorial arrangement is an inescapable one in government, and that the community is a unit below which we cannot go. But there cannot help but be interests growing up between communities. And historically these interests have led to association of communities. Rivalry and friction arise. War follows. The mediæval city-states fought with one another. New York and New Jersey are rivals; the writer recalls one occasion when New Jersey was threatening suit against New York for befouling the Hudson River. The only safeguard against internecine warfare between communities is a more comprehensive power. So a larger unit grows. And these units must be still further integrated. The process will not stop until it comes to the nation with its government, the state. How much further it will go will be disclosed by future events.

Is the state a permanently necessary institution? The principle of integration embodied in the state is a fundamental one. It is the principle of coöperation for coöperation. The good of any institution is that of coöperation for some end. The primary end of the state is that of coöperation itself. Its purpose is that of enabling men to live and work together in peace. Loyalty to the national group is loyalty to the principle of human coöperation. The most valuable thing about the state is not that it does this or that, but that it gets men working together. It provides the setting for further cooperation. In its protection against enemies either within or without the group, it is acting to keep the coöperation of the members of the group from being interfered with.

Thus it will be seen that the state is essentially a peace unit. There are those who deny this. There are two theories of the state. One is that it is a peace unit. The other is that it is a war unit. It is, according to this latter view, organized for the waging of war. Because of this latter view there has been of late a great deal of opposition to and criticism of the state. It is alleged that all the other things besides fighting which the state once did have been taken over by other agencies better fitted to do them, and that really the only thing which the state now has as its purpose is that of declaring and making war. The citizens coöperate in the state only when they have a fight on with another state. But it may be replied that it is hardly fair to charge all our troubles in war to the state. Wars have been waged where there was no state in the modern sense; they have been carried on by other agencies than states; and states have lived together peaceably. Savage individuals, savage tribes, feudal barons have all fought. Race riots have given vent to hatred. Representatives of labor and capital have fought pitched battles. The United States and Canada have lived side by side without ever having found it necessary to declare war or even fortify the frontier.

And the state is really a peace unit. It exists primarily for the purpose of keeping order within the area of its jurisdiction. It becomes apparent here how some of the beliefs of patriotism are well-founded. The state is needed as the protector of one’s self. In the Middle Ages, in the absence of any other agency to provide protection, there grew up voluntary associations, founded and operated usually by warriors, and called regna, whose business it was to keep the peace. Here was an attempt to do the work of the state. But the attempt failed, and there are now no such organizations. One would not miss the mark far in hazarding the opinion that they failed because they did not represent a peace unit composed of an integrated people occupying a given extent of territory. What has been said here would indicate that what we need to do is so to extend the integration of society that the whole world will be a peace unit. The whole problem of keeping peace should be made an internal problem. There should be no foes without.

The state is the ultimate protector of all the values of life. The citizen was right when he believed that his earthly salvation depended upon his state. The state itself does not usually furnish the goods of life, although it does on occasion furnish them. That is not its primary business. It does not even guarantee the goods of life. Much, of course, depends upon the individual himself. But the just state does ultimately protect the individual in all rightful opportunities in which he as an individual or in voluntary association with others cannot protect himself. The civilized life itself at present depends upon the state. The very word “civilization” is derived from a term meaning “state.” It is that which is possible where there is a settled order provided by the state. One can imagine what the state means if he pictures himself at the fringe of civilization where he would miss the many values of life which the state makes possible. The state does its work for the most part noiselessly, but it is just because it is so efficient that it is so noiseless. We are not conscious of its working, and therefore assume that it is otiose. But it is with us all the time, and providing the opportunity for all the values of life. The state is a kind of second nature which does not guarantee happy living, but offers the opportunities for such a life.

The state does, however, go beyond its primary purpose. It has not, as a matter of fact, been restricted purely to acting the part of policeman or night-watchman. Philosophers have disputed a good deal about the functions of the state. But when all is said and done it has been found necessary for the state to engage in some activities which were not purely those of providing protection, but were designed to promote positively the general welfare. The state truly, as Aristotle said, even though it has originated in the bare needs of life, has continued for the sake of the good life. The state strives to aid men in a positive way. Some community interests thought to be in the province of the state are those of education, transportation, communication, sanitation, taxation, and the maintenance of economic justice. And this positive character of the state’s functions renders patriotism all the more strongly entrenched.

As already has been intimated, syndicalistic organizations are being put forward as rivals of the state. Industry is one of the chief interests of men, and is especially virulent at the present time. There are those who would organize society according to occupation. And when society was completely organized in this way there would be, so it is thought, no further excuse for the existence of the state. All the legitimate common concerns of men would be taken care of by syndicalistic organizations. The economic arguments for or against syndicalism are of secondary importance in this connection; the point of interest is that which bears on syndicalism as a principle of government. Graham Wallas has studied these questions. He points to the mediæval experience under the guild system. He says that quarrels between the crafts were rife, as were quarrels between the craftsmen and the merchants; that the people hated strangers as well as the police; that the public health was neglected; and that the cities found it impossible to keep order in their own streets during a trade dispute.[188] The fact is that the growth of power on the part of Labor and Capital and the conflicts arising because of that power render the state more necessary rather than less so.

There is a true sense in which the state embodies the general will. It is, in the area of its jurisdiction, the representatives not of a class, but of all the people living in that area. It is the repository of the collective will of its citizens. Therefore, it is fitted to keep the peace, and to be for the purpose of keeping peace, the user of force. The cry has been raised, “Why is the state armed? No other institution feels it necessary to be equipped with an armament.” But the truth is that it is just because the state is armed that no other institution needs to be. One police force is enough. We shall always need the state to keep other institutions in harmony. And institutions which exist for other purposes than that of the maintenance of law and order will have to submit to regulation by the state for the sake of law and order. It will be the state’s business, among other things, to maintain a democracy of institutions.

The state, because of the generality of its character, plays an important role in federating the loyalties of men. Economic interests, religious interests, and so on, do not exhaust the catalogue of human activities. Each individual will have touch with other individuals with whom he would not outside the state be organized in any institution. One may have a neighbor who is of another trade or church. The state brings one into a common life with his neighbors. The state’s character as a power helps it to occupy this role as federator of loyalties. It is back of all the institutions of life; it sustains them. Consequently the loyalties given to the other institutions tend to head up in the state. It is a universal, too, because its unifying principle, that of space, is so universal. Such a principle is very general, and may be empty unless enriched by many differentiations within itself; the life that it unifies may be very meagre without those differentiations, but generality is akin to universality, and just because the principle is so general, it may act as a unifier of many in one. A loyalty that shall be an organizer of all loyalties is needed. For the individual, even after he is a member of all the voluntary organizations to which he is eligible, there ought to be that which will unify his whole life. So likewise there ought to be that which will unify the whole of mankind. The state and the church seem to be the only institutions which in ideal are capable of achieving these results. And at the present time we seem nearer a universal political than religious unification of mankind. Human nature is a long way from being ready to warrant putting one’s trust in it as the guarantee of peace and justice because each human being loves his neighbor as himself. At any rate, the state will have a fundamental purpose as an integration of mankind for so long a time to come that it may be said to be permanently necessary. The character of the state as being the condition of all the values of civilized life, the embodiment of the general will, and the federator of human loyalties, throws light upon the phenomenon that when the state calls the individual every other loyalty must go.

The state seems still to be entitled to its place in the sun. But we must keep ourselves at the point where we can criticize our political loyalties. Some states on occasion need reform. The morality of nations must be criticized. States have grown in response to the needs of human beings. They must be kept subservient to those needs. The state is not divine. There is no divine right of kings, and there is no divine right of states, except as these institutions meet the real needs of real human beings. The state has justified its existence, but that doesn’t mean that the existence of any particular kind of state is justified.

In other words, patriotism seems to be necessitated by the fundamental order of reality. Its existence is justified. Patriotism is essentially a fundamental human good. But that fact doesn’t justify all that is found in patriotism. Consequently, the problem is not only to evaluate patriotism as an essential ideal, but also to criticize the faults and virtues of its different forms. Something of that criticism will be the effort of the concluding chapter.