Patriotism serves a necessary purpose, and is therefore a fundamental human good. In some form it is existentially necessary. The problem of patriotism now becomes, then, “What is its form to be?” For patriotism as it actually appears in persons and nations is not all good. It may be, as an individual possession, morally colorless. There are barnacles attached to the ship of state. Zimmermann made a keen remark when he said, “The love of one’s country, however extolled, is, in many cases, no more than the love of an ass for its stall.”[189] It may be either noble or narrow. There is a higher and lower patriotism. It depends on how it expresses itself. Before the ethical value of nationalistic loyalty can be fully determined it must be looked at in its concrete forms. The varying motives and effects of patriotism must be considered.

Why is patriotism noble? The reason why it has been popularly extolled is that it is a form of unselfishness. There is hardly another cause in the world today that calls forth such heroic self-sacrifice as the cause of one’s country. Royce included the state among the causes that have organized men in unselfish devotion. He said, “... we have certain human activities that do now already tend to the impersonal organization of the life of those engaged in them. Such activities are found in the work of art, in the pursuit of truth, and in genuine public spirit. Beauty, Knowledge, and the State, are three ideal objects that do actually claim from those who serve them harmony, freedom from selfishness, and a wholly impersonal devotion.”[190] And unselfishness is one of the fundamental human virtues. It makes the individual himself a better man, and is most certainly needed in the structure of society.

Patriotism has the tendency to make men idealists. It is hard enough to get men’s thoughts off of purely material things, and whatever can draw their devotion to an ideal cause is, so far, worth while.

Patriotism has made for coöperation among men. The primary purpose of the state is that of coöperation, that is, of making it possible for men successfully to live together. That, on the face of it, is a noble purpose. And the state has actually secured a larger range of coöperation than what had been attained before it. It has secured a wider range of peace. It is a larger peace unit. Hence, the state as an integration of men is a gain, and is not, if it is avoidable, to be destroyed. It would not, for instance, be a gain to condemn even Germany to destruction as long as any other mode of treatment is possible. Of course this argument assumes that the state is indispensable as an institution for the integration of mankind. But it really is indispensable. An irreducible unit of society is a community—those living in close contact in some given limited territory. Hence, the territorial principle is an inescapable one in the organization of society. And, if so, communities will, by their conflicts, if by nothing else, be organized into states. That is what has happened. No organization of society on any other plan is likely to find it possible to dispense with the state. And now, if the state is so necessary and valuable in the organization of society, patriotism as a force that preserves the state and its benefits is of value to men.

But the relations of patriotism to war and internationalism are now its most crucial problems. It is often argued that while patriotism has done and does what is claimed for it, it has in large measure outlived its usefulness, and is a prolific source of the world’s greatest troubles at the present time in that it makes for jealousy, conflict, and war. Patriotism is said to be divisive, when thought of in world terms. Hasn’t it, therefore, outlived its usefulness, and isn’t it time to entrust the keeping of the coöperation of men to a still larger institution that shall be worldwide, and thus avoid the conflicts of the present? The feeling that prompts this argument is embodied in the following words: “... a striking factor in today’s thinking is the perception of the immoral consequences of patriotism. We see that while devotion to country entails the final sacrifice of self, it entails also the most inhumane sacrifice of others. We have not yet been able to think the matter out. Distraught, we reverence the men who are dying for their separate flags and strain our eyes beyond the battlefields for the oriflamme of internationalism.”[191] It is evident that when countries go to war, all cannot be right, and that fact puts the patriots of some country in a false position. One cannot take simply the attitude of uncritical patriotism. The good man and the good patriot are not necessarily one and the same. If the contrary were true, then neither we nor the Germans would have any moral grounds upon which to be indignant at one another. Not all causes become just simply for the reason that one’s country chooses to defend them. Aristotle called attention to the fact of varying governments in the world, and drew the following conclusion: “If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that the virtue of the good citizen cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that a good man is he who has perfect virtue. Hence, it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.”[192] A larger view than that of uncritical patriotism is therefore needed, and the critic says that such is just what the patriot cannot be expected to attain. The critic makes the charge that the coöperation that has been gained in patriotism is an obstruction in the way of attaining a larger coöperation. Patriotism, in other words, is not a proper force for saving the world. For one thing, it contents a man with his own country; the patriot doesn’t strive for any higher organization of men, and so the spirit of progress is deadened. Moreover, so the critic sometimes says, patriotism is simply a coöperation for conflict. It is setting men at each other’s throats.

It will have to be admitted first of all that patriotism may be the kind of force that its critic describes it to be. And if it were irrevocably and wholly committed to be such a spirit, one would have to pass an unfavorable verdict upon it. Whatever its benefits might otherwise be, the world would not tolerate it, if that meant to be forever confronted with the possibility of another conflict such as the present one. It may, however, be pleaded that the present internecine conflict of patriots is not a permanent condition of mankind. It is a stage through which the race is having to pass in its development towards world-wide organization. And it is not altogether strange that in the process, patriotism should be a temporary difficulty, just as family, clan, and provincial pride once were. The factors making for a world integration have not yet fully found themselves, and of course, are not adequate for the job of overcoming the prejudices of patriots. Moreover, it is natural for any stage of progress gained to be a bar to further progress. Each stage has to be sharply and definitely conceived in order to be reached, but that in turn makes it a bar to further development. The vision of the next step simply doesn’t come easily to men’s minds. Moreover, it is easy for them to take achieved results as final. Those results have to be taken seriously, if they are to yield their full value. And besides, a stage of progress doesn’t know itself simply as a link in a single logical line of development; it has many individual interests of its own,—interests which may give it a tendency to fly out of what has been the line of progress. Other things, too, get mixed up with it that tend to pull it out of its straight and narrow path. Patriotism has been mixed up with and betrayed by junkeristic, dynastic, and profiteering interests. Patriotism itself surely should not have to bear the full blame for the faults of those evil companions, although patriotism, it must be admitted, has been in bad company. In the light of all the facts, it seems most accurate to say that patriotism taken as a whole does offer difficulties in the way of welding men into larger peace units. But after all they are only difficulties, and not impassable barriers. They are practical rather than theoretical, not rational and necessary. They offer no grounds for a final condemnation of patriotism.

It does not seem to be fair, at any rate, to say that patriotism is a disintegrating factor in world affairs. There is no larger unit of cooperation that it is breaking up. And patriotism can claim for itself that it has come in as a force making for larger groupings of men. If patriotism were at one sudden blow stricken out of the world, we should be set backward rather than forward in the process of winning the conditions of world peace.

Patriotism cannot be set down as an ultimate enemy of peace on earth and good will among men because it sometimes supports a war. The purpose of a state is not primarily that of waging war, but that of enabling men to live together in peace. And correspondingly patriotism is not exclusively or mainly a war-waging virtue. In fact, it more commonly expresses itself as a peaceful and constructive public spirit. Patriotism, as matters now stand, is not likely to cause the opening of hostilities, although it will support a war which has already been started. And it is, even in war, usually a defensive rather than an offensive attitude. This is virtually proved by the fact that all the belligerent countries have to make their peoples believe that they are fighting a defensive war. That is the way in which the martial spirit of patriots has to be appealed to. And it is a significant thing that such is the case. It indicates that the destruction of patriotism is not necessary to the attainment of world peace, but that the end may be secured simply through the decay of the bellicose spirit. As a matter of fact, the conscience of the world has already undergone great changes with regard to war. It is probable that the earliest savage state was that of almost incessant warfare. And in those days, it wasn’t necessary to find any pretext for opening hostilities. The sufficient reason for an attack was that the other group had something that the party of the first part wanted. The earliest stage of savage and even civilized life, therefore, was one in which wars could quite uniformly be frankly wars of aggression. The stage in which the present generation seems to be living is that of “wars of defense.” There are some signs that the next era will be that of peace. The whole world is getting tired of war, and longing for internationalism. And, what is new, these feelings are springing up all over the world at the same time. Perhaps we are already in the transitional period. At any rate, it does not seem to be quite accurate to charge that patriotism is the first cause of wars in these days. It is safe to say that the populations of the world wanted peace in 1914. Something else is the first cause of wars. A dispute arises between two governments, and patriotism, to be sure, adds fuel to the flames. But patriotism in itself is for the most part peaceful until it is fanned into fury.

But even if patriotism does go to war, it is not simply for that to be condemned without further ado. The resistance that a nation offers is often really a service to the cause of integration in the world. For world coöperation cannot be based upon world conquest. That is not the way to a broader unity. And whoever opposes such conquest is the friend of true unity. There can be such a thing as an integration on a thoroughly bad principle. A robber band or a conscienceless monopolistic “trust” would be examples of just such an organization. And there also may be a thoroughly unholy alliance in the political realm. It is just that which the spirit of patriotism is at the present time preventing. World domination and world brotherhood are incompatible, and that proposition right now just as truly has a practical application, although in a different way, for those who live west of the Rhine as for those who live on the other side. If it is wrong for Germany to build up a world-empire on the principle of domination, it is wrong for us to let her do it. Integration implies a unity of differences. There can, then, be no true integration where significant differences are ignored. And there will be no just organization of all the peoples of the world where the individuality of some of the parts is disregarded. Within the nation, we demand that the individuality of each unit be respected. The pacifist makes that demand for himself. And it is just as much right that the individuality of each nation should be respected in the community of which it is a part. The nation occupies the same position with regard to the world that the individual occupies with regard to the country. Similar rights and similar duties may be claimed for both. It is fair that the same organizing principle should be applied on both the national and international levels, namely, unity in difference.

In other words, the same principles of justice and liberty that must guide within the nation must also be normative of the relations between states. The integration of a nation is one of will, and, moreover, one of good will. The same thing can be said of a world organization. The permanent integration of the world will have to be upon the basis of good will. And that cannot have been accomplished where a great many apparently within the fold are not in it at heart. Peace wouldn’t necessarily mean good will or true integration. If, for instance, we voluntarily surrendered to Germany, as the pacifists sometimes urge, and showed good will on our part, that wouldn’t necessarily call forth the same spirit on the part of Germany. Their spirit might simply be that of exaggerated egoism. But on the other hand, will it make for good will to go on fighting Germany? In the long run, it seems to be the way that is necessary to follow in order to bring her to a frame of mind where she can be coöperated with.

It is therefore not completely out of harmony with the cause of world coöperation that a state should sometimes go to war. And the nation itself has rights and duties. It would not be any more morally good for a country to consent to its extinction or the serious crippling of its individuality than it would be for the human individual to commit suicide or incapacitate himself. The state fights for its individuality, and individuality is a thing worth fighting for. It is right that each individual nation should have the privilege of living a life of its own, that is, as long as it does not forfeit its privilege by ignoring the rights of others.

The recognition of the tendencies and power of patriotism shut one up to the conclusion that a world organization will have to be established along the lines of internationalism rather than those of cosmopolitanism. Each group has its own consciousness which will have to be taken into account. Wallas says that, “In England the ‘particularism’ of trades and professions and the racial feeling of Wales and Ulster, of Scotland or Catholic Ireland, seem to be growing stronger and not weaker.”[193] It will be the same with patriotism in a world organization. The successful line of development in world organization seems to be one in which the preceding stages are not wiped out, but are preserved and made the basis of a new integration. Therefore, it seems as if the next larger grouping or groupings of men will have to be joined onto nationalism. Sumner stated a truth when he said, “... changes which run with the mores are easily brought about, but ... changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all.”[194] If a reform is to be made in the direction of a world integration, it will, if it wishes to succeed, have to be joined onto patriotism.

But there are reasons why it is better that we should develop into internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism. The latter contains fundamental dangers. It makes too much for detachment, aloofness, and selfishness. The Stoics were an example of how cosmopolitanism passed into those things. The eighteenth century was an “age of Reason” which tended towards cosmopolitanism, and it was a cosmopolitanism which though enlightened was chill and abstract. Cosmopolitanism tends to reduce all life to a mediocre type. This danger is well pointed out in the following words: “I believe largely in the comparative permanence of what we call racial characteristics; I sincerely hope they will not be merged into a common humanity.... Nearly every group of peoples has developed its own mentality, its own psychology, ideas and ideals. We need to preserve the difference between those ideas and ideals. If you merge them, you get a common—a very common—humanity. All progress takes place in the reaction between extremes. All philosophy has arisen from a mixture of races which brought to one another different ideas and ideals.”[195] The condition of progress is the preservation of national characteristics. But, what is even more important, there are in cosmopolitanism grave moral dangers involved. G. F. Barbour says: “The great meeting-places where the currents of Oriental and Occidental life have come together have indeed produced a vivid and brilliant type of life, but hardly one that has been morally stable and sound.”[196] Each side finds it easy to adopt the vices of the other, but not the virtues, and both sides are liable to become superficial. The brilliant but shallow and immoral life of Corinth in the days of Paul offers an example.

The problem at the present time is to federate groups. Individuals have already become unified. But what sets the problem gives rise also to a hope. The existence of groups will prove an aid in the accomplishment of world unification. And the wise humanitarian will work through the groups that already exist, that is, countries.

World cosmopolitanism would, at least at present, leave the individual cold; he could not comprehend it, and could not be intelligently loyal to it. Hence, in order to get effective sympathy and action among men, there must exist a group of the size and meaning that is able to appeal to the individual. There must be aroused something like what Royce called “provincialism.” Provincialism might be interpreted in one way as loyalty to that integration of men whose individuality expressed the individuality of oneself. And from it will be derived dynamic for humanitarianism. Royce said that, “... philanthropy that is not founded upon a personal loyalty of the individual to his own family and to his own personal duties is notoriously a worthless abstraction.”[197] And the application was that “the province will not serve the nation best by forgetting itself, but by loyally emphasizing its own duty to the nation and therefore its right to attain and to cultivate its own unique wisdom.”[198] Therefore Royce said that, “Every one ... ought, ideally speaking, to be provincial,—and that no matter how cultivated, or humanitarian, or universal in purpose or in experience he may be or may become.”[199] Provincialism did not mean exclusiveness or jealousy. To Royce, “... our province, like our own individuality, ought to be to all of us rather an ideal than a mere boast.... The better aspect of our provincial consciousness is always its longing for the improvement of the community.”[200] But the point is that the spirit of provincialism is a useful force in securing the attachment of men. And the clue that one finds in it is that the best way to get a world integration is to do it by the federation of nationalities. The organization of patriotic loyalties would secure an integration that would hang together. Under such an arrangement, the patriot would contribute strength to internationalism by his very attachment and loyalty to his own nation. Nationalism would thus become a spur to a wider humanitarian impulse. And patriotism can, if properly educated, be counted upon to support international government. The patriot himself will develop an insistent demand for internationalism when he once clearly sees, what is true, that the individuality of his own nation is best realized in a community of nations where legitimate national differences are synthesized in justice.

This program of the unification of nationalities is to be taken seriously. Emphasis must be laid not only on nationality but also upon unification. The patriot must really recognize that he has another loyalty than that to country, namely, that to internationalism. It is plain that improvements can be made upon the present world order, and the most important thing to do is to work towards some kind of arrangement whereby national disputes can be settled according to international law, and the peace can be kept at the same time that justice is done. As a matter of fact, most thoughtful individuals do long for some kind of internationalism at the same time that they are patriotic. In a situation like the present many are torn by a conflict between loyalty to humanitarianism on the one hand and patriotism on the other. And it is a situation with which the individual cannot deal satisfactorily alone. There must be an end put to the system which makes such conflicts possible. But one must remember also that the nation is just about as helpless as the individual. The nation, too, is faced with a conflict of loyalties which it cannot by itself solve. The rescue must come out of a concerted action of nations. The situation must be dealt with in the very beginning by an international act. It is not to be expected that any one country can deal adequately with the present world problems. The disarmament or non-resistance of any one nation will not be a solution, and it seems unreasonable for any one to counsel his own country to take any such action. However, we must relate our patriotism to internationalism. “We must keep patriotism, and yet go beyond it, if we are to save what is best in patriotism itself, just as for the sake of religion, religious men had to go beyond their own willingness to die for their own faith. Toleration demanded not irreligion, but a better religion, and we might have a better patriotism if we could remember that we are also citizens of the world.”[201] The nations must be in some respects like the planets in the system of the universe. The planets have each a free swing in their own orbits, but they do not collide. Each helps to hold all the rest in place, and together they all form one system. We all have, at the present time, in addition to the duty of winning the war, the further obligation of working for permanent conditions of peace. We may fairly claim that we have inherited this war and are not really responsible for it, but if we do not discharge our international duties both now and when the conditions of peace are being planned at the end of this present conflict, we shall be responsible for the next war.

It is a reassuring fact to the internationalist at the same time that it is a justification for the continued existence of patriotism that there actually have been and are tendencies making not only for closer relations between nations, but also for the moralizing of those relations.[202] In material things countries have been drawn closer and closer together. They are not economic wholes. They are debtors and creditors of one another. They do not keep improved methods of industry in the country where they originated; even improved methods of war have not been so restricted. And they are interdependent in non-material things. Physicians and surgeons do not hide their ideas within their own group. And art and science, of course, have long been ties that have bound together associations of the citizens of diverse countries. There is, in short, a wide unofficial intercourse between the citizens of different countries, a fact which leads Burns to exclaim, “Nor will even diplomatic subtleties be able to keep us back: for trust between the citizens of diverse states is trust between the states, and the official governments will soon have to submit to the new situation.”[203] But states as such consider themselves to be in moral relations with one another. What else can it mean that they have foreign secretaries, and employ an extensive diplomatic service which does a continuous business; that they have been increasingly taking common action for the control of disease or the management of postal and telegraphic communication; that they have been more and more concluding such peace treaties as exist, for instance, between England and the United States?[204]

The present war even is proving that the nations of the world are closely interrelated. The struggle is world-wide, and it could not have assumed such tremendous proportions were not every part of the world in close touch with all the rest. And it is significant that the contestants are alliances. Lippman well remarks: “The process of fusion has gone so far that war itself has ceased to be a national enterprise.”[205] The existence of alliance is portentous of the relations of the future. It will do something towards creating a feeling of sympathy between the citizens of the allied countries, and it will show that the nations can work together. And if they can coöperate in war, it ought to be fairly easy for them to draw the conclusion that they can act together in peace. Moreover, if the Allies win the present war, the peace that will result will be representative of the interests of a large group of very different peoples. It is encouraging, too, in the attitude of at least one nation that President Wilson, at the very time when he went to war, declared for a league of nations. We should do well to remind ourselves that one form of patriotism finds its satisfaction in its country as a good neighbor and a servant of humanity.

The observation of moral relations as expressed in the “rules of war” has received a jolt in this present conflict. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the morality of nations is smashed. The essential moral temper of the world is shown by the horror that has been manifested at the atrocities that have been committed. And, moreover, every belligerent nation has been eager to justify itself before the world. That in itself is an indication that a world sentiment has been formed on the conduct of nations in the declaring and waging of war. A century ago militarists did not need to bother themselves much about the world’s opinion. The moral relationships of states in war is further illustrated by the fact that we even hear what is officially announced in the war bulletins of our enemies, and that we send word to them upon questions in which they still have a common interest with ourselves.[206] In view of all these facts it may well be asked what forces are doing any better in the direction of a broader integration of mankind than the several countries and the patriotic citizens of those countries.

The fact of the business is that patriotism is a stage in the growth of loyalty. States and nations are steps in the process of world integration. After families, tribes, city-states, and all the rest, have come nations. Nations must have the loyalty of mankind because they are the largest peace units so far attained, and because they will be the foundations of larger peace units. The next step in the organization of the race seems to be that of internationalism. And the logic of history seems to indicate that international government will come. The tendency of societal organization has been toward larger and larger wholes. “The tendency to the enlargement of the social unit has been going on with certain temporary relapses throughout human history. Though repeatedly checked by the instability of the larger units, it has always resumed its activity, so that it should probably be regarded as a fundamental biological drift the existence of which is a factor which must always be taken into account in dealing with the structure of human society.”[207] The process of enlargement is still carrying on. States and nations have actually grown very close together, and are increasingly establishing official relations between themselves. And the temper of the patriotic spirit has become such that on the whole it will not only welcome but further international government. In this character patriotism shows itself to be a force making not only for the salvation of the one country but of mankind. This is at once its justification and an indication of what there is in it that the morally good man ought to approve and support. If the fundamental justification of patriotism is that it strengthens the principle of coöperation among men and makes for peace, then its continued vindication will be in its further support and extension of the primary principle for which it stands. There is good reason why its relations to war and internationalism are crucial problems of patriotism. The fundamental good of the nation is that it is a peace unit, and if patriotism comes to the place where it stands for war more than for peace, and is in the way of larger groupings of men, it will have defeated itself. The higher patriotism is that which looks toward internationalism.

The practical ethical problem in patriotism is that of separating the good from the evil, and of preserving the former while allowing the latter to fall into disuse. It is fairly certain that nationalism and patriotism could not be destroyed even if one thought that such was the best thing to do. Some form of an organization of men based upon the geographical principle is with us to stay in at least the predictable future. And countries will not consent to extinction. Patriotism is the will to national individuality, and patriots will insist upon that individuality. In view of these facts, it seems that our salvation does not lie in breaking up the units that already exist, but in securing a larger measure of coöperation between them. And it is all the more sure that we should proceed in that way for the reason that patriotism secures things of great value in the world. If we destroyed it, we should lose the good along with the evil. This can be illustrated. Patriotism in one way is national pride. And pride often causes trouble. But on the other hand, it often causes good. It may be said of national pride along with Zimmerman: “Virtues and vices are often put in motion by the same spring. It is the philosopher’s part to make known these springs, and the legislator to profit by them. Pride is the gem of so many talents and apparent virtues, that to destroy it is wrong, it should only be turned to good.

If patriotism were destroyed, it is likely that we should be forced to recreate it.

The literature on the subject of the details of reconstruction after the war proposes two main lines of approach. Some writers place the greatest stress upon the readjustment of the arrangements of national and international government. For instance, this school emphasizes the need for the international control of backward countries and the main highways upon the seas. Lippmann says, “... the supreme task of world politics is not the prevention of war, but a satisfactory organization of mankind. Peace will follow that.”[209] The idea seems to be that if the causes of friction are effectively removed, trouble will not arise. Another school of writers places its reliance upon broadening the vision of men. Powers represents this method of approach. He says, “The chief remedy—perhaps we may say the only remedy—for ills that flesh is heir to, is to be found in the increased intelligence and forbearance of men.”[210] These methods will have to be used in conjunction with each other. It is not safe in the near future to trust entirely to human nature as long as irritating causes of friction remain, and by removing the causes of friction we may allow the belligerent type of patriotism to fall into disuse. But neither will any merely external arrangements provide security so long as human nature finds its glory in a chauvinistic patriotism. Patriotism is the will to national individuality. It is a major task of mankind to see that that will is intellectualized and ethicized.