To speak now of the commerce of Attica, the most extensive and important in the ancient world. It is an error shared by persons in other respects above the vulgar, that a commercial people is necessarily sordid; and hence Napoleon considered it opprobrious to the English, that they are a nation, as he expressed it, of shopkeepers. There are some lessons in the science of human nature that Napoleon had not learned, among which this is one,—that the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of mankind have risen and flourished in trading communities, and been themselves in many instances engaged in commerce. No country in the modern world has produced men of more chivalrous honour or heroic disinterestedness than England; and in antiquity the Athenians, as a community and as individuals, far outshone in wisdom, high-mindedness, and patriotism, every other people with whom we could compare them. In one word, they were the English of antiquity;—bold, adventurous, indefatigable people, equally renowned in trade, philosophy, and war. That they were less fortunate may be accounted for from their geographical position, lacking the inestimable advantage which we enjoy in being seated on an island,—a misfortune well understood by Pericles, who alludes to it in his first oration for the war.^[1570]

No country, however fertile, produces all that its inhabitants, when advancing in civilisation, require, which tends more than any other circumstance to promote the amelioration of society; and Attica, from its comparative barrenness and very limited extent, peculiarly experienced the necessity of foreign commerce. To this accordingly the Athenians from a very early period applied themselves, and with so much success, that whatever commodities the ancient world produced were generally to be found in the greatest abundance in their city.^[1571] They enjoyed as has been already observed, most of the advantages of insular position, that is,^[1572] excellent harbours conveniently situated, in which they received supplies during all winds,^[1573] and, in addition to these, some of the compensating advantages of being situated on the continent, in facilities for inland traffic. Chief of all, however, were the blessings flowing from the wisdom, and moderation, and liberality, of its government, which rendered Athens the resort of all the enterprising and enlightened men of every other country. Its dealings with foreigners were facilitated by the purity of the coin, as the traders who did not choose to purchase merchandise might take bullion, which, as Xenophon expresses it, was a very handsome article, and of so little alloy as everywhere to pass for more than its nominal value, like the old Spanish dollars, and English gold currency in the East.^[1574] Prohibitions to export money, as Bœckh observes, were unknown in ancient times, and are only compatible with bills of exchange.^[1575]

Though war to a certain extent interfered with Athenian commerce, yet, being masters of the sea, they could generally command a plentiful supply of foreign commodities, so that many articles regarded as rare in other countries might be found abundantly in the warehouses of the Peiræeus. “Hither, on account of the richness of our city,” says Pericles, “are borne the products of all lands, so that we are not more familiar with the use of wheat grown in Attica than with the productions of other countries.”^[1576] So Isocrates: “the Peiræeus, has been established as an emporium in the heart of Greece, and so far excels all its rivals, that articles with difficulty met with singly in other ports may be readily found here altogether.”^[1577] And true it is, that every region of the east and island of the Mediterranean poured their productions into Attica, whence they were distributed throughout Greece. Thither were brought the magnificent carpets and fine wool of Persia, Phrygia, and Miletos; the gloves and purple of Tyre and Sidon; the fine linen of Egypt;^[1578] the gold and ivory of Africa; the pearls of India and the Red Sea;^[1579] white and black slaves, and corn, and timber, and spices, and costly wines, and perfumes from Spain, Sicily, Italy, Cypros, Lydia, the Black Sea, and the farthest regions of the east.^[1580]

This extended commerce, and the encouragement which strangers of all countries found to settle at Athens, rendered it the home of all languages and religions,^[1581] and led to the adoption of many barbarous words. But she thus created a boundless market for her own exports, whether consisting of manufactures or the surplus produce of the soil; and as we now retail to the Continental nations many productions of Eastern Asia, so the Athenians disposed, in the uncommercial countries around, of the commodities they had elsewhere collected. For example, they found a vent among the nations on the Black Sea for the wines of the islands and shores of the Ægean, Peparethos, Cos, Thasos, Mendè, Skionè, Lemnos, and Crete.^[1582] From a passage in Xenophon, it would appear either that Greek sailors amused themselves by reading on their voyages, or that books were exported to Pontos, for there seems to be no foundation for the suspicions that they were blank books.^[1583] “Here,” says Xenophon, speaking of the coast of Thrace, “are found numerous beds, cabinets, books, and such other things as shipmasters are accustomed to transport in chests.”^[1584] Theopompos represents the Persians as carrying books (χάρται βιβλίων) along with them in their invasion of Egypt, and the Greeks could have been scarcely less literary.^[1585] Certain, at all events, it is, that there was a book-market at Athens, probably resembling the bazars of the East, where the dealers in manuscripts kept their shops;^[1586] and thence, in all likelihood, the Greek cities on the Black Sea were supplied; and this is by no means inconsistent with the proverb respecting Hermodoros, Plato’s Sicilian publisher, who was said, contemptuously, to traffic in words; for, as he himself was one of Plato’s hearers, it may have been thought beneath him to turn trader.^[1587] Somewhat later we read of Zeno, a stranger in the city, going into a bookseller’s shop to sit down, where he finds the owner reading Xenophon, and is recommended by him to follow Crates.^[1588]

So extensive a trade as Athens carried on could not be conducted without protecting regulations, and the co-operation of a commercial police. Accordingly the government exhibited much wisdom and liberality in whatever related to commerce, by all means seeking to encourage enterprise and industry. Numerous officers were appointed to watch over the commercial dealings of the citizens; such as the superintendents of the harbour, ten persons appointed annually by lot; the overseers of the market, likewise ten, of whom five superintended the markets in the city, the other five, those in the Peiræeus; fifteen inspectors of weights and measures, ten of whom attended in the city, the other five those in the port; and subordinate, probably, to these were the public meters, who seem to have been Scythians, and therefore slaves of the state: their duty was to measure whatever grain was sold in the market,^[1589] for which was paid a small sum, applied, it may be supposed, to the augmentation of the revenue. Great care, in fact, was bestowed on the subject of weights and measures, and to the market regulations generally; and yet we find from the comic poets^[1590] that much fraud was occasionally committed.^[1591]

It is, by some writers, supposed that credit was at a low ebb in Greece; but this notion seems to have been formed hastily, without allowing for circumstances, as the condition of the times sufficiently accounts for the facts which suggested it; for all large and established houses are known to have possessed almost unlimited credit, since they were able, on the mere security of their name, to raise whatever money they needed; so that none, probably, but persons little known, or not known advantageously, were required to give security.^[1592] The inhabitants of certain cities, as, for example, of Phaselis, enjoyed, as we say, a bad reputation,^[1593] and were, no doubt, among those whom people refused to trust.

If severity, however, in the laws of debtor and creditor have any tendency to support credit, the confiding portion of the community had little reason to complain at Athens, since the spirit of this branch of Athenian jurisprudence was unusually stern. The man who obtained the loan of money and fraudulently withheld his security, was deemed to have committed a capital offence, nor could his high rank or honourable connexions skreen him from punishment.^[1594] For it was considered, observes the orator, that an offender of this description not only defrauded the individuals with whom he dealt, but also made an attempt against the sources of public prosperity, commercial operations depending not on the borrower but on the lender, without whose coöperation no ship, or captain, or passenger, can move. On which account the most effective protection was afforded them by law.

Merchants and sea-captains were also defended by very severe enactments against false accusers, who, upon conviction, were heavily fined, and, in default of payment, deprived of the rights of citizenship.^[1595] Causes of this kind were tried in the Commercial Court of the Nautodikæ, which was also empowered to examine the claims of citizens accused of foreign extraction.^[1596] The causes were introduced by the Thesmothetæ, and in lawsuits between citizens of different nations, by virtue of a particular agreement, there existed an appeal from one state to the other.^[1597] Nothing more clearly shows the consideration in which nautical and mercantile affairs were held at Athens, than the laws which regulated the proceedings of this court: in the first place, not to interrupt the course of business and occasion loss to individuals, the Nautodikæ sat during the winter months, from September till March, when navigation was usually suspended. At first, indeed, they did not commence their sittings till January;^[1598] but this was found inconvenient, the decision of the court being frequently delayed till late in the spring or summer, to the great loss and detriment of the litigants. Consequences still more disastrous, perhaps, ensued when the cause stood over till the ensuing winter, when, as new judges would be appointed, the whole business had to be commenced de novo. To remedy this evil a plan of reform was conceived by Xenophon,^[1599] but with nothing like a statesman’s views, its chief merit consisting in proposing a prize to be awarded to the most able and expeditious judge. His scheme, however, may have had the merit of fixing the attention of wiser men upon the subject, which at length produced the monthly suits to which belonged all causes concerning trade-clubs, dowries, and mines.^[1600] Upon the introduction of this improvement in the practice of the commercial court the advantage proposed by Xenophon was fully obtained, since causes could not, as some have imagined, stand over from month to month, but must absolutely be decided within the term.^[1601] The more completely to protect and advance the interests of commerce, each state had its consul^[1602] (προξένος) who represented the interests of his country, and, like our own consuls in the Levant, was bound to receive and entertain such citizens as arrived at the port where he resided. Besides, when a merchant or trader died abroad, it was part of the consul’s duty to take charge of his property, and transmit immediately to his friends an account of what had taken place, with the necessary particulars.^[1603] Occasionally, however, very improper persons obtained this respectable and, no doubt, lucrative situation, as the man Lycidas, formerly one of Chabrias’s slaves, who contrived, by intrigue, to be appointed consul of Messina; and Dionysios, a man of like origin and character, and by birth a Megarean, who enjoyed the honour of representing Athens at Megara.^[1604]

It has been made a question, whether or not perfect freedom of trade existed among the ancients, and upon the whole it appears, that among the Athenians, at least, no unwise or vexatious interference habitually took place.^[1605]

Bœckh remarks that, in the plan of Xenophon for restoring the revenue, no allusion is made to the removal of onerous restrictions on trade; from which it may be inferred that none such existed. Heeren^[1606] is clearly of this opinion: “nothing was known of the balance of trade, and consequently all the violent measures resulting from it were never devised by the Greeks. They had duties as well as the moderns; but these duties were exacted only for the sake of increasing the public revenue, not to direct the efforts of domestic industry by the prohibition of certain wares. There was no prohibition of the exportation of the raw produce; no encouragement of manufactures at the expense of the agriculturist. In this respect, therefore, there existed a freedom of industry, commerce, and trade. And such was the general custom. As every thing was decided by circumstances, and not by theories, there may have been single exceptions, and perhaps single examples, where the state for a season usurped a monopoly. But how far was this from the mercantile and restrictive system of the moderns!”

This it appears to me is the philosophical view of the matter, which is not modified materially by the remarks of Bœckh. No doubt the interests of the state were regarded as paramount, comprehending, as in just states they do, the interests of all individuals; but for this very reason they would, to the best of their knowledge, beware of interfering capriciously or unnecessarily with private interests, since a prosperous community cannot be constituted of unprosperous members. Mr. Bœckh seems, with all his learning and acuteness, to misapprehend the political theory of the ancients, and to imagine that, because the right of governments to regulate the actions of individuals was recognized, they might safely do so on all occasions without rhyme or reason. But in this he is certainly in error. The object of government was understood then as well as it is now; so that I am apt to think that the erudite professor advances, in the following passage, a doctrine which would have met with but a cold reception among the Athenians, though adopted literally by the historians of the Doric race: “Not in Crete and Lacedæmon alone, two states completely closed up, and from their position unsusceptible of free trade, but generally throughout the whole of Greece, and even under the free and republican government of Athens, the poorest as well as the richest citizen was convinced that the state had the right of claiming the whole property of every individual; any restriction in the transfer of this property, regulated according to circumstances, was looked upon as just, nor could it properly be considered an infringement of justice before the security of person and property was held to be the sole object of government; a light under which it never was viewed by any of the ancients.”^[1607]

It would be difficult to select from any writer, ancient or modern, a passage more abounding than this with erroneous conclusions. Neither Lacedæmon nor Crete was excluded by its position from the advantages of free trade; and at Athens there was no citizen, however poor or ignorant, who acknowledged in the state any such right as Mr. Bœckh speaks of, except for the purpose of providing for the general safety, in which case it would be as cheerfully acknowledged in every modern community. While penning the concluding sentence, Mr. Bœckh must have been thinking of the despotic governments of Germany. An Englishman considers the preservation of his political rights as much an object of government as the protection of his person or his property, and would as strenuously contend for it, in which feeling he resembles the Athenian. But I will not permit even this theme to tempt me from the matter in hand.

There can be no difficulty in admitting that, as the very existence of commerce, properly so called, depends on the existence of political communities, the state has a right to interfere, under certain circumstances, with the movements of commerce. For example, merchants may justly be prevented by the laws from furnishing their country’s enemy with arms, with ammunition, with provisions, in short, with any article whatsoever, which, by strengthening the hands of the foe, may tend to the detriment of their own community. Again, in famines and scarcities, the law of self-preservation authorizes states to restrain the exportation of articles absolutely required for home consumption; because distress produces discontent and tumult and insurrection, and may thus endanger the very existence of the government itself. Prohibitions to export, originating in such motives, are perfectly defensible. But so much can scarcely be said for monopolies, which were not unknown to the Greeks, though it is not denied that they were of short duration.^[1608] “It can, however, be safely asserted,” says Mr. Bœckh, “that no republic ever demanded of its citizens that they should furnish commodities to the state in specific quantities, and at prices arbitrarily fixed at a low rate, with a view to secure to itself a monopoly: such a demand could only have been enforced in countries under the government of a tyrant.”^[1609] The folly, as well as the wickedness, of such despotic interference, I witnessed in the depopulation and misery of Egypt, which at length proceeded so far as to alarm the Pasha himself, and produce some amelioration of his vicious system.

It is, no doubt, possible, that many monopolies of which we know nothing may have existed in antiquity;^[1610] but it will be quite evident that, upon such possibility, it would be useless to reason. The monopolies which we know to have existed were few, and of short duration. Aristotle, while observing what advantages both individuals and states sometimes derived from them, attributes a better policy to Athens. He gives two or three examples of private monopolies, the well-known story of Thales and the oil-presses, and that of a man who bought up all the iron^[1611] at Syracuse, and adds, that, in great pecuniary straits, governments were sometimes found to imitate them.^[1612] Thus, at a late period of their history, the Athenians are supposed to have monopolised the lead obtained from the silver mines of Laureion, which they did, we are told, at the instigation of Pythoclos; that is, they bought it up at the usual price of two drachmas the commercial talent, and sold it at six drachmas.^[1613] At Rome the price was higher. As there can be little doubt that the lead was for exportation, no injury was inflicted on individuals. With respect to the monopoly granted by the Byzantines to a banker, it may be observed, that it was only one of the many shifts to which the nakedness of their treasury compelled them to have recourse. The list is given in the second book of the Economics, and is not without interest. I would not affirm that their contrivances were innocent.^[1614] Again, the Selymbrians, in a period of public difficulty, constituted themselves monopolists in a manner which Mr. Bœckh might fearlessly have pronounced “less defensible.” By law they were not permitted to export in times of scarcity; but being in want of money, they decreed that the state should purchase all the old stock at a fixed price, leaving individuals sufficient for their yearly consumption, after which they sold the surplus at a higher price, with permission to export.^[1615]

It is difficult to say what men will agree to consider “perfect freedom of trade;” but it appears to me, that commerce was as unshackled at Athens as it could have been consistently with the welfare of the community. Mr. Bœckh says, “There are abundant proofs that exportation and importation were regulated according to the exigencies and interests of the community, which is by no means consistent with the perfect freedom of trade.”^[1616] There appears to lurk a fallacy in this. Such freedom as this writer would call perfect is inconsistent with the very existence of civil society, whose fundamental laws require that no man’s freedom shall trench upon the freedom, and still less upon the life, of another. But if in commerce the exigencies and interests of the community could have been set at nought, there would have been an end of such community, since frequently its well-being, if not its being, depended on its commercial relations with foreign states.

So far, therefore, it must, doubtless, be admitted, that commerce was not free. To this extent, and no further, does Aristotle counsel or contemplate interferences with trade: “With regard to importation and exportation,” he says, “it is necessary to know how large a supply of provisions the state requires, and what proportion of them can be produced in the country and what imported, and what imports and exports are necessary for the state, in order that commercial treaties and agreements may be concluded with those of whom the state must make use for this purpose.”^[1617]

With regard to the prohibition to export attributed to Solon, it is necessary either to abandon the subject altogether, or to understand it in the contrary sense to that usually given. Plutarch, as his text now stands, tells a very strange story, observing, that the exportation of every thing but oil was prohibited by Solon, and therefore he adds, it is not wholly improbable that figs also were prohibited.^[1618] I understand the matter differently. Solon, probably observing that Attica, at that time, produced barely sufficient oil for its own consumption, prohibited its exportation, though as agriculture improved, the law fell into desuetude, and oil became a principal export. From this example, Plutarch thinks it not improbable, that figs also may at some time or another have been prohibited. The matter is thus clear and natural. Besides, the Scholiast on Pindar, alluding no doubt to some particular period, observes, that the exportation of oil was not permitted.^[1619] It is therefore surprising that Bœckh should have laid any stress at all on so contradictory a passage, without endeavouring to restore it, particularly as Solon was himself a merchant and a transgressor of his supposed law. That the exportation of corn should not have been allowed is both intelligible and reasonable, as Attica never produced sufficient for its own consumption; and they were not disposed to adopt the system of the modern Tuscans, who would sell their own corn to the English, and subsist on an inferior sort from the Black Sea, if indeed it be inferior.^[1620]

Certain commodities were, however, undoubtedly not allowed to be exported, as for example, timber, tar, wax, rigging, and “leathern bottles, articles which,” as Bœckh observes, “were particularly important for the building and equipment of the fleet.”^[1621] But the word which this distinguished scholar conceives to mean “leathern bottles,” had a very different signification, and meant that leathern defence through which the oars passed, and which was designed to keep the sea from rushing in at the row-port. This we gather as well from the scholiast on Aristophanes,^[1622] as from several passages of Pollux overlooked by Bœckh. This writer observes, that the leathern defence of the row-port was called ἄσκωμα,^[1623] and elsewhere he says that a woman’s breast, when full of milk, was also so called;^[1624] from which we may conjecture what form the askoma assumed, when the oar forced it outwards during the act of rowing. Nor do I suppose that such prohibition existed only during time of war, for it would have been equally imprudent to furnish such articles to men preparing for war, as men always are in peace, as to such as were actually engaged in it. From a passage in Theophrastus, it has been inferred that permission to export timber for ship-building was sometimes granted free of duty to individuals; but as it is the Boaster who makes the assertion, adding that, to avoid envy, he never made use of it,^[1625] it may be regarded as no less a joke than the reason for prohibiting lamp-wicks from Bœotia, viz., that they might set the fleet on fire!^[1626]

The prohibition to export arms during war to the country of the enemy, and that under pain of death,^[1627] was an obvious measure of self-defence. In time of peace, however, the trade in arms was as free as any other trade; and the Athenians imported from their neighbours, the Bœotians, helmets,^[1628] in the manufacture of which this people excelled. No doubt, as states derive the sinews of war, in part at least, from commerce, the Athenians had the sagacity to attack their enemies in the vulnerable point of their pride, for the purpose of bringing them the sooner to reason. They thus, too, taught the inferior states, such as Megara and Bœotia, that Athens was independent of them in all respects, while it was for them to consider whether they were equally independent of her.^[1629] Thus the Ocean Queen of antiquity was said to exercise (as Great Britain formerly) a despotic sway over trade; as when, for example, she exacted a tenth from all ships sailing to or from the Black Sea;^[1630] though in this, as in all human affairs, the despotism^[1631] arose naturally from the possession of superior power, and could scarcely have been guarded against. To weaken the enemy by every possible means was the object of a wise policy; so that in contemplating every coast belonging to a power not in alliance with Athens as in a state of blockade,^[1632]—in seizing, capturing, or detaining, all vessels of every description by which her interests could be infringed, Athens only acted in self-defence. That she was hated for her superiority we need not be surprised, who know with what heart-burnings and secret aversion our own maritime supremacy has ever been beheld by the nations of the Continent, who repeat against us all the accusations anciently muttered by the surrounding states against Athens.

Utopian speculators, reading history in their easy chairs, find it facile to condemn the measures of ancient statesmen. But allowing them to have been reprehensible, it remains to be seen whether, in the same circumstances, we could have carried any better into execution; for the ability to imagine better is nothing, unless we suppose that events always allow men to act up to their knowledge. However this may be, the Athenian government found itself compelled by its position sometimes to interfere with the course of trade; but it may well be doubted whether any other freedom of trade than there existed be either possible or desirable. For, both commerce, and every other mode in which the energies of a nation can develope themselves, should no otherwise exist than as they are beneficial to the nation at large; and of this the managers of public business ought always to be better judges than merchants or speculators, who only consider their own interests, which may not always be identical with those of the state. I am far, however, from designing to maintain that the commercial regulations of Athens were in no case oppressive. Perhaps in the matter of the corn-trade they were so; and yet much may be said for a populous city surrounded by a barren country, and therefore solicitous about its own subsistence. Let us examine those regulations. According to the letter of the law, which was often transgressed, no inhabitant of Athens could land a cargo of corn anywhere but on the Peiræeus; but, arrived there, and the necessities of the state provided for, the remainder could be disposed of elsewhere. This was the full amount of the grievance, if it ought to be so called.

With respect to the law which is supposed to have restrained capitalists from lending money on any vessel not returning to Athens with corn or other commodities, it would be highly unreasonable, with Mr. Bœckh, to denominate it “excessively oppressive,” until we understand it.^[1633] For my own part, until something better be proposed, I must adopt the interpretation of Salmasius, that it was not permitted to lend money for the purpose of buying corn in other countries except upon the condition, that that corn should be imported into Athens.^[1634] There no doubt are difficulties attending this view of the matter; but this is equally the case in whichever way we understand it. It may have been that, in order to render Athens as far as possible the emporium of the world, the law required that money should not be lent to merchants or supercargoes, unless it was their intention to return thither with a lading, whether of corn or some other commodity. But even this seems very doubtful.

But, by whatever laws this branch of trade was regulated, no doubt can exist as to its extent and importance. For, as the population of Attica had, at a very early period, outgrown the means of subsistence supplied by the country itself, the republic found itself constrained to depend for the primary article of food upon the productions of foreign states, to the amount of nearly one-third of its whole consumption; that is to say, while there were grown at home two hundred and ninety-two thousand three hundred and ninety-two quarters, as may be proved by calculation,^[1635] there were imported a hundred and eighteen thousand quarters in the age of Demosthenes. Earlier its importation of corn was still more considerable, when the greater part of the supply was obtained from Eubœa, by the way of Oropos and the pass of Deceleia.^[1636]

Of the hundred and eighteen thousand quarters abovementioned, about sixty thousand were obtained from the countries on the Black Sea, chiefly from Theodosia, now Kaffa,^[1637] in the Crimea, the remainder from Thrace, the islands of the Ægæan, Egypt, and Sicily.^[1638]

Yet the people of Athens were subject to few scarcities; and those they experienced happened in later times, when their enemies had acquired the superiority at sea. For so long as this state attended to her own navy and maintained her maritime supremacy, there was never, I believe, a deficiency of the grain in Peiræeus,^[1639] though attempts were frequently made by the corn-dealers to create a monopoly and extort famine prices from the public,^[1640] for which they were sometimes punished with death. Numerous proofs of the ease with which Athens could provision herself, occurred during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and the age immediately succeeding. Thus, when the Spartans, with their king Agis, were in possession of the pass of Deceleia, and ravaged habitually the whole territory of Attica, they felt that even the occupation of that important post was scarcely of any avail to them so long as Athens remained mistress of the sea, since they daily saw numbers of corn ships from all parts of the Levant, sailing into the Peiræeus.^[1641] Afterwards, when the Spartans had begun to apply themselves to naval affairs, one of their first endeavours was to distress Attica, by attacking her corn ships, as on the occasion when Pollis sought to capture the transports in the neighbourhood of Geræstos, which however were relieved by the fleet under Chabrias.^[1642]

No inconvenience was ever experienced from the reluctance of the corn-growing states to export their produce. On the contrary, the petty kings of the countries on the Euxine were so anxious to secure to themselves the custom of Athens, that they conferred on that state numerous privileges and made her great presents, in order to tempt her corn ships into their harbours and prevent the application to rival states. It may indeed be said, that peace was scarcely ever interrupted between Athens and the exporting countries, and that not through the Athenians truckling to them to obtain their corn, but through their truckling to the Athenians to be allowed to supply them. Thus, as far as the experience of antiquity can be relied on, it must be concluded, that the country which purchases agricultural produce invariably exercises a paramount influence over the countries which supply it. It is in fact a rule all the world over, that it is the customer who coerces the dealer, not the dealer who influences the customer.

But, further, this immense importation of grain did not throw any of the lands of Attica, however poor and barren, out of cultivation.^[1643] On the contrary, the powers of the soil were still taxed to the utmost, and the processes of agriculture carried to a much higher degree of perfection than in any other part of Greece.^[1644] In fact, with its vineyards, the whole of Attica resembled a continued garden up to the very walls of the city.^[1645] From which, as well as from positive testimony, it appears evident, that the Athenians always retained their partiality for rural labours,^[1646] notwithstanding the extent to which the manufacturing system was carried among them. The cultivation of the soil has, indeed, so many charms for mankind, that they will never desert it so long as it is able to provide for their wants. Men become manufacturers only when they can no longer live by agriculture.