[1623] Cic. Rep. ii. 35. 60; Gell. xi. 1. 2 f.; Fest. 202. 11; 237. 13; ep. 144; cf. p. 233 above. Dionysius, x. 50. 1 f., wrongly gives two cattle and thirty sheep as the maximum.
[1624] X. 50. 1 f.
[1625] With less probability Lange, Röm. Alt. i. 620; ii. 576 f., regards it as a concession to the plebs to satisfy their craving for the limitation of the consular power by written law.
[1626] Livy ii. 43. 3; 44. 6; Dion. Hal. viii. 87. 4; ix. 5. 1; 18. 1; x. 26. 4; Dio Cass. Frag. 22. 3; Zon. vii. 17. 7.
[1627] Livy iii. 11. 1.
[1628] Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 297.
[1629] The veto of governmental acts, assigned them for the pre-decemviral period by the historians (cf. Livy ii. 44), is therefore an anachronism. The very fact mentioned by Livy, in the chapter here cited, of the patrician attempt to win as many tribunes as possible points to obstruction rather than to the veto as their weapon. The increase in the number of tribunes from two to ten indicates the same condition.
[1630] Cf. Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 157.
[1631] Cf. Livy ii. 42. 6; 43. 3; 44. 1; 48. 2 f.; 52. 2 f.; 54. 2; Dion. Hal. viii. 87. 4 f.; ix. 5. 1; 37. 1 f.
[1632] Livy ii. 56. 2: “Rogationem tulit ad populum, ut plebei magistratus tributis comitiis fierent.”
[1633] The senate gave its consent; Livy ii. 57; Dion. Hal. ix. 49. 3 f.
[1634] Livy ii. 56. 3: “Haud parva res sub titulo prima specie minime atroci ferebatur, sed quae patriciis omnem potestatem per clientium suffragia creandi quos vellent tribunos auferret”; cf. Dion. Hal. ix. 41. 5.
[1635] That the ancients had this conception of the curiate assembly which elected tribunes cannot be doubted; p. 24, 32; cf. Mommsen, Röm. Forsch. ii. 283, n. 1.
[1636] P. 54, 60 f.
[1637] IX. 49. 5; cf. 41. 3. Patrician magistrates auspicated their comitia, plebeian magistrates did not; p. 104.
[1638] VII. 17. 6: Καί τινες τῶν δημάρχων ἄλλα τε κατὰ τῶν εὐπατριδῶν συνέγραψαν, καὶ τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ πλήθει καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ συνιέναι καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων βουλεύεσθαι καὶ χρηματίσαι πάνθ’ ὅσα ἂν ἐθελήσῃ; cf. Livy ii. 60. 4 f.
[1639] Livy ii. 56. 11 f.
[1640] Livy iii. 11. 4; vi. 35. 7; Dion. Hal. x. 3. 5; ch. 4; 40. 3 f.; 41.
[1641] P. 300 f.
[1642] IX. 43. 4.
[1643] Dion. Hal. ix. 49. 5; Livy ii. 56. 2; Dio Cass. xxxix. 32. 3; Suet. Caes. 76; cf. Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 799, n. 2.
[1644] Diod. xi. 68. 8: Ἐν τῇ Ῥῶμῃ τότε πρώτως κατεστάθησαν δήμαρχοι τέτταρες, Γάιος Σικίνιος καὶ Λεύκιος Νεμετώριος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Μάρκος Δουίλλιος καὶ Σπόριος Ἀκίλιος. Livy, ii. 58. 1, following Piso, supposes that the number was now increased from two to five. Dio Cassius probably placed the increase from five to ten at this date; Zon. vii. 15. 1; 17. 6; Dio Cass. Frag. 22. 1. In the opinion of Meyer, in Hermes, xxx (1895). 1-24; Gesch. d. Alt. v. 141 f., the plebeian tribunate was instituted at this time and the original number was four; cf. p. 55, n. 1 above. But Diodorus does not say so; indeed his grouping of the four tribunes in pairs suggests a doubling—a fact which he has perhaps condensed from his source.
[1645] It has been shown above (119 ff., 126 ff.) that the assembly of tribes under tribunician presidency is rightly so designated.
[1646] Livy ii. 61. 1; 63. 2; iii. 1. 2 f.; Dion. Hal. ix. 51 f.
[1647] Livy iii. 31. 5 f. (454); Dion. Hal. x. 34 f., 42, 48; Pliny, N. H. vii. 28. 101.
[1648] Livy iii. 10; 25. 9; 30. 5; Dion. Hal. x. 15. 3; 20. 4; 26. 4; Dio Cass. Frag. 21.
[1649] Livy iii. 30. 5; Dion. Hal. x. 30. 6 (457). The object, as stated by Livy, was increased protection for the commons. Any enlargement of the number after they had acquired the veto would have been a positive disadvantage; Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 161; cf. above p. 270, n. 2. The change was made with the consent of the senate, doubtless through a centuriate law.
[1650] P. 233, 265, n. 1 (3).
[1651] P. 265, n. 1 (3).
[1652] Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 170.
[1653] Livy. ii. 9. 6. Even if these acts are not historical, there can be no doubt that the senate had the power which they imply.
[1654] Cf. Livy ii. 15. 1 f.
[1655] Livy ii. 3. 5; 5. 1.
[1656] Cf. Livy iii. 70. 14.
[1657] Livy ii. 36. 1; 37. 1.
[1658] Livy ii. 37. 8.
[1659] Cf. Livy iii. 21. 1 f.
[1660] Livy iii. 4. 9 (464). As long as the dictatorship was in use (till near the end of the third century B.C.) there was no need of resorting to this measure, although it cannot be doubted that the senate had the right.
[1661] Cf. Livy iii. 11. 1.
[1662] Livy iii. 11. 4; 14. 5; 16. 6; 17. 4; Dion. Hal. x. 3. 3 f.; 4. 2.
[1663] Livy iii. 33. 4; Dion. Hal. x. 55. 3; p. 233 above.
[1664] Cf. Livy ii. 58. 1; iii. 24. 9; 30. 6.
[1665] Cf. p. 264 ff.
[1666] P. 234.
[1667] Livy. iii. 55. 7; cf. p. 264.
[1668] Ibid. § 6 f.
[1669] Livy iii. 55. 8 ff.; cf. Cic. Balb. 14. 33; Tull. 20. 47; Appian, B. C. ii. 108. 453; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 303 with notes.
[1670] Plut. Ti. Gracch. 15.
[1671] Livy iii. 55. 3: “Cum velut in controverso iure esset, tenerenturne patres plebi scitis, legem centuriatis comitiis tulere, ut quod tributim plebis iussisset, populum teneret, qua lege tribuniciis rogationibus telum acerrimum datum est”; cf. 67. 9; Dion. Hal. xi. 45. 1.
[1672] On the tribunician legislation of the period 449-339, see p. 292 ff.
[1673] P. 271.
[1674] XI. 45. 3: Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς φυλετικαῖς ἐκκλησίαις οἱ δημοτικοὶ καὶ πένητες ἐκράτουν τῶν πατρικίων.
[1675] VI. 35. 7: “Qui (patres) ubi tribus ad suffragium ineundum citari a Licinio Sextioque viderunt, stipati patrum praesidiis nec recitari rogationes nec sollemne quidquam aliud ad sciscendum plebi fieri passi sunt.” When the tribes were again called for voting, the dictator, accompanied by a crowd of patricians, took a seat in the assembly and supported the tribunician protest; Livy vi. 38. 5 ff. On another occasion some years earlier the patres old and young came into the Forum, and taking their places in the several tribes, appealed to their tribesmen to vote against the proposal of the tribunes; Livy v. 30. 4 f. Still earlier C. Claudius and other senior patricians spoke in a tribunician assembly against the measure then before the plebs. Soltau’s objection (Berl. Stud. ii. 47) to the interpretation here represented has little weight, as it rests upon the theory that from the beginning everything was carefully defined and regulated by law.
[1676] P. 153, 156 f.
[1677] P. 157, 211.
[1678] P. 211.
[1679] P. 271, n. 3.
[1680] P. 300 f.
[1681] Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 157, regarding the alleged pre-decemviral plebiscites as genuine acts of the plebs, believes that this conditioned validity of such acts was established at some unknown time prior to the decemvirate. The view of Herzog that certain statutes termed plebiscites in the sources were in reality centuriate laws is accepted in this chapter.
[1682] P. 235.
[1683] Livy iii. 55. 15; iv. 6. 3 (Canuleian plebiscite); 12. 8 (for the election of a prefect of the market, 440); 49. 6 (“Temptatum ab L. Sextio tribuno plebis, ut rogationem ferret, qua Bolas quoque sicut Labicos coloni mitterentur, per intercessionem collegarum, qui nullum plebi scitum nisi ex auctoritate senatus passuros se perferri ostenderunt, discussum est,” 415); 51. 2 f. (413); vi. 42. 9 (Licinian-Sextian plebiscite); vii. 15. 12 f. (law against bribery, 356); 27. 3 (347); viii. 23. 11 f. (the plebiscite for prolonging the consular imperium, 327); x. 6. 9 (Ogulnian plebiscite, 300); 21. 9 (plebiscite ordering the praetor to appoint triumviri for conducting colonies, 296). Cf. also Dion. Hal. x. 26. 4 f. (457); 30. 1; 48. 1 (454); 50. 3; xi. 54. 4 (444); Mommsen, Röm. Forsch. i. 208 ff. All the citations from Dionysius, excepting the last, refer to pre-decemviral time, and hence are anticipations of a later condition.
The first triumph by order of the people, without the consent of the senate, according to Livy iii. 63. 11 (cf. Dion. Hal. xi. 50. 1), took place in 449. It is to be noticed, however, that a magistrate always had a right to triumph without permission either of the senate or of the people (Mommsen, Röm. Forsch. i. 214 f.), provided he paid his own expenses; Polyb. vi. 15. 8; Livy xxxiii. 23. 8. The resolution of the people on this occasion, if historical, may have been a mere pledge of sympathy and confidence; cf. p. 293. But Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 194, doubts its reality.
The “ancient law long ago abolished,” which required the consent of the senate to proposals brought before the people, and which Sulla is said to have renewed (Appian, B. C. i. 59. 266; cf. p. 406), is ordinarily referred, as by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 158; Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 193, to the condition on the validity of the plebiscite under discussion. Appian may have had this restriction in mind, for we know at least that under the constitution as reformed by Sulla the tribunes did propose laws de senatus sententia; CIL. i. 204 (year 71); Bruns, Font. Iur. 94; Girard, Textes, 66; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 154; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 158; Fröhlich, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl. iv. 1559.
[1684] Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 157.
[1685] Lange’s idea (Röm. Alt. ii. 619; cf. i. 611, 614, 642) that there was no statute which made the consent of the senate essential to the validity of the plebiscite does not appear to be well considered. Had the tribunes not been bound by written enactment, they would have felt themselves free to legislate without the senate’s coöperation, and even the law they tried in vain to disregard.
[1686] Livy iii. 55. 13.
[1687] Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 158.
[1688] Diod. xii. 25. 3: Ἐὰν δὲ οἱ δήμαρχοι μὴ συμφωνῶσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κύριοι εἶναι τὸν ἀνὰ μέσον κείμενον μὴ κωλύεσθαι; Livy iv. 48. 10-16 (416); 53. 6; v. 25. 1 (395); vi. 36. 8; 37. 3; 38. 5. The same passages show the dependence of the government upon the tribunes for checking innovations.
[1689] Livy iii. 69. 5 f.; iv. i. 6; 30. 15; 53. 2, 6 (407); 55. 1-5 (406); 60. 5 (403); v. 12. 3, 7 (397); vi. 27. 9 f. (376); 31. 4 (cf. 31. 1 f., year 374); vi. 36. 3 f.; Dion. Hal. xi. 54. 3 (444).
[1690] It is true that Livy (iv. 50. 6, 8; 56. 10-13, year 408; v. 9. 4 ff., year 402; vi. 35. 9) assigns the tribune this right; but on one occasion (vii. 17. 12, year 356) he informs us that such a protest was disregarded by the magistrate. We may suppose that in this period they often attempted the power, but usually without success. They possessed a growing influence in the right to address the people, which must often have added an overwhelming force to their protests; cf. Livy iv. 25. 1 (434); 58. 14 (406); v. 2. 2 ff. (403); ch. 6 (403). This kind of obstruction may be meant by Livy iv. 36. 3 (424); 43. 3 (421); v. 17. 5 (397); vii. 21. 1 ff. (353). The government, on the other hand, continued to use the levy for the obstruction of tribunician bills; Livy iv. 55. 1 (409); v. 11. 9 (401).
[1691] The principal recorded seditions are (1) the revolt against the decemvirate in 449 (Livy iii. 50 ff.); (2) a plebeian secession to the Janiculum in the struggle for the Canuleian law (Florus i. 25); (3) a state of anarchy in 376 (Diod. xv. 61. 1), which, according to Matzat (Röm. Chron. ii. 110), lasted about four months; (4) a state of anarchy in the struggle for the Licinian-Sextian laws (Diod. xv. 75. 1; Livy vi. 35. 10), which, according to Matzat (ibid. ii. 112), continued three years, 376-373; (5) a secession of the plebs to the Janiculum in the struggle which resulted in the Hortensian legislation, 287 (Livy, ep. xi; Dio Cass. Frag. 37; Zon. viii. 2. 1).
[1692] P. 104, 110, 116 f.
[1693] X. 47. 1.
[1694] P. 116 f.
[1695] P. 230.
[1696] Cf. Livy vi. 3. 2 (389); 33. 7 f. (377); vii. 19. 7 (353).
[1697] Livy vi. 14. 1: “Dictator ... minime dubius bellum cum his populis patres iussuros” (385). In 381 the senate decreed that the Tusculans should be punished with war (Livy vi. 25. 5), no mention being made of the people; and the declaration of war against the Latins in 340 appears to have been merely acclaimed by the people who chanced at the time to be in front of the senate-house; Livy viii. 6. 4-8.
[1698] Livy v. 49. 2 (390).
[1699] Livy iv. 58. 1 f.; v. 28. 5 (394); 50. 3 (390); vi. 10. 9 (382); vii. 19. 4 (353); 22. 5 (351); 38. 1 (343); viii. 2. 1 (341); 19. 1-3 (330); x. 11. 13 with 12. 1, 13 (298); 45. 4 (293); p. 302.
[1700] Livy viii. 11 f., 14 (340, 338). It punished for revolt; ibid. viii. 20. 7 (329).
[1701] Livy vi. 26. 8; viii. 11. 16; p. 304.
[1702] P. 273.
[1703] Livy v. 19. 6 (396); cf. iv. 27. 1 (431).
[1704] Livy v. 50 (390).
[1705] Cf. Livy vii. 28. 5 f. (345).
[1706] Livy iv. 59. 11 (406); p. 367. The statement of Diodorus, xiv. 16. 5, that the Romans voted to pay for military service does not necessarily point to an act of the assembly; and the opposition of the tribunes to the measure indicates that at least in Livy’s opinion it was an act of the senate alone.
[1707] Cf. the tributum for the new wall; Livy vi. 32. 1.
[1708] Cf. Livy v. 30. 8 (393); p. 295, 310.
[1709] Livy iv. 11; 47. 6; v. 24. 4; 30. 8; ix. 28. 8 (313); Vell. i. 14. 1; p. 310.
[1710] Livy vi. 4. 5 (389).
[1711] Livy v. 13. 5 (399).
[1712] Livy iv. 30. 9 (428).
[1713] Livy x. 1. 3 (303).
[1714] Livy iv. 46. 10; 56. 8; vi. 11. 10; vii. 6. 12; 21. 9; vii. 3. 4; viii. 17. 3; 29. 9 (325).
[1715] Livy v. 9. 6 (402).
[1716] Livy v. 9; 17. 2 f. (397); 31 f. (392, 391); viii. 3. 4 (341).
[1717] Livy viii. 16. 11; 20. 7; 39. 15 (322).
[1718] P. 277, n. 4.
[1719] Livy vi. 19. 3 (384).
[1720] Livy iii. 54. 5, 9, 11 (449).
[1721] Livy iii. 65. 1 (448). That the coöptation of tribunes was once legal is proved by a formula quoted by Livy iii. 61. 10. That the coöpted tribunes were patrician is now generally disbelieved (cf. Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 195) because it does not accord with the conventional view of a constitution kept in perfect working order from the beginning to the end of Roman history. The irregular is possible and is less likely to be invented.
[1722] Livy iii. 65. 1-4; Diod. xii. 25. 3. Diodorus, who mentions the penalty, connects the law closely in time, as does Livy, with the reëstablishment of the constitution.
[1723] V. 10. 11; 11. 1-3.
[1724] Livy iv. 16. 3 (439).
[1725] Continuous fasti tribunicii, however, did not exist.
[1726] Thereafter when a vacancy occurred during the year, it was filled by election; Appian, B. C. i. 13. 54; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13.
[1727] Tac. Ann. xi. 22; Cic. Fam. vii. 30. 1; cf. Gell. xiii. 15. 4.
[1728] Livy ix. 46. 1 f.; xxv. 2. 7; Varro, R. R. iii. 17. 1; Cic. Planc. 20. 49; Piso, in Gell. vii. 9. 2.
[1729] Sall. Iug. 63.
[1730] Gell. xiii. 15. 4.
[1731] P. 280.
[1732] P. 241, 268.
[1733] Cf. Cic. Leg. iii. 19. 45; Livy xxvi. 3. This subject is admirably presented by Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 578-80.
[1734] Cic. Inv. i. 38. 68.
[1735] Cf. Livy v. 11. 4; 12. 2; 29. 6 f.; viii. 33. 17; xxvi. 3. 6.
[1736] Livy xxvi. 3. 6-9; p. 307 f., 322 above.
[1737] P. 234, 269 above; Cic. Rep. ii. 35. 60; Livy iv. 30. 3. The equivalents are mentioned in connection with the lex Aternia Tarpeia; Gell. xi. 1. 2; Fest. 202. 11; 237. 13; ep. 144; Lange, Röm. Alt. i. 622; Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. i. 172, 639. The law is no proof of the existence of coins at that time.
[1738] Cato, Orig. v. 5; Fest. 246 (lex Silia); Cic. Rep. 35. 60; Livy iv. 30. 3; Karlowa, Röm. Rechtsgesch. i. 409; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 580.
[1739] Livy viii. 37. 8 ff. A tribune of the plebs brought before the tribes certain Tusculans, accused of having incited neighboring states against Rome, 323. They were acquitted; p. 310.
[1740] Livy iv. 11. 3-7. This is one of the few prosecutions of inferior officials for maladministration; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 323, n. 2. The event is too early to be certain.
[1741] Livy iv. 40. 4; 41. 10 f.; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 581.
[1742] Livy v. 11. 4 ff.; 12. 1.
[1743] P. 244 f.
[1744] Livy vi. 1. 6.
[1745] Livy vii. 3-5.
[1746] Off. ii. 31. 112.
[1747] Livy x. 37. 7; cf. xxix. 19. 6 f.; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 320, n. 3.
[1748] Livy x. 46. 16.
[1749] Livy, ep. xi; cf. p. 306 below.
[1750] Livy, ep. xi; Dion. Hal. xvii. 4 f.; Dio Cass. Frag. 36. 32. Dionysius states the fine at 50,000 denarii.
[1751] Livy v. 29. 6 f. Lange, Röm. Alt. i. 823; ii. 581, looks with suspicion on this case because it is the only one of the kind in the period. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 323, n. 1, considers it an anticipation of the condemnation of the tribunes in 84 for having taken the side of Sulla.
[1752] Livy iv. 21. 3 f.
[1753] Livy vi. 38. 9; Plut. Cam. 39.
[1754] P. 247, 248, n. 1.
[1755] Cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 282, 475. In time the aediles themselves received viatores through a lex Papiria of unknown date; CIL. vi. 1933.
[1756] Dion. Hal. vii. 35. 4; Plut. Cor. 18. For this reason tribunician sentences continued to the end to be executed by a tribune or an aedile; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. i. 146.
[1757] Dion. Hal. vi. 90. 2; cf. 95. 4; Zon. vii. 15. 10.
[1758] Livy iii. 31. 4-6; Dion. Hal. x. 48; Pliny, N. H. vii. 29. 201.
[1759] P. 264, 272. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 475, n. 3, however, who looks upon it as a legally credible tradition, remarks that the competence of the aediles, at that time coextensive with that of the tribunes, must afterward have been limited by the Twelve Tables.
[1760] As in 204, when an aedile was sent to arrest Scipio, should circumstances favor his apprehension: Livy xxix. 20. 11; xxxviii. 52. 7. More frequently they executed the sentence; p. 290, n. 5.
[1761] Livy vii. 16. 9; Dion. Hal. xiv. 12 (22); Pliny, N. H. xviii. 3. 17; Plut. Cam. 39; Val. Max. viii. 6. 3.
[1762] Livy x. 13. 14; cf. Greenidge, Leg. Proced. 341.
[1763] Livy x. 23. 13. We are not informed whether these cases came before the assembly.
[1764] Livy x. 47. 4.
[1765] Livy vii. 28. 9. The rank of the prosecutor cannot be more definitely stated.
[1766] Pliny, N. H. xxxiii. (6.) 19. The accuser, Cn. Flavius, was curule aedile; Livy ix. 46. 1.
[1767] Livy x. 23. 11 f. The prosecutors were curule aediles.
[1768] Livy viii. 22. 3; Val. Max. viii. 1. 7. Fourteen of the twenty-nine tribes then existing had declared against him, when the prosecuting aedile by an unintentional expression turned the vote in his favor. This result is to be explained on the supposition that the proceedings were at that point interrupted, and the whole vote taken again; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 486.
[1769] Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. ii. 493, n. 3; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 584. From the nature of the process we infer that it was aedilician; and as the accuser was a patrician, his aedileship must have been curule.