When we reflect upon the deplorable condition of Wallachia and Moldavia, examine the causes of their evils, and cast an eye upon the numerous gifts with which nature has enriched them,—when we compare the effects of demoralisation and ruin, which are the natural consequences of their present system of administration, to the advantages that would accrue to them from a regular and permanent form of government,—it is hardly possible not to regret that the question of a change in their political fate was not proposed and resolved at the late congress of Vienna.

A variety of facts related in the foregoing pages have, perhaps, sufficiently demonstrated the nullity of the independence still acknowledged by the Ottoman Court to the constitution of its transdanubean Principalities, and the little regard it bears to the common prosperity of their affairs. That those countries should resume independency, and maintain themselves in it by their own means alone, would, however, be as absurd, as it is impossible to expect. But that they should be rescued from the hands of those who act as their worst enemies, and placed under the special protection of some great Christian power, under whose influence they might be enabled to employ their resources to their own profit and to that of their neighbours, give to their trade all the extent it is capable of compassing,—under which, in short they might have the hope of soon placing themselves on a footing with the civilised world—formed an object which called forth the attention of Christian Europe, and which, in magnitude and importance, had at least equal claims to it as the question relating to the Ionian Islands, to which the Turks had no smaller pretensions, though neither more nor less valid.

Conformity of religion, and the old standing connections between Russia and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, point out that power as their natural protector; but, if the security of Europe forbids the recognition of further encroachments of the Russians on Turkey, though at the same time the political change in the principalities had been once regularly admitted, would not a partition made of them between Austria and Russia have been equally beneficial in its consequences, and at all events preferable in every respect to the statu quo? Indeed, upon the very principle of impeding the progress of Russia, the occupation of Wallachia by the Austrians was a measure of the first necessity, as sufficiently capable of forming an insurmountable barrier against the Russians. Without it, what obstacle will ever prevent these from extending the whole of their frontier on the side of European Turkey to the Danube? and once entirely masters of the borders of that river, the road to Constantinople is open to them, and the political existence of the Turkish empire is left to depend on the will and pleasure of the Russian emperor.

Austria, as long as she is willing to maintain her present extent of power, would certainly feel herself far from secure at the approach of the Russians on so great a line of her eastern frontiers, and would not tacitly consent to be severed from Turkey in a manner so as to alter materially the course of her communications with that country, and almost to preclude the possibility of affording it future assistance; neither would the rest of Europe, interested in obstructing the further designs of aggrandisement of Russia, view such an event without alarming apprehensions.

The precautions which the best political prudence could have suggested, ought, therefore, to have brought the Austrians into Wallachia, where they should have improved the fortifications at the most essential points. Such a measure, carried into execution, the Russians would in vain have attempted new encroachments; they could not have made one step into Turkey without the permission of the Austrians.

It has been said that the Russian plenipotentiaries at the congress of Vienna observed so profound a silence with respect to Turkish affairs, and so carefully avoided any opportunities of hearing them named, as to prove evidently, that in her concerns with that Power Russia wishes to remain her own arbiter. Perhaps, by that conduct, she prevented what she feared; for, had the partition of Wallachia and Moldavia been proposed to her, with the cession of the latter province to herself, could she possibly have brought forwards any reasonable objections? The arrangement would have appeared so suitable to all parties, that she could not have opposed it without betraying ambitious and subversive views; Turkey must have consented, if she bore any regard to her own future safety; and the inhabitants of the principalities, notwithstanding that they would in both have preferred the patronage of Russia to any interference of Austria, would soon have begun to feel the importance of the change in their favour.

What are the effects of the present system?—

The policy of the Turks in the principalities, renders them detestable to their inhabitants. They send men devoid of principles, bereft of all feelings of humanity, to exhibit a farce of sovereignty over them, and to display an arrogant and insulting power, in order to intimidate them into submission, and to impose with less difficulty an almost intolerable yoke. These agents of authority are looked upon by the two nations, whom they are sent to govern, not as their natural well-wishers, but as the chief enemies of the State; and the Turks being justly considered as the true authors of all their evils, the hand of vengeance is constantly raised over them, waiting for the opportunity when it can act with most efficacy.^[44]

Russia is perfectly aware that such sentiments and dispositions constantly prevail amongst the Wallachians and Moldavians. The authority which she holds from her treaties with the Porte, enables her to interfere in all manner with their affairs, and to create, through their means, motives of discord between herself and Turkey whenever she finds a moment propitious to a rupture; and she may even, when she thinks proper, give an apparent urgency to such circumstances to justify any sudden seizure of the two provinces, operated without any previous declaration of war, and before the Porte could have entertained a suspicion of her intentions.

Turkey then, in being possessed of Wallachia and Moldavia on the present footing, is only favoured with a momentary advantage, very disproportionate to the danger of being involved through them in war against Russia, an event which must necessarily follow any attempts on the part of the latter to seize on the principalities, and which, according to the present political arrangements existing in Europe, would not fail to create again general convulsion.

From these considerations, it would appear evident, that as long as the transdanubean provinces continue to be a source of discord between Russia and Turkey, and as long as the important question relating to them remains unsettled, peace and tranquillity in Europe will only be of imaginary stability.

In the pacific sentiments which so eminently distinguish the Emperor Alexander, we have, indeed, a solid guarantee against any hostile attempts on Turkey; but the life of man being so precarious, is the hope of a long and uninterrupted peace to rest on the mere knowledge of that sovereign’s personal character? And even if the Emperor Alexander should, contrary to present expectations, march his armies again into Moldavia and Wallachia, for the purpose of taking permanent possession of them, could we, in strict justice, accuse him of ambition in the performance of an act which common humanity dictates to any Christian power?

It is asserted that the success of the late great efforts against Buonaparte had, in a great measure, depended upon the Porte’s forbearing to take a part against Russia, and that the allies, in order to induce the Turkish cabinet to adhere to the resolution it had evinced of remaining neutral, had promised to guarantee, whatever might happen, the integrity of the Ottoman empire; that the Porte, subsequently relying on this promise, declared itself entirely foreign to the objects in discussion at the congress of Vienna, and consequently was not invited to send ministers to it.

Now, that the co-operation of Turkey, with or against Russia and her allies, could have made the least impression on the destinies of Europe, at a time that the nation itself seemed so decidedly averse to the resumption of a war, and that the state was exhausted, appears most doubtful; but that the participation of the Turks in the transactions of the Congress might have settled affairs in a much more solid and lasting manner, is extremely probable. It is at that universal tribunal alone, formed for the vast purpose of creating a just and unchangeable equilibrium in the political affairs of Europe, that the Turks might have been made to understand and to feel the necessity of renouncing to possessions beyond the Danube, which, as they have no longer the means of maintaining and defending them, must, in their hands, continue to be a source of unceasing contentions, and a subject of wars, which will not only endanger the safety of the Ottoman empire, but also compromise the tranquillity of all Europe; and that the Danube being, in fact, the natural frontier of their present extent of empire in that part of it, is alone calculated to offer them security. And those tottering Ottomans, whose existence in Europe is already tolerated with too much indulgence, and who must be aware, notwithstanding the high opinion they entertain of their own importance, how much they are at the mercy of Christian powers, would they have ventured to combat any decisions of the congress which deprived them of a comparatively small extent of territory to enable them to preserve the remainder of their possessions in Europe? Could they have insisted upon the strict observance of former promises, when circumstances so important, concurring even to their own safety, revoked them, and whilst they themselves have, in many instances, been guilty of infractions to their very treaties?

No opportunity was ever, or will, perhaps, be again so favourable to the decision of this important question, as the Congress of Vienna; however, it passed there under general silence. This silence may indeed have originated in motives of great weight, but it could only have been of a momentary necessity, and probably it will not a little contribute to the causes of the first hostile shot that will be fired on the continent of Europe.