When the Army of the Cumberland fell back from Chickamauga and Rossville to Chattanooga, the first and most important thing to do was to quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched directly to the places assigned them, and when all were in place, the lines half encircled the city, both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was on the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the left. The troops began at once the work of throwing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were from time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two forts had been partially completed by the enemy; these were finished and occupied by both artillery and infantry. The army was drawn in close around the city; the point of Lookout Mountain and its slopes beyond Chattanooga Creek were left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate Army command of the river, the rail and wagon roads (parallel with the river), between Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only other practicable road to the bases of supplies was over Walden’s Ridge on the north side of the river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it became very difficult to furnish more than half or three-quarters rations to the men, and only very little forage could be furnished to the animals. The road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team of four or six mules would consume almost the entire load of feed in bringing the load and in returning for another.
General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his main line along Missionary Ridge—across the valley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side of the river by small detachments at different points—to Bridgeport sufficient to starve out the army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to raid the line of supplies. Wheeler burned 300 wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went on north doing what damage he could. Fearing that Bragg might follow Longstreet’s advice and cross the river east of Chattanooga with a large part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an inside works of circumvallation by which ten thousand men might be able to hold the city, while he might be obliged to protect his base of supplies by marching the rest of his army to meet such a situation. That Bragg did not undertake an enterprise of this character was further proof of the used-up condition of his army, the result of the late battle of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding his ability to starve the forces in the city was good only on the supposition that the Government at Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforcements to protect the rear, and to raise “The Siege of Chattanooga;” it was not more than a semi-siege, however, and has been so called by some authors. If Bragg’s army had occupied both sides of the river and practically surrounded the city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have been called a siege. Of course the situation of the Union Army was critical, not only here in the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the Tennessee River during the campaign preceding the battle of Chickamauga. As before mentioned, General Rosecrans estimated on September 23, 1863, that he had about 35,000 troops in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry were then on the north side of the river and guarded the crossings for a considerable distance, both above and below. Union reinforcements had been ordered both from the east and from the west; but Burnside, who commanded in East Tennessee, was asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, instead of being able to send any succor to Rosecrans. Before the battle of Chickamauga reinforcements had been ordered from the Army of the Tennessee—at that time on or near the Mississippi at Memphis—and from Burnside, but none had arrived. After the great battle and the falling back of Rosecrans, the commander did not need to urge the President and Secretary of War to be convinced, that unless they really desired to lose Tennessee and all that had so far been gained in the department of the Cumberland, other troops must be sent with the greatest celerity. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were ordered to the battlefield; the Eleventh commanded by General O. O. Howard, and the Twelfth under General H. W. Slocum; both under the command of General Joseph Hooker. General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the Union Army with the Fifteenth Corps, and one division of the Seventeenth from the Army of the Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was made by the troops present to hold the city at all hazards. When Wheeler captured and burned the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the Sequatchie Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery started from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. Retarded by an incessant rain, he was in time to see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he made a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s troops past the fire upon their main body. He followed this Confederate division—which was commanded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler—out of the valley, captured a number of soldiers and 800 mules and saved some of the wagons. Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture the garrison and burn the supplies. He was off toward Murfreesboro before the arrival of Crook and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. The Union cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. Mitchell, with McCook’s division, joined Crook at Murfreesboro and saved that place from capture. They followed Wheeler so persistently and fought him so successfully that they prevented the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at Rogersville to the south of the Tennessee; Mitchell followed and captured at that point a large amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. Mitchell prevented the Confederate advance to Winchester and Decherd after having heard at Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate cavalry was moving towards these cities, having been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s intention was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications and to force him to abandon Chattanooga. The maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville was of vital importance to the Union Army. Wheeler’s loss on this raid was according to the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 pieces of artillery. These fatalities made the Confederate commander more cautious. Crook’s loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. Wheeler’s raid and the Union pursuit, are specimens of the kind of warfare which cavalry are expected to make, showing the terrible destruction of men and horses, the untiring marches, and watchfulness necessary in a field so extensive and difficult as that of the department of Cumberland. It would have been much more economical and effective, if the War Department had previously protected the railway with sufficient infantry, as it now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordinary force of cavalry. The Department did adopt the plan of protecting the railway with infantry, when Hooker came with a division; this mode was most effectively used also in 1864.
Although the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was being maintained and supplies were accumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity of hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended and precipitous road as the one over Walden’s Ridge, and the destruction of so many wagons by Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the entrenched city. The rains were heavy and continuous during the early part of October, making the roads almost impassable in some places. The trips to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, the mules became thinner, and so the rations had to be reduced from time to time, until men, horses, and mules were in very sore straits. The artillery horses and all extra horses of mounted officers, that had not already died from starvation, were sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept there until the strain could be relieved sometime in the indefinite future. Yet no thought of retreat or surrender entered the minds of the devoted soldiers. The fact that the army in the surrounding hills was in a worse condition—too weak to take any advantage of the situation by aggressive movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in the rear—undoubtedly saved the Union Army from destruction.
In the early part of October, General Hooker arrived at Nashville with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the railroad to Bridgeport. The corps had come to Nashville by railroad, but were without transportation, therefore did not supply all the relief needed at Chattanooga. What was absolutely necessary was the restoration of rail transportation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not exclusively the protection of the railroad from the north to Bridgeport. Sufficient reinforcements were also needed in order to enable the Union Army to attack and destroy or drive back the enemy, who was in too close proximity for safety; and therefore the first thing to be considered, after the Union troops were properly fortified, was to plan means by which the cooperation of these eastern reinforcements could be made available. In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat which had been captured at Chattanooga, had been repaired and another was being built at Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring to Bridgeport all his command, with the exception of what was needed to protect the railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He started also the construction of pontoons for a bridge, at some point over the river below Chattanooga, where his troops might have to cross in order to meet Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, and also in order to shorten the road down the river. General W. F. Smith (“Baldy Smith”) had lately been appointed chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the river near Williams’s Island, a few miles below the points of Lookout Mountain, expecting to make of that island a steamer landing and supply depot. This last order was issued October 19, and on that same day General Rosecrans was relieved from the command of the Army; and General George H. Thomas assumed command.
Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland had been made. Many of the regiments and brigades had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle and by sickness, that consolidation of brigades became imperative. Besides, in order to maintain efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a weeding out among the general officers became a necessity. Ever since the close of fighting at Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of feeling among the majority of the officers, that certain ones, who had failed to meet the emergencies which arose during that battle, could not continue in command, without decided detriment to the future operations of the army. In compliance with the President’s order of September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps was placed under the command of General Gordon Granger who had particularly distinguished himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was made a part of the Fourteenth Corps. Each corps was composed of three divisions and each division of three brigades. The following short dispatch sent to the Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives a very concise and interesting statement of what was done:
“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First Brigade, Cruft, nine regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 2,035 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second Division, Sheridan; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 2,385 men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, Willich, nine regiments, 2,069 men; Second Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 men; Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men.
“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; First Brigade, Carlin, nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, King, four regiments of regulars and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade, Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis; First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 men [this brigade had been in the reserve and did not take part in the late battle]; Second Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses in the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; First Brigade, Turchin, seven regiments, 2,175 men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regiments, 2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.”
Those detachments of the reserve corps which still remained along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were not included. The garrison at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Battle Creek, under General J. D. Morgan, as above stated, were however included. The State of Tennessee was divided into two districts, the northern, commanded by General Robert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville, and the southern under General R. W. Johnson with headquarters at Stevenson.
General L. H. Rousseau superseded General R. S. Granger at Nashville, in November, prior to the battles. General Starkweather relieved Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter having been assigned in Rousseau’s place, as commander of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.
In the reorganization of the army the Wisconsin troops were distributed as follows: The First and Twenty-First Infantry remained in Starkweather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the First Brigade of the same division which was commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The Twenty-fourth Infantry was in the First Brigade of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Willich’s Brigade of Wood’s Division, of the Fourth Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Third, Eighth and Tenth, and Company A of the First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps were not reorganized prior to the battles; the Third and Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the same organization in which they were in the Army of the Potomac—viz.: the Third in Ruger’s Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) of the Twelfth Corps; the Twenty-sixth in the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Eleventh Corps.
When General Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland, General John M. Palmer was made commander in his place of the Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft was assigned to the command of the First Division of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer.
General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had been elected member of Congress from his district in Ohio; he left in order to assume his duties and General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief of staff in his place. General John M. Brannan was made chief of artillery. These, with General W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added to the strength of the headquarters staff.
This order of the President—which affected these local changes in the Army of the Cumberland—was followed by a much greater consolidation on a very much broader scale. The Army of the Tennessee—then in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi—was placed under command of General W. T. Sherman, who was on his way with a portion of it to Chattanooga in order to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the Ohio, under General A. E. Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three armies had not before had a commander in common under whose orders they could be made to cooperate. A commander-in-chief at Washington had so far been unable to accomplish this very necessary cooperation. The Tennessee River ran through the fields of operations of all the three armies—less directly in the field of the Army of the Tennessee—and the preceding lack of unity in movements jeopardized the ultimate object of all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment of the former relation between the states in rebellion and the general government. On this account the President established the Military Division of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant in command. This was a virtual consolidation of the three armies; their cooperation in that wide field was henceforth perfect. Subsequent events showed the wisdom of this order. The Confederates never won another battle in this department; and in fourteen months after the organization of one command there existed no organized Confederate force in this field, worthy of notice. There were only detachments here and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring of 1865, until General James H. Wilson’s cavalry raid put an end to all resistance.
After its reorganization, the Army of the Cumberland was composed of the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and three divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheridan been placed in command of the combined cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its efficiency would have been greatly improved; but all the changes, that might have been beneficial, could not be thought of at once. The pending events in this department developed some pre-eminent officers, who were indeed very much needed; they became masterful factors in the early downfall of the rebellion, both in the east and in the west; Sheridan was one of these; others were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman.
Grant reached his new command by way of Louisville, Kentucky, where he met the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him the order of October 18, as well as General Grant’s commission. Grant sent from Louisville the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping them up.” General Thomas answered: “Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thousand to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th—probably three hundred wagons. I will hold the town till we starve.”
On October 19, Thomas ordered General Hooker to carry out the former orders of General Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chattanooga.
General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23, one month after the Union troops had taken possession of the city. On the 24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with Thomas and W. F. Smith, the chief engineer; at once he recognized the necessity and possibility of the scheme, initiated by General Rosecrans, but conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of placing a pontoon bridge there and of obtaining a hold on the south side of the river at that point, and he ordered its execution; much had already been done toward preparing for it. General Smith was given full power to complete the plan. The river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west opposite the city, but soon it curves to the north and then it turns to the south with quite a sharp bend at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from where the river runs directly north, forming a narrow and perfect peninsula directly opposite or west of the city. This peninsula widens slightly at its southern end and forms a perfect shape of a human foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” Brown’s Ferry is directly west of the city, on the western point of the neck of this peninsula, some miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in direct line to Brown’s Ferry from the northern end of the bridge, at the foot of Cameron Hill in the western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s Ferry the river continues north, and passes Williams Island; five or more miles from the ferry, it makes another sharp turn to the south at the foot of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven miles from this northern bend it flows tortuously past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula thus formed, is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in direct line somewhat to the southwest, and, as said before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga. It is about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to Brown’s Ferry, but from where the boats for the Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently started, it is about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures show the value to the transportation, of obtaining unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a landing for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport across Brown’s Ferry, when it should come into possession of the Union Army by the advance of Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or put into working order from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The movement of troops which accomplished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on the south side of the river, to meet, and assist, Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, thus breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road to Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders and supervision, the plans were successfully carried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under Hazen passed down the river nine miles, and close to the Confederate pickets. They were to land at different points in sections, the places having been pointed out previously to the officers in command. On account of the darkness fires were kept burning opposite these places, so that the different sections could land at the proper points. The remainder of Turchin’s and Hazen’s brigades—from which the men in the boats were taken—and their batteries, were marched across the peninsula, and posted out of sight in the woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of the river.
The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, as soon as the men under Hazen landed on the south side, and recross to the north side. The artillery was to move into position as soon as the boats landed, in order to cover a retreat in case of disaster. The equipment for the pontoon bridge was also in place and ready for use. The boats commenced to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and they were not discovered by the enemy until 5 a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion of the second section, which did not land in the proper place, was fired on by the enemy’s picket, calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve of the enemy. But the Union troops on the north side of the ferry crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed forward to the top of the ridge, and in two hours they protected themselves sufficiently with timber and abatis to hold the tête de pont. On the 27th the bridge was completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work was done under some shelling from Lookout Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michigan Engineers was the skillful superintendent of the bridge building. Twenty beeves, six pontoons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into the hands of the Union troops. The Union loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded, and 9 missing. Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates and 6 were killed; how many were wounded is not known. While the bridge was being laid, General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on a pontoon bridge, and was marching up towards Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the 28th, his head of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the railroad from Bridgeport, with the branch from Trenton up the valley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s Ferry runs about four miles, along the western base of a ridge, which here and there has deep depressions; through one of these the railroad continued to Chattanooga, around the nose of Lookout, close to the river; through another the wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him Howard’s Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division of the Twelfth, with the exception of one regiment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at Whiteside’s and one at Shellmound; the latter two places being on the railroad between Bridgeport and Chattanooga.
The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, (Williams), had been left to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s brigade of this division was the Third Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Colonel William Hawley. This regiment had been mustered into the service on June 29, 1861, and had been serving with the Army of the Potomac since that date until now, when it became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the Third Division, (Schurz) of the Eleventh Corps was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who was appointed Major November 17, 1863. It was exclusively a German regiment, and was mustered in at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. On the following October 6, it left Wisconsin for the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until it became a part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and Hooker of the Army of the Cumberland.
Hooker’s advance troops, under General Howard, camped that night within a mile or so of Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication with the troops there. Geary’s division was in the rear and camped near Wauhatchie, three miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry—three miles to the northwest of Wauhatchie—was controlled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, but not before he had his division in line for defense. Howard was ordered to double quick his nearest division, under command of General Carl Schurz, to Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, it was fired upon from the near hills on the division’s left, but at long range. The firing produced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. Howard detached one brigade to deploy on these hills, and pushed on with the other; in the meantime Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. Then it was discovered that another hill, in the rear of Schurz was also occupied by the enemy. Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the bayonet against three times its number.
Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost three hours, without assistance Geary repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field.” Thus the Lookout Valley was secured, and new communications were opened. The loss to General Hooker’s command was 416. Longstreet practically conceded that the Union commander had succeeded in opening this new line of communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s brigades were subsequently moved over to this region. The steamboat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of the 28th; thereafter two steamboats (one had been built at Bridgeport), made regular trips with supplies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry and the railroad from Bridgeport towards the east was being repaired. There was no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid preparations were commenced to attack the enemy in his strong positions around the city. Hope and confidence had always inspired the Army of the Cumberland; the rank and file had never despaired; now, they took the lead in anticipating that the end was in sight; success in battle depends very much on the condition of the human body and the enthusiasm of the spirit.
The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Longstreet to prevent the opening of the river, and the advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of all the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland to the weakness of the Confederate Army, both in the ranks and among the officers. General Longstreet, in his official report of the battle of Wauhatchie, attributes his defeat to the jealousy of brigade officers.[35] The Confederate troops, making the attack on General Geary, were withdrawn from the east side of Lookout, but they returned immediately before daylight on the night of the attack. General Longstreet gave reasons for this action; he showed that it was not good military tactics to keep a large force on that side of the mountain, where its only line of retreat was around the slope of Lookout; if it were defeated, it would be exposed to the fire of the Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga. These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the ease with which Hooker’s forces, on November 24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Lookout Mountain. It was after this defeat, that Bragg (for reasons unknown), sent Longstreet’s Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned in time to assist in the battle, that he knew must be fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took with him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and Alexander’s cavalry. Wheeler’s cavalry passed him on the road; it was supposed to do certain things that it failed to do. Longstreet recommended that Bragg’s army should be drawn back in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; his reason for this recommendation was, that in its present position it could be reached in twenty minutes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be blind, however, to the events so rapidly transpiring in Chattanooga; he did not seem to realize that the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, were reinforcements from the East to the Union Army.
In the meantime the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge sent an occasional artillery shot into the Union lines. The pickets of the two armies held their lines close to each other in the valley and watched each other’s movements, firing whenever a soldier on his beat became visible. There being no good reason for this desultory and ineffectual warfare, an agreement was finally reached, that the pickets should fire only when advances of troops became apparent; henceforth, an officer could with impunity ride along the picket line in plain view of the opposite pickets.
As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s departure for East Tennessee, he prepared for an attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep him from detaching more troops against Burnside and to compel him to return those already sent. He ordered General Thomas to assault the north end of Missionary Ridge; the order was given November 7; but on account of the utter lack of animals—caused not only by the great loss in the recent battles, but also by the death of a large number from starvation since the occupation of the city—it was finally decided by Grant, Thomas, and Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could arrive. The necessity for aggressive operations, on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking such a desperate chance as to send a large force commanded by his ablest general away from his weak little army, increased the activity of the Union Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was opened a way for the relief of Burnside; the hope was that he could hold out until help arrived.
It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to Burnside and urged him to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman, what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith, looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills, at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much stronger position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank, and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired, Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of attack; the plan further contemplated that all the forces available should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of retreat could be easily cut off.
Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant.
A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced the impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression. Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back, and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would be safe in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion, and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of Chattanooga, where he was finally driven.
Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside.
In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more.
With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve, General Wood moved forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade took part in this engagement; its losses were not reported until after the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15 p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob.
The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman only three divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this accident resulted in modifying the original plans very materially, as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his original plan, at a later date.
Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 288
At 4 p. m. on November 24, 1863, one of the most spectacular battles of the war commenced. General Hooker’s force consisted of the following: Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps, Cruft’s (formerly Palmer’s) of the Fourth; Geary’s of the Twelfth—with the exception of such regiments from the last two divisions as were required to protect the communications with Bridgeport and Kelly’s Ferry; battery K of the First Ohio, and battery I of the First New York of the Eleventh Corps, having sufficient horses for but one battery; a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry. The aggregate number of this force was 9,681. The foregoing statement of the forces is taken from General Hooker’s official report[36], which is remarkably well written, clear in statement and full of essential facts. “At this time the enemy’s pickets formed a continuous line along the right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson’s division, and those were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the next [that is, from the valley in which Hooker’s troops were located] for a distance of 20 miles up the valley was by two or three trails, admitting to the passage of but 1 man at a time; and even these trails were held at the top by rebel pickets.”
The top of Lookout Mountain at this point consists of a perpendicular crest, or palisade of rocks which rises out of the main body of the mountain about a hundred feet. From the foot of this crest the mountain slopes by a gradual descent but with a very broken surface on all sides to the valleys on the east, west, and to the river on the north. An army could operate on this slope only below the crest, from the west to the east, or on the side of Chattanooga, around the northern slope, under the crest. Hooker’s army did not cross the top of the crest; but by taking the slope, the Confederate troops occupying the top, were forced to retreat by the only wagon road reaching to the top on the Chattanooga side. The slope on that side is less precipitous than on the west side where Hooker was. At the foot of the slope on the Chattanooga side flows the Chattanooga Creek and on the west side Lookout Creek, both flowing north, practically parallel with the trend of the mountain, and emptying into the Tennessee River, which runs west at the foot of the northern slope. Hooker continues his report as follows: “On the northern slope midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land, encircles the crest. There, a continuous line of earth-works had been thrown up, while redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope to repel an assault from the direction of the river.”
Geary commenced his movements as instructed, crossed the creek at 8 o’clock a. m., “captured the entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, marched directly up the mountain until his right rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley.” The Confederate Walthall was in command of the troops immediately opposed to Geary, and Moore’s brigade near the Craven house on the eastern, or northeastern slope. General Stevenson was there in command of all the Confederate troops on the mountain. He placed sharpshooters along the western edge of the crest, and wherever there was depression enough, the artillery by raising the trails of the gun carriages did some execution until Geary’s troops reached the foot of the palisades. The Confederate troops located on the western slope, moved into position, facing Lookout Creek, in order to prevent the Union troops crossing at the bridge; but this disposition subjected them to a flank enfilading fire from Geary’s troops. The other Union troops moved up the Creek, crossed behind Geary’s line, and joined on his left. The batteries had been placed on elevated points, so as to enfilade the route by which the enemy had to march down the slope, and on other points, by which the Confederates had to retreat if they were driven back. The Union line advanced, the artillery opened. The rout of the enemy was complete, many prisoners were taken, and many were killed and wounded. At noon when Geary’s advance rounded the northern slope, his flags were plainly visible from Chattanooga. There had been a fog all morning, which greatly favored Hooker’s movements, preventing the Confederates on top of the crest from directing their shots satisfactorily. As the Union flags appeared on the sky line of the northern slope, and were visible at Chattanooga, this fog settled down upon the lower stretches of the slope and revealed the Confederate lines badly broken and in flight with the compact ranks of the Union soldiers triumphantly advancing with flags flying and muskets glistening in the sun. It was a glorious sight to the Union troops, then in line in front of the works at Chattanooga. The picture presented was a “battle above the clouds,” for the fog obscured all that part of the mountain which was below the conquering lines of Hooker. General Stevenson says in his report, with regard to this affair: “Finding that the fog was becoming so dense that the troops on the northern part of the mountain [meaning Pettus’s brigade on the crest] could not see the enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave orders for Pettus with my only disposable force to move down and report to Brigadier-General Jackson. He started at 12:30 o’clock and reached the scene of action a little past 1 o’clock. * * * This position was held by Moore, Walthall, and Pettus until about 8 p. m.”[37]
Stevenson had six brigades in his command; four of these took part in the fight on the mountain, the other two were placed between Chattanooga Creek and the road up the slope, in order to guard the line of retreat on the east side of the mountain against any advance from Chattanooga. Stevenson reports, that he lost only 380 in his three brigades; he does not state the number of troops he had on the mountain. Hooker rested at 2 o’clock p. m. after passing the point. The settling down of the fog shut off his view of the Chattanooga Valley and prevented his seeing sufficiently the topography to justify him in advancing down into the valley that same evening. He formed his lines on the eastern slope; his right was at the palisades, and his left was near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. This line he fortified, and reported the fact to the department commander. In this position he enfiladed the enemy’s line in the Chattanooga Valley, and also had communication across the mouth of the creek with the Union forces in the city. At 5:15 p. m. General Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth Corps, reported to General Hooker after having crossed the mouth of the creek by ferry; he was placed on the right of the line relieving Geary’s troops, which were almost exhausted with fatigue. During the night the enemy withdrew entirely, leaving behind 20,000 rations, and the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades. General Thomas reported, that Hooker captured 500 or 600 prisoners. The Eighth Kentucky Infantry scaled the crest about daylight on the 25th and hoisted the United States flag amid wild and prolonged cheers from the whole army.
At ten o’clock a. m. on the 25th, leaving two regiments to hold the mountain, Hooker started towards Rossville, across Chattanooga Creek and the valley, with Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps in the lead. Thus the left of the Confederate Army was completely turned, while the right still held its own. Hooker was too far from the Confederate line of retreat to menace it. To have turned the right first would have been better. Hooker was delayed four hours by a destroyed bridge in crossing Chattanooga Creek. The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry of Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth Corps participated in this engagement; it was detached from the brigade, and held a fort south of the Crutchfield house on the east side of the mountain; its losses were not reported.
While these operations were occurring on Lookout Mountain under the command of Hooker, Sherman advanced across the Tennessee River at the mouth of the Chickamauga with three divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, and one division (Davis’s) of the Army of the Cumberland, on the morning of the 24th, against the other or extreme right wing of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge. He advanced and formed his lines on the north end of the ridge; a brigade of Howard’s Corps moved to the left at 9 a. m. on the same day and communicated with Sherman about noon. Later Howard joined Sherman with his two divisions and formed on his right. Carlin’s brigade rejoined his division on the 25th, which was then in the valley half way to Missionary Ridge and on the right of Thomas’s line. Palmer’s and Granger’s corps were held in readiness by Thomas to advance to the foot of the ridge, as soon as Hooker should get into position at Rossville. It was after 2 p. m. that General Hooker effected a crossing of Chattanooga Creek and advanced as above stated. At noon General Sherman was heavily engaged with the enemy in his position, and finding it to be very strong was not making any headway against it. General Baird was, therefore, ordered to march his division within supporting distance of Sherman, and to move promptly.
He reported to Sherman, but the latter told him he could not find room for him and could not make use of his troops. General Baird marched back a distance of about two miles, and arrived at the left of General Thomas’s line at 2:30 p. m.; he was ordered to fall in on the left of Wood, the left division of Grangers Fourth Corps.
It will be well at this time to take a rapid view of the entire lines of the Union and the Confederate armies, as they stood facing each other, arms in hand, at 3 o’clock p. m. on November 25, 1863, just before they grappled in a struggle for life and death, and for the permanent possession of the stronghold of the Middle West. So many changes having occurred in the previous three or four days in the Union Army, and equally as many and more important changes occurring on the Confederate side, makes it necessary to pause, just before describing the great spectacular battle of Missionary Ridge, and try to get at least a bird’s-eye view of the position of the numerous divisions and corps.
General Osterhaus had again taken command of his own division, relieving General Charles R. Woods; General Cruft, and General Geary were near enough with their troops to the ridge at Rossville to form the extreme right of the Union line. There was an interval between Geary’s left and Johnson’s right, where Carlin stood after coming from Lookout. Johnson had only two brigades, Carlin on the right, and Stoughton (John H. King’s successor) on the left; Starkweather had been left in the works around the city. Hooker’s and Thomas’s troops were without reserves. Sheridan’s three brigades, F. T. Sherman’s, Harkers’s and Wagner’s were next to the left of Johnson; then Wood’s three brigades, Hazen’s, Willich’s, and Beatty’s; the latter appeared in two lines, being the last in Thomas’s section, and forming the left flank of the line; and then Baird’s three brigades, Turchin’s, Van Derveer’s and Phelps’s.
A mile and a half to the left of General Thomas’s line lay Sherman’s right flank, with no troops in the interval. The latter’s line was composed from right to left of the following brigades, viz.: Buschbeck’s, Ewing’s Matthies’s, Corse’s and A. Smith’s; Raum, was behind Matthies, and two brigades of J. E. Smith’s were in reserve behind the centre. Behind this line, a half mile in the fortified line lay from left to right the brigades of Loomis, Cockerill, Alexander, and Lightburn, and Schurz’s division. Sherman thus had six divisions. The Confederate line from its right, which faced Sherman, was as follows by divisions: Cleburne, Stevenson, Gist, Cheatham, Anderson, Bate, and Stewart. Stewart held the left of Bragg’s line, and his troops were the first to encounter those of Hooker on their way to Rossville from Lookout Mountain. General Hardee commanded the right wing, consisting of the following four divisions: Cheatham, Cleburne, Stevenson, and Walker; General Breckenridge was in charge of the left wing, which was composed of Bate, Stewart, and Anderson. Cheatham’s division faced Baird, Anderson’s Wood; Bate’s Sheridan, and Stewart’s Johnson. Cleburne’s division reached the front of Sherman’s line on the afternoon of the 24th while marching from the Confederates’ left. Before the fight of the 25th occurred, Cheatham’s, Stevenson’s, and Walker’s divisions had prolonged Bragg’s line to within three-quarters of a mile of the tunnel; Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division held Tunnel Hill on the 25th against Sherman; the rest of the division was not heavily engaged, but it had the assistance of Brown’s and Cumming’s brigades of Stevenson’s division, and Maney’s of Walker’s. Tunnel Hill was not captured by Sherman’s troops until after the retreat of these Confederate forces on the evening of the 25th, the result of the successful assault in the centre by Thomas.
The whole Confederate line on the left across the Chattanooga Valley was abandoned; Stewart withdrew to the top of the ridge before Hooker reached Rossville. It must be noticed, that General Thomas’s line in the centre, contained only four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland, namely two of the Fourth Corps, and two of the Fourteenth; one division (Davis’s) of the Fourteenth Corps was with Sherman on the left, and one (Cruft’s) was with Hooker on the right. Hooker had three divisions and Sherman six.
Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division was left to hold the original works around Chattanooga; and did so during the assault of the rest of the troops upon Missionary Ridge.
At 1 p. m. on the 12th, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was in Chattanooga, sent this dispatch to the Secretary of War at Washington, “In our front here [meaning Thomas’s front], Confederate rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gaining ridge.” At 4:30 p. m. he sent another dispatch showing how misleading the former dispatch was: “Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas’s troops, and rebels routed.” The reader must not lay much stress on the time given, at which the various movements were made; this is a mere guess in most instances. Seldom did an officer think of looking at his watch, at the moment any orders were given to make an important movement. The original Army of the Cumberland, referred to by Dana, were the troops General Grant thought would not fight, because they had been so roughly handled at Chickamauga.[38] It was quite a natural conclusion. The entire Union Army was in line at about 3:30 p. m., ready for any commands which might be given by Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Hooker. The array of soldiers in the Union ranks from the three armies, those of the Potomac, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, was formidable, commanded by such heroes as Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Hooker, Sheridan, and Howard. Thomas’s four divisions had about 18,000 in rank and file, Hooker’s about 9,000, and Sherman’s about 24,000.
It is not likely that Bragg had more than 30,000; but his position was sufficiently strong to almost equal Grant’s advantage in numbers. The Confederate Army was concentrated on a 500 feet ridge, which had a very steep and rough surface, sloping towards the Union lines at an angle of about forty-five degrees. This ridge had a fortified line on the top, manned by veteran infantry and artillery, and a thinner line of infantry at its foot in a series of deep rifle-pits; in front of the latter was a swarm of skirmishers. The army was still in command of Braxton Bragg, a commander of great experience; and of two wing commanders, Hardee a veteran of the old regular army, and Breckenridge a former vice-president of the United States. Its division commanders were, as a rule, soldiers of the old regular United States Army, and were very capable officers. That army had two months before (or thought it had) won the battle of Chickamauga, and it was now fighting—at least in the centre where Thomas’s troops faced them—the same troops they claimed to have defeated a short time ago. It had every advantage of position at this time, and it had success in the past to fire the hearts of its soldiers, and arouse in them confidence in their ability to hurl back their old foe, who had the audacity to assault so formidable a stronghold.
Standing on any of the Union forts at Chattanooga, especially on Fort Negley or Fort Wood, or better still on Orchard Knob, where Grant and Thomas remained during the 25th, one would have not only a rear view of the Union Army as it stood, but also a front view of most of the Confederate force. From the top of Missionary Ridge, where Bragg had his headquarters, the whole panorama was magnificent. The lines of blue, and their array of glittering muskets, could be seen from there in front. The backs of the troops were turned on Chattanooga. “Their faces were to the foe.” Bragg had a view of them which Grant and Thomas missed, and if he could have had an hour undisturbed by the conflicting emotions aroused in him by the pending conflict, if he could have watched through his field-glass the valorous mien, the confident air, and the evident determination of these veteran soldiers, to “feed fat the ancient grudge” against the old foes they had met at Mill Springs, Perryville, Stone’s River, and Chickamauga, he would surely have read in these characteristics the doom of the defeat which an hour later overwhelmed him and his little army, and from which it never sufficiently recovered to win another battle. Had he been half as much of a philosopher, as he was a soldier, he would have foreseen, what afterwards was expressed by one of his ablest generals (D. H. Hill), that the holding of Chattanooga “sealed the fate of the confederacy.”
The living, moving lines of soldiers, presented to the view of the two opposing commanders, stationed at vantage points above the valley in which the Union Army was then formed, although a most interesting picture, was more impressive because of its background of magnificent mountains, rivers, and hills. On the west rose great Lookout Mountain, 1,500 feet above the level of the valley; while across the valley, east of Lookout, Missionary Ridge stretched from the north to the South, rising 500 feet and crowned by the lines of grey soldiers, every movement of whom could be seen from Orchard Knob.
General Grant’s most excellent plan on the 24th was that Thomas’s troops should bear to the left, join with the right of Sherman after his forces had advanced to the tunnel, through which the railroad from Chattanooga to East Tennessee ran, and together they should make an assault with the whole union line. Thomas’s troops were in line until 3:30 p. m. on the 25th, waiting for Sherman to capture the hill over the tunnel. General Sherman had begun the fight early in the morning of the 25th by advancing Corse’s brigade; the latter moved down the southern slope of the second hill which had been gained the day before, and under a galling fire advanced against Cleburne’s fortified position. This position was very strong, however, and Corse could not drive the enemy from the hill. Then other brigades were brought up, but they did not succeed in loosening Cleburne’s firm hold. General Grant observing this from Orchard Knob sent the rest of Howard’s Corps to Sherman’s aid at 10 a. m. Howard had two divisions, Steinwehr’s and Schurz’s. It was evident, that Bragg endeavored most vigorously to keep Sherman from turning his right. Had Sherman succeeded in his effort, he would have been in Bragg’s rear and able to menace his line of retreat at Chickamauga station, which was immediately in the rear of the right flank. There was no evidence, however, that Bragg was weakening his lines in front of Thomas; although he had already sent the forces, which Hooker had defeated the day before on Lookout, to his right wing; and these proved to be amply able to hold so strong a natural fortress without any further reinforcements. When General Sherman received Howard’s two divisions, he renewed his efforts to take Tunnel Hill; he made a charge and received one in return, which broke some of John E. Smith’s brigades.
It appears that Grant did not contemplate any attack by Thomas on the centre, when he at noon ordered Baird to report to Sherman; for with Baird’s he had already detached nearly half of Thomas’s troops to Sherman and Hooker. With Baird gone, Thomas had only eight brigades to Sherman’s seven divisions; General Hooker had seven brigades as far from General Thomas’s right, as General Sherman’s were from the latter’s left.
General Grant and General Thomas were together when these orders were given on the 25th; they were in accordance with Grant’s original plan, that Bragg’s defeat should be accomplished by Sherman’s turning the enemy’s right. Grant must therefore have consulted with Thomas concerning this maneuver. Whether General Thomas expressed his opinion on the 25th with regard to making the attack in some other place than at Sherman’s line, is not known; but it will be seen, that the success of the day pivoted around Thomas, because of the invincible position of the enemy at Tunnel Hill, and the valor of the old Army of the Cumberland. This is no disparagement to General Grant’s original idea; his plans were generally correct and successful, and this one was fine in conception, but it shows definitely, that the “best laid schemes, o’mice and men, gang aft a’gley.”
General Grant boldly made his third deviation from his original outline planned for the battle. Seeing the improbability of Sherman advancing his present line to join with Thomas’s left, as contemplated, he ordered an independent assault by Thomas’s troops alone; this order was given at 3 p. m. This section of the Union line was covered by two lines of skirmishers; and was confronted by something less than four divisions of the enemy, namely, a part of Stewart’s on the Confederate left, which was facing Hooker’s line under General Breckenridge’s personal direction. The signal for the advance was to be six shots from a battery (perhaps Bridge’s), on Orchard Knob. General Grant’s report will best tell what occurred, viz.: “Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, * * * with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines, on the rifle-pits with a view to carry the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive—stopped but a moment until the whole were in line—and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.”[39]
When the summit was reached by the Union troops, the scene of confusion and flight of the Confederate forces, down the eastern slope of the ridge, was wonderful to behold.
General Thomas in his report,[40] says: “Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed.”
In the meantime Hooker was advancing toward Thomas’s right with his line stretched across the ridge, at right angles to it. Stewart’s troops, seeing their left threatened by Hooker, tried to escape down the eastern slope toward Ringgold, but encountering there Osterhaus’s troops, moved northward along the base; here they ran into Johnson’s division, and more than a thousand were captured. After General Baird’s division had gained the summit, Stewart wheeled his division to the left, across the crest, and advanced toward the troops, resisting General Sherman. He had not advanced far before he met Cheatham’s forces in line across the crest; the contest here lasted until after dark. During the night all the Confederate forces retreated across the Chickamauga, burned the bridges, and continued their flight to Taylor’s Ridge, near Ringgold, the nearest heights across the Chickamauga Valley, sixteen miles in a straight line southeast. General Sheridan, after halting a few moments on top of the ridge to reform his troops, pushed on to Chickamauga Creek; he captured 300 prisoners, 13 cannon, and a train of 12 wagons.
Mr. C. A. Dana sent a dispatch to the Secretary of War at 10 a. m. November 26, which contained the following paragraph: “The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant, nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was accomplished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest, and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully.”
General Grant says in his report that he intended the lines should be readjusted and ascend the ridge if they were successful at the base. The reports of the corps and division commanders indicate that some of them misunderstood the orders. The men advanced without special orders, however, when they found the position at the foot of the ridge too much exposed to the plunging fire of the enemy. In some instances they were even called back to the foot after proceeding part way up the hill. The assault was made, however, and was so successful, that no one was court-martialed; no one was bold enough to repudiate the responsibility for its initiation. General Grant did not hesitate to modify his original plans from time to time, when inevitable circumstances showed him that some other movement than the one laid down was essential to success. This characteristic is the quality of a great general.
The artillery also under command of General Brannan did fine service during the assault. The large guns in Forts Wood, Sherman, Cheatham, and battery Rousseau directed their fire first upon the Confederate line at the foot of the ridge, as did four light batteries in front of Chattanooga. When the Union line was ascending the ridge, this artillery turned their shots to the entrenched Confederate line on top. The enemy’s artillery and musketry seemed largely to have over-shot the Union lines; the records do not show that the Union troops suffered as heavy losses during the time they were under fire, as the enemy’s apparently advantageous position would warrant. It is also probable that the audacity of the blue coats in assaulting the top of the ridge surprised the Confederates and induced nervousness, wild shooting, terror, confusion, and flight.
The Union troops did not advance up the ridge as if on parade; but conformed more or less to the contour of the ground; the line appeared to an onlooker as a zigzag one; but the standards were always where they ought to be, and there were no stragglers. They did not fire their muskets to any extent while advancing, although they received a constant wild fire from the enemy. It was an assault by the musket bearers, and it is not likely they received many orders from their officers. As soon as the Union troops gained the crest at one point, although it appeared as if the six different points were gained simultaneously, it greatly assisted the rest of the troops, who were so near the crest. The Confederates began to fall back as soon as the first Union troops gained the top. General Bragg tried to send his troops from a less threatened point to one more in danger, but his attempt failed, because his men saw better than he seemed to do that all was lost when one point was carried. This observation applies only of course to the isolated line on the right and left of Bragg’s headquarters, which was attacked by General Thomas’s troops. His troops further to the right, beyond an unoccupied space—such as Cheatham’s division—were not affected that way, because they turned on left wheel, and attacked Baird’s division on the crest.