—Resist the Devil, and he will flee from you.
That there are Angels and Spirits, good and bad; that, at the head, of these last, there is ONE, more considerable and malignant, than the rest, who in the form, or under the name, of a Serpent, was deeply concerned in the fall of man, and whose head, as the prophetic language is, the Son of man was, one day, to bruise; that this evil spirit, though that prophecy be, in part, completed, has not yet received his death’s wound, but is still permitted, for ends unsearchable to us, and in ways which we cannot particularly explain, to have a certain degree of power in this world, hostile to its virtue and happiness, and sometimes exerted with too much success; all this is so clear from Scripture, that no believer, unless he be, first of all, spoiled by philosophy and vain deceit, can possibly entertain a doubt of it.
The subject, indeed, in its full extent, cannot be discussed at this time, nor conveniently, perhaps, in this place. But it may not be improper to make some general reflexions upon it; such as may serve to rectify your APPREHENSIONS of the doctrine itself, which, as I said, is truly scriptural, and to suggest, at the same time, the MORAL AND RELIGIOUS USES, we ought to make of it.
1. An opinion prevailed in the East very early, and was probably derived from some still more ancient tradition of the fall, corrupted, and misunderstood, that two, equally great and independent beings, a good and a bad, shared the government of the world between them; that these beings, of directly opposite characters, carried on a perpetual war with each other, crossed each other’s designs and operations, and, as either prevailed, produced the good or evil, the happiness or misery, of this life.
This opinion was, afterwards, taken up by some, who called themselves Christians; and was especially applied by those, who loved to philosophize (as too many did, and, at all times, have been prone to do) on the secrets of divine Providence, to the solution of that great question, concerning the origin of natural and moral evil.
Now, to this notion some countenance, it is thought, has been given by the scriptural doctrine of the Devil, who is spoken of, as the Prince of this world[218], as the Prince of the power of the air[219], as the God of this world[220], and in other terms of the like sort, denoting as well the power, as malignity, of this evil Being.
But, though these terms are, some of them, very strong, and certainly imply, not the existence only, but the extensive agency and influence, of this wicked Spirit, yet there is no pretence or colour for supposing that any thing like an equality to the God of heaven and earth, or an independency upon him, was intended to be expressed by them. For it is manifest, that no writings in the world exalt our ideas of that God so high, or set forth his supreme irresistible and sovereign dominion in so strong and decisive terms, as the Jewish and Christian scriptures. And with regard to the particular evil being under consideration, he is represented as trembling[221] at the very apprehension of the omnipotent Creator, as sentenced by his justice[222], and reserved for the execution of it[223]; as exercising a partial, a precarious, a limited power in this world, working only in the children of disobedience[224], and in them, consequently, no longer than they continue to deserve that character; and baffled in his attempts, not only by the Son of God, but by the resistance[225], by the prayers[226], by the faith[227], of Christians; as a rebel indeed, yet a rebel cast out[228] and disabled[229], and compelled to be an instrument, like all other things, in the hands of the Almighty[230].
But nothing shews more clearly, how abhorrent the spirit of Christianity is from the Manichæan doctrine, than the care that is taken throughout the Gospel-history to set forth the triumphs of Christ over the kingdom of Satan, in casting out devils; of which the instances are so many, and so circumstantially described, as if our Lord’s main or sole purpose had been to expose and explode that great impiety. He not only, himself, commanded, by a word, the devils to go out of the possessed, who accordingly obeyed him, and, in departing, deprecated that power[231], which they knew he had over them; but he, likewise, gave the same authority to his disciples, who went forth with his commission, and returned again with joy, saying, Lord, even the devils are subject unto us, through thy name[232]. On which occasion, he said unto them, as exulting in his dominion over the enemy, and in the rapid, instantaneous, irresistible effect of it, I beheld Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven[233].
Thus much may suffice to shew, that, though the Gospel affirms the existence of evil spirits, and of one eminently so, yet that it gives no countenance to the doctrine of the two principles; as if the evil one were independent of the good, or that Satan could have the madness to think of rivalling the power of God, and of entering into a direct formal contest, as it were, with the Almighty. Whatever of this sort has been said, or insinuated, contradicts the express testimony, indeed, the whole tenour, of holy scripture, and is nothing but poetry, or misrepresentation.
2. Still, on the face of that account, which Scripture itself gives, it must be owned, that the power of Satan is great and even dreadful.
That he was permitted, in our Saviour’s time, to vex, and, in various ways, torment the BODIES of men, is clear from the number of possessions, we read of in the Gospel; which though some have laboured to explain away (as they have, indeed, the personality of the Devil himself) by reducing what is said of his agency to a mere figure of speech, yet I do not find that their attempts have, hitherto, been, or are likely to be, successful.
That he was, also, permitted to lay such trains, and contrive such measures, as had a fatal effect, sometimes, on the FORTUNES of men, not of those only, who were the immediate instruments of his malice, but of good and innocent men, who stood at a distance from him, we see by the sad catastrophe of that council, which he put into the heart of Judas to betray his master[234]; first, in the untimely death of the traitor himself, and then, by a series of connected events, in the crucifixion of the holy Jesus; and by several other instances. And, that he still retains this last power, as formidable as it truly is, must be concluded, if it be true, as we shall presently see it is, that he insinuates himself into the minds of bad men, and is concerned in exciting and promoting their wicked purposes. But, whether he be allowed to tyrannize over the bodies of men, is more problematical. That, for any thing we know, he may operate in the way of possession, I do not see on what certain grounds any man can deny: that he does so, I would not affirm, because the Scripture, our only guide as to what respects the agency of spirits, is silent in that matter. But the inquiry is of the less moment, because, since the gift of discerning spirits hath ceased in the church, we have no means of distinguishing between possessions and natural disorders; and, because, if we had, there is no known cure, or antidote, for them.
Had this been considered, all the mischiefs which have arisen from the trade of witchcraft and diabolism, would have been prevented. For they have proceeded, not from the supposed possibility of possessions, but from a fraudulent pretence of knowing when they take place, and from a superstitious belief of certain charms or spells, which may be applied, with effect, to the removal of them. Whereas, the fact is not cognizable by us, the symptoms, whether of the natural disorder, or of the pretærnatural infliction, being equivocal; and Christianity acknowledges no power in words, or ceremonies, to exorcise evil spirits. The only exorcism, which is now permitted to Christians, is that of faith and repentance, that is, of a good life; which every man may, and should apply, when it is needful, to his own case, and which, in that application, can surely do no hurt to himself, or others.
And, with this explanation, I leave the matter of possessions. As I have no authority to affirm, that there are, now, any such, so neither may I presume to say, with confidence, that there are not any.
But, then, with regard to the influence of evil spirits at this day upon the SOULS of men, I shall take leave to be a great deal more peremptory. For this influence is so constantly supposed in the Gospel; there are so many admonitions, cautions, advices, relating to it; there are so many warnings given us by Christ and his Apostles against the snares, the wiles, the devices, the depths, of Satan, and these, conveyed in the form of general precepts, plainly calculated for the use of Christians in all ages; it is so expressly said, in Christ’s own parable of the sower, that the tares, that is, bad men, are sown by the devil, and that this husbandry will be carried on by him to the end of the world; it is so apparent, that his empire over bad men is exercised in the way of temptation and seduction, by putting bad purposes into their minds, and filling their hearts with corrupt imaginations and intentions; it is, besides, so evident that we are continually in danger of this temptation, by that clause in the Lord’s prayer, the daily prayer of all Christians—deliver us from the evil one[235]—for such is the proper sense of these words, which we translate, deliver us from evil—All this, I say, is so manifest to every one who reads the scriptures, that, if we respect their authority, the question, concerning the reality of demonic influence upon the minds of men, is clearly determined.
Nay, there are many instances, in history, and common life, of prodigious, almost unimaginable wickedness, strangely conceived and executed, which, if they do not prove this doctrine, in the way of sensible experience, perfectly fall in, and harmonize with it. It seems, as if the soul of some men were demoniacal, as the bodies of others have been. Let me appeal to yourselves. Suppose that a person, duly commissioned for that purpose, had dislodged as many devils from Nero or Cæsar Borgia, as our Saviour did from the poor unhappy man of Gadara, would this exorcism have surprized you more in the former case, than the latter? or would not this miracle have furnished us with a better account, than we can now give, of the transcendant wickedness, which possessed the hearts of those monsters?
Indeed, in the simpler ages, our forefathers, who read the scriptures, and believed what they read, constantly ascribed any crime, with which they charged another, to the instigation of the devil; as you may see from the language of those forms, which are used, in criminal prosecutions to this day: and, if those charges be vow considered as mere forms, it was not always so; and a better reason will be required, than can be presently given, why any Christian should so conceive of them.
3. But to all this it be said, “that the doctrine, here laid down, as scriptural, is strange and incredible; that it makes the virtue and happiness of men depend on others, and not themselves; that it supposes a power, adverse to the great Creator and Governor, and able, on many occasions, to prevail against him, which, degrades both his sovereignty and his wisdom; and that, above all, it represents weak simple men as exposed to the practices of great and subtle tempters, which overturn all our ideas of the divine justice and goodness.”
The objection might be expressed in more words, but you see the drift and force of it. Now, in answer, it would be enough to say, that, let the difficulties be what they will, the doctrine is scriptural. But then, as to those difficulties themselves, I must further say, that they are not peculiar to this doctrine, as revealed in scripture, but bear equally against the natural doctrine of God’s moral government.
For do we not see that we all of us depend in a great measure, for the virtue and happiness we possess, on the conduct of others? Can we look about us, and not perceive an order of beings, I mean, wicked men, opposing themselves to the will of God, traversing his righteous purposes, and prevailing, for a time at least, against his primary intentions? Do they not pervert, corrupt, destroy multitudes every day; and are not the weak and simple permitted to fall into the snares of the wise and crafty? Do not these things evidently take place in our world, and is it thought any derogation from the attributes of God that they should be allowed to do so? Are not men, too oft, a sort of devils to each other, and can we wonder that vice and misery are much in the power of such agents? Yes, but spiritual unseen agents!—Does that make any mighty difference? Is it necessary to suppose that spirits, of whatever rank, are privileged from abusing their free-will, and from being perverse and wicked, as we see men are? And, what if they are unseen? Have we reason to expect, from the present constitution of things, that we should suffer only from the practices of known and visible tempters? As if much of the vice and wretchedness of this life did not come upon us by surprize, as we may say, and when we think little of the cause, or the agent! A lye, flies in the dark, and misleads many into errors, and even crimes. A libel, gets abroad, nobody knows from whom, and yet shall tempt, perhaps drive, unwary multitudes, into rebellion. How many plots of wickedness are laid and succeed, when the plotter is out of sight and not so much as suspected! Nay, a certain cast of mind, or temperament of body, things, wholly unknown and unthought of by most men, shall, without great care and circumspection, be fatal to our virtue. Even the air, we breathe, (which, like the prince of the power of the air, is to us invisible) has a secret, and yet, sometimes, powerful influence on our passions. And shall we still disbelieve the seduction of an evil spirit, because he steals insensibly upon us?
But the true answer to all objections of this sort, whether men or devils be the tempters, is, that neither shall prevail, but by our own fault, by some carelessness, or wilful corruption of our own hearts, which are always sufficiently admonished, that the enemy is at hand, when evil thoughts, however produced, begin to stir in them. Then is the time to watch, and resist: and our resistance, the text tells us, will not be in vain. And what though legions of spirits lay siege to us! We may call more than twelve legions of angels, even the holy Spirit of God himself, to our assistance, if we please; for greater is HE THAT IS IN US, than he that is in the world[236]. So faithful is God, after all our impious surmises and distrust of his gracious providence, who will not suffer us to be tempted above that we are able, though Satan himself be the tempter, but will with the temptation also, if we be careful to do our part, make a way for us to escape[237].
4. And this being the case, all objections to the doctrine here inculcated, fall to the ground; so that I have only to remind you, in two words, (for the time will not allow many) of the moral and religious uses, we ought to make of it.
I shall but mention ONE, of each sort.
1. In a RELIGIOUS view, the belief of this doctrine is of the utmost importance: for the whole scheme of Redemption is founded upon it. For therefore Christ came into the world, and suffered upon the cross, that, through death, as St. Paul says, he might destroy him, that had the power of death, that is, the DEVIL[238]. And, universally, for this purpose (I quote the words of St. John) the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the DEVIL[239]. It concerns us, then, infinitely, to take heed lest, by denying, or questioning, or explaining away, the existence and agency of the evil spirit, we subvert the foundation of our faith, detract from the glory of our Saviour’s passion, and unthankfully despise the riches of his goodness in dying for us: nay, and lest we blaspheme the Holy Ghost; who was given to help our infirmities[240], to strengthen us with might in the inner man[241], and therefore to save us, from the power of that spirit, which worketh in the children of disobedience[242].
2. In a MORAL view it is, also, of great importance, that we entertain right notions on this subject.
I know that the world and the flesh are powerful enemies enough, and that we need not wish to signalize our courage by a contest with any other.
But if there be another, we are concerned to know what our danger is, and to provide against it. Security is generally fatal; especially when the strength of the enemy is greater than we take it to be. Therefore, let us learn from scripture, what that strength is; and let us use all diligence in resisting (as we have long since engaged to do) not the world and the flesh only, but also, the DEVIL. This is the advice of the text—Resist the DEVIL. And then, too, is the advice of the Apostle Peter—Be sober, be vigilant; become your adversary, the DEVIL, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour[243] (words, by the way, which put the personality of the tempter out of all question); Whom resist, says he, stedfast in the FAITH; under the protection of which shield, we shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of THE WICKED[244].
By the fear of the Lord, men depart from evil.
All the authority of Solomon’s name and wisdom will, I doubt, be no more than sufficient to procure respect to this observation; which some may consider as a trite and vulgar truth, scarce deserving their regard; while others, perhaps, will not so much as allow it to be a truth at all, but indeed a vulgar mistake, arising out of the narrow views of ignorant or superficial declaimers. It may be slighted by one set of men, as conveying no information, and by another, as conveying a wrong one.
Let me attempt then to rescue the sacred text from both these imputations. Permit me to shew you, that the observation, it contains, is neither so generally received, as to make all further discourse about it frivolous and unnecessary; nor yet, on the other hand, of so questionable a nature, as to justify the scorn with which it is sometimes rejected.
I. To those, who are such fastidious hearers of the word, as to disregard an important truth, because repeatedly inforced upon them, I might reply that such truths can never be insisted upon too much, that our duty is to inculcate them, in season, and out of season.
But the fact is mistaken. We are so far from nauseating our hearers, with a too common and superfluous truth, when we remind them perpetually, that, by the fear of God, men depart from evil, that, on the contrary, very many want to be informed, or at least convinced, of it.
What the text affirms, is, that the fear of God, or the RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE, is the proper guide of life. But look now into the world, at large: there the acknowledged rule of life, is FASHION. Look into the civil or political world: there the boasted rule of life, is THE LAW OF THE MAGISTRATE. Look into the learned world: there too commonly the only rule of life is each man’s own reason, or what he proudly calls PHILOSOPHY.
And will it now be said that the fear of God, is a principle too stale and too unquestioned to be discoursed upon and recommended to you from this place, when we see so large and so considerable a part of the world actuated by one or other of these different and discordant principles? But neither
II. Is the truth, though far enough from being generally received, so slightly grounded as to justify any man in the contempt of it.
It is a truth, taught of God, and revered by all wise men. It has nature, and reason, and experience on its side; and is only combated by the folly, the short-sighted policy, or lastly, the pride, of half-thinking and presumptuous men.
For to give, now, the godless principles, I before mentioned, a short and separate examination.
1. Tell the man of the world, that the religious principle is that by which alone he ought to govern himself, and you are presently told of the power and prerogatives of FASHION.
“The fear of God, he will say, may be the proper rule of monks and hermits; but must be qualified, at least, in many respects, by such as live in the world and mix in the society of it. They who have to converse with mankind, are to accommodate themselves to their notions and practices: they are to think with the rest of the world, or at least they are to act with them: they are to found their moral systems on the liberal and enlarged basis of approved use or custom. Their observation of human life must inform them of the ways that men take to conciliate the good will of their fellows, to prosecute their own advantages in the world, and to acquire the confidence and esteem of that society, in which they are stationed. What they find to be the rule of others, must be a rule to themselves. To do otherwise is not weakness, only: It is, besides, arrogance, incivility, inhumanity.”
All this is thought plausible by some men; and taken together, it must be owned, forms a very easy and commodious system: but how consistent with conscience, with duty, and with common sense, they will do well to consider. For if fashion only be to regulate our conduct in all cases, I ask not what becomes of piety, but of humanity itself, I mean of those offices which we owe to others and to ourselves, and which reason dictates to us in every situation. Custom, you will say, is practical reason. But what! To be led blind-fold by the prevailing practice, whatever it be, what is it but to renounce our intelligent nature, and to live at hazard, and without reason? Further still: If it be sufficient to do as we see others creditably do, without examining any farther, we shall often find ourselves involved, I do not say in the most irrational, the most inconsistent, but the most horrid practices. Then, killing with malice and with forethought, if the point of honour prevail, will be no murder: And, adultery, if the law of politeness so ordain, shall hide its atrocious nature under the mask of gallantry: Then shall society at large become a scene of fraud and rapine; good faith, shall be termed simplicity, and fair dealing, folly.
Go now, and say that the fear of God is a needless restraint on free spirits; and count the advantages which ye have reason to promise to yourselves, from acknowledging no other guide of life, but imperious fashion!
2. A graver set of men come next, and tell us, “That fashion is indeed a very uncertain guide of life: But that LAW, the result of the public wisdom, armed with the public force, is an adequate rule of human action; that the legislator’s province is to enact such salutary laws, and the magistrate’s duty, to carry them into execution, as shall be sufficient to secure the peace and order of society; And that every other rule of life is at once unnecessary and ineffectual: unnecessary, because the interests of virtue are amply provided for by the wisdom of law; and ineffectual, because no other principle has force enough to exact obedience: That, in particular, the fear of God is too remote a consideration to restrain the tumultuous passions of men, which are held in subjection by nothing but the instant terrors of civil justice; in a word, that where the law of the state is duly enforced, there is no need of other restraints; and that, lastly, to lay a stress on the religious principle is to weaken the operation of law, as it opens a door to fanaticism and superstition.”
This plea of the politician receives an apparent force from this certain truth, That law is indeed of indispensable necessity, and that the general virtue and happiness of a people cannot be maintained without it. We join him therefore very cordially in this encomium on civil justice; but must remind him, withal, that neither is the religious principle superseded by it, nor can civil justice itself maintain its due course, without the support of the religious principle: That, when the authority of law has done its best, there will be much for religion to controul and regulate; much, that is not within the reach of law, and without its jurisdiction: That the fear of the Lord penetrates deeper and farther, than the sword of the magistrate; and that, even within his own province, all his policy and all his power will take a very imperfect effect, without the concurrence of a higher principle; as he himself is abundantly convinced from the necessity of fortifying his own most important constitutions, by the religion of an oath; which is nothing else but an appeal to the fear of God, under a sense of its being a needful supplement to the fear of the magistrate.
Yet society, they say, is entirely upheld by the authority of law; at least, the world may go on very well, by virtue of that only. Yes; It may go on, as we see it does, full of open violence, which all its terrors cannot restrain; and of secret frauds, for which it cannot so much as project a remedy: It may go on, indeed, but polluted by vices of all sorts, which are not the objects of law, and even by crimes, which are often too strong for it: It may go on indeed, till the religious principle be quite effaced from the minds of men (if we may have leave for a moment, to put so desperate, and, thank God, so impossible a case); but, when that dreadful time comes, society itself, with all its bulwark of laws, must inevitably be swept away with it.
Universal history bears testimony to this awful truth; there being no account of any state on the face of the earth, which could ever support itself in general virtue, or general happiness, by the mere force of its civil institutions. And how should it be otherwise, when the fear of God is requisite to enforce the law, as well as to observe it; to supply the state with faithful magistrates, as well as with obedient subjects?
If then this vital principle of religion, so necessary to the conservation of all states, cannot be kept free from some mixture of fanaticism or superstition, we are surely to endure the inconvenience, as we can, rather than put the interests of society to hazard by suspending them all on the weak and false supports of an irreligious policy.
3. Lastly, the PHILOSOPHER’s plea, though specious at first sight, is of all others the weakest. For fashion, if it chance to be on the side of virtue, will be punctually followed: And the sword of the magistrate can, in part, at least, enforce obedience. But what coercive power is there in philosophy? It may see and determine right: but who, or what shall compell this supreme directress of life to observe its own determinations? “The fitness, it may be said, of those determinations themselves; the very reason of the thing being the proper restraint of reasonable natures.” Still the question returns, What if I am disposed to throw off this restraint? I act against conviction, indeed, and am self-condemned, which to a liberal mind is no small punishment. But look into the world, and see if that punishment be sufficient to induce the bulk of mankind, nay the gross body of philosophers themselves, to depart from evil.
And what, after all, is this magnified reason? One man admits no other rule of life but abstract truth, or what he calls the differences of things: Another, will hear of none, but an instinctive moral sense: And a third, entrenches himself within the narrow circle of private happiness. These several systems have been laid down, each in its turn, as the only proper basis of moral action: But could the patrons of them be made to agree in any one; or could their several schemes be made, as perhaps they might, to consist together: still, they could only serve to acquaint us what the nature of virtue is; they do but slenderly provide for the practice of it.
Let the philosophers, then, debate this matter among themselves. It is enough for us to learn of Solomon, to fear God: To fear HIM, who is everywhere and essentially present; who is conscious to all our actions and all our thoughts; from whose knowledge there is no escape, from whose justice there is no appeal, and to whose power there is no hope, or possibility of resistance.
With this principle, an unquestioned principle of reason, if there be any, deeply rooted in the mind, we have indeed an adequate rule of life; or, what is better, a controuling motive to put in practice whatever rule of life we chuse to follow. Moral systems, taken by themselves, are poor ineffective things; even virtue’s self is but a name, till the religious principle be infused into her. Then it is, that she lives and acts, and by her powerful influence inclines the hearts of men to depart from evil.
Nor let any man apprehend that this religious fear will degrade, or servilize his virtue. To be free from sin, and only the servants of God, is the truest and noblest liberty.
Dismissing, then, all other rules of life, let us adhere to that, which Solomon prescribes to us. It had been venerable from any hands, but comes with an extraordinary grace and propriety from HIM, who delivers it. So that none of the parties, concerned in this discourse, can excuse themselves from paying a peculiar deference to his judgment.
1. The MEN OF THE WORLD can have no pretence for declining this determination. The author of it is no obscure sordid moralist, whose views of life are confined to a cloyster or a cottage. He addresses them from the throne of Israel, when it was the pride of the East; and from the center of a court, which he had made the envy of the surrounding nations. The followers of fashion will then act but agreeably to their own principles, if they respect the example of such a court, and the authority of its sovereign.
2. The POLITICIANS will reflect, that their instructor is himself a great magistrate, consummate in the arts of government; who yet could find no secret, but that of the fear of God, by which he could reign securely himself, or promote the real welfare and prosperity of his people. With what complacency do they sometimes urge a political aphorism, taken from Aristotle! But a greater than Aristotle is here.
3. Lastly, to you, the sages of the world, who are, or account yourselves PHILOSOPHERS, nothing can be so respectable to you, as the authority of ONE, whose name is the name itself of wisdom; of ONE, who, like you, had given his heart to know wisdom[245]; who had an understanding, at least, equal to yours, and an experience of life, far greater. Yet even HE delivers it, as the result of all his knowledge, That by the fear of the Lord men depart from evil.
It is indeed this principle only, which gives its proper direction and integrity to every other. It controuls Fashion; supplies the defects of Law; and enforces the conclusions of Reason. It rectifies all our systems, and gives sense and solidity to all our speculations.
To conclude, Let us all be wise enough to reverence the plain doctrine of the text, and to act upon it: The rather, as that doctrine is not only just and reasonable in itself, but proceeds from one, whom the Spirit of God had been pleased to inform with celestial wisdom.
All things are lawful unto me; but all things are not expedient: All things are lawful for me; but I will not be brought under the power of any.
It would be taking up too much of your time, and of this discourse, to explain minutely the occasion of these words, and the connexion they have with the general argument of this chapter. Let it suffice to say, that they are introduced as an answer to something which the Corinthian Christians did, or might alledge for their neglect of the instructions, given them by the Apostle. We may conceive them to speak to this effect—“What you enjoin us so strictly to avoid, is not one of those practices which can be deemed unlawful: it is not, as we conceive, condemned by the law of nature, certainly, not by the law of that society to which we belong. Now in matters of this kind, there is no need of advice or direction: the things being indifferent in themselves, we may do as we please, and we are disposed, in the present case, to make use of our Christian liberty.”
To this plea, or suggestion, the Apostle replies in the text: “Admitting, says he, the truth of what ye alledge for yourselves, it does not follow that I may not properly and usefully direct your conduct, in the present case. For suppose that all things are lawful to me, all things are not expedient: And, again, though all things are lawful to me, I will not be brought under the power of any.”
St. Paul, you see, does not stay to consider whether the things forbidden to the Corinthians, were lawful or not (though possibly they might mistake in that assumption, as licentious or thoughtless people, we know, every day do) but, be this as it may, he insists that he had reason to lay them under some restraint even in lawful things, because the practice of such things was inexpedient, in many respects; And because, if all other considerations might be overlooked, it is enough that an unrestrained indulgence in them begets slavish habits, and would, in the end, destroy, or very much impair, their moral freedom.
Of the words, thus far opened, I propose to make this use; to dissuade you from giving a full scope to the pursuit even of innocent pleasures; and that, from the two considerations, expressed in the text:
I. That such devotion of ourselves to them is, on many other accounts, hurtful and improper—all things are not expedient: And
II. That, in particular, it violates the dignity of human nature, by taking from us, or weakening to a great degree, that manly authority of reason, that virtuous self-command, which we should always retain, and be in a condition to exert, even in indifferent matters—I will not be brought under the power of any.
1. Wealth and prosperity have a natural tendency to alter, that is, in the language of moralists, to corrupt, the public manners. Hence it is that the old English habits of plainness, industry, and frugality, are, now, exchanged for those of indulgence, dissipation, and expence. All the elegant accommodations of life have an unusual stress laid upon them; and there seems to be a general effort to advance them all to the last degree of refinement. The superfluous, which we call the fine arts, excite an universal admiration, and administer, in ten thousand ways, to a luxurious, which, again, takes the name of a polite, indulgence. Hence, society, which used to fill only the vacant intervals of business, is now become the business of life; and yet is found insipid (so insatiable is the love of dissipation) if it be not, further, quickened by amusements. These have multiplied upon us so prodigiously, that they meet us at every turn, and in every shape; nay, are grown so common, that they would almost lose the name of amusements, if every possible art were not employed to give a poignancy to them, and if fashion, after all, more than the pleasure they afford, did not support the credit of them. As the last resource of the weary disappointed mind, we have found means to interest our keenest passions in one species of amusement, which is therefore called play, by way of eminence; and is become the favourite one, because the most violent: just as the hottest cordials succeed to the free use of strong liquors.
In this state of things (a very alarming one, in all views) nothing threatens the utter ruin of the little virtue, that is left among us, so much, as the general persuasion, that such pursuits may be indulged to any degree, because they are commonly acknowledged to be lawful. Here, then, the distinction of the Apostle comes in very seasonably, and may, one would hope, be pressed on the lovers of pleasure, with some effect. We may question, it seems, the expediency of these pursuits, how indifferent soever they be in their own nature; and a little reflexion will shew that they are, indeed, inexpedient, that is, unprofitable, unadvisable, improper, in a great variety of respects.
I do not suppose, at present, that the expence of them is ruinous to those, who devote themselves to these pleasures (for then they would plainly not be lawful to such persons); but consider, if you can afford to pay the price of them ever so well, they take up too much of your time: abundantly too much, if you have any profession to follow, or to prepare yourselves for, as most men have; but too much, if you have not, because it might, and should be employed on better things.
Then, of the little time, they leave to yourselves, they disable you, in some degree, for making the proper use. For they dissipate the attention; they relax the nerves of industry and application; they spread a languor over all the faculties, and make the exertion of them, to any valuable purpose, painful at least, if not impossible. We hear it generally observed, that there is a scarcity of able men in all the departments of life. Can it be otherwise, when the vigour of the mind, which should nourish all great and laudable efforts, which is so requisite to push the active powers of invention, or recollection, to their full extent, is wasted on trifles, is checked by frivolous habits, and left to languish under them?
Or say, that you have force of mind enough to elude this so natural effect of dissipation, is it nothing that, by giving your countenance to it, you draw in weaker spirits to make the dangerous experiment? that you help to propagate the enfeebling passion through all quarters, till, from this authorized scene of vanity, the Capital, the contagion spreads (as we see it now does) to the smaller towns, and even to private houses, in the remotest provinces? that you contribute to make respectable I know not what frivolous and worthless arts, and, of course, to multiply the professors of them, to the great discouragement and decay of useful industry? that you hurt the interests of society, by giving an air of importance to the veriest trifles, and by diverting on these the attention, and the passion, that should regularly, and would otherwise, exert themselves on nobler objects?
I might push these questions still further. For I remember what history attests, and what wise men have said, on the chapter of polite arts and elegant amusements.
“They tell us, how sad a sign[246] of the times it is, when they grow into general repute among us; that from incessantly indulged appetites (let the object of them be what it will) such an impotence of mind may follow, such a lust of gratification, such an impatience of controuling a predominant fancy, as shall overleap all the fences of discretion and virtue. The dæmon of taste, say they, shall be obeyed, in defiance of every private and public duty, till distress, disgrace, and infamy break in upon us; till we seek the relief of our wants in fraud and rapine, involve the public ruin in our own, and, in the end, rush blindfold, through an extreme of profligacy, to desperation.”
To this effect, and in this tone, have some inveighed against our more refined and elegant amusements. But I return to what are commonly known by that name: and with respect to these, allow me to say that the life of man is a serious thing[247]: so serious, that dissolute, I mean, untempered, continued mirth, or pleasure, is not of a piece with it[248]. Our virtue, our hopes, nay, our present happiness depends on keeping the mind in a firm and steady frame. Whatever encroaches on this manliness of temper, is pernicious, and unchristian.
I will indulge the extreme candour to suppose, that, in a constant round of lawful amusements, you do not forget, or intermit your moral and religious duties. But with what spirit are they performed? With disgust, I doubt; but certainly, with indifference. Nor is this the worst. Temptations are to be expected in this life: and in what condition are we to meet them? Nay, we expose ourselves to needless temptation, even in the midst of these lawful pleasures; and we bring no power with us, hardly the inclination, to withstand it. The present scene distracts the mind, and fascinates the senses. And, in this delirium of the whole man, without God in his thought, or heaven in his eye, what wonder if he become the sport, and, almost before he is aware, the victim of every passion!
Still he is not happy in this feverish state: at most, he but forgets himself, for a moment: and the intervals of his amusement, which, in the nature of things, must be many and long, are filled with disgust and languor. Nay, the very amusement wears out by frequent repetition. And then such a sickliness of mind succeeds, and such a weariness of living on in a too much used and exhausted world, as is insupportable and fatal to him[249].
You see then there are many good reasons, which shew the inexpediency of prosecuting even lawful pleasures with an unrestrained passion. But, if all others were away, there is ONE consideration still behind, and of so much weight, that St. Paul scruples not to make a distinct argument of it, and to press it on the Corinthian Christians, as fully decisive of the point in question—All things are lawful for me; but I WILL NOT BE BROUGHT UNDER THE POWER OF ANY—And to unfold this argument is what I proposed to myself
2. Under the second head of this discourse.
It should be the ambition of every man to preserve the independency of his own mind on all his natural or acquired inclinations. The dignity of his character depends on this supremacy: and his virtue is no longer secure, than while he retains the power, on all occasions, to exert it.
1. The stoical wise man was exposed to much ridicule by taking to himself the name and office of a king. The pretensions were high, no doubt, and the language, something arrogant and ostentatious. But, let the terms, we employ, be what they will, all philosophy, that deserves the name, must agree in this, That to have the command of himself, is the duty, and chief distinction of a wise man[250]. There is, then, a consistency and harmony in his whole conduct. We naturally respect those who give this proof of respecting themselves; and we place an entire confidence in the vigour and uniformity of their character.
Again: though the virtue of self-denial shine out to most advantage in the conquest of ardent passions and violent temptations, its use is not inconsiderable in curbing all the lighter fancies. The reason is, that custom prevails insensibly, and reaches farther than we, at first, intended. By humouring the mind in trifles, we teach it to presume on its own importunity, in greater matters: and it will be found a convenient rule in the management of our passions, as of our children, to refuse a compliance with them, not merely when they ask improper things, but when they ask any thing with impatience.
Even our curiosity, an innocent and useful passion, should be kept within bounds, and not indulged, as we see it is, on every occasion that presents itself to us.
The continence of Scipio has been much and justly applauded. But he went a step too far, in seeing his captive. He triumphed, indeed, over the stronger temptation, but he was not enough on his guard against the weaker: by complying too easily with a frivolous curiosity, he risked the honour of that virtue, which a pagan historian finds so divine in ONE, who was et juvenis, et cœlebs, et victor[251].
To apply these reflexions to the case before us. It may seem to be a matter of great indifference, whether we indulge an inclination for lawful amusements, or not. But the dignity of our character is concerned in keeping a strict hand over our inclinations of every sort: and, if it were only for an exercise of self-government, it would be worth the while to moderate, that is, frequently to suspend, the use of a favourite, though innocent gratification. To be enslaved by vicious habits, is the ignominy of a little mind: to be superior to all, is the glory of a great one.
2. But, in truth, there is no security in any case, if we let go this habit of self-government. One compliance inevitably brings on another; and, though we set out with the design of stopping at a certain point, we shall almost fatally be carried much farther. We meant to acquiesce in this, confessedly harmless, indulgence: constant use makes it insipid; and then we venture on one of a suspicious character. Being now on the confines of vice, we are easily pushed into that quarter; with some doubt and hesitation, at first; but scruples give way, as the habit strengthens, and all vices being connected with each other, especially all of one sort, we, by degrees, make the trial of all: and thus, from an innocent fancy, or inclination, indulged too freely, at setting out, we slip insensibly, and beside our purpose, into manifest, perhaps universal, dissolution.
So salutary, so divine is the resolution of the Apostle! All things are lawful for me: but I will not be brought under the power of any.
To interdict amusements, altogether, to the vivacity of youth, would be severe and cynical. They are abundantly too numerous, at present, and too much frequented: but many of them are supposed to be, and some, without doubt, are, in themselves, lawful. Of these, only, I am now speaking: and even of these it must be affirmed, that the unrestrained use of them is not expedient; as, for the other reasons suggested to you in this discourse, so chiefly, because it degrades the man, and enslaves him.
To conclude; the safe and manly part is, to be temperate in all things[252]: to make our pleasures, the occasional relaxation[253] of the mind, and by no means the employment of it: not, perhaps, to affect a total abstinence from them, which the world would account an incivility; but resolutely to forbear all vicious, or but suspected pleasures: and, for the rest, to keep a great deal on this side of what is thought allowable in the use of them.
Ye have heared that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also: And, if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also: And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.
I suppose, if these words had been found in any book whatsoever, except the Bible, no man of sense could have entertained the least doubt of their meaning. But, while one sort of readers think they do honour to God’s word by taking every precept in the most strict and rigid sense, and another, by the same mode of interpretation, hope to dishonour it, we may expect that, between them, the usual rules of criticism will be very little regarded.
The text refers us to a law of Moses, which established the jus talionis, or right of retaliation[254]. This law, in the main, is consonant to natural equity; was of general use and authority in ancient times; has, with some modification, been adopted by legislators of all times; and was peculiarly fit, or rather necessary, in the Mosaic institute, composed in a very remote age of the world, and addressed to a fierce and barbarous people.
But this, so reasonable law, had undergone a double abuse in our Saviour’s time. What was designed, in the hands of the magistrate, to prevent future injury, was construed into an allowance of private and personal revenge: And, again, what was calculated to prevent great and outrageous injuries, was pleaded in excuse for avenging every injury. The Jews retaliated, at pleasure, on those that offended them, and for the slightest offence.
Our divine Master, then, without derogating from the law, when administered in due form, and on a suitable occasion, applies himself to correct these so gross perversions of it—I say unto you, that ye resist not evil—that is, that ye do not retaliate on the person, that does you an injury, in the way of private revenge; or even of a public suit, for small and trivial injuries.
You see, our Lord’s purpose was, to oppose the mild spirit of the Gospel to the rigid letter of the law, or rather to an abusive interpretation of it: And this purpose is declared in three familiar and proverbial sayings, which, together, amount to thus much; “That, when a small or tolerable injury is sustained by any one, either in his person, or property, or liberty, it is far better (and was, thenceforward, to be the law of Christians) to endure patiently that injury, or even to risk a repetition of it, than, by retaliating on the aggressor, to perpetuate feuds and quarrels in the world.”
That such is the meaning of the text, would appear more evidently, if the injuries specified were, further, considered with an eye to the sentiments and circumstances of the Jewish people. A blow on the cheek was, always, an indignity, no doubt; but the sense of it was not inflamed in a Jew by our Gothic notions of honour; though, if it had, the divine Saviour[255] would scarce have advised his followers to extinguish it in the blood of a fellow-citizen: the loss of a vest[256], or under garment, was easily repaired, or not much felt, in the cheap and warm country of Judæa: and the compulsion to attend another[257], on his occasions, was not much resented by a people, that had been familiarised to this usage by their foreign masters.
But, without scrutinizing the expression farther (which, as I said, is of the proverbial cast, and, therefore, not to be taken strictly) it appears certainly, that the rule enjoined is no more than this, “That we are not to act on the old rigid principle of retaliation, but rather to exercise a mutual patience and forbearance, in our intercourse with each other, for the sake of charity and peace.”
Still, it has been asked, whether this rule be a reasonable one, and whether the conduct, it prescribes, be not likely to do more hurt, than good to mankind?
The ground of this question is laid in following considerations:
First, that resentment, being a natural passion, was, without doubt, implanted in us for valuable purposes, and that its proper and immediate use is seen in repelling injuries:
Secondly, That to eradicate, or to suppress this movement of nature, is to dispirit mankind, and to effeminate their character; in other words, to make them unfit for the discharge of those offices, which the good of society requires:
Lastly, That this softness of temper is injurious to the individuals, in whom it is found, as it exposes them to many insults, and much ill usage, which the exertion of a quick and spirited resentment would enable them to avoid:
From all which, conclusions are drawn very unfavourable to the doctrine of the text, and to the honour of our divine Master. It will, then, be proper to give the premises a distinct and careful examination. And,
I. The use of the natural passion of resentment is not superseded by the law of Jesus. For the legitimate use of this passion is to quicken us in repelling such injuries as would render human life wholly burthensome and uneasy to us, not of those petty affronts and discourtesies which afflict us much less by being dissembled and forgiven, than by being resented and returned. Now Christianity does not require us to renounce the right of nature in repelling injuries of the former class. The law in question, as explained by our Lord himself, does not, we have seen, import thus much: and for the rest, the appeal is open to the principles of nature and common sense—Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right[258]? The practice of the Apostles (the best comment on the law) shews, too, that, on certain critical and urgent occasions[259], they scrupled not to take advantage of those principles. So that universally, as it would seem, where the ends of self-preservation, or of prepollent public utility, require and justify resistance in other men, there it is left free for Christians, likewise, to resist evil; the purpose of their divine legislator being, in this instance, to explain the law of nature, and to guard it from the abuse of our hasty passions, not to abrogate, or suspend it.
If any case be excepted from the general permission, it is that of persecution for the sake of his religion. And possibly this exception was made in the early days of Christianity, to afford a striking proof to the world that this religion owed its success to the divine protection only, and not to the power of men. Accordingly, the command given in that case has an extraordinary, that is, a suitable, promise[260], annexed to it. But the end of God’s special providence having been answered, and the prophecies accomplished[261], by the patience of the saints under the fiery trial of persecution in those days (whence the miraculous establishment of our religion is evinced) it seems allowable to suppose that the Christian world was, thenceforth, in this, as in other instances, to conduct itself by the ordinary rules and principles of human wisdom; provided that the object of that wisdom be necessary self-defence, and not dominion, or revenge, which, in all the forms of either, Christianity forbids and reprobates.
But be this as it may, in cases where religion is not concerned, it seems clear that Christians are left at liberty to repell intolerable oppressions by all those means, which human wisdom dictates. And there is no need of drawing the line very exactly between tolerable and intolerable injuries, because the aggressor, knowing the force of instinctive passion, has reason, always, to fear, that it will begin to operate too soon, rather, than too late.
The apprehension, then, that the proper use of the natural passion, “resentment of injuries”, is likely to be defeated by the patient genius of the Gospel, is weakly entertained: While, on the other hand, every one must see the convenience of putting this fiery sentiment of indignation under some restraint, and of interdicting the exertion of it in cases, to which so violent a remedy is ill and hurtfully applied.
But
II. It is said, that this doctrine of the Gospel tends to dispirit and effeminate mankind, and to render Christians unfit for many offices, which society requires of them.
What these offices are, one does not readily conceive, since it is allowed that evil may be resisted, when it becomes excessive, that is, when it is worth resisting. But, I suppose, the objectors mean, this patient spirit of Christianity damps the vigour with which it is for the interest of men in society that their civil rights should be asserted, or a foreign enemy repelled: they think, in short, it makes bad citizens, and worse soldiers.
Now to the FORMER charge I reply, that it only tends to check, or prevent, the turbulent, the factious, the seditious spirit of any community (which is surely doing it no hurt) while, at the same time, it allows men to assert their essential civil interests by every reasonable exertion of firmness and courage; nay, inculcates those principles of a disinterested love for mankind, and what is properly called a public spirit, which make it their duty to do so. And they will not do it with the less effect, for waiting till the provocation given appear to all men to be without excuse. The fury of a patient man, is almost proverbial: and particularly, in this case, it is to be expected that, when the natural incitement to resistance, long repressed and moderated, comes at length to be authorised by necessity, and quickened by sense of duty, it will act with a force and constancy, not a little formidable to those against whom it is directed. There is no danger, then, that true patriotism should suffer by the meek principles of the Gospel of peace.
As to the OTHER charge of their weakening the military spirit, it must be owned again, they would render wars less frequent than they now are, and less destructive—forgive Christianity this wrong—but, when the necessity of self-defence (the only justifiable ground of war) is real and instant, I know not, why the Christian prince, or Christian soldier, should want courage, because he had given proof of this equitable forbearance; or, that either will be likely to do his duty the worse, for knowing that what he does, is his duty.
And, if we appeal to fact, it is enough known, that the Christian soldiery have been no disgrace to their profession; no, not even then, when the unresisting spirit was at its height, I mean, in the early days of our religion. Christians had many good reasons for not being forward to serve in the Roman armies; but some of them did serve there; without doubt, when they were released from such military obligations and observances, as they esteemed idolatrous: Nay, it appears, that the number of Christian soldiers was, on some occasions, considerable: Yet we no where find, that these patient men misbehaved themselves in a day of action; or, that they threw away their swords, when they had said their prayer.
And I give this instance of bravery in the primitive Christians, the rather, because it cannot be imputed to a fanatic spirit, which is able, we know, to controul any principles: It cannot, I say, be imputed to a fanatic spirit, because religion was not the object of those wars, in which they were engaged: They were left, then, to the proper influence of their own principles; which at that time had their full effect upon them, and yet did not prevent them from acting with the true spirit of their profession, that is, with a full sense of the duty imposed upon them by their engagements to the state.
With regard to the publick, then, there is no reason to think that our Lord’s injunction will disserve it, in any respect.
III. The last, and most plausible objection to the conduct prescribed in the text, is, “That the tame spirit, it discovers, is injurious to individuals, and only serves to provoke much insult and ill usage, which a quick resentment and return of injuries would prevent.”
This is the common plea, and passes with many for a full justification, of that false honour, which predominates in the world, but is equally frivolous with the other pretences, already confuted.
For,
1. It is taken up on a groundless and mistaken notion, that the unfriendly and malevolent passions are the most natural to mankind. On the contrary, man is by nature, kind and generous; proud and vindictive, indeed, if stimulated by ill treatment, but prompted, again, by that very pride, to relent at the appearance of gentleness and submission in the party offending; and easily disposed to lay aside the thoughts of revenge, when no obstinate resistance seems to make it necessary. There are, certainly, few persons, at least in civilized life, of so base a temper, as to insult others, and much less to insult them the more, for their gentle inoffensive manners. Or, if such monsters there be, they will soon become detestable in society; while the objects of their unprovoked fury find an asylum in the general good-will and favour of mankind.
They, therefore, who pretend that the world cannot be kept in order, but by resentment and revenge, will do well to make trial of the opposite conduct, before they have recourse to so boisterous a remedy. They will probably find, that only by PRIDE cometh contention[262], and that they have injured their species, in thinking otherwise.
2. Let it be remembered, that the Gospel neither forbids us to take the benefit of the laws in cases, where the injury is considerable, nor to resist, without law, in extreme cases; besides, that our corrupt nature will often get the better of principle, I mean, when the provocation is not of that size, as to justify either remedy. Whence it follows, that brutal force and malignity will lie under many restraints, and will rarely be encouraged by the passive temper of a conscientious Christian, to proceed to such lengths, as the objection supposes. But,
3. Lastly, and principally, we should call to mind, that, though some ungenerous dispositions should take advantage of our dissembling smaller injuries, to repeat, or even increase them, till they come at length to the utmost verge of what we call tolerable injuries, yet it does not follow, from such inconvenience, that the law is to be accounted inexpedient. For the law has a general end in view, the good of society at large, or of the individual: And the law is a proper one, if the end be commonly and for the most part attained by the conduct prescribed, though with some exceptions.
That the lawgiver foresaw the possibility of such exceptions, is clear from the language, employed by him. If a blow on one cheek be patiently received, it may be succeeded by a blow on the other: if we suffer our coat to be taken away, our cloke may follow it: and if we make no resistance to the requisition of going one mile, we may be compelled to go two. The inconvenience, then, is supposed and admitted in the law itself; but it was seen not to be of moment enough to evacuate the law. Generally speaking, it will be better to bear the inconvenience, than to violate the law; better for the injured party himself, but certainly better for society, at large.
We are certain, that the law will operate this effect, because the lawgiver is, by supposition, divine. He, who knew what was in man, what his nature, and true interest, is, could not mistake in adapting the law to the subject of it. And then, for the exceptions, he has it in his power to make amends for those, and to recompense fully, as he engages to do, any sacrifice we make to conscience, acting within the scope and purpose of the law.
So that, on the whole, it is but a just deference to the law, and to the authority of the lawgiver, to abstain from resisting evil, according to the true sense and spirit of the command, though, by so doing, we subject ourselves to some, nay to much inconvenience. For he must be slenderly instructed in the school of Christ, who is yet to learn, that greater sacrifices, than these, must be made, if need be, for the sake of him who died for us.