History of the war in the Peninsula, Vol. 6 of 6

‘Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of the town is a very high hill (mamelon tres elévé), which commands all the plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (rideau), which forms the basin of the Guadiana. Two roads or openings (débouchés) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (rideau), which, from the right of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa Neuva de la Serena.’... ‘The ridge which confines the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (movemens de terrain) more or less apparent. It completely commands (domine parfaitement) the valley of the Guadiana; and it was at the foot of this ridge the enemy’s cavalry was posted. Not an infantry man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy’s army was masked behind this ridge of Don Benito.’... ‘Favoured by this ridge, he could manœuvre his troops, and carry them upon any point of the line he pleased without being seen by us.’

Now ‘rideau’ can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a steppe or a ridge; but, in this case, it could not mean a steppe, since the Spanish army was hidden behind it, and on a steppe it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a high ridge, because it not only perfectly commanded the basin of the Guadiana, overlooking the steppe which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge of land, mark, reader, not a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance.’ Here then we have another measure of value for the reviewer’s topographical pretensions.

The reference to French military reports and registers has not been so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession the general report and register of Soult’s army, which enables me to show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses me of painting the wretched state of Soult’s army at St. Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s own account, and the account of Le Noble, historian of the campaign, and ordonnateur en chef or comptroller of the civil administration of the army.

Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.

‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, the shattered and exhausted state (“delabrement et epuisement”) of the “corps d’armée,” and the insufficiency of the means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St. Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’... ‘Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; the parc which since the Carion had not been seen now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña), together with various detachments that the previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were connected with the duke of Belluno’s, &c. &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties.’

‘The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country.’

Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have celebrated marshal Soult for the reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without one word of praise towards the French marshal.

To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’ position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘the big book which contains all that sir George does not know.’ For, first, Heudelet’s register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February, the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer’s other objections. And I request the reader, both now and always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.

‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.

‘The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra. It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense (on disait le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia.

‘The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon Ribadavia.

‘The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, overthrew them in the morning of the 17th, and pursued them to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body far more numerous. General Heudelet having come up with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered fighting.

‘The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, where three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves, Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was before him.’

The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says, ‘The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. The 20th, the other divisions followed the movement upon Orense.’ Here then, besides increasing the bulk of the book, containing what sir George does not know, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth.

In the above extracts nothing is said of the ‘eight or ten thousand Spaniards;’ nothing of the ‘strong rugged hill’ on which they were posted; nothing of ‘Soult’s presence in the action.’ But the reader will find all these particulars in the Appendix to the ‘Victoires et Conquêtes des Français,’ and in ‘Le Noble’s History of Soult’s Campaign.’ The writers in each work were present, and the latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects and numbers of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out by Soult’s report, I set the Spaniards down at 8,000 or 10,000, grounding my estimate on the following data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body far more numerous. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3d. ‘Three or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.’ Finally, the expression eight or ten thousand showed that I had doubts.

Let us proceed with Heudelet’s register. In my history it is said that Soult softened the people’s feelings by kindness and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet’s register, statements of certain excesses, committed principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that count Heudelet blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the people’s feelings, begging the reader to observe that both Heudelet and my history speak of Soult’s stay at Orense immediately after the action at Ribadavia.

‘At this period the prisoners of Romana’s corps (note, the reviewer says none of Romana’s corps were there) had all demanded to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph. The Spanish general himself was far off (fort éloigné). The inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances appeared favourable for the invasion of Portugal.’

Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished the Quarterly Review to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some outrages, committed by Soult’s cavalry, the ground of a false and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. Those outrages he admits himself were vigorously repressed, and they were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the Reviewer’s patriots to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from lord Wellington’s despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, and assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated.

Extract, May 1, 1809.—‘I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again.’

‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success more than sir John Moore’s army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them but if I should not succeed I shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’

‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army.’

‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the —— and —— regiments.’

‘It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed.’... ‘Not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation.’... ‘It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and the officers who are sworn, “well and truly to try and determine according to evidence, the matter before them,” have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them.’... ‘There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment.’... ‘All the foreign armies have such an establishment. The French gendarmerie nationale to the amount of forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still larger amount. While we who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe, have nothing of the kind.’

‘We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.’... ‘I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence,’... ‘We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, but we are worse than an enemy in a country, and take my word for it that either defeat or success would dissolve us.’

‘We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers.’... ‘As matters are now conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting each other while no notice is taken of the murderer.’

‘But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men.’

‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose conduct this tribunal was constituted to controul; the consequence is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and plunder.’

‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the soldiers is infamous.’... ‘At this moment there are three general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts, robbing convoys under their charge, &c. &c. Perjury is as common as robbery and murder.’

‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal.’

‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general court-martial and have been executed.’... ‘I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach.’

‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.’... ‘It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of the French.’

‘The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s early attention to the subject.’

Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate prisoners:—

‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.’

‘I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.’

Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described by its own general through a series of years; and having also from the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is not at once knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of Wellington’s testimony to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the French soldiers were ‘sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.’ But what intolerable injustice it would be to stigmatise either nation for military excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity, and honour.

And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do not express my admiration of their honour in assassinating men whom they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their humanity for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who, after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman’s brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the disparagement of the Spaniards in my history without sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English, who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple, of sir John Moore, of sir John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of lord William Bentinck, of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the duke of Wellington; and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my history.

‘I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration.’... ‘That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy: we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.’... ‘In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off in my presence when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire.’... ‘I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so numerous and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon.’

‘The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy.’... ‘In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is.’... ‘It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill.’... ‘Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual.’... ‘I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.’

‘The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.’

‘The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments.’

‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.’

‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.’

‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received from general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!

‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established. It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner. Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the Guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.

‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. Their courage, and even their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of choice nor of foresight.’

‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has in my opinion been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and they have become odious to the country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.’

‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of general Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them.

‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities—that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.’

‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barrosa) is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.’[11]

So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—

1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is proné by many, amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’

Now reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my history; compare it with the above:—

‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command.’ And again, speaking of his death, I say, ‘He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the expressions are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because this was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of his letters, says, ‘I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler.’ And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to general Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘I know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported it with a tolerably efficient force.’

In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing lord Wellington’s opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, proceeds thus—

‘It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the present state of Spain, that the Spaniards are incapable of forming either a good government or a good army.’... ‘With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarzfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castaños, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O’Donnel.’... ‘You cannot make good officers in Spain.’

If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my history about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of ‘Romana’s cormorants flying into Portugal,’ and says, ‘that foolish fellow the Duque del Parque has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed on the frontier.’ Again—

‘The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance when their front is clear of an enemy.’

‘There never was anything like the madness, the imprudence, and the presumption of the Spanish officers in the way they risk their corps, knowing that the national vanity will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps; but instead of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.’... ‘I have ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in providing these vagabonds if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.’

Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation, made by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, ‘the misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake’s ignorance of his profession and to Mahy’s cowardice and treachery.’

Now if any passage in my history can be pointed out more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an ‘unnatural bias’ against that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my second volume which he was then reviewing, was the following passage; and there are many of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards which he leaves unnoticed.

‘Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not active supporters of their country’s cause; but with a wonderful constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity and merits respect, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the effects nugatory.’—History, vol. ii. chap. 1.

I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon Soult’s government of Oporto and the intrigue of the Anti-Braganza party. Let him however look first at the whole statement of these matters in my book, and not trust the garbled extracts made by the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet’s expedition to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place after Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening before the arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that Soult had laboured to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in my history, namely, that Soult was unprepared for one effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet’s and Riccard’s Registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement.

Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the Portuguese to the French arms because it was the object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a new and independent dynasty; a still greater difference between that and offering the crown to Soult himself; and it was this last which the word unprepared referred to in my history. So far from thinking or saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have expressly said, that he ‘encouraged the design,’ that he ‘acted with great dexterity,’ and I called the whole affair an ‘intrigue.’ But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole affair it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the Anti-Braganza party’s views. He had only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult’s military position made it absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military operations: wisely, therefore, and even magnanimously did he encourage the Anti-Braganza party, drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon’s sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers and parasites, whose knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it.

The facts then stand thus. Heudelet’s expedition through the Entre Minho e Douro took place between the 5th of April and the 27th of that month, and the country people being then in a state of exasperation opposed him vehemently; in my history the combats he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that previous to the Anti-Braganza intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my history the difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts.

I shall now give two extracts from Soult’s general report, before quoted, in confimation of my statements:—

‘Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself strong enough in the province of Entre Minho e Douro, to propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal. In a political view, marshal Soult could not without express authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such authority having lost his own communication with France, and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’

‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the province (Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to their labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves with the idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their hands.’

It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to show how I am wrong in my statement, that, in a strategic point of view it was better to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances led sir Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place sir Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave him to compare it with mine.