Bundesrath; Conseil fédéral.

The three main forms of executive embrace the hereditary and irresponsible king, with or without a responsible ministry; the single responsible president; and the executive council. The most typical examples of these are: the constitutional monarchy of England; the Presidency of the United States; and the Federal Council of Switzerland. Or, there may be said to exist four chief ways in which parliamentary government is worked.

First, that of England, where the executive is the primary and the legislature the ultimate source of power; the English ministers have the right of initiative, but they cannot remain in office without a majority in the House of Commons.

Second, the German plan, where the ministers are solely dependent upon the Crown, but cannot spend money without parliamentary sanction.

Third, there is the constitution of the United States, under which the functions of both branches are clearly defined; the Cabinet being excluded from Congress, and Congress having no control over it, further than the confirmation of its members by the Senate.

Fourth, the Swiss system, wherein the executive is as great a departure from the precedent of the United States, and has produced something at least as widely different from the President of the United States, as he differs from an European king. The Swiss constitution provides no executive head, in the sense of that of the President of the United States; there is practically no such functionary. The Swiss executive has, in fact, none of the functions that are given to the President of the United States, as an independent power in the State, making him as truly the representative of the sovereign people as Congress itself. Andrew Jackson, indeed, habitually prided himself on the privilege of representing the masses; and the use of the veto by the President is in most cases highly popular, for through it the President is expected to counterbalance the power of the legislature.

Not until 1833, was there any project of reform in Switzerland looking to a special federal executive, apart from all the cantonal governments. Previously, the federal executive authority was not vested in any special magistrate or council, but exercised by the council of one or the other of the three directing Cantons, as explained in the “Introduction.” This had of course the inconvenience, among many others, of causing the employment of federal authority to be more or less guided by the politics actually prevalent in each of the three directing Cantons. Up to 1848, the legislative and executive power were vested in the same body. Switzerland, in its federal character, having never known a personal head of any kind, when the old weak Diet was changed into a real federal government, it naturally limited the executive power far more than it is limited in the United States; and the powers left to the executive were no less naturally intrusted, not to a President, but to a council. Unwilling to trust the executive power to any single man, it was placed in the hands of a council of seven. It may be called an impersonal executive. There is nothing about it to invite the homage of those whose chief object it is to find something to abase themselves before; its walks cannot be recorded in a court circular; it holds no drawing-rooms or levées; it pays no one the honor of a visit, and no one has the honor of being invited to visit it in return. A legislature chosen for a fixed term, which cannot be dissolved before the end of that term, chooses an Executive Council, for the term of its own existence. To such a body no scrap or rag of royal purple can hang; and it completely refutes the notion that the executive power of a republic is simply a shadow of kingship, a mere transfer from a life and hereditary tenure to an elected and limited term. The organization, powers, and duties of the Federal Council are defined by the constitution in the following provisions:

1. The supreme direction and executive authority of the Confederation shall be a Federal Council, consisting of seven members.

2. The members of the Federal Council are chosen by the Federal Assembly for the term of three years, from among all Swiss citizens eligible to the National Council. But not more than one member shall be chosen from the same Canton. After every general election for the National Council, the Federal Council shall also be integrally renewed. Vacancies which occur in the course of the three years are filled, for the rest of the term, at the ensuing session of the Federal Assembly.

3. The members of the Federal Council shall not during their term of office hold any other office, either in the service of the Confederation or of a Canton, or follow any other pursuit, or exercise a profession.

4. The Federal Council is presided over by the President of the Confederation. There is also a Vice-President. The President of the Confederation and the Vice-President shall be chosen, for the term of one year, by the Federal Assembly from among the members of the Council. The retiring President is not eligible either as President or Vice-President for the year ensuing. The same member may not hold the office of Vice-President for two consecutive years.

5. The President of the Confederation, and the other members of the Federal Council, shall receive an annual salary from the federal treasury.

6. A quorum of the Federal Council consists of four members.

7. The members of the Federal Council have the right to take part in the discussions, but not to vote in either House of the Federal Assembly; and also the right to make motions on any matter under consideration.

8. The powers and the duties of the Federal Council, within the limits of this constitution, are particularly the following: It directs federal affairs conformably to the laws and resolutions of the Confederation: it shall care that the constitution, federal laws and ordinances, and also the provisions of the federal concordats be observed: it shall take the necessary measures for their execution either on its own initiative or upon complaint, so far as the decision of such affairs has not been vested in the Federal Tribunal. It takes care that the guarantee of the cantonal constitutions is enforced. It proposes bills and resolutions to the Federal Assembly, and gives its opinions upon the propositions sent to it by the Federal Assembly or the Cantons. It executes the federal laws and decrees, the judgments of the Federal Tribunal, as well as the compromises or decisions in arbitration on questions of dispute among the Cantons. It makes such appointments as are not intrusted to the Federal Assembly, Federal Tribunal, or other authority. It examines the treaties made by the Cantons with one another, or with foreign countries, and approves them, if proper. It watches over the external interests of the Confederation, especially in all international relations, and shall, in general, have charge of foreign affairs. It protects the external safety, and the independence and neutrality of Switzerland. It protects the internal safety of the Confederation, and the maintenance of its peace and order. In cases of urgency, and when the Federal Assembly is not in session, the Federal Council shall have authority to raise the necessary troops and employ them, with the reservation that it shall immediately call the Federal Assembly together, if the number of men called out shall exceed two thousand, or if they remain in arms more than three weeks. It has charge of the federal army affairs and all other branches of administration which belong to the Confederation. It examines those laws and ordinances of the Cantons which must be submitted for its approval; it exercises supervision over those branches of cantonal administration that are placed under its control. It administers the finances of the Confederation, introduces the budget, and submits a statement of the accounts of federal income and expenditure. It supervises the conduct of all the officials and employés of the federal administration. It submits to the Federal Assembly at each regular session a report of its administration, and a statement of the condition of the Confederation, internal as well as external; and recommends to its attention such measures as in its judgment are desirable for the promotion of the common welfare. It also makes special reports when the Federal Assembly or either branch thereof requires it.

9. The business of the Federal Council is distributed by departments among its members. This distribution has the purpose only of facilitating the examination and despatch of business; every decision must emanate from the Federal Council as a body (a single authority).

10. The Federal Council and its departments are authorized to call in experts on special subjects.

In the exercise of several of its most important functions the action of the Federal Council is essentially judicial. This is conspicuously so in its right to examine the agreements made by Cantons among themselves or with foreign governments; and to judge of their conformity with the federal constitution. Under the name of “administrative law,” it passes in a judicial capacity upon the validity of numerous cantonal laws and ordinances, such as school affairs, freedom of trade and commerce, patent rights, rights of settlement, freedom from military service, rights of religious bodies, validity of cantonal elections, votes, etc. But there is no efficient instrumentality for the enforcement of the decrees of the Federal Council against the Cantons in these cases. If a Canton adopts a measure which the Council on appeal holds to be unconstitutional, and it declines to conform to the Council’s order, the latter has no direct way of enforcing it. The two methods of coercing a refractory Canton, so far tried, have been,—to send a special agent to negotiate with the cantonal authorities, and should his efforts fail, to quarter troops and the expense of their maintenance upon the offending Canton, until it yields; the other method is to keep back from the Canton subsidies which are to be provided for local purposes from the federal treasury. Both of these methods have been found efficacious. The Federal Council retains, however, under all circumstances, a very affectionate, if not reverential, tone in its communications to the Cantons, addressing them as “Faithful and dear confederates,” and closing, “We embrace this occasion, faithful and cherished confederates, to commend you with ourselves to divine protection.”

The Federal Council exercises wider discretionary authority, in the matter of arrest, of temporary imprisonment, of expulsion from the territory, and the like, than seems inferable from the terms of the constitution. A recent decree of the Federal Council forbade public exhibitions of magnetism and hypnotism. Wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, and in a republic, no less than under a monarchy, discretionary authority on the part of the government means insecurity for legal freedom on the part of the citizen. The Swiss constitution apparently is more democratic than that of the United States, from the fact that it does not vest the veto in any official; yet in the amount of authority which is allowed to the executive power over the citizen it is less democratic. Every legislative measure passes under the inspection of the Federal Council before action by the Federal Assembly; and the measures adopted by the Assembly are promulgated by the Council, signed both by the President of the Confederation and by the Chancellor, the ministerial officer of the Council; no doubt, in all cases, two signatures are safer than one.

The Federal Council, rather than to take the initiative, sometimes, by means of a suggestion from itself, is requested to present to the Assembly a measure; in this event a rejection of the measure would not be regarded by the Council in the light of a defeat. During the recesses of the Assembly the federal Councillors, at the head of committees designated by the Assembly or with expert commissions, meet in different parts of the country, to consider subjects that are to be brought before the Assembly. The bills are then prepared, which, with full and careful explanatory reports, are published in the official journal and carried by the newspapers to every corner of the Confederation. They are discussed by the people, and when the Assembly meets it is ready to take action with but little, if any, debate by the prompt enactment of these recommendations into law, the chief to whose department the subject-matter appertains being present, when it is taken up in the Assembly, to give any further information that may be desired.

All Swiss citizens eligible to the National Council are declared to be eligible to the Federal Council. But practically the qualification of a federal Councillor is prior membership of the National Council. Primarily the selection of federal Councillors is always made from among the members of the National Council; and by a strange custom invariably observed with only one exception since 1848, they are again triennially returned to the National Council from their respective districts while still serving as federal Councillors, and with the full knowledge that within a few days after the convening of the Federal Assembly they will be again chosen by that body for a new term in the Federal Council. This necessitates supplementary elections to fill the vacancies created in the Assembly. Again, at every recurring election of the National Council, one of the sitting members from each district wherein a federal Councillor resides, must make room for this temporary appearance of the federal Councillor in the National Council, as a condition precedent to his re-election. The sitting members cheerfully yield to this exigency, conscious that they are standing aside for a mere locum tenens, and in no wise imperilling the ultimate return to their seats, after a traditional custom has been accommodated. One district has of late years disregarded this custom, declining to go through the empty form of electing to the National Council the federal Councillor residing there, and whose re-election as federal Councillor is conceded. This one obdurate district may, by persisting in its course, be the means of the final overthrow of a practice, which at present involves a double election for six seats every three years at considerable expense and trouble: and apparently incapable of any intelligent explanation. Like many customs, it has simply taken root without any inquiry, and propagates itself without any opposition. A partial explanation may be discovered in the desire to preserve the identity of the federal Councillor with his Canton, and as a renewed declaration that he continues to enjoy the confidence of, and is in accord upon questions of public policy with, that local constituency which in all probability he served for many years in the National Council, before his promotion to the Federal Council. A federal officer holding his office directly from the Federal Assembly, and at the same time invested with the popular confidence of a local constituency equally with the other members of that assembly, presents a most remarkable assertion of local political autonomy in a purely national affair.

Originally these federal Councillors, when during their term elected to the National Council for the purpose of re-election to the Federal Council, took their seats in the former when it convened, and exercised all the functions of a member, yet concurrently holding their portfolios in the Federal Council for an unexpired term. This twofold service continued until their re-election for a new term took place, when they resigned their seats in the National Council, and resumed the single service of federal Councillors. It is related that one member of the Federal Council, some years since, only secured re-election by means of his own vote during his transition service as above described in the National Council. Of late years the exercise of these dual rights and privileges incident to this most singular condition of things, while not in violation of any law, has been regarded with disfavor, and the federal Councillors, during the few days of their membership triennially in the National Council, confine themselves to the privileges and rights that attach to a Councillor.

The geographical assignment of the members of the Federal Council is well established by an unwritten law, which is faithfully observed; a well-established usage in the election of the Federal Council assigns one member to each of the Cantons of Bern, Vaud, Zurich, and Aargau, and St. Gallen or Thurgau, then one each to the Catholic and Italian Swiss. The constitutional inhibition of the choice of more than one member from the same Canton may be regarded as a restriction that limits the choice without any adequate counter-benefit; it may exclude from the government statesmen of high merit, and thus diminish the resources of the state.

The members of the Federal Council can be and are continually re-elected, notwithstanding sharp antagonisms among themselves, and it may be between them and a majority in the Assembly. They also continue to discharge their administrative duties, whether the measures submitted by them are or are not sanctioned by the voters. The rejection of measures approved and proposed by them does not necessarily injure their position with the country. The Swiss distinguish between men and measures. They retain valued servants in their employment, even though they reject their advice. They retain in the service Councillors whose measures the voters nevertheless often refuse to sanction. Valuing the executive ability of these men, still they may constantly withhold assent from their suggestions.

The Council substantially in its present form came into existence with the Constitution of 1848; the first election of its members taking place in November of that year. The election, therefore, which occurred on the 13th of December, 1887, was the fourteenth triennial renewal of the Council, and covered a period of thirty-nine years. During this period the complete roster of the members embraces only twenty-seven names; even this small ratio of change resulted in seven cases from death, and eleven from voluntary retirement; leaving only two who failed to be re-elected on the avowed ground of political divergence. This most remarkable conservatism on the part of the Assembly, in retaining the members of the Council by repeated re-elections, has survived important issues of public policy, including several revisions of the constitution, upon which there was a wide diversity of opinion in the Council; some of whom actively participated in the discussions, antagonizing the views of a majority of the Assembly; the Assembly to which they owed their election and upon which they relied for their retention in office. Their periodical re-election, though seemingly pro forma, carries with it a salutary sense of accountableness. This sure tenure of service in the Federal Council makes those chosen look upon it as the business of their lives. Without this permanence attached to the position, such men as now fill it could not be induced to do so. They are men trained to vigorous personal and intellectual exertion, who often surrender pursuits yielding a much more profitable return. Precariousness of tenure in responsible positions discourages one from engaging in those measures of long-sighted policy or those plans of necessarily slow accomplishment, in which he might be so shortly interrupted, and his labors rendered abortive and unavailing. Political science, the science of wise government, is perhaps that department of intellectual exertion which requires the greatest powers of mind and the intensest application. Its facts are multifarious and complicated, often anomalous and contradictory, and demanding the guidance of clear perceptions. Its principles are many of them abstruse, and to be developed by long and close processes of reasoning; and the application of these principles requires the sagacity of quick observation and long experience. It is a business which requires as long and arduous preparation as any profession which can be named; and as entire devotion to it, with freedom from all other serious or momentous occupation, when its duties are once undertaken, as the calling of a lawyer, a physician, a merchant, or an engineer. One chief reason why there are so many needless, blundering, crude, mischievous, and unintelligible actions in public life, is that men have not dedicated themselves to its requirements as a separate study or profession; but have considered it to be a business which might be played with in their hours of leisure from more serious pursuits.

A member of the Federal Council cannot, during his term, “occupy any other office in the service of the Confederation or a Canton, or follow any other pursuit, or practise any profession.” He devotes his entire time and attention to his department, and not a mere casual, intermitting, and brief attention; or merely giving the refuse of his time and abilities in passing judgment on what others have devised and executed. He is obliged to attend to the routine, the detail, and all the technical niceties of its daily administration.

The salaries paid to these distinguished officials are not relatively higher than the wages of the people at large; and are very insignificant when compared with the compensation accorded for like services in other countries. Each of the seven members receives an annual salary of 12,000 francs or $2316; the President of the Council is given 1500 francs additional, making his salary $2605. This increase of salary to the President is made under the head of “expenses of representation,” understood to mean entertainments and kindred purposes devolving upon this official. The entire annual appropriation made for the maintenance of the executive department will not exceed $17,000.36

The business of the Federal Council is distributed among seven departments, as follows:

1. Foreign Affairs.

2. Interior.

3. Justice and Police.

4. Military.

5. Finance and Customs.

6. Industry and Agriculture.

7. Posts and Railways.

Each one of these departments is presided over by one of the Councillors. When the Council is integrally renewed by the Assembly there is no designation or assignment of any department; the members are simply chosen as federal Councillors, and make the apportionment among themselves; and an agreeable understanding has always been reached. According to the constitution this departmental division is only “to facilitate the examination and despatch of business; all decisions must emanate from the Council as a whole.” Regular Council meetings are generally held twice a week. A decision is not valid unless at least four members are present, and no decision can be reversed except by four out of the seven, in a session attended by more than four. The Councillor presides over his department, conducting it much as an ordinary Secretary would under a cabinet system. In theory, each is responsible for all, and all are responsible for each. There is no question of rank, each department is of equal dignity.

The Bundespräsident, or President of the Confederation, is merely the chairman for a year of the Federal Council. He is only the chief of the executive; he is not himself the whole of it, and therefore can hardly be called the executive chief of the nation. His commission as President simply enhances his dignity, and does not confer upon him any additional power or responsibility. The other members are his colleagues, not his mere agents or advisers; he is only primus inter pares. He has no appointive power or patronage, no veto, no right of even nomination to any position. Not a single Swiss official at home or abroad is disturbed by the annual change in the executive head. Few republics have invested a single magistrate with such large powers as the President of the United States; few commonwealths have given a nominal chief magistrate so small a degree of power as belongs to the Swiss President. He is not a chief magistrate. He is chief of a board, which board, in its collective capacity, acts as chief magistrate. The central authority in Switzerland, since the birth of the republic, has always been vested in a committee; and a committee it is to-day. The small addition to the salary, giving audience for letters of credence and recall from diplomatic representatives, precedence on state and ceremonial occasions, and the right to be addressed as “Son Excellence,” about exhaust the special privileges, power, and dignity of the President of the Confederation. He is just as accessible to the public as any of his colleagues. He has no guards, no lords in waiting, no liveried ushers, no gewgaws and trappings. You may go to his official quarters with as little ceremony as you may call on a private citizen. The stranger may knock at the door and the chief magistrate of the Confederation bids him to come in. The new President enters upon the discharge of his duties on the 1st of January, following his election.37 There is no formal or public installation, no demonstration, civic or military. The newly-elected President repairs to his modest chambers in the federal palace at noon, where alone he receives all who desire to call and pay their respects. This opportunity is availed of very little beyond the members of the diplomatic corps, who are expected to tender their congratulations personally and on behalf of the governments they represent. The writer was told by a colleague, who had been recently transferred to Bern from a post with an elaborate court, that on the announcement of the death of the Swiss President he donned his full diplomatic uniform to go and tender his official and personal condolence to the bereaved family. With considerable difficulty he found the executive mansion in apartments on the third floor of a building of a modest street. There being no portier, he rang the bell at the street entrance and ascended the stairs. Reaching the floor of the apartments he was met at the door by a woman who was wiping her mouth with the corner of her apron, evidently having been disturbed in a meal. She invited the diplomat in, and receiving the card, to his surprise, instead of leaving the room to deliver it, she invited him to be seated and opened the conversation. He soon discovered that she was the widow of the deceased President, and a woman of good education, force, and character. All the organs of the Swiss government have an unassuming and civic appearance, retaining in a degree the wisdom, moderation, and simplicity of their ancient manners; those who are invested with high trusts are ever ready and willing to retire to complete equality with their fellow-citizens, from the eminence of civil or military station to which their talents and the call of their country have raised them. There is nothing of pomp and majesty; the soil is too natural for the artificial forms of court diplomacy. The manly consciousness of freedom which creates and finds expression in the constitution elevates the middle classes who form its chief support; while the direct or indirect contact with public affairs develops the intelligence and strengthens the character of the citizen.

In its organization and practical workings, the Swiss executive is claimed by some to be modelled after a better pattern than that of the United States, in so far as escaping the great quadrennial contests, and the passions, ambitions, and disappointments born of them constituting, as more than once illustrated in the past, the greatest national peril.

Previous to 1888, the President of the Confederation ex officio became chief of what was called “The Political Department,” including the conduct of foreign affairs. A reorganization was found to be advisable, and, being formulated by the Federal Council and approved by the Federal Assembly, came into force on the 1st of January, 1888. Under this rearrangement of portfolios “Foreign Affairs” is placed on a new and separate footing and no longer falls to the President of the current year. This new department retains what belonged to the “Political Department,” with the exception of the former presidential functions. It is charged also with the management of commerce in general, with work preparatory to the negotiation of commercial treaties, and co-operation in drawing up the customs tariff; also with matters relating to industrial property, copyright, and emigration; and covering all the more important relations of Switzerland with foreign countries. It is the uniform practice for the Vice-President to succeed the President. In this way every member of the Federal Council in turn becomes President and Vice-President once during each septennial period.

Belonging to different political parties, the Councillors frequently antagonize one another on the floor of the Assembly, but this is not found to interfere with their harmonious working as an administrative body. The right of the members of the Federal Council to participate in the debates and make motions in the Federal Assembly, gives that body, what the Congress of the United States has not, the advantage of a direct ministerial explanation. Yet that ministerial explanation cannot be, as it may be in England, mixed up with fears of votes of censure on one side or of a penal dissolution on the other. Irremovable by the existing Assembly,38 with the question of their re-election dependent on an Assembly which is not yet in existence, they have less need than either American or English statesmen to adapt their policy to meet any momentary cry. Is it not a most excellent political system? Is not this relation between the legislature and the executive, both in theory and practice, happily devised? It brings a quick and close communication between these two great branches, and tends to promote a good understanding between them. Elected by the Assembly, coming into office along with it, there is every chance of the Council acting in harmony with it; and their power of taking a share in the debates at once enables the Assembly to be better informed on public affairs. There is much in the Swiss experiment to refute the belief that there can be no executive power proper, unless it derives its authority from an independent source, and is made directly by the people, so it may claim to be equally representative of the people, and to have received still greater proof of the public confidence. The choice of the executive by the legislative body may be susceptible to the objection that it fails to furnish the limit and restraint that each of these powers should exercise on the other; and that it is entitled to be regarded as only a Cabinet d’Affaires,—a purely administrative committee. The history of the Swiss system has developed no unusual dissensions between these powers, and none are likely to occur. With the legislature governed as a rule by motives of public utility, there is little room for want of harmony with the executive, the simple function of which is to carry into effect the measures which the legislature has decreed.

The present Federal Council of Switzerland is composed of men of high order of ability, instructed by education and disciplined by experience. They are men of crystalline integrity, trained familiarity with the duties of their post, and profoundly patriotic in motive. Among all the changes and complications of late years, no government in Europe in its executive action has displayed a higher degree of practical wisdom than the Federal Council of Switzerland. It acts with sterling good sense and moderation, the result in a great measure of that slow and cautious temperament which has ever marked the Swiss character; traits which perhaps may be traced back to the privations and distress through which, during a long course of years, they struggled to the attainment of a dear-bought independence. It presides over the national interests in an equitable and impartial spirit, dealing wisely and temperately with the people without encroachment or oppression, and, if we may judge from the insignificance of their emoluments, without desire of advantage. The Councillors move in the surest way, both to the attainment and preservation of power, through the medium of those qualities which secure the esteem and gain the confidence of the people. The people, on the other hand, behold with content and satisfaction the absence of all selfish or ignoble purpose in the labors of the Councillors; and sacrifice all factious opposition and interference to the public benefit which they know to be identified with the vigor, stability, and welfare of the government. It is not too much to say that in the Federal Council of Switzerland an honest attempt is made to follow the wise admonition of Cicero in his “Offices:” “Those who design to be partakers in the government should be sure to remember the two precepts of Plato; first, to make the safety and interest of their citizens the great aim and design of all their thoughts and endeavor without ever considering their own general advantage; and, secondly, to take care of the whole collective body of the republic so as not to serve the interests of any one party to the prejudice or neglect of all the rest; for the government of a state is much like the office of a guardian or trustee, which should always be managed for the good of the pupil, and not of the persons to whom he is intrusted.”

There has been some movement to change the mode of appointment to the executive power of the Confederation. Like other human things, it is not absolutely ideal in its working. The relations between the executive and judicial departments are not what they should be, though much better than they were at the beginning of the constitution. Yet, on the whole, the working of the Swiss executive during the forty-two years of its trial has been such that it need not shrink from a comparison with the working of either of the two better known systems. The fact of the Council being not directly chosen by the people is claimed by some to be inconsistent with the “democratic theory.” Surely it is not wise to exchange at the bidding of a certain abstract doctrine a system which has worked well for so long, for one which is not certain to work better, and which might work a great deal worse. By many constitutional students the actual form of the Swiss executive is looked on as the happiest of the political experiments of the present half century. It seems to have escaped both some of the evils which are incident to kings and some of the evils which are incident to presidents. It seems more wisely planned, in all events for the country in which it has arisen, than those forms to which we are better accustomed.