NEWTON had established the simple and fruitful law that two bodies, even when they are not visibly connected with one another, as in the case of the heavenly bodies, exert a mutual influence, attracting one another with a force directly proportional to the product of their masses, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. But Huygens and Leibniz refused to acknowledge the validity of this law, on the ground that it did not satisfy a fundamental condition to which every physical law is subject, viz. that of continuity (continuity in the transmission of force, action "by contact" in contradistinction to action "at a distance"). How were two bodies to exert an influence upon one another without a medium between them to transmit the action? The demand for a satisfactory answer to this question became, in fact, so imperative that finally, in order to satisfy it, the existence of a substance which pervaded the whole of cosmic space and permeated all matter—the "luminiferous ether"—was assumed, although this substance seemed to be condemned to remain intangible and invisible (i.e. imperceptible to the senses for all time) and had to be endowed with all sorts of contradictory properties. In the course of time, however, there arose in opposition to such assumptions the more and more definite demand that, in the formulation of physical laws, only those things were to be regarded as being in causal connection which were capable of being actually observed: a demand which doubtless originates from the same instinct in the search for knowledge as that of continuity, and which really gives the law of causality the true character of an empirical law, i.e. one of actual experience.
The consistent fulfilment of these two postulates combined together is, I believe, the mainspring of Einstein's method of investigation; this imbues his results with their far-reaching importance in the construction of a physical picture of the world. In this respect his endeavours will probably not encounter any opposition in the matter of principle on the part of scientists. For both postulates—(1) that of continuity and (2) that of causal relationship between only such things as lie within the realm of observation—are of an inherent nature, i.e. contained in the very nature of the problem. The only question that might be raised is whether it is expedient to abandon such useful working hypotheses as "forces at a distance."
The principle of continuity requires that all physical laws allow of formulation as differential laws, i.e. physical laws must be expressible in a form such that the physical state at any point is completely determined by that of the point in its immediate neighbourhood. Consequently, the distances between points, which are at finite distances from one another, must not occur in these laws, but only those between points infinitely near to one another. The law of attraction of Newton given above, inasmuch as it involves "action at a distance," disobeys the first postulate.
The second postulate, that of a stricter form of expression for causality in its occurrence in physical laws, is intimately connected with a general theory of relativity of motions. Such a general principle of relativity requires that all possible systems of reference in nature be equivalent for the description of physical phenomena, and hence it avoids the introduction of the very questionable conception of absolute space which, for reasons we know (see § 4), could not be circumvented by Newtonian mechanics. A general theory of relativity would, in excluding the fictitious quantity "absolute space," reduce the laws of mechanics to motions of bodies relative to one another, which are actually and exclusively what we observe. Thus, its laws would be founded on observed facts more completely than are those of classical mechanics.
The rigorous application of the principles of continuity and relativity in their general form penetrates deeply into the problem of the mathematical formulation of physical laws. It will, therefore, be essential at the outset to enter into a consideration of the principles involved in the latter process.