About the middle of June Beust suggested that a “Note” should be sent asking for information respecting the Socialist organisation. The Chief believes that Beust’s proposal contemplates “blue-book lucubrations, which would only hamper the attainment of the real object in view,” as it would give warning to the Socialists and furnish the European press with a theme for denouncing new “Karlsbad resolutions,” and, to judge from the bias displayed in other complicated compilations of a similar character, the Austrian Chancellor would not be above making capital out of it for the benefit of his own popularity. The Minister was therefore to inform him that we were prepared, without any official demand on his part, to furnish him with the results of our observations upon the connection between the Communistic parties. A letter, dated the 26th of June, and addressed to S., contains the following further remarks: “I find him (Baron von Gablenz) much more disposed to meet our views in the matter of joint action against this danger (the Socialistic agitation) than has hitherto been the case in Vienna. He was of opinion that the Emperor Francis Joseph was very favourably inclined towards the understanding we had suggested.... I have not concealed from him, however, that Count Beust’s desire to see this suggestion embodied in the form of a ‘Note’ has, to some extent, cooled our zeal.”
B. reports, under date of the 1st of June, that Baron d’Anethan is in perfect agreement with the proposal of the Chief for an exchange of communications on the extent and direction of the Socialistic agitation, and also as to the recognition of the principle that Socialistic threats against life and property should be included in the category of ordinary crimes. He furthermore considers it absolutely necessary that the Governments should unite in establishing an international principle, and, acting on that basis, should proceed against the revolutionary agitation with inexorable rigour. The Belgian Minister strongly condemned the attitude of England, and expressed the apprehension that it would be difficult to procure the adhesion of the English Government to a common understanding.
There are grounds for believing that the motive for raising the whole subject was less the danger of the Socialist organisation (which, however, was strongly emphasised by me in the press under instructions from the Chief, and afterwards on my own account in the pamphlet Zur Geschichte der Internationale, Leipzig, 1872) than the opportunity which would be thereby afforded of bringing all the Powers together for the consideration, in common, of one question; and, in particular, of producing a rapprochement between two of them. In other words, the main object of the manœuvre was to maintain the antagonism between Russia and France—the land of the Commune, by exaggerating the danger of the International, and to win over Austria.
I now return to the chronological order of my diary, observing at the same time that some of the most important notes and instructions which I received from the Chief at that time cannot be reproduced, as the slips upon which they were written have been mislaid.
May 30th.—The National Zeitung, commenting in an exceptionally violent and discourteous tone upon an article in Brass’s paper, spoke of “the Mamelukes of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,” of a “coarseness and boorishness, that can only be explained by the habits of literary menials,” and of the “tone of the Imperial Chancellor to which the anti-Parliamentary press, watching his every gesture, and exhibiting the zeal of a retriever, barks in eager response.” The Chief wished to have a reply written to this article, somewhat to the following effect. It was not necessary to enter into the attacks made upon the newspaper. The specimens quoted from the organ of MM. Bamberger and Lasker would suffice to show that persons who gave vent to their own irritation in that style were hardly entitled to complain of the manner in which others expressed themselves. But when the article charges the Imperial Chancellor with adopting an unseemly attitude towards the Reichstag, whereas his attitude has been eminently prudent and patriotic, when it accuses him of “domineering over men,” and of “demanding blind submission,” it may well be asked what part of the verbatim reports has given rise to these invectives. (From this point on dictation.) “We, who have not left these reports unread, as the author of this philippic would appear to have done, fail to find anything in the expressions of the Imperial Chancellor, but a declaration, for which he gave his reasons, that the motion under discussion was unacceptable, and that if it were maintained he could not undertake the responsibility for the administration of Alsace-Lorraine, during the period of provisional government. If any one discovers, in what he said, anything which would appear to justify in any way the charges in question, we would ask him to remember that a tone of bitterness and violence was first adopted by the Reichstag, and exactly by that party which takes credit for prudence and patriotism—and in general not without justification. We at least fail to recognise as models of prudence and patriotism, the sallies of Herr Bamberger in the last debate, in which he fell upon the Post Office officials. ‘When all is said, we are curs,’ and ‘Look out for the whip,’ were some of the flowers of rhetoric with which he presented the Government—and Herr von Hoverbeck’s feats of eloquence on the same occasion leave us in the same difficulty.”
May 31st.—Wrote to Brass to-day on the instructions of the Chief respecting the leading article in No. 124 of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which struck the Prince as too vehement in its attack upon the National Liberals. I recommended greater moderation and dignity. In reply, Brass excuses himself on the ground that he received that article from an official source, and was, therefore, in a dilemma—which is very probable.
A letter is to be sent to Vienna to-day, saying that Favre had stated at Frankfurt that a proposal from Beust in favour of the Pope had been submitted to the Versailles Government. This was made in such a form as to give rise to the inference that it was in harmony with the intentions of the Emperor William, as it referred to intimations from Count Bray, and Bavaria would not, presumably, adopt a policy on that question which deviated from that of the German Empire. S. is then requested to make guarded inquiries as to whether the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken any, and if so, what, steps in that direction. Of course, there was no doubt as to Bray’s personal views in the matter, but only a desire that, should he have actually taken such steps in Vienna, no room should have been left for misconception as to the personal and individual character of his action. The German Foreign Office had had no share in it, and “we have,” the letter concludes, “avoided, up to the present, expressing any opinion on the Roman question, or on the attitude of the German Empire towards it.”
June 5th.—Wrote an article, dated from Darmstadt, for the Kölnische Zeitung. The Chief gave me the information. The article ran as follows:
“However much our new Ministers may adapt themselves to circumstances, it is nevertheless no secret that the feeling in the spheres above them still continues unfavourable to the new state of things in Germany, and that it is sought here to preserve as much as possible of the old arrangements without causing too great offence. Whatever the spontaneous initiative of the powers that be fails to do in this direction is supplied by the very considerable influence of Prince Alexander, who is still associated with those circles in Vienna which in German affairs have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, and which now as formerly exercise a kind of co-regency that makes itself felt in many different ways. A case in point is the maintenance of the Legation in Vienna, which has long since lost all importance, particularly since the foundation of the German Empire through the Versailles Treaties. We hear on good authority that the present holder of that office, Heinrich von Gagern, the whilom President of the Frankfurt Parliament, requested several months ago to be allowed to retire from his post, at the same time recommending that it should be abolished, but he received a negative answer. He is now understood to have repeated his request and recommendation to the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, and—as we are informed—Herr von Lindelhof was not unfavourably disposed, particularly as there is no prospect of the representative body continuing to vote supplies for this post, which has become purely ornamental, as a necessary item of expenditure. In the highest quarters, however, a different view prevails, which is evidently due to the Prince, and if Gagern is permitted to resign he will have a successor. It is understood that in these circumstances the prospective successor would be von Biegeleben, the Prince’s intimate friend, a statesman as Ultramontane as could be found in the Episcopal Palace at Mainz, and as anti-Prussian as could be desired anywhere. I report this merely as a symptom of the sentiments prevailing in competent quarters here. Given adequate power, mischief can be wrought even without a Legation, but when that element is lacking, all diplomatic posts become merely ornamental, not to say ridiculous.”
June 7th.—According to a communication from Bernstorff of the 3rd instant, Brunnow reports that Napoleon has greatly aged and become very infirm. He speaks with gratitude of our Emperor and without hatred of Prussia; while, on the other hand, he is strongly incensed against Thiers and Favre, who will be overtaken by the just vengeance of Heaven for having brought about the overthrow of the Empire. Their punishment has already commenced in the severe conditions to which they have been compelled to allow the country to be subjected. According to this report, the Emperor did not express any hope of his restoration. The Empress, however, is full of courage, and has great expectations. The Bonapartists share her views. Some of them look forward to a restoration of Napoleon; and others, though a minority, to the regency of the Empress. Hopes are entertained that although Germany might not give any direct assistance to a restoration, it would moderate the conditions of peace if Napoleon were re-elected. In case of a plebiscite also, Germany might be helpful in the occupied provinces. Some are in favour of a national vote, as they feel sure of the rural population; while others are for violent measures, relying upon 180,000 soldiers. In their opinion, the main point is that neither the Comte de Chambord nor any one of the Orleans has any prospect of success.
The following communication was sent to Fabrice on the 4th inst.: “As the Government of which M. Thiers is the head has concluded a definitive peace with us, it is in our interest, and in that of our international position, to recognise only the present Government in France, so long as no other Government has been evolved out of it in a legal way which would secure for the future the execution of the Treaty of Peace, and the maintenance of the present relations between the two countries. The present Government is bound by its past, and by its entire position, to fulfil its obligations towards us, and it therefore finds a support in Germany. Any other Government which may seize power in an irregular way may possibly seek its salvation by sacrificing to popularity the treaties concluded with us, and in that manner force us to renew the war. We have, therefore, not only an interest in the maintenance of the present Government, but also the right to withhold our recognition from any violent change in the form of government, however brought about, and to make our decision dependent upon the guarantees provided for our treaty interests. It must, furthermore, be remembered that everything calculated to disturb order, which is scarcely restored as yet, must prejudicially affect the power of France to meet its obligations towards us within the periods laid down in the treaty, whoever may be at the head of affairs, and that we must therefore desire to avoid every crisis which would lead to a renewal of civil war. You will please express yourself in this sense to the French Government, and make it clear to them beyond all question that in those portions of the country which we occupy we shall recognise no alteration in the form, and no change in the principal holders of power, which does not arise out of the existing situation in the regular way, and in accordance with the laws now in force. We are giving evidence of the confidence which we repose in the present Government by rapidly reducing the German forces in the occupied districts. Should new movements in France force us to doubt the maintenance of the peace which has been concluded, your Excellency is aware that within fourteen days we could again put the same army in the field which we had in France last winter.”
June 11th.—Fabrice telegraphed the day before yesterday to the Chief stating, inter alia, that the rapid withdrawal of our troops outside Paris and elsewhere before the payment of the first half milliard was obviously exercising an influence upon the temper and behaviour of the population, whose attitude would grow more and more confident, if not hostile, as the evacuation proceeded. Washburne had confidently advised prudence, and in speaking to Holstein had described the sentiments of the Parisians towards the Germans as doubtful, adding that the Government lacked the power, and perhaps the will, to counteract this tendency, and that the protection of the Germans in Paris depended solely upon the German garrisons still in the neighbourhood. No reliance could be placed upon the future development of affairs in France. The first two milliards would be paid in order to give Germany a sense of security. The balance of three milliards, however, would not be paid—as had been openly stated by personages in authority, not soldiers—while, on the other hand, there was a determination to recover the ceded territories.
The Chief thereupon telegraphed to the Saxon General yesterday that neither were we bound nor did we intend to reduce the zone of occupation, and that we should certainly not evacuate the forts before the date specified in the Treaty of Frankfurt. If we reduced the number of our troops in the occupied districts, it was not that we trusted France, but only that we had confidence in our own rapidity of mobilisation. It was possible that the French would not carry out the treaty of peace in full, and even that they intended to attack us, but as soon as the mobilisation of the French forces rendered the latter eventuality probable, or if there were a wilful delay in the payments to be made, a force of 600,000 could, within a fortnight, be put into the field between Metz and Paris. He, Fabrice, should permit no doubt to exist upon this point. It was cheaper to strengthen our forces outside Paris as required than to leave them there for an indefinite period. There was no disposition to conceal the possibility of a renewal of the war, but on the other hand such a renewal was not feared.
June 19th.—This morning read a number of telegrams which have been exchanged between Waldersee and the Chief, from which it would almost seem as if it might come to hostilities if the French only had sufficient power. On the evening of the 15th instant their troops stationed near Lilas pushed forward their outposts to within twenty-five paces of ours, and on ground that belonged to us. The Chief, upon advices to this effect from Waldersee on the 16th instant, immediately instructed him to demand the punishment of the officers who had been guilty of this breach of existing arrangements, adding that our men had received instructions to attack the French troops posted within rifle range of them if the latter did not withdraw in the course of the day. He would also immediately advise the King to withdraw the orders for the recall of all our troops until satisfaction had been received. A telegram to the like effect was at the same time despatched to Favre. It concluded as follows: “Les protestations du commandant allemand contre cette violation des stipulations en vigueur sont restées infructueuses. Je regrette vivement un incident qui trouble les relations de confiance mutuelle qui commençaient à naître.” The Frenchmen were greatly frightened by this Quos ego, particularly MacMahon, who immediately ordered the withdrawal of the troops from a position in which they had no right to be.
Favre has declared that Pouyer-Quertier cannot pay the first half milliard before the 15th of July, as the Ministry of Finance has been destroyed (by the Communists). Moreover, the restoration of order, mentioned in Article 7 of the treaty, has not yet been completed. In a telegram sent to Waldersee the day before yesterday the Chief described these observations as “impudent,” and instructed Waldersee to tell Favre that if the money is not paid on the 1st of July, France will have failed to fulfil its obligations under the article in question.
Waldersee further reported the day before yesterday that he had presented his credentials to Favre, and was then received by Thiers. His reception by both gentlemen was exceedingly polite and amiable. A 6 per cent. voluntary loan of two milliards, with a 15 per cent. payment on account, was to be placed on the market on the 26th of June. With the money raised by this means, and with some other funds at the disposal of the Government, a payment of 375 million francs would be made. Thiers assured him that with the best will in the world he could not promise him the complete payment of the first half milliard before the 10th of July, as nobody could foresee at the present moment how the subscriptions would go. He, Waldersee, had, however, insisted upon the 1st of July, as otherwise we should be driven to question the good will of the French, and moreover—owing to certain financial arrangements—we required the money at that date. Thiers replied that he both desired and hoped to be able to begin the payment on the 1st, but it was a physical impossibility for him to collect the whole sum before the 10th. Waldersee had not stated that the proposal would be accepted in Berlin.
The Chief thereupon telegraphed the same day that the proposal of M. Thiers was incompatible with the 7th Article of the Frankfurt Treaty of Peace, and could not, therefore, be accepted without counter-concessions. The telegram continues: “Besides, the understanding at first was that the occupation of Paris should be taken as the term for this payment, and it was only in consequence of a concession made by us out of complaisance that the expression ‘rétablissement de l’autorité’ was inserted in the French draft of the treaty. Furthermore, through an oversight, the payment of the following 125 millions was fixed in the French draft at sixty days after the payment of the 375 millions, instead of thirty days, or sixty days after the occupation of Paris, as M. Pouyer-Quertier himself had proposed. In the presence of the unconciliatory attitude which the French negotiators now manifest, we see no occasion to show them any favour without counter-concessions. If, therefore, the French Government does not make the payment provided for by the treaty on the 1st of July, we must regard it as a failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 7. I beg your Excellency to leave M. Favre in no doubt upon this point.”
June 20th.—Again an amusing interlude provided by the diplomatic world. Von K., a Russian envoy abroad, has addressed to the Emperor Alexander a long memorial dated the 25th of May, or the 6th of June according to our calendar. This document, which deals with the Socialist parties and agitation in Germany, includes the following, among a number of other extraordinary whimsicalities: “Wuttke (Our Leipzig Professor and Puzzlehead), un des piliers républicains en Saxe, a dit dernièrement assez haut pour être entendu à Dresde: ‘Dans cinq ans il n’y aura plus de princes.’” Most wonderful and admirable knowledge of affairs and men! Wuttke, a pillar and prophet of Saxon Republicanism! And this is the sort of stuff which a diplomatist reports with a serious face!
June 22nd.—Under instructions from the Chief utilised in the press the main ideas of a memorandum written by Bucher on the Paris Commune, and the reasons why it was not supported in the provinces. This document, which was dated the 17th instant, was forwarded to Vienna. (...)
The following appears in the Volkszeitung to-day: “We have been requested to publish the following letter: ‘Desiring an audience of his Serene Highness Prince Bismarck, I addressed him as he was passing in the street, for the purpose of obtaining permission to present myself. Hardly had I spoken to the Prince before two detectives laid hold of me by both arms and wanted to arrest me. In spite of my protest that I was under no obligation to accompany two civilians, and moreover that I had committed no offence, I was dragged through the streets to the police station in the Taubenstrasse. I was then taken in charge of a policeman to the Molkenmarkt, where I was kept in custody for the whole night, being liberated at 11 o’clock next morning, with the remark that my arrest was doubtless due to a misunderstanding. I leave the whole affair to the judgment of the public. H. L. Back.’”
June 23rd.—Called this morning to the Chief, who showed me the above letter. He was in good humour, and while dressing he gave me the following account of the incident. “As I was leaving the Reichstag on my way home an exceptionally greasy individual, evidently a Jew, came up and said he wished to have an audience of me. I declined, but he remained at my side and kept on talking to me, I would surely not refuse a German writer such a request, as he had something of importance to communicate to me. Yes, but I do though, I replied, I never give audiences to German authors. He continued to follow me, however (with the fly-like persistence, obtrusiveness and foolhardiness of the young Jew), and while he kept on talking he pressed so close to me that he trod on one of my spurs, breaking it off. I wheeled round and was about to chastise him physically, when the two policemen took him in charge. He really was exceptionally greasy, one could have scraped the pot-house fat off him.” Wrote a paragraph on the subject for the papers.
Called again to the Minister later on, and received instructions for an article on certain pretended revelations of a M. de Vallon in the Versailles Assembly, which had been commented upon in the National Zeitung. He read through and corrected this article before it was sent off. In giving me the information, he said: “Favre has here made several erroneous statements. He gave an inaccurate account of the facts in his speech of the 19th instant, in which he referred to Vallon’s assertion that he, Favre, had told him I had been disposed at Ferrières to conclude peace on the cession of Strassburg and its environs. He declared that at that time there had been no negotiations respecting peace, though M. de Bismarck had, indeed, told him that it would be possible to negotiate on the conditions indicated by M. de Vallon in the National Assembly. Say, with reference to that point, that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had thereby given evidence of a defective memory. Or, better still, say: It is quite conceivable that all the details of several long interviews have not been retained with equal clearness by all those concerned in them. According to the reports now before us, the question of the armistice occupied the first place, as a means of preparing the way for peace through the convocation of a National Assembly; but the peace itself was also discussed. M. Favre himself says this in his report of September last to the Government of National Defence, describing the occurrences at Haute Maison. There we read: ‘After I had made known the intentions of the French Government by means of a circular, I desired to ascertain those of the Prussian Minister. It seemed to me out of the question that two nations, without first ascertaining each other’s views, should continue a war which, notwithstanding its advantages for the victor, would be a cause of great suffering. Brought about by the will of one individual, this war had no longer any raison d’être when France had again become her own mistress. I vouched for her love of peace, and at the same time for her resolve not to accept any conditions which would transform this peace into a short and threatening armistice. M. de Bismarck replied that if he were convinced of the possibility of such a peace, he would sign it immediately.’
“On this occasion M. Favre also ascertained the conditions put forward by Germany, and these were by no means restricted to the cession of Strassburg and its environs. M. Favre’s above-mentioned report goes on to say: ‘On my pressing him very strongly with respect to the conditions, he told me plainly that the security of his country imposed upon him the necessity of retaining the territory which would guarantee the same. He repeated several times: Strassburg is the key of the house. (I said our house.) I begged him to speak still more plainly. That is useless, he replied, as we cannot come to an understanding; that is a matter that can be settled later. I requested him to do so immediately. (The following is given in italics in the article.) He then said to me that the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine and a portion of the Moselle department, with Metz, Château Salins, and Soissons (incorrect, it was Saargemund which was mentioned) were indispensable to him, and that he could not forego them.’”
About the same time, probably shortly before the above article was written, the following communiqué was prepared for the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung under instructions from the Chief, who also saw and corrected it before it was sent to the press. He struck out the portions within brackets, although they were almost literally his own words: “Reports reach us daily of bad treatment and serious prejudice to their rights to which the Germans in France, and particularly those in Paris, are subjected. Bankers dismiss German clerks who have served them long and faithfully; manufacturers announce that they will no longer employ German workpeople; even academies and institutions, centres of French learning (and, as one would wish to think, of French wisdom), indulge in anti-German demonstrations, and decline in future to elect any corresponding members from among the German citizens of the Universal Republic of Letters. All these, more or less petty expressions of bitter resentment, may be merely regarded as symptoms of a feeling which is of significance for the future, and against which we must secure ourselves. But the French, and particularly the Parisians, have gone further in the petty warfare, which they carry on in continuation of the great war now concluded. Incited by an unbridled press, they have permitted themselves to adopt towards those Germans who have returned to France, either to put their affairs in order, or to reopen business, an attitude which would be regarded by civilised nations as improper, even in time of war. They have prevented Germans from opening their shops, and have wrecked German establishments. They have prohibited other Germans from attending the Bourse, and have arrested harmless German subjects, simply because they were Germans. That is not an affair of the future, but of the immediate present, and demands immediate redress. We have concluded peace, and we honestly and sincerely desire to maintain it, but of course, on the assumption that the French people preserve this peace, which was sought for and demanded by their Government. If the offences in question are not (speedily and thoroughly) checked, and if the French Government does not protect peaceful and law-abiding Germans, we must, in the interest of German subjects, and in view of the honour of Germany, decide upon the reprisals to be exercised. We should not be surprised if, then, for every German illegally arrested and not released immediately upon representations being made, arrests of French citizens were ordered in those districts of France which we temporarily occupy. We should not consider it out of order, if the evacuation of certain departments were postponed until these passions had calmed down, and indeed, according to circumstances, these regrettable occurrences might lead to fresh action against Paris, which is the seat of the evil.”
June 24th.—Wrote the following article for Brass from materials supplied by the Chief, whose attention was called to the matter by an article in the Schlesische Zeitung, on “Napoleon and the Men of the 4th of September”: “Trochu’s attempt to exculpate himself before the bar of public opinion has failed conclusively. His speech only confirmed the fact that he had betrayed the Emperor by using, in order to bring about his fall, the forces entrusted to him. It was principally through the men on the 4th of September that he came to the head of affairs. He was chiefly responsible for the continuation of the war from that date. And in addition to his treason came his incapacity. He was constantly giving assurances that he had plans which would infallibly succeed, and yet when they were carried out not one of them was really successful. When he finally, however, with brazen impudence charges the Prussians with having supported the Commune and with complicity in the scenes of terror enacted since the outbreak of the Socialist conspiracy, it may be pointed out (1) that German policy would have incurred no reproach before Europe if it had shown a certain readiness to meet the Commune during the first weeks following the 18th of March, when it had not as yet disclosed its true nature, particularly as there appeared to be very little good will and very considerable equivocation on the other side; (2) that there has been no question of any kind of complaisance on the part of the Germans towards the Commune, to say nothing of an understanding or of support, and that, on the contrary, everything which was permissible in the circumstances was done to assist the Versailles Government in its preparations to suppress the rising, and during the fighting itself. It is therefore to be expected that the members of the French Government, who are better informed, will contradict the assertions of the General, which if not mendacious are at least utterly erroneous. We still await such a correction. If this disavowal were not made we should consider it desirable that the matter should be taken up on the German side and that those diplomatic documents should be published which show that assistance was really given and in what manner, and that this was done at the wish and request of the Versailles Government.”
June 30th.—During the last few days again read a number of interesting documents despatched and received. Tauffkirchen, the Bavarian representative at the Curia, reported from Rome on the 21st inst. that the Pope had spoken to him on the previous day of the danger by which society was threatened by the Communists. “They are,” he said, as he drove away some flies from his table, “like these insects. It is no use to kill a few, still less to drive them away. General measures must be taken to prevent their entrance and propagation.” Respecting the removal of the Italian Government to Rome, a recent despatch says that if the King proceeds thither the foreign representatives will follow him in accordance with diplomatic custom. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs were to reside there without the sovereign, it would then depend upon the requirements of business whether, and for how long, an envoy would go to Rome for purposes of personal communication. France and Austria had instructed their representatives to follow the Minister to Rome, irrespective of the circumstance whether Victor Emmanuel went there or not; in that case, however, they were to take leave of absence, leaving a substitute in charge. A despatch from Waldersee, dated the 25th instant, contains the following sentence: “It is not in the interest of the Empire that the different Federal States should maintain separate envoys abroad. We may, however, await their gradual disappearance as a work of time, and as the result of the Budget debates in the several States.” According to a report from Tauffkirchen, Prince Löwenstein-Heubach, who has gone to Rome on behalf of the Clericals, threatened Cardinal Antonelli with the consequences of any disavowal of the Centre party in the Reichstag.
July 2nd.—The Chief asked me yesterday if I had not, in accordance with his instructions, informed Brass[4] that he should cease his attacks upon the French Government. I replied: “Yes, several times, both by letter and verbally.” He then said: “That must be put a stop to. But I believe he is paid by Napoleon.” To-day he wished me to send Brass the following article, for which he gave me the ideas. “There has been much discussion of the question, whether the war indemnity imposed upon France by Germany is too high, and whether the former will be able to bear the burden of those five milliards. Some answer the question in the affirmative, some in the negative, while others remain in doubt. Now, however, we may consider the point as settled, by the programme which M. Thiers has submitted to the National Assembly, first, as regards the loan and the financial position of France, and then with respect to the future of the country in general. Undoubtedly France is obliged to exercise greater economy than she has hitherto done. She must increase the productiveness of her resources, and administer them with the utmost care. Notwithstanding this, M. Thiers has no idea whatever of reducing the army or the navy, which nevertheless offer the largest field for economies. On the contrary he desires to bring both up to the highest figure they have yet reached, and to keep them at that point, and what is more, he wishes to have the army reinforced by a reserve of 900,000 men. This clearly proves to us that the idea of France being entitled to dominate Europe has by no means been given up in Government circles at Versailles, and that now, as formerly, they hold fast to the statement in which M. Thiers during his autumn tour expressed the hope and self-confidence of the French politician: ‘L’Europe ne veut pas changer de maître.’ Indeed, now that the French Government thinks of submitting the same military Budget, and the French seem to consider that they can bear their old military burdens even under more unfavourable conditions than prevailed formerly, the indemnity demanded must be regarded rather as too low than too high. Moreover, France is nowhere endangered or threatened, and these formidable armaments can therefore only betray aggressive aspirations, the expression of which must be looked upon as a direct threat to her neighbours. On both these grounds there ceases in our opinion to be any moral obligation to show indulgence in the matter of the indemnity.”
July 5th.—This afternoon Keudell brought down from the Chief an article which appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the 2nd inst., which began with the words “Der Telegraph.” The Chief had written on the margin, “This article is contrary to the instructions given. The Minister of the Interior is to be written to respecting a warning to the editorial staff, or the withdrawal of all favours. Strict daily supervision necessary.” Keudell said the Chancellor was furious with Brass, and almost believed that he was paid by Napoleon to make mischief between ourselves and Versailles. He then begged me to write the necessary letter to the Minister of the Interior.
The article of the 2nd of July was the last which I wrote for the Foreign Office from the direct personal instructions of the Chancellor. From that time forward the direct intercourse with the Chancellor, which I had hitherto enjoyed, was transferred to the new “Press Councillor,” Aegidi, who had been here for some weeks, but had not been received by the Prince until eight or ten days after his arrival, and who, even then, was not employed immediately.
I did not know at the time what was the reason of the change, and Bucher also was unable to explain it. He was afterwards of opinion that Aegidi was introduced by Keudell, who intended to leave the Foreign Office and take an appointment abroad, in order that he might be kept informed of what was going on here. It would be his business also to see that the press men should not cease to accord him that recognition which he, as Personal Councillor, Treasurer and Administrator of Pensions, was accustomed to receive from time to time, but that it should, on the contrary, continue to flow in a stronger and deeper stream. I cannot say whether the former surmise was correct. I will show later on, when I come to deal with Herr von Keudell himself, that the other point did not remain any mere suspicion. For the present I will only remark that the censer, which used to be swung before the latter in the press, was much more frequently in use after the arrival of his protégé in Berlin, and that the smoke of the incense recalled in a very suspicious way Aegidi’s own style. (...)
James Ludwig Carl Aegidi, a Protestant, son of a doctor in Freienwalde, was born in 1825. He studied law at Königsberg, Heidelberg and Berlin, and was married to a Fräulein von Senden, a cousin of Keudell’s.... A few days after Aegidi’s arrival Keudell, speaking of him to me, credited him with “exceptional scientific knowledge, relations with almost all literary circles, and the tact which was desirable for mediating between the Chief and the daily press.”
The following chapters will show the nature of those relations and this tact. Let one proof suffice for the moment. Some months after the appointment of the new Councillor the following was to be read in the Spenersche Zeitung, with which he had exceptionally intimate relations: “A Berlin correspondent of the Pester Lloyd, recalling the circumstance that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which is regarded as a semi-official organ, received some sharply worded démentis during the summer of the present year, draws attention to the fact that for a short time past the journal in question has again come to be considered as official in the highest sense. The correspondent writes that, ‘Since Professor Aegidi, who is at the same time one of the most eminent and respected of German professors of law and a spirited publicist, has been in charge of the press department of the Foreign Office, much more attention has again been paid to the newspapers. He has taken care, in particular, to maintain a certain continuity of views in the official press. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung has again become the principal official organ, and since the 1st of December all the leading articles published under the heading “Political News of the Day,” dealing with foreign affairs, the affairs of the Empire, the relations of the Federal States to the President of the Council, as well as those on Church and State, may be considered as the direct expression of the views held by the highest officials of the Empire.’ The correspondent states he is informed, on trustworthy authority, that for the most part Professor Aegidi himself edits the ‘Political News of the Day,’ utilising for the purpose the information which he receives direct from the Chancellor.”
The Chief was beside himself at this article. Aegidi was summoned before him, and returned—as a gentleman in the Central Bureau remarked—looking quite crestfallen and red in the face. He denied that he had prompted the communication in the Pester Lloyd. We soon ascertained, however, that it had emanated from one Julius L., a writer of the lowest rank and the most unenviable reputation, who had formerly served Keudell, and was now intimately associated with Aegidi.
I ought, perhaps, to have now tendered my resignation. Certain considerations, however, prevented my doing so for some time. There was still something for me to learn, and I soon observed that I could yet do good service. It was also conceivable that my old relations with the Prince might be restored, as a man of Aegidi’s character, with his self-seeking, mercurial exuberance of zeal, and his almost Jewish vanity, would sooner or later render himself impossible. I therefore remained, and fell in with the wish of the Councillor to “enter into friendly relations with him,” so far as that was possible. Subsequently, however, when he attempted to give me instructions, as a kind of superior, I once and for all entered an energetic protest against such presumption, and declared that I could only carry out such instructions as he could assure me were the direct expression of the Chief’s desire, thus taking up a position towards him, not of subordination, but of equality. I did well in deciding to remain yet a while. I learnt a great deal more, as I still had access to the documents received and despatched, and became more and more intimate with Bucher. The hoped-for opportunities of serving the Chief at the same time as the representative of Keudell’s interests, and without his knowledge, occurred more frequently than I had expected, although my personal intercourse with the Chief was not renewed for the time being.