211 Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Gwynn was Chief of Staff. The Division consisted of:

212 The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 197.

213 The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 199.

214 One of the transports (the Southland), conveying a battalion of the 2nd Australian Division, was torpedoed on September 2, thirty-one miles from Mudros. The firemen took to the boats, but the engineers kept sufficient head of steam to work the pumps and electric light. Finding she was filling only slowly, they called for soldier volunteers to help with the stoking, and in an hour got steam up to the blowing-off point. The destroyer Racoon, which had come alongside, was then able to supply practised stokers, and they, with the engineers, stoked the boilers into Mudros harbour.

215 “It was not entirely an easy matter to assimilate these reinforcements. As a rule, a draft is a comparatively small body of men which easily adopts the character of the unit in which it is merged. In Gallipoli, however, units had been so much reduced in strength that in some cases the draft was stronger than the battalion that it joined, while it almost invariably increased the strength of what was left of the original unit to half as much again. As a result, after two or three drafts had arrived, the old battalions had been swamped.”—The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 235.

216 The Tenth (Irish) Division, p. 229. The 54th Brigade remained in Egypt.

217 During this period of comparative inaction, it was announced that Flight-Lieutenant Edmonds in a seaplane sank a Turkish transport full of reinforcements with a heavy bomb, and that a submarine sank a transport of 11-inch guns in the Sea of Marmora (September 7).—The “Times” History of the War, Part 84, p. 211.

218 The full speech is quoted in Nelson’s History of the War, by Colonel John Buchan, vol. xi. p. 18.

219 See Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch on the Dardanelles evacuation.

220 The further history of the 10th Division (which I visited once more among the mountains beyond Lake Doiran), as well as of the whole Salonika campaign up to summer 1917, is told in The Story of the Salonika Army, by my colleague, Mr. G. Ward Price.

221 Colonel John Buchan puts the number at 13,000 (Nelson’s History of the War, xi. 26).

222 See the speech of Venizelos to the Athenian Chamber, August 26, 1917.

223 Belgrade fell to Mackensen on October 9; the Bulgarians crossed the Serbian frontier on the 11th, occupied Uskub on the 22nd, and Nish on November 5, thus opening direct railway communication between the Central Powers and Constantinople through Sofia. Monastir fell on December 2, and by the middle of that month the Serbian army and the Allies had been entirely driven out of Serbian territory.

224 Sir Ian’s dispatch, last section but two.

225 Sir Ian’s dispatch.

226 Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).

227 Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).

228 Speech in the House of Commons, November 2, 1915.

229 See The “Times” History of the War, Part 84, p. 213. It is worth noticing that on November 18, Lord Ribblesdale in the House of Lords declared that it was common knowledge that Sir Charles Monro had “reported in favour of withdrawal from the Dardanelles, and adversely to the continuance of winter operations there.” One can only suppose that, in saying this, Lord Ribblesdale deliberately intended to mislead the enemy, who could hardly believe so rash a betrayal of intention could be made with impunity, if the statement were true.

230 Lord Kitchener’s original objection to evacuation may perhaps be supported by a passage in an article by Dr. E. J. Dillon (Fortnightly Review, February 1918): “The evacuation of Gallipoli was not warranted in the light of all the elements of the problem, because from the point of view of the Coalition it meant the asphyxiation of Russia and her ultimate disappearance as a belligerent, and to ward off this calamity the sacrifice of several warships would not have been excessive.”

231 See Australia in Arms, pp. 284, 285. The fate of those suffocated by fumes perhaps caused the rumour that the Turks used poison gas. I never heard an authentic case of this, though at one time we were all ordered to carry gas-masks.

232 That little animosity existed on the Turkish side either is shown by the following note which I made early in December, though I cannot date the incident precisely: “The community of human nature between men who are out to kill each other was lately shown here by an interval of friendliness, as often in France. It began with the wagging of a Turkish periscope over the sandbags. One of the Australians (it was at Anzac) wagged his periscope in answer. Then Turkish hands were held up, moving the fingers together in the Turkish sign of amity. Presently heads appeared on both sides, the few words that could be understood were said, cigarettes and fruit were thrown from one side to the other, and a note, written in bad French, was thrown to the Australians, saying, ‘We don’t want to fight you. We want to go home. But we are driven on by the people you know about.’ I presume that meant the Germans. Then signs were made that an officer was approaching. The heads disappeared, and bombs were thrown from trench to trench in place of fruit.”

233 The figures for Suvla, as given me by the Staff at the time, were 44,000 men; 90 guns of all calibre, including one anti-aircraft gun; 3000 mules; 400 horses; 30 donkeys; 1800 carts; 4000 to 5000 cartloads of stores.

234 The account of the Suvla evacuation is founded on notes I made at the time and on an article of mine which passed the Military Censor two days after the event, but was not published in full till I received General Birdwood’s permission in the following spring. It is perhaps worth while here contradicting the report that the Turks were bribed to allow the army to withdraw without opposition. That malignant depreciation of a most skilful enterprise was a libel both on the enemy and on our own officers and men. There was not a vestige of truth in it.

235 The following rough estimate of the Turkish forces was made by the General Staff about a week before the evacuation:

Three regiments were in reserve at Suvla, and three at Anzac. The Army Headquarters were just south of Koja Dere; Corps Headquarters in the north behind Anafarta Sagir; in the south at Koja Dere. There were large camps at Ejelmer Bay and Turchen Keui (a few miles inland from the bay) in the north, and at Koja Dere in the south.

At Helles the numbers were then uncertain or not available, but the following regiments were posted opposite our lines from our left to right:

Taking an average of 2000 per regiment, this gives a total of 18,000, apart from reserves; but it is a low estimate. The Headquarters were at Ali Bey Farm.

236 The 11th Division (Major-General Fanshawe) now held the Xeros shore and the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. On the broad and deeply ravined undercliff below Jephson’s Post, and even beyond it, the 32nd Brigade (9th West Yorks, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th York and Lancaster) had elaborately entrenched and fortified positions which they called the “Green Knoll” and “The Boot.” Brigadier-General Dallas was justifiably proud of the work and of his Yorkshire Brigade. After going round the complicated trenches with me on December 11, he whispered sorrowfully, “Pity to leave them! Pity to leave them!” And to the last he went from man to man, adjuring one to shave, another to wash his shirt, and all to keep smart whatever happened. To such temper the difficult operation owed its success.

237 The management of their mules by the Indians was remarkable. They controlled those incalculable animals as though they were trained dogs. It was pathetic that the Indians mistook the name of their destination (Mudros) for Madras. “Do you want to go to India so much, then?” an officer asked. “Does a man want to go to heaven?” was the reply.

238 Beside my personal observation during visits from Suvla in the final days, my chief authorities upon the Anzac evacuation are Phillip Schuler’s Australia in Arms, an officer’s diary in the “Manchester Guardian’s” History of the War, Part 43, p. 187; Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch; and conversation with men who were present. A German correspondent with the Turks on the night of the evacuation wrote in the Vossische Zeitung of January 21, 1916: “So long as wars exist, the British evacuation of the Ari Burnu and Anafarta fronts will stand before the eyes of all strategists of retreat as a hitherto quite unattained masterpiece.”

239 A dilatory and whispering 6-inch shell, thrown from a black-powder battery north of Troy, was called “Creeping Caroline” by our men. Similarly the French called one particular shell “Marie pressée”—no doubt a “high velocity.”

240 On December 30 Sir Charles Monro handed over his command to General Sir Archibald Murray and left Mudros for Alexandria on his way back to France.

241 Shortly before it left, a deed of singular heroism added honour to the 42nd Division. On December 22, in front of Krithia, Second Lieut. Alfred Victor Smith (5th East Lancashire, 126th Brigade), only son of the Chief Constable of Burnley, was throwing a grenade when it slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several officers and men. He shouted a warning, and jumped clear into safety. But seeing that the others were unable to get into cover, and knowing the grenade was due to explode, he returned without hesitation and flung himself down on it. He was instantly killed by the explosion. See the London Gazette announcing that the Victoria Cross had been conferred on him after death.