Not long after Mr. Ames informed Mr. Scofield he could have the stock, but could not give him a certificate for it until he could get a larger certificate dividend. Mr. Scofield received the bond dividend of 80 per cent., which was payable January 3, 1868, taking a bond for $1,000 and paying Mr. Ames the difference. Mr. Ames received the 60 per cent. cash dividend on the stock in June, 1868, and paid over to Mr. Scofield $600, the amount of it.

Before the close of that session of Congress, which was toward the end of July, Mr. Scofield became, for some reason, disinclined to take the stock, and a settlement was made between them, by which Mr. Ames was to retain the Credit Mobilier stock and Mr. Scofield took a thousand dollars Union Pacific bond and ten shares of Union Pacific stock.

The precise basis of the settlement does not appear, neither Mr. Ames nor Mr. Scofield having any full date in reference to it; Mr. Scofield thinks that he only received back his money and interest upon it, while Mr. Ames states that he thinks Mr. Scofield had ten shares of Union Pacific stock in addition. The committee do not deem it specially important to settle this difference of recollection. Since that settlement Mr. Scofield has had no interest in the Credit Mobilier stock and derived no benefit therefrom.

MR. JOHN A. BINGHAM, OF OHIO.

In December, 1867, Mr. Ames advised Mr. Bingham to invest in the stock of the Credit Mobilier, assuring him that it would return him his money with profitable dividends. Mr. Bingham agreed to take twenty shares, and about the 1st of February, 1868, paid to Mr. Ames the par value of the stock, for which Mr. Ames executed to him some receipt or agreement. Mr. Ames received all the dividends on the stock, whether in Union Pacific bonds, or stock, or money; some were delivered to Mr. Bingham and some retained by Mr. Ames. The matter was not finally adjusted between them until February, 1872, when it was settled, Mr. Ames retaining the twenty shares of Credit Mobilier stock, and accounting to Mr. Bingham for such dividends upon it as Mr. Bingham had not already received. Mr. Bingham was treated as the real owner of the stock from the time of the agreement to take it, in December, 1867, to the settlement in February, 1872, and had the benefit of all the dividends upon it. Neither Mr. Ames nor Mr. Bingham had such records of their dealing as to be able to give the precise amount of those dividends.

MR. WILLIAM D. KELLEY, OF PENNSYLVANIA.

The committee find from the evidence that in the early part of the second session of the Fortieth Congress, and probably in December, 1867, Mr. Ames agreed with Mr. Kelley to sell him ten shares of Credit Mobilier stock at par and interest from July 1, 1867. Mr. Kelley was not then prepared to pay for the stock, and Mr. Ames agreed to carry the stock for him until he could pay for it. On the third day of January, 1868, there was a dividend of 80 per cent. on Credit Mobilier stock in Union Pacific bonds. Mr. Ames received the bonds, as the stock stood in his name, and sold them for 97 per cent. of their face. In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of 60 per cent., which Mr. Ames also received. The proceeds of the bonds sold, and the cash dividends received by Mr. Ames, amounted to $1,376. The par value of the stock and interest thereon from the previous July amounted to $1,047; so that, after paying for the stock, there was a balance of dividends due Mr. Kelley of $329. On the 23d day of June, 1868, Mr. Ames gave Mr. Kelley a check for that sum on the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Kelley received the money thereon.

The committee find that Mr. Kelley then understood that the money he thus received was a balance of dividends due him after paying for the stock.

All the subsequent dividends upon the stock were either in Union Pacific stock or bonds, and they were all received by Mr. Ames. In September, 1868, Mr. Kelley received from Mr. Ames $750 in money, which was understood between them to be an advance to be paid out of dividends. There has never been any adjustment of the matter between them, and there is now an entire variance in the testimony of the two men as to what the transaction between them was, but the committee are unanimous in finding the facts above stated. The evidence reported to the House gives some subsequent conversations and negotiations between Mr. Kelley and Mr. Ames on this subject. The committee do not deem it material to refer to it in their report.

MR. JAMES A. GARFIELD, OF OHIO.

The facts in regard to Mr. Garfield, as found by the committee, are identical with the case of Mr. Kelley to the point of reception of the check for $329. He agreed with Mr. Ames to take ten shares of Credit Mobilier stock, but did not pay for the same. Mr. Ames received the 80 per cent. dividend in bonds and sold them for 97 per cent., and also received the 60 per cent. cash dividend, which together paid the price of the stock and interest, and left a balance of $329. This sum was paid over to Mr. Garfield by a check on the Sergeant-at-Arms, and Mr. Garfield then understood this sum was the balance of dividends after paying for the stock. Mr. Ames received all the subsequent dividends, and the committee do not find that, since the payment of the $329, there has been any communication between Mr. Ames and Mr. Garfield on the subject until this investigation began. Some correspondence between Mr. Garfield and Mr. Ames, and some conversations between them during this investigation, will be found in the reported testimony.

The committee do not find that Mr. Ames, in his negotiations with the persons above named, entered into any detail of the relations between the Credit Mobilier Company and the Union Pacific Company, or gave them any specific information as to the amount of dividends they would be likely to receive further than has been already stated. They all knew from him, or otherwise, that the Credit Mobilier was a contracting company to build the Union Pacific road, but it does not appear that any of them knew that the profits and dividends were to be in stock and bonds of that company.

The Credit Mobilier Company was a State corporation, not subject to congressional legislation, and the fact that its profits were expected to be derived from building the Union Pacific road did not, apparently, create such an interest in that company as to disqualify the holder of Credit Mobilier stock from participating in any legislation affecting the railroad company. In his negotiations with these members of Congress, Mr. Ames made no suggestion that he desired to secure their favorable influence in Congress in favor of the railroad company, and whenever the question was raised as to whether the ownership of this stock would in any way interfere with or embarrass them in their action as members of Congress, he assured them it would not.

The committee, therefore, do not find, as to the members of the present House above named, that they were aware of the object of Mr. Ames, or that they had any other purpose in taking this stock than to make a profitable investment. It is apparent that those who advanced their money to pay for their stock present more the appearance of ordinary investors than those who did not, but the committee do not feel at liberty to find any corrupt purpose or knowledge founded upon the fact of non-payment alone.

It ought also to be observed that those gentlemen who surrendered their stock to Mr. Ames before there was any public excitement upon the subject, do not profess to have done so upon any idea of impropriety in holding it, but for reasons affecting the value and security of the investment. But the committee believe that they must have felt that there was something so out of the ordinary course of business in the extraordinary dividends they were receiving as to render the investment itself suspicious, and that this was one of the motives of their action.

The committee have not been able to find that any of these members of Congress have been affected in their official action in consequence of their interest in Credit Mobilier stock.

It has been suggested that the fact that none of this stock was transferred to those with whom Mr. Ames contracted was a circumstance from which a sense of impropriety, if not corruption, was to be inferred. The committee believe this is capable of explanation without such inference. The profits of building the road, under the Ames contract, were only to be divided among such holders of Credit Mobilier stock as should come in and become parties to certain conditions set out in the contract of transfer to the trustees, so that a transfer from Mr. Ames to new holders would cut off the right to dividends from the trustees, unless they also became parties to the agreement; and this the committee believe to be the true reason why no transfers were made.

The committee are also of opinion that there was a satisfactory reason for delay on Mr. Ames’s part to close settlements with some of these gentlemen for stock and bonds he had received as dividends upon the stock contracted to them. In the fall of 1868 Mr. McComb commenced a suit against the Credit Mobilier Company, and Mr. Ames and others, claiming to be entitled to two hundred and fifty shares of the Credit Mobilier stock upon a subscription for stock to that amount. That suit is still pending. If McComb prevailed in that suit, Mr. Ames might be compelled to surrender so much of the stock assigned to him as trustee, and he was not therefore anxious to have the stock go out of his hands until that suit was terminated. It ought also to be stated that no one of the present members of the House above named appears to have had any knowledge of the dealings of Mr. Ames with other members.

The committee do not find that either of the above named gentlemen, in contracting with Mr. Ames, had any corrupt motive or purpose himself, or was aware that Mr. Ames had any, nor did either of them suppose he was guilty of any impropriety or even indelicacy in becoming a purchaser of this stock. Had it appeared that these gentlemen were aware of the enormous dividends upon this stock, and how they were to be earned, we could not thus acquit them. And here as well as anywhere, the committee may allude to that subject. Congress had chartered the Union Pacific road, given to it a liberal grant of lands, and promised a liberal loan of Government bonds, to be delivered as fast as sections of the road were completed. As these alone might not be sufficient to complete the road, Congress authorized the company to issue their own bonds for the deficit, and secured them by a mortgage upon the road, which should be a lien prior to that of the Government. Congress never intended that the owners of the road should execute a mortgage on the road prior to that of the Government, to raise money to put into their own pockets, but only to build the road.

The men who controlled the Union Pacific seem to have adopted as the basis of their action the right to encumber the road by a mortgage prior to that of the Government to the full extent, whether the money was needed for the construction of the road or not.

It was clear enough they could not do this directly and in terms, and therefore they resorted to the device of contracting with themselves to build the road, and fix a price high enough to require the issue of bonds to the full extent, and then divide the bonds or the proceeds of them under the name of profits on the contract. All those acting in the matter seem to have been fully aware of this, and that this was to be the effect of the transaction. The sudden rise of value of Credit Mobilier stock was the result of the adoption of this scheme. Any undue and unreasonable profits thus made by themselves were as much a fraud upon the Government as if they had sold their bonds and divided the money without going through the form of denominating them profits on building the road.

Now had these facts been known to these gentlemen, and had they understood they were to share in the proceeds of the scheme, they would have deserved the severest censure.

Had they known only that the profits were to be paid in stock and bonds of the Union Pacific Company, and so make them interested in it, we cannot agree to the doctrine, which has been urged before us and elsewhere, that it was perfectly legitimate for members of Congress to invest in a corporation deriving all its rights from and subject at all times to the action of Congress.

In such case the rules of the House, as well as the rules of decency, would require such member to abstain from voting on any question affecting his interest. But, after accepting the position of a member of Congress, we do not think he has the right to disqualify himself from acting upon subjects likely to come before Congress without some higher and more urgent motive than merely to make a profitable investment. But it is not so much to be feared that in such case an interested member would vote as that he would exercise his influence by personal appeal to his fellow-members, and by other modes, which often is far more potent than a single silent vote.

We do not think any member ought to feel so confident of his own strength as to allow himself to be brought into this temptation. We think Mr. Ames judged shrewdly in saying that a man is much more likely to be watchful of his own interests than those of other people. But there is a broader view still which we think ought to be taken. This country is fast becoming filled with gigantic corporations, wielding and controlling immense aggregations of money, and thereby commanding great influence and power. It is notorious in many State legislatures that these influences are often controlling, so that in effect they become the ruling power of the State. Within a few years Congress has, to some extent, been brought within similar influences, and the knowledge of the public on that subject has brought great discredit upon the body, far more, we believe, than there were facts to justify.

But such is the tendency of the time, and the belief is far too general that all men can be ruled with money, and that the use of such means to carry public measures is legitimate and proper. No member of Congress ought to place himself in circumstances of suspicion, so that any discredit of the body shall arise on his account. It is of the highest importance that the national legislature should be free of all taint of corruption, and it is of almost equal necessity that the people should feel confident that it is so.

In a free government like ours, we cannot expect the people will long respect the laws, if they lose respect for the law-makers.

For these reasons we think it behooves every man in Congress or in any public position to hold himself aloof, as far as possible, from all such influences, that he may not only be enabled to look at every public question with an eye only to the public good, but that his conduct and motives be not suspected or questioned. The only criticism the committee feel compelled to make on the action of these members in taking this stock is that they were not sufficiently careful in ascertaining what they were getting, and that in their judgment the assurance of a good investment was all the assurance they needed. We commend to them, and to all men, the letter of the venerable Senator Bayard, in response to an offer of some of this stock, found on page 74 of the testimony.

The committee find nothing in the conduct or motives of either of these members in taking this stock, that calls for any recommendation by the committee of the House.

The case of Mr. Brooks stands upon a different state of facts from any of those already given. The committee find from the evidence as follows: Mr. Brooks had been a warm advocate of a Pacific Railroad, both in Congress and in the public press. After persons interested in the Union Pacific road had obtained control of the Credit Mobilier charter and organized under it for the purpose of making it a construction company to build the road, Dr. Durant, who was then the leading man in the enterprise, made great efforts to get the stock of the Credit Mobilier taken. Mr. Brooks was a friend of Dr. Durant, and he made some efforts to aid Dr. Durant in getting subscriptions for the stock, introduced the matter to some capitalists of New York, but his efforts were not crowned with success.

During this period Mr. Brooks had talked with Dr. Durant about taking some of the stock for himself, and had spoken of taking fifteen or twenty thousand dollars of it, but no definite contract was made between them, and Mr. Brooks was under no legal obligation to take the stock, or Durant to give it to him. In October, 1867, Mr. Brooks was appointed by the President one of the Government directors of the Union Pacific road. In December, 1867, after the stock of the Credit Mobilier was understood, by those familiar with the affairs between the Union Pacific and the Credit Mobilier, to be worth very much more than par, Mr. Brooks applied to Dr. Durant, and claimed that he should have two hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock. It does not appear that Mr. Brooks claimed he had any legal contract for stock that he could enforce, or that Durant considered himself in any way legally bound to let him have any, but still, on account of what had been said, and the efforts of Mr. Brooks to aid him, he considered himself under obligations to satisfy Mr. Brooks in the matter.

The stock had been so far taken up, and was then in such demand, that Durant could not well comply with Brooks’s demand for two hundred shares. After considerable negotiation, it was finally adjusted between them by Durant’s agreeing to let Brooks have one hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock, and giving him with it $5,000 of Union Pacific bonds, and $20,000 of Union Pacific stock. Dr. Durant testifies that he then considered Credit Mobilier stock worth double the par value, and that the bonds and stock he was to give Mr. Brooks worth about $9,000, so that he saved about $1,000 by not giving Brooks the additional hundred shares he claimed. After the negotiation had been concluded between Mr. Brooks and Dr. Durant, Mr. Brooks said that as he was a Government director of the Union Pacific road, and as the law provided such directors should not be stockholders in that company, he would not hold this stock, and directed Dr. Durant to transfer it to Charles H. Neilson, his son-in-law. The whole negotiation with Durant was conducted by Mr. Brooks himself, and Neilson had nothing to do with the transaction, except to receive the transfer. The $10,000 to pay for the one hundred shares was paid by Mr. Brooks, and he received the $5,000 of Pacific bonds which came with the stock.

The certificate of transfer of the hundred shares from Durant to Neilson is dated December 26, 1867. On the 3d of January, 1868, there was a dividend of 80 per cent. in Union Pacific bonds paid on the Credit Mobilier stock. The bonds were received by Neilson, but passed over at once to Mr. Brooks. It is claimed, both by Mr. Brooks and Neilson, that the $10,000 paid by Mr. Brooks for the stock was a loan of that sum by him to Neilson, and, that the bonds he received from Durant, and those received for the dividend, were delivered and held by him as collateral security for the loan.

No note or obligation was given for the money by Neilson, nor, so far as we can learn from either Brooks or Neilson, was any account or memorandum of the transaction kept by either of them. At the time of the arrangement or settlement above spoken of between Brooks and Durant, there was nothing said about Mr. Brooks being entitled to have 50 per cent. more stock by virtue of his ownership of the hundred shares. Neither Brooks nor Durant thought of any such thing.

Some time after the transfer of the shares to Neilson, Mr. Brooks called on Sidney Dillon, then the president of the Credit Mobilier, and claimed he or Neilson was entitled to fifty additional shares of the stock, by virtue of the purchase of the one hundred shares of Durant.

This was claimed by Mr. Brooks as his right by virtue of the 50 per cent. increase of the stock hereinbefore described. Mr. Dillon said he did not know how that was, but he would consult the leading stockholders, and be governed by them. Mr. Dillon, in order to justify himself in the transaction, got up a paper authorizing the issue of fifty shares of the stock to Mr. Brooks, and procured it to be signed by most of the principal shareholders. After this had been done, an entry of fifty shares was made on the stock-ledger to some person other than Neilson. The name in two places on the book has been erased, and the name of Neilson inserted. The committee are satisfied that the stock was first entered on the books in Mr. Brooks’s name.

Mr. Neilson soon after called for the certificate for the fifty shares, and on the 29th of February, 1868, the certificate was issued to him, and the entry on the stock-book was changed to Neilson.

Neilson procured Mr. Dillon to advance the money to pay for the stock, and at the same time delivered to Dillon $4,000 Union Pacific bonds, and fifty shares of Union Pacific stock as collateral security. These bonds and stock were a portion of dividends received at the time, as he was allowed to receive the same per centage of dividends on these fifty shares that had previously been paid on the hundred. This matter has never been adjusted between Neilson and Dillon. Brooks and Neilson both testify they never paid Dillon. Dillon thinks he has received his pay, as he has not now the collaterals in his possession. If he has been paid it is probable that it was from the collaterals in some form. The subject has never been named between Dillon and Neilson since Dillon advanced the money, and no one connected with the transaction seems able to give any further light upon it. The whole business by which these fifty shares were procured was done by Mr. Brooks. Neilson knew nothing of any right to have them, and only went for the certificate when told to do so by Mr. Brooks.

The committee find that no such right to fifty shares additional stock passed by the transfer of the hundred. And from Mr. Brooks’s familiarity with the affairs of the company, the committee believe he must have known his claim to them was unfounded. The question naturally arises, How was he able to procure them? The stock at this time by the stockholders was considered worth three or four times its par value. Neilson sustained no relations to any of these people that commanded any favor, and if he could have used any influence he did not attempt it; if he had this right he was unaware of it till told by Mr. Brooks, and left the whole matter in his hands. It is clear that the shares were procured by the sole efforts of Mr. Brooks, and, as the stockholders who consented to it supposed, for the benefit of Mr. Brooks. What power had Mr. Brooks to enforce an unfounded claim, to have for $5,000, stock worth $15,000 or $20,000? Mr. McComb swears that he heard conversation between Mr. Brooks and Mr. John B. Alley, a large stockholder, and one of the executive committee, in which Mr. Brooks urged that he should have the additional fifty shares, because he was or would procure himself to be made a Government director, and also that, being a member of Congress, he “would take care of the democratic side of the House.”

Mr. Brooks and Mr. Alley both deny having had any such conversation, or that Mr. Brooks ever made such a statement to Mr. Alley. If, therefore, this matter rested wholly upon the testimony of Mr. McComb, the committee would not feel justified in finding that Mr. Brooks procured the stock by such use of his official position; but all the circumstances seem to point exactly in that direction, and we can find no other satisfactory solution of the question above propounded. Whatever claim Mr. Brooks had to stock, either legal or moral, had been adjusted and satisfied by Dr. Durant. Whether he was getting this stock for himself or to give to his son-in-law, we believe, from the circumstances attending the whole transaction, that he obtained it knowing that it was yielded to its official position and influence, and with the intent to secure his favor and influence in such positions. Mr. Brooks claims that he has had no interest in this stock whatever; that the benefit and advantage of his right to have it he gave to Mr. Neilson, his son-in-law, and that he has had all the dividends upon it. The committee are unable to find this to be the case, for in their judgment all the facts and circumstances show Mr. Brooks to be the real and substantial owner, and that Neilson’s ownership is merely nominal and colorable.

In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of $9,000 upon this one hundred and fifty shares of stock. Neilson received it, of course, as the stock was in his name; but on the same day it was paid over to Mr. Brooks, as Neilson says, to pay so much of the $10,000 advanced by Mr. Brooks to pay for the stock. This, then, repaid all but $1,000 of the loan; but Mr. Brooks continued to hold $16,000 of Union Pacific bonds, which Neilson says he gave him as collateral security, and to draw the interest upon all but $5,000. The interest upon the others, Neilson says, he was permitted to draw and retain, but at one time in his testimony he spoke of the amount he was allowed as being Christmas and New Year’s presents. Neilson says that during the last summer he borrowed $14,000 of Mr. Brooks, and he now owes Mr. Brooks nearly as much as the collaterals; but, according to his testimony, Mr. Brooks for four years held $16,000 in bonds as security for $1,000, and received the interest on $11,000 of the collaterals. No accounts appear to have been kept between Mr. Brooks and Neilson, and doubtless what sums he has received from Mr. Brooks, out of the dividends, were intended as presents rather than as deliveries of money belonging to him.

Mr. Brooks’s efforts procured the stock; his money paid for it; all the cash dividends he has received; and he holds all the bonds, except those Dillon received, which seem to have been applied toward paying for the fifty shares. Without further comment on the evidence, the committee find that the one hundred and fifty shares of stock appearing on the books of the Credit Mobilier in the name of Neilson were really the stock of Mr. Brooks, and subject to his control, and that it was so understood by both the parties. Mr. Brooks had taken such an interest in the Credit Mobilier Company, and was so connected with Dr. Durant, that he must be regarded as having full knowledge of the relations between that company and the railroad company, and of the contracts between them. He must have known the cause of the sudden increase in value of the Credit Mobilier stock, and how the large expected profits were to be made. We have already expressed our views of the propriety of a member of Congress becoming the owner of stock, possessing this knowledge.

But Mr. Brooks was not only a member of Congress, but he was a Government director of the Union Pacific Company. As such it was his duty to guard and watch over the interests of the Government in the road and to see that they were protected and preserved. To insure such faithfulness on the part of Government directors, Congress wisely provided that they should not be stockholders in the road. Mr. Brooks readily saw that, though becoming a stockholder in the Credit Mobilier was not forbidden by the letter of the law, yet it was a violation of its spirit and essence, and therefore had the stock placed in the name of his son-in-law. The transfer of the Oakes Ames contract to the trustees and the building of the road under that contract, from which the enormous dividends were derived, were all during Mr. Brooks’s official life as a Government director, must have been within his knowledge, and yet passed without the slightest opposition from him. The committee believed this could not have been done without an entire disregard of his official obligation and duty, and that while appointed to guard the public interests in the road he joined himself with the promoters of a scheme whereby the Government was to be defrauded, and shared in the spoil.

In the conclusions of fact upon the evidence, the committee are entirely agreed.

In considering what action we ought to recommend to the House upon these facts, the committee encounter a question which has been much debated: Has this House power and jurisdiction to inquire concerning offenses committed by its members prior to their election, and to punish them by censure or expulsion? The committee are unanimous upon the right of jurisdiction of this House over the cases of Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks, upon the facts found in regard to them. Upon the question of jurisdiction the committee present the following views:

The Constitution, in the fifth section of the first article, defines the power of either House as follows:

“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a member.”

It will be observed that there is no qualification of the power, but there is an important qualification of the manner of its exercise—it must be done “with the concurrence of two-thirds.”

The close analogy between this power and the power of impeachment is deserving of consideration.

The great purpose of the power of impeachment is to remove an unfit and unworthy incumbent from office, and though a judgment of impeachment may to some extent operate as punishment, that is not its principal object. Members of Congress are not subject to be impeached, but may be expelled, and the principal purpose of expulsion is not as punishment, but to remove a member whose character and conduct show that he is an unfit man to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the body, and whose presence in it tends to bring the body into contempt and disgrace.

In both cases it is a power of purgation and purification to be exercised for the public safety, and, in the case of expulsion, for the protection and character of the House. The Constitution defines the causes of impeachment, to wit, “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The office of the power of expulsion is so much the same as that of the power to impeach that we think it may be safely assumed that whatever would be a good cause of impeachment would also be a good cause of expulsion.

It has never been contended that the power to impeach for any of the causes enumerated was intended to be restricted to those which might occur after appointment to a civil office, so that a civil officer who had secretly committed such offense before his appointment should not be subject upon detection and exposure to be convicted and removed from office. Every consideration of justice and sound policy would seem to require that the public interests be secured, and those chosen to be their guardians be free from the pollution of high crimes, no matter at what time that pollution had attached.

If this be so in regard to other civil officers, under institutions which rest upon the intelligence and virtue of the people, can it well be claimed that the law-making Representative may be vile and criminal with impunity, provided the evidences of his corruption are found to antedate his election?

In the report made to the Senate by John Quincy Adams in December, 1807, upon the case of John Smith, of Ohio, the following language is used: “The power of expelling a member for misconduct results, on the principles of common sense, from the interests of the nation that the high trust of legislation shall be invested in pure hands. When the trust is elective, it is not to be presumed that the constituent body will commit the deposit to the keeping of worthless characters. But when a man whom his fellow-citizens have honored with their confidence on a pledge of a spotless reputation, has degraded himself by the commission of infamous crimes, which become suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world, defective indeed would be that institution which should be impotent to discard from its bosom the contagion of such a member; which should have no remedy of amputation to apply until the poison had reached the heart.”

The case of Smith was that of a Senator, who, after his election, but not during a session of the Senate, had been involved in the treasonable conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Yet the reasoning is general, and was to antagonize some positions which had been taken in the case of Marshall, a Senator from Kentucky; the Senate in that case having, among other reasons, declined to take jurisdiction of the charge for the reason that the alleged offence had been committed prior to the Senator’s election, and was matter cognizable by the criminal courts of Kentucky. None of the commentators upon the Constitution or upon parliamentary law assign any such limitation as to the time of the commission of the offense, or the nature of it, which shall control and limit the power of expulsion. On the contrary they all assert that the power in its very nature is a discretionary one, to be exercised of course with grave circumspection at all times, and only for good cause. Story, Kent, and Sergeant, all seem to accept and rely upon the exposition of Mr. Adams in the Smith case as sound. May, in his Parliamentary Practice, page 59, enumerates the causes for expulsion from Parliament, but he nowhere intimates that the offense must have been committed subsequent to the election.

When it is remembered that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the parliamentary law of England, and must have had in mind the then recent contest over Wilkes’s case, it is impossible to conclude that they meant to limit the discretion of the Houses as to the causes of expulsion. It is a received principle of construction that the Constitution is to be interpreted according to the known rules of law at the time of its adoption, and therefore, when we find them dealing with a recognized subject of legislative authority, and while studiously qualifying and restricting the manner of its exercise, assigning no limitations to the subject-matter itself, they must be assumed to have intended to leave that to be determined according to established principles, as a high prerogative power to be exercised according to the sound discretion of the body. It was not to be apprehended that two-thirds of the Representatives of the people would ever exercise this power in any capricious or arbitrary manner, or trifle with or trample upon constitutional rights. At the same time it could not be foreseen what necessities for self-preservation or self-purification might arise in the legislative body. Therefore it was that they did not, and would not, undertake to limit or define the boundaries of those necessities.

The doctrine that the jurisdiction of this House over its members is exclusively confined to matters arising subsequent to their election, and that the body is bound to retain the vilest criminal as a member if his criminal secret was kept until his election was secured, has been supposed by many to have been established and declared in the famous case of John Wilkes before alluded to. A short statement of that case will show how fallacious is that supposition. Wilkes had been elected a member of Parliament for Middlesex, and in 1764 was expelled for having published a libel on the ministry. He was again elected and again expelled for a similar offense on the 3d of February, 1769. Being again elected on the 17th of February, 1769, the commons passed the following resolution: “That John Wilkes, Esq., having been in this session of Parliament expelled this house was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present Parliament.” Wilkes was again elected, but the House of Commons declared the seat vacant and ordered a new election. At this election Wilkes was again elected by 1,143 votes, against 296 for his competitor, Luttrell.

On the 15th of April, 1769, the house decided that by the previous action Wilkes had become ineligible, and that the votes given for him were void and could not be counted, and gave the seat to Luttrell. Subsequently, in 1783, the House of Commons declared the resolution of February 17, 1769, which had asserted the incapacity of an expelled member to be re-elected to the same Parliament, to be subversive of the rights of the electors, and expunged it from the journal. It will be seen from this concise statement of Wilkes’s case that the question was not raised as to the power of the house to expel a member for offenses committed prior to his election; the point decided, and afterward most properly expunged, was that expulsion per se rendered the expelled member legally ineligible, and that votes cast for him could not be counted. Wilkes’s offense was of purely a political character, not involving moral turpitude; he had attacked the ministry in the press, and the proceedings against him in Parliament were then claimed to be a partisan political persecution, subversive of the rights of the people and of the liberty of the press. These proceedings in Wilkes’s case took place during the appearance of the famous Junius letters, and several of them are devoted to the discussion of them. The doctrine that expulsion creates ineligibility was attacked and exposed by him with great force. But he concedes that if the cause of expulsion be one that renders a man unfit and unworthy to be a member, he may be expelled for that cause as often as he shall be elected.

The case of Matteson, in the House of Representatives, has also often been quoted as a precedent for this limitation of jurisdiction. In the proceedings and debates of the House upon that case it will be seen that this was one among many grounds taken in the debate; but as the whole subject was ended by being laid on the table, it is quite impossible to say what was decided by the House. It appeared, however, in that case that the charge against Matteson had become public, and his letter upon which the whole charge rested had been published and circulated through his district during the canvass preceding his election. This fact, we judge, had a most important influence in determining the action of the House in his case.

The committee have no occasion in this report to discuss the question as to the power or duty of the House in a case where a constituency, with a full knowledge of the objectionable character of a man, have selected him to be their Representative. It is hardly a case to be supposed that any constituency, with a full knowledge that a man had been guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude, would elect him. The majority of the committee are not prepared to concede such a man could be forced upon the House, and would not consider the expulsion of such a man any violation of the rights of the electors, for while the electors have rights that should be respected, the House as a body has rights also that should be protected and preserved. But that in such case the judgment of the constituency would be entitled to the greatest consideration, and that this should form an important element in its determination, is readily admitted.

It is universally conceded, as we believe, that the House has ample jurisdiction to punish or expel a member for an offense committed during his term as a member, though committed during a vacation of Congress and in no way connected with his duties as a member. Upon what principle is it that such a jurisdiction can be maintained? It must be upon one or both of the following: that the offense shows him to be an unworthy and improper man to be a member, or that his conduct brings odium and reproach upon the body. But suppose the offense has been committed prior to his election, but comes to light afterward, is the effect upon his own character, or the reproach and disgrace upon the body, if they allow him to remain a member, any the less? We can see no difference in principle in the two cases, and to attempt any would be to create a purely technical and arbitrary distinction, having no just foundation. In our judgment, the time is not at all material, except it be coupled with the further fact that he was re-elected with a knowledge on the part of his constituents of what he had been guilty, and in such event we have given our views of the effect.

It seems to us absurd to say that an election has given a man political absolution for an offense which was unknown to his constituents. If it be urged again, as it has sometimes been, that this view of the power of the House, and the true ground of its proper exercise, may be laid hold of and used improperly, it may be answered that no rule, however narrow and limited, that may be adopted can prevent it. If two-thirds of the House shall see fit to expel a man because they do not like his political or religious principles, or without any reason at all, they have the power, and there is no remedy except by appeal to the people. Such exercise of the power would be wrongful, and violative of the principles of the Constitution, but we see no encouragement of such wrong in the views we hold.

It is the duty of each House to exercise its rightful functions upon appropriate occasions, and to trust that those who come after them will be no less faithful to duty, and no less jealous for the rights of free popular representation than themselves. It will be quite time enough to square other cases with right reason and principle when they arise. Perhaps the best way to prevent them will be to maintain strictly public integrity and public honor in all cases as they present themselves. Nor do we imagine that the people of the United States will charge their servants with invading their privileges when they confine themselves to the preservation of a standard of official integrity which the common instincts of humanity recognize as essential to all social order and good government.

The foregoing are the views which we deem proper to submit upon the general question of the jurisdiction of the House over its members. But apart from these general views, the committee are of opinion that the facts found in the present case amply justify the taking jurisdiction over them, for the following reasons:

The subject-matter upon which the action of members was intended to be influenced was of a continuous character, and was as likely to be a subject of congressional action in future Congresses as in the Fortieth. The influences, brought to bear on members were as likely to be operative upon them in the future as in the present, and were so intended. Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks have both continued members of the House to the present time, and so have most of the members upon whom these influences were sought to be exerted. The committee are, therefore, of opinion that the acts of these men may properly be treated as offenses against the present House, and so within its jurisdiction upon the most limited rule.

Two members of the committee, Messrs. Niblack and McCrary, prefer to express no opinion on the general jurisdictional questions discussed in the report, and rest their judgment wholly on the ground last stated.

In relation to Mr. Ames, he sold to several members of Congress stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth double that amount or more, with, the purpose and intent thereby to influence their votes and decisions upon matters to come before Congress.

The facts found in the report as to Mr. Brooks, show that he used the influence of his official positions as member of Congress and Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to get fifty shires of the stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth three or four times that sum, knowing that it was given to him with intent to influence his votes and decisions in Congress, and his action as a Government director.

The sixth section of the act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. United States, 171, is in the following words:

“If any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise, offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any other valuable thing whatever, to any member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after his election as such member, and either before or after he shall have qualified and taken his seat, or to any officer of the United States, or person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under or in connection with any Department of the Government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after the passage of this act, with intent to influence his vote or decision on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of the United States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit, and shall thereof be convicted, such person or persons so offering, promising, or giving, or causing or procuring to be promised, offered, or given, any such money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or other valuable thing whatever, and the member, officer, or person who shall in anywise accept or receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as for a high crime and misdemeanor in any of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding three times the amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding three years; and the person so convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or any part thereof, if an officer or person holding any such place of trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or place; and any person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”

In the judgment of the committee, the facts reported in regard to Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks would have justified their conviction under the above-recited statute and subjected them to the penalties therein provided.

The committee need not enlarge upon the dangerous character of these offenses. The sense of Congress is shown by the severe penalty denounced by the statute itself. The offenses were not violations of private rights, but were against the very life of a constitutional Government by poisoning the fountain of legislation.

The duty devolved upon the committee has been of a most painful and delicate character. They have performed it to the best of their ability. They have proceeded with the greatest care and deliberation, for while they desired to do their full duty to the House and the country, they were most anxious not to do injustice to any man. In forming their conclusions they have intended to be entirely cool and dispassionate, not to allow themselves to be swerved by any popular fervor on the one hand, or any feeling of personal favor and sympathy on the other.

The committee submit to the House and recommend the adoption of the following resolutions.

“1. Whereas Mr. Oakes Ames, a Representative in this House from the State of Massachusetts, has been guilty of selling to members of Congress shares of stock in the Credit Mobilier of America, for prices much below the true value of such stock, with intent thereby to influence the votes and decisions of such members in matters to be brought before Congress for action: Therefore,

Resolved, That Mr. Oakes Ames be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

2. Whereas Mr. James Brooks, a Representative in this House from the State of New York, did procure the Credit Mobilier Company to issue and deliver to Charles H. Neilson, for the use and benefit of said Brooks, fifty shares of the stock of said company, at a price much below its real value, well knowing that the same was so issued and delivered with intent to influence the votes and decisions of said Brooks, as a member of the House, in matters to be brought before Congress for action, and also to influence the action of said Brooks as a Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company: Therefore,

Resolved, That Mr. James Brooks be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

The House, after much discussion, modified the propositions of the committee of investigation, and subjected Oakes Ames and James Brooks to the “absolute condemnation of the House.” Both members died within three months thereafter.

The session was full of investigations, but all the others failed to develop any tangible scandals. The Democrats demanded and secured the investigation of the New York custom-house; the United States Treasury; the use of Seneca sandstone; the Chorpenning claim, and the Navy Department, etc. They were, as stated, fruitless.

The “Salary Grab.”

At the same session—1871–’73, acts were passed to abolish the franking privilege, to increase the President’s salary from $25,000 to $50,000, and that of Senators and Representatives from $5,000 to $7,500. The last proved quite unpopular, and was generally denounced as “The Salary Grab,” because of the feature which made it apply to the Congressmen who passed the bill, and of course to go backward to the beginning of the term. This was not new, as earlier precedents were found to excuse it, but the people were nevertheless dissatisfied, and it was made an issue by both parties in the nomination and election of Representatives. Many were defeated, but probably more survived the issue, and are still enjoying public life. Yet the agitation was kept up until the obnoxious feature of the bill and the Congressional increase of salary were repealed, leaving it as now at the rate of $5,000 a year and mileage.

A House committee, headed by B. F. Butler, on Feb. 7th, 1873, made a report which gave a fair idea of the expenses under given circumstances—the increase to be preserved, but the franking privilege and mileage to be repealed. We quote the figures:

The House passed a bill for the abolition of mileage, but in the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment, and not again heard from. So that the increased pay no longer obtains, the franking privilege only to the extent of mailing actual Congressional documents, and mileage remains.

The following curious facts relating to these questions we take from Hon. Edward McPherson’s admirable compilation in his “Hand-Book of Politics” for 1874.

Statement of Compensation and Mileage.