The parties peculiar to our Colonial times hardly have a place in American politics. They divided people in sentiment simply, as they did in the mother country, but here there was little or no power to act, and were to gather results from party victories. Men were then Whigs or Tories because they had been prior to their emigration here, or because their parents had been, or because it has ever been natural to show division in individual sentiment. Political contests, however, were unknown, for none enjoyed the pleasures and profits of power; the crown made and unmade rulers. The local self-government which our forefathers enjoyed, were secured to them by their charters, and these were held to be contracts not to be changed without the consent of both parties. All of the inhabitants of the colonies claimed and were justly entitled to the rights guaranteed by the Magna Charta, and in addition to these they insisted upon the supervision of all internal interests and the power to levy and collect taxes. These claims were conceded until their growing prosperity and England’s need of additional revenues suggested schemes of indirect taxation. Against these the colony of Plymouth protested as early as 1636, and spasmodic protests from all the colonies followed. These increased in frequency and force with the growing demands of King George III. In 1651 the navigation laws imposed upon the colonies required both exports and imports to be carried in British ships, and all who traded were compelled to do it with England. In 1672 inter-colonial duties were imposed, and when manufacturing sought to flank this policy, their establishment was forbidden by law.
The passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 caused high excitement, and for the first time parties began to take definite shape and manifest open antagonisms, and the words Whig and Tory then had a plainer meaning in America than in England. The Stamp Act was denounced by the Whigs as direct taxation, since it provided, that stamps previously paid for should be affixed to all legal papers. The colonies resented, and so general were the protests that for a time it seemed that only those who owed their livings to the Crown, or expected aid and comfort from it, remained with the Tories. The Whigs were the patriots. The war for the rights of the colonies began in 1775, and it was supported by majorities in all of the Colonial Assemblies. These majorities were as carefully organized then as now to promote a popular cause, and this in the face of adverse action on the part of the several Colonial Governors. Thus in Virginia, Lord Dunmore had from time to time, until 1773, prorogued the Virginia Assembly, when it seized the opportunity to pass resolves instituting a committee of correspondence, and recommending joint action by the legislatures of the other colonies. In the next year, the same body, under the lead of Henry, Randolph, Lee, Washington, Wythe and other patriots, officially deprecated the closing of the port of Boston, and set apart a day to implore Divine interposition in behalf of the colonies. The Governor dissolved the House for this act, and the delegates, 89 in number, repaired to a tavern, organized themselves into a committee, signed articles of association, and advised with other colonial committees the expediency of “appointing deputies to meet in a general correspondence”—really a suggestion for a Congress. The idea of a Congress, however, originated with Doctor Franklin the year before, and it had then been approved by town meetings in Providence, Boston and New York. The action of Virginia lifted the proposal above individual advice and the action of town meetings, and called to it the attention of all the colonial legislatures. It was indeed fortunate in the incipiency of these political movements, that the people were practically unanimous. Only the far-seeing realized the drift and danger, while nearly all could join their voices against oppressive taxes and imposts.
The war went on for colonial rights, the Whigs wisely insisting that they were willing to remain as colonists if their rights should be guaranteed by the mother country; the Tories, chiefly fed by the Crown, were willing to remain without guarantee—a negative position, and one which in the high excitement of the times excited little attention, save where the holders of such views made themselves odious by the enjoyment of high official position, or by harsh criticism upon, or treatment of the patriots.
The first Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia in September, 1774, and there laid the foundations of the Republic. While its assemblage was first recommended by home meetings, the cause, as already shown, was taken up by the assemblies of Massachusetts and Virginia. Georgia alone was not represented. The members were called delegates, who declared in their official papers that they were “appointed by the good people of these colonies.” It was called the “revolutionary government,” because it derived its power from the people, and not from the functionaries of any existing government. In it each colony was allowed but a single vote, regardless of the number of delegates, and here began not only the unit rule, but the practice which obtains in the election of a President when the contest reaches, under the constitution and law, the National House of Representatives. The original object was to give equality to the colonies as colonies.
In 1776, the second Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia, all the colonies being again represented save Georgia. The delegates were chosen principally by conventions of the people, though some were sent by the popular branches of the colonial legislatures. In July, and soon after the commencement of hostilities, Georgia entered the Confederacy.
The Declaration of Independence, passed in 1776, drew yet plainer lines between the Whigs and Tories. A gulf of hatred separated the opposing parties, and the Tory was far more despised than the open foe, when he was not such, and was the first sought when he was. Men who contend for liberty ever regard those who are not for them as against them—a feeling which led to the expression of a political maxim of apparent undying force, for it has since found frequent repetition in every earnest campaign. After the adoption of the Declaration by the Continental Congress, the Whigs favored the most direct and absolute separation, while the Tories supported the Crown. On the 7th of June, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, moved the Declaration in these words:
“Resolved, That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.”
Then followed preparations for the formal declaration, which was adopted on the 4th of July, 1776, in the precise language submitted by Thomas Jefferson. All of the state papers of the Continental Congress evince the highest talent, and the evils which led to its exhibition must have been long but very impatiently endured to impel the study of the questions involved. Possibly only the best lives in our memory invite our perusal, but certain it is that higher capacity was never called to the performance of graver political duties in the history of the world.
It has been said that the Declaration is in imitation of that published by the United Netherlands, but whether this be true or false, the liberty-loving world has for more than a century accepted it as the best protest against oppression known to political history. A great occasion conspired with a great author to make it grandly great.
Dr. Franklin, as early as July, 1775, first prepared a sketch of articles of confederation between the colonies, to continue until their reconciliation with Great Britain, and in failure thereof to be perpetual. John Quincy Adams says this plan was never discussed in Congress. June 11, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare the force of a colonial confederation, and the day following one member from each colony was appointed to perform the duty. The report was submitted, laid aside August 20, 1776, taken up April 7, 1777, and debated from time to time until November 15th, of the same year, when the report was agreed to. It was then submitted to the legislatures of the several states, these being advised to authorize their delegates in Congress to ratify the same. On the 26th of June, 1778, the ratification was ordered to be engrossed and signed by the delegates. Those of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and South Carolina signed July 9th, 1778; those of North Carolina July 21st; Georgia July 24th; Jersey November 26th, same year; Delaware February 22d and May 5th, 1779. Maryland refused to ratify until the question of the conflicting claims of the Union and of the separate States to the property of the crown-lands should be adjusted. This was accomplished by the cession of the lands in dispute to the United States, and Maryland signed March 1st, 1781. On the 2d of March, Congress assembled under the new powers, and continued to act for the Confederacy until the 4th of March, 1789, the date of the organization of the government under the Federal constitution. Our political life has therefore three periods, “the revolutionary government,” “the confederation,” and that of the “federal constitution,” which still obtains.
The federal constitution is the result of the labors of a convention called at Philadelphia in May, 1787, at a time when it was feared by many that the Union was in the greatest danger, from inability to pay soldiers who had, in 1783, been disbanded on a declaration of peace and an acknowledgment of independence; from prostration of the public credit and faith of the nation; from the neglect to provide for the payment of even the interest on the public debt; and from the disappointed hopes of many who thought freedom did not need to face responsibilities. A large portion of the convention of 1787 still clung to the confederacy of the states, and advocated as a substitute for the constitution a revival of the old articles of confederation with additional powers to Congress. A long discussion followed, and a most able one, but a constitution for the people, embodying a division of legislative, judicial and executive powers prevailed, and the result is now daily witnessed in the federal constitution. While the revolutionary war lasted but seven years, the political revolution incident to, identified with and directing it, lasted thirteen years. This was completed on the 30th of April, 1789, the day on which Washington was inaugurated as the first President under the federal constitution.
As questions of government were evolved by the struggles for independence, the Whigs, who of course greatly outnumbered all others during the Revolution, naturally divided in sentiment, though their divisions were not sufficiently serious to excite the establishment of rival parties—something which the great majority of our forefathers were too wise to think of in time of war. When the war closed, however, and the question of establishing the Union was brought clear to the view of all, one class of the Whigs believed that state government should be supreme, and that no central power should have sufficient authority to coerce a state, or keep it to the compact against its will. All accepted the idea of a central government; all realized the necessity of union, but the fear that the states would lose their power, or surrender their independence was very great, and this fear was more naturally shown by both the larger and the smaller states. This class of thinkers were then called Particularists. Their views were opposed by the
who argued that local self-government was inadequate to the establishment and perpetuation of political freedom, and that it afforded little or no power to successfully resist foreign invasion. Some of these went so far as to favor a government patterned after that of England, save that it should be republican in name and spirit. The essential differences, if they can be reduced to two sentences, were these: The Particularist Whigs desired a government republican in form and democratic in spirit, with rights of local self-government and state rights ever uppermost. The Strong Government Whigs desired a government republican in form, with checks upon the impulses or passions of the people; liberty, sternly regulated by law, and that law strengthened and confirmed by central authority—the authority of the national government to be final in appeals.
As we have stated, the weakness of the confederation was acknowledged by many men, and the majority, as it proved to be after much agitation and discussion thought it too imperfect to amend. The power of the confederacy was not acknowledged by the states, its congress not respected by the people. Its requisitions were disregarded, foreign trade could not be successfully regulated; foreign nations refused to bind themselves by commercial treaties, and there was a rapid growth of very dangerous business rivalries and jealousies between the several states. Those which were fortunate enough, independent of congress, to possess or secure ports for domestic or foreign commerce, taxed the imports of their sister states. There was confusion which must soon have approached violence, for no authority beyond the limits of the state was respected, and Congress was notably powerless in its attempts to command aid from the states to meet the payment of the war debt, or the interest thereon. Instead of general respect for, there was almost general disregard of law on the part of legislative bodies, and the people were not slow in imitating their representatives. Civil strife became imminent, and Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts was the first warlike manifestation of the spirit which was abroad in the land.
Alive to the new dangers, the Assembly of Virginia in 1786, appointed commissioners to invite all the states to take part in a convention for the consideration of questions of commerce, and the propriety of altering the Articles of Confederation. This convention met at Annapolis, Sept. 11th, 1786. But five states sent representatives, the others regarding the movement with jealousy. This convention, however, adapted a report which urged the appointment of commissioners by all the states, “to devise such other provisions as shall, to them seem necessary to render the condition of the Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, will effectually provide for the same.” Congress approved this action, and passed resolutions favoring a meeting in convention for the “sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and report to Congress and the State legislatures.” The convention met in Philadelphia in May, 1787, and continued its sessions until September 17th, of the same year. The Strong Government Whigs had previously made every possible effort for a full and able representation, and the result did not disappoint them, for instead of simply revising the Articles of Confederation, the convention framed a constitution, and sent it to Congress to be submitted to that body and through it to the several legislatures. The act submitting it provided that, if it should be ratified by nine of the thirteen states, it should be binding upon those ratifying the same. Just here was started the custom which has since passed into law, that amendments to the national constitution shall be submitted after approval by Congress, to the legislatures of the several states, and after approval by three-fourths thereof, it shall be binding upon all—a very proper exercise of constitutional authority, as it seems now, but which would not have won popular approval when Virginia proposed the Annapolis convention in 1786. Indeed, the reader of our political history must ever be impressed with the fact that changes and reforms ever moved slowly, and that those of slowest growth seem to abide the longest.
The Strong Government Whigs, on the submission of the constitution of 1787 to Congress and the legislatures, and indirectly through the latter to the people, who elect the members on this issue, became the Federal party, and all of its power was used to promote the ratification of the instrument. Its ablest men, headed by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, advocated adoption before the people, and their pens supplied much of the current political literature of that day. Eighty-five essays, still noted and quoted for their ability, under the nom de plume of “Publius,” were published in “The Federalist.” They were written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, and with irresistible force advocated the Federal constitution, which was ratified by the nine needed states, and Congress was officially informed of the fact July 2d, 1788, and the first Wednesday in March, 1789, was fixed as the time “for commencing proceedings under the constitution.”
This struggle for the first time gave the Federalists an admitted majority. The complexion of the State legislature prior to it showed them in fact to be in a minority, and the Particularist Whigs, or Anti-Federals opposed every preliminary step looking to the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of a Federal constitution. They were called Anti-Federals because they opposed a federal government and constitution and adhered to the rights of the States and those of local self-government. Doubtless party rancor, then as now, led men to oppose a system of government which it seems they must have approved after fighting for it, but the earlier jealousies of the States and the prevailing ideas of liberty certainly gave the Anti-Federals a popularity which only a test so sensible as that proposed could have shaken. They were not without popular orators and leaders. Patrick Henry, the earliest of the patriots, and “the-old-man-eloquent,” Samuel Adams, took special pride in espousing their cause. The war questions between Whig and Tory must have passed quickly away, as living issues, though the newspapers and contemporaneous history show that the old taunts and battle cries were applied to the new situation with a plainness and virulence that must still be envied by the sensational and more bitterly partisan journals of our own day. To read these now, and some of our facts are gathered from such sources, is to account for the frequent use of the saying touching “the ingratitude of republics,” for when partisan hatred could deride the still recent utterances of Henry before the startled assembly of Virginians, and of Adams in advocating the adoption of the Declaration, there must at least to every surface view have been rank ingratitude. Their good names, however, survived the struggle, as good names in our republic have ever survived the passions of the law. In politics the Americans then as now, hated with promptness and forgave with generosity.
The Anti-Federals denied nearly all that the Federals asserted. The latter had for the first time assumed the aggressive, and had the advantage of position. They showed the deplorable condition of the country, and their opponents had to bear the burdens of denial at a time when nearly all public and private obligations were dishonored; when labor was poorly paid, workmen getting but twenty-five cents a day, with little to do at that; when even the rich in lands were poor in purse, and when commerce on the seas was checked by the coldness of foreign nations and restricted by the action of the States themselves; when manufactures were without protection of any kind, and when the people thought their struggle for freedom was about to end in national poverty. Still Henry, and Adams and Hancock, with hosts of others, claimed that the aspirations of the Anti-Federals were the freest, that they pointed to personal liberty and local sovereignty. Yet many Anti-Federals must have accepted the views of the Federals, who under the circumstances must have presented the better reason, and the result was as stated, the ratification of the Federal constitution of 1787 by three-fourths of the States of the Union. After this the Anti-Federalists were given a new name, that of “Close Constructionists,” because they naturally desired to interpret the new instrument in such a way as to bend it to their views. The Federalists became “Broad Constructionists,” because they interpreted the constitution in a way calculated to broaden the power of the national government.
The Confederacy once dissolved, the Federal party entered upon the enjoyment of full political power, but it was not without its responsibilities. The government had to be organized upon the basis of the new constitution, as upon the success of that organization would depend not alone the stability of the government and the happiness of its people, but the reputation of the party and the fame of its leaders as statesmen.
Fortunately for all, party hostilities were not manifested in the Presidential election. All bowed to the popularity of Washington, and he was unanimously nominated by the congressional caucus and appointed by the electoral college. He selected his cabinet from the leading minds of both parties, and while himself a recognized Federalist, all felt that he was acting for the good of all, and in the earlier years of his administration, none disputed this fact.
As the new measures of the government advanced, however, the anti-federalists organized an opposition to the party in power. Immediate danger had passed. The constitution worked well. The laws of Congress were respected; its calls for revenue honored, and Washington devoted much of his first and second messages to showing the growing prosperity of the country, and the respect which it was beginning to excite abroad. But where there is political power, there is opposition in a free land, and the great leaders of that day neither forfeited their reputations as patriots, or their characters as statesmen by the assertion of honest differences of opinion. Washington, Adams, and Hamilton were the recognized leaders of the Federalists, the firm friends of the constitution. The success of this instrument modified the views of the anti-Federalists, and Madison of Virginia, its recognized friend when it was in preparation, joined with others who had been its friends—notably,[1] Doctor Williamson, of North Carolina, and Mr. Langdon, of Georgia, in opposing the administration, and soon became recognized leaders of the anti-Federalists. Langdon was the President pro tem. of the Senate. Jefferson was then on a mission to France, and not until some years thereafter did he array himself with those opposed to centralized power in the nation. He returned in November, 1789, and was called to Washington’s cabinet as Secretary of State in March, 1790. It was a great cabinet, with Jefferson as its premier (if this term is suited to a time when English political nomenclature was anything but popular in the land;) Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Knox, Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General. There was no Secretary of the Navy until the administration of the elder Adams, and no Secretary of the Interior.
The first session of Congress under the Federal constitution, held in New York, sat for nearly six months, the adjournment taking place September 29th, 1789. Nearly all the laws framed pointed to the organization of the government, and the discussions were able and protracted. Indeed, these discussions developed opposing views, which could easily find separation on much the same old lines as those which separated the founders of constitutional government from those who favored the old confederate methods. The Federalists, on pivotal questions, at this session, carried their measures only by small majorities.
Much of the second session was devoted to the discussion of the able reports of Hamilton, and their final adoption did much to build up the credit of the nation and to promote its industries. He was the author of the protective system, and at the first session gave definite shape to his theories. He recommended the funding of the war debt, the assumption of the state war debts by the national government, the providing of a system of revenue from the collection of duties on imports, and an internal excise. His advocacy of a protective tariff was plain, for he declared it to be necessary for the support of the government and the encouragement of manufactures that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported.
The third session of the same Congress was held at Philadelphia, though the seat of the national government had, at the previous one, been fixed on the Potomac instead of the Susquehanna—this after a compromise with Southern members, who refused to vote for the Assumption Bill until the location of the capital in the District of Columbia had been agreed upon; by the way, this was the first exhibition of log-rolling in Congress. To complete Hamilton’s financial system, a national bank was incorporated. On this project both the members of Congress and of the cabinet were divided, but it passed, and was promptly approved by Washington. By this time it was well known that Jefferson and Hamilton held opposing views on many questions of government, and these found their way into and influenced the action of Congress, and passed naturally from thence to the people, who were thus early believed to be almost equally divided on the more essential political issues. Before the close of the session, Vermont and Kentucky were admitted to the Union. Vermont was the first state admitted in addition to the original thirteen. True, North Carolina and Rhode Island had rejected the constitution, but they reconsidered their action and came in—the former in November, 1789, and the latter in May, 1790.
The election for members of the Second Congress resulted in a majority in both branches favorable to the administration. It met at Philadelphia in October, 1791. The exciting measure of the session was the excise act, somewhat similar to that of the previous year, but the opposition wanted an issue on which to rally, they accepted this, and this agitation led to violent and in one instance warlike opposition on the part of a portion of the people. Those of western Pennsylvania, largely interested in distilleries, prepared for armed resistance to the excise, but at the same session a national militia law had been passed, and Washington took advantage of this to suppress the “Whisky Rebellion” in its incipiency. It was a hasty, rash undertaking, yet was dealt with so firmly that the action of the authorities strengthened the law, and the respect for order. The four counties which rebelled did no further damage than to tar and feather a government tax collector and rob him of his horse, though many threats were made and the agitation continued until 1794, when Washington’s threatened appearance at the head of fifteen thousand militia settled the whole question.
The first session of the Second Congress also passed the first methodic apportionment bill, which based the congressional representation on the census taken in 1790, the basis being 33,000 inhabitants for each representative. The second session which sat from November, 1792, to March, 1793, was mainly occupied in a discussion of the foreign and domestic relations of the country. No important measures were adopted.
The most serious objection to the constitution before its ratification was the absence of a distinct bill of rights, which should recognize “the equality of all men, and their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” and at the first session of Congress a bill was framed containing twelve articles, ten of which were afterwards ratified as amendments to the constitution. Yet state sovereignty, then imperfectly defined, was the prevailing idea in the minds of the Anti-Federalists, and they took every opportunity to oppose any extended delegation of authority from the states of the Union. They contended that the power of the state should be supreme, and charged the Federalists with monarchical tendencies. They opposed Hamilton’s national bank scheme, and Jefferson and Randolph plainly expressed the opinion that it was unconstitutional—that a bank was not authorized by the constitution, and that it would prevent the states from maintaining banks. But when the Bill of Rights had been incorporated in and attached to the constitution as amendments, Jefferson with rare political sagacity withdrew all opposition to the instrument itself, and the Anti-Federalists gladly followed his lead, for they felt that they had labored under many partisan disadvantages. The constitution was from the first too strong for successful resistance, and when opposition was confessedly abandoned the party name was changed, also at the suggestion of Jefferson, to that of Republican. The Anti-Federalists were at first disposed to call their party the Democratic-Republicans, but finally called, it simply Republican, to avoid the opposite of the extreme which they charged against the Federalists. Each party had its taunts in use, the Federalists being denounced as monarchists, the Anti-Federalists as Democrats; the one presumed to be looking forward to monarchy, the other to the rule of the mob.
By 1793 partisan lines under the names of Federalists and Republicans, were plainly drawn, and the schism in the cabinet was more marked than ever. Personal ambition may have had much to do with it, for Washington had previously shown his desire to retire to private life. While he remained at the head of affairs he was unwilling to part with Jefferson and Hamilton, and did all in his power to bring about a reconciliation, but without success. Before the close of the first constitutional Presidency, however, Washington had become convinced that the people desired him to accept a re-election, and he was accordingly a candidate and unanimously chosen. John Adams was re-elected Vice-President, receiving 77 votes to 50 for Geo. Clinton, (5 scattering) the Republican candidate. Soon after the inauguration Citizen Genet, an envoy from the French republic, arrived and sought to excite the sympathy of the United States and involve it in a war with Great Britain. Jefferson and his Republican party warmly sympathized with France, and insisted that gratitude for revolutionary favors commanded aid to France in her struggles. The Federalists, under Washington and Hamilton, favored non-intervention, and insisted that we should maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Washington showed his usual firmness, and before the expiration of the month in which Genet arrived, had issued his celebrated proclamation of neutrality. This has ever since been the accepted foreign policy of the nation.
Genet, chagrined at the issuance of this proclamation, threatened to appeal to the people, and made himself so obnoxious to Washington that the latter demanded his recall. The French government sent M. Fauchet as his successor, but Genet continued to reside in the United States, and under his inspiration a number of Democratic Societies, in imitation of the French Jacobin clubs, were founded, but like all such organizations in this country, they were short-lived. Secret political societies thrive only under despotisms. In Republics like ours they can only live when the great parties are in confusion and greatly divided. They disappear with the union of sentiment into two great parties. If there were many parties and factions, as in Mexico and some of the South American republics, there would be even a wider field for them here than there.
The French agitation showed its impress upon the nation as late as 1794, when a resolution to cut off intercourse with Great Britain passed the House, and was defeated in the Senate only by the casting vote of the Vice-President. Many people favored France, and to such silly heights did the excitement run that these insisted on wearing a national cockade. Jefferson had left the cabinet the December previous, and had retired to his plantation in Virginia, where he spent his leisure in writing political essays and organizing the Republican party, of which he was the acknowledged founder. Here he escaped the errors of his party in Congress, but it was a potent fact that his friends in official station not only did not endorse the non-intervention policy of Washington, but that they actively antagonized it in many ways. The Congressional leader in these movements was Mr. Madison. The policy of Britain fed this opposition. The forts on Lake Erie were still occupied by the British soldiery in defiance of the treaty of 1783; American vessels were seized on their way to French ports, and American citizens were impressed. To avoid a war, Washington sent John Jay as special envoy to England. He arrived in June, 1794, and by November succeeded in making a treaty. It was ratified in June, 1795, by the Senate by the constitutional majority of two-thirds, though there was much declamatory opposition, and the feeling between the Federal and Republican parties ran higher than ever before. The Republicans denounced while the Federals congratulated Washington. Under this treaty the British surrendered possession of all American ports, and as Gen’l Wayne during the previous summer had conquered the war-tribes and completed a treaty with them, the country was again on the road to prosperity.
In Washington’s message of 1794, he plainly censured all “self-created political societies,” meaning the democratic societies formed by Genet, but this part of the message the House refused to endorse, the speaker giving the casting vote in the negative. The Senate was in harmony with the political views of the President. Party spirit had by this time measurably affected all classes of the people, and as subjects for agitation here multiplied, the opposition no longer regarded Washington with that respect and decorum which it had been the rule to manifest. His wisdom as President, his patriotism, and indeed his character as a man, were all hotly questioned by political enemies. He was even charged with corruption in expending more of the public moneys than had been appropriated—charges which were soon shown to be groundless.
At the first session of Congress in December, 1795, the Senate’s administration majority had increased, but in the House the opposing Republicans had also increased their numbers. The Senate by 14 to 8 endorsed the message; the House at first refused but finally qualified its answers.
In March, 1796, a new political issue was sprung in the House by Mr. Livingstone of New York, who offered a resolution requesting of the President a copy of the instructions to Mr. Jay, the envoy who made the treaty with Great Britain. After a debate of several days, more bitter than any which had preceded it, the House passed the resolution by 57 to 35, the Republicans voting aye, the Federals no. Washington in answer, took the position that the House of Representatives was not part of the treaty-making power of the government, and could not therefore be entitled to any papers relating to such treaties. The constitution had placed this treaty-making and ratifying power in the hands of the Senate, the Cabinet and the President.
This answer, now universally accepted as the proper one, yet excited the House and increased political animosities. The Republicans charged the Federals with being the “British party,” and in some instances hinted that they had been purchased with British gold. Indignation meetings were called, but after much sound and fury, it was ascertained that the people really favored abiding by the treaty in good faith, and finally the House, after more calm and able debates, passed the needed legislation to carry out the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.
In August, 1796, prior to the meeting of the Congressional caucus which then placed candidates for the Presidency in nomination, Washington issued his celebrated Farewell Address, in which he gave notice that he would retire from public life at the expiration of his term. He had been solicited to be a candidate for re-election (a third term) and told that all the people could unite upon him—a statement which, without abating one jot, our admiration for the man, would doubtless have been called in question by the Republicans, who had become implacably hostile to his political views, and who were encouraged to believe they could win control of the Presidency, by their rapidly increasing power in the House. Yet the address was everywhere received with marks of admiration. Legislatures commended it by resolution and ordered it to be engrossed upon their records; journals praised it, and upon the strength of its plain doctrines the Federalists took new courage, and prepared to win in the Presidential battle which followed. Both parties were plainly arrayed and confident, and so close was the result that the leaders of both were elected—John Adams, the nominee of the Federalists, to the Presidency, and Thomas Jefferson, the nominee of the Republicans, to the Vice-Presidency. The law which then obtained was that the candidate who received the highest number of electoral votes, took the first place, the next highest, the second. Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina was the Federal nominee for Vice-President, and Aaron Burr of the Republicans. Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson 68, Pinckney 59, Burr 30, scattering 48. Pinckney had lost 12 votes, while Burr lost 38—a loss of popularity which the latter regained four years later. The first impressions which our forefathers had of this man were the best.
John Adams was inaugurated as President in Philadelphia, at Congress Hall, March 4th, 1797, and in his inaugural was careful to deny the charge that the Federal party had any sympathy for England, but reaffirmed his endorsement of the policy of Washington as to strict neutrality. To this extent he sought to soften the asperities of the parties, and measurably succeeded, though the times were still stormy. The French revolution had reached its highest point, and our people still took sides. Adams found he would have to arm to preserve neutrality and at the same time punish the aggression of either of the combatants. This was our first exhibition of “armed neutrality.” An American navy was quickly raised, and every preparation made for defending the rights of Americans. An alliance with France was refused, after which the American Minister was dismissed and the French navy began to cripple our trade. In May, 1797, President Adams felt it his duty to call an extra session of Congress, which closed in July. The Senate approved of negotiations for reconciliation with France. They were attempted but, proved fruitless; in May, 1798, a full naval armament was authorized, and soon several French vessels were captured before there was any declaration of war. Indeed, neither power declared war, and as soon as France discovered how earnest the Americans were she made overtures for an adjustment of difficulties, and these resulted in the treaty of 1800.
The Republicans, though warmly favoring a contest, did not heartily support that inaugurated by Adams, and contended after this that the militia and a small naval force were sufficient for internal defense. They denounced the position of the Federals, who favored the enlargement of the army and navy, as measures calculated to overawe public sentiment in time of peace. The Federals, however, through their prompt resentment of the aggressions of France, had many adherents to their party. They organized their power and sought to perpetuate it by the passage of the alien and sedition, and a naturalization law.
The alien and sedition law gave the President authority “to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order.” The provisions which followed were in keeping with that quoted, the 3d section commanding every master of a ship entering a port of the United States, immediately on his arrival, to make report in writing to the collector of customs, the names of all aliens on board, etc. The act was to continue in force for two years from the date of its passage, and it was approved June 25th, 1798.
A resolution was introduced in the Senate on the 25th of April, 1798, by Mr. Hillhouse of Connecticut, to inquire what provision of law ought to be made, &c., as to the removal of such aliens as may be dangerous to the peace of the country, &c. This resolution was adopted the next day, and Messrs. Hillhouse, Livermore and Read were appointed the committee, and subsequently reported the bill. It passed the Senate by 16 to 7, and the House by 46 to 40, the Republicans in the latter body resisting it warmly. The leading opposing idea was that it lodged with the Executive too much power, and was liable to great abuse. It has frequently since, in arguments against centralized power, been used for illustration by political speakers.
The Naturalization law, favored by the Federalists, because they knew they could acquire few friends either from newly arrived English or French aliens, among other requirements provided that an alien must reside in the United States fourteen years before he could vote. The Republicans denounced this law as calculated to check immigration, and dangerous to our country in the fact that it caused too many inhabitants to owe no allegiance. They also asserted, as did those who opposed Americanism later on in our history, that America was properly an asylum for all nations, and that those coming to America should freely share all the privileges and liberties of the government.
These laws and the political resentments which they created gave a new and what eventually proved a dangerous current to political thought and action. They were the immediate cause of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, Jefferson being the author of the former and Madison of the latter.
These resolutions were full of political significance, and gave tone to sectional discussion up to the close of the war for the Union. They first promulgated the doctrine of nullification or secession, and political writers mistake who point to Calhoun as the father of that doctrine. It began with the old Republicans under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, and though directly intended as protests against the alien and sedition, and the naturalization laws of Congress, they kept one eye upon the question of slavery—rather that interest was kept in view in their declarations, and yet the authors of both were anything but warm advocates of slavery. They were then striving, however, to reinforce the opposition to the Federal party, which the administration of Adams had thus far apparently weakened, and they had in view the brief agitation which had sprung up in 1793, five years before, on the petition to Congress of a Pennsylvania society “to use its powers to stop the traffic in slaves.” On the question of referring this petition to a committee there arose a sectional debate. Men took sides not because of the party to which they belonged, but the section, and for the first time the North and South were arrayed against each other on a question not then treated either as partisan or political, but which most minds then saw must soon become both partisan and sectional. Some of the Southern debaters, in their protests against interference, thus early threatened civil war. With a view to better protect their rights to slave property, they then advocated and succeeded in passing the first fugitive slave law. This was approved February 12, 1793.
The resolutions of 1798 will be found in the book devoted to political platforms. So highly were these esteemed by the Republicans of that day, and by the interests whose support they so shrewdly invited, that they more than counterbalanced the popularity acquired by the Federals in their resistance to France, and by 1800 they caused a rupture in the Cabinet of Adams.
In the Presidential election of 1800 John Adams was the nominee for President and C. C. Pinckney for Vice-President. A “Congressional Convention” of Republicans, held in Philadelphia, nominated Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr as candidates for these offices. On the election which followed the Republicans chose 73 electors and the Federalists 65. Each elector voted for two persons, and the Republicans so voted that they unwisely gave Jefferson and Burr each 73 votes. Neither being highest, it was not legally determined which should be President or Vice-President, and the election had to go to the House. The Federalists threw 65 votes to Adams and 64 to Pinckney. The Republicans could have done the same, but Burr’s intrigue and ambition prevented this, and the result was a protracted contest in the House, and one which put the country in great peril, but which plainly pointed out some of the imperfections of the electoral features of the Constitution. The Federalists proposed to confess the inability of the House to agree through the vote by States, but to this proposition the Republicans threatened armed resistance. The Federalists next attempted a combination with the friends of Aaron Burr, but this specimen of bargaining to deprive a nominee of the place to which it was the plain intention of his party to elect him, really contributed to Jefferson’s popularity, if not in that Congress, certainly before the people. He was elected on the 36th ballot.
The bitterness of this strife, and the dangers which similar ones threatened, led to an abandonment of the system of each Elector voting for two, the highest to be President, the next highest Vice-President, and an amendment was offered to the Constitution, and fully ratified by September 25, 1804, requiring the electors to ballot separately for President and Vice-President.
Jefferson was the first candidate nominated by a Congressional caucus. It convened in 1800 at Philadelphia, and nominated Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice-President. Adams and Pinckney were not nominated, but ran and were accepted as natural leaders of their party, just as Washington and Adams were before them.
This contest broke the power of the Federal party. It had before relied upon the rare sagacity and ability of its leaders, but the contest in the House developed such attempts at intrigue as disgusted many and caused all to quarrel, Hamilton having early showed his dislike to Adams. As a party the Federal had been peculiarly brave at times when high bravery was needed. It had framed the Federal Government and stood by the powers given it until they were too firmly planted for even newer and triumphant partisans to recklessly trifle with. It stood for non-interference with foreign nations against the eloquence of adventurers, the mad impulses of mobs, the generosity of new-born freemen, the harangues of demagogues, and best of all against those who sought to fan these popular breezes to their own comfort, It provided for the payment of the debt, had the courage to raise revenues both from internal and external sources, and to increase expenditures, as the growth of the country demanded. Though it passed out of power in a cloud of intrigue and in a vain grasp at the “flesh-pots,” it yet had a glorious history, and one which none untinctured with the better prejudices of that day, can avoid admiring.
The defeat of Adams was not unexpected by him, yet it was greatly regretted by his friends, for he was justly regarded as second to no other civilian in the establishment of the liberties of the colonies. He was eloquent to a rare degree, possessed natural eloquence, and made the most famous speech in advocacy of the Declaration. Though the proceedings of the Revolutionary Congress were secret, and what was said never printed, yet Webster gives his version of the noted speech of Adams, and we reproduce it in Book III. of this volume as one of the great speeches of noted American orators.
Mr. Jefferson was inaugurated the third President, in the new capitol at Washington, on the 4th of March, 1801, and Vice-President Burr took his seat in the Senate the same day. Though Burr distinctly disavowed any participancy in the House contest, he was distrusted by Jefferson’s warm friends, and jealousies rapidly cropped out. Jefferson endeavored through his inaugural to smooth factious and party asperities, and so well were his words chosen that the Federalists indulged, the hope that they would not be removed from office because of their political views.
Early in June, however, the first question of civil service was raised. Mr. Jefferson then removed Elizur Goodrich, a Federalist, from the Collectorship of New Haven, and appointed Samuel Bishop, a Republican, to the place. The citizens remonstrated, saying that Goodrich was prompt, reliable and able, and showed that his successor was 78 years old, and too infirm for the duties of the office. To these remonstrances Mr. Jefferson, under date of July 12th, replied in language which did not then, as he did later on, plainly assert the right of every administration to have its friends in office. We quote the following:
“Declarations by myself, in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to harmony and affection in social intercourse, and respect for the equal rights of the minority, have, on certain occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the tenure of office was not to be disturbed. But could candor apply such a construction? When it is considered that, during the late administration, those who were not of a particular sect of politics were excluded from all office; when, by a steady pursuit of this measure, nearly the whole offices of the United States were monopolized by that sect; when the public sentiment at length declared itself, and burst open the doors of honor and confidence to those whose opinions they approved; was it to be imagined that this monopoly of office was to be continued in the hands of the minority? Does it violate their equal rights to assert some rights in the majority also? Is it political intolerance to claim a proportionate share in the direction of the public affairs? If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few, by resignation none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed? This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I meet it as such. I proceed in the operation with deliberation and inquiry, that it may injure the best men least, and effect the purposes of justice and public utility with the least private distress, that it may be thrown as much as possible on delinquency, on oppression, on intolerance, on ante-revolutionary adherence to our enemies.
“I lament sincerely that unessential differences of opinion should ever have been deemed sufficient to interdict half the society from the rights and the blessings of self-government, to proscribe them as unworthy of every trust. It would have been to me a circumstance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy to that state of things when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be: Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?”
Mr. Adams had made few removals, and none because of the political views held by the incumbents, nearly all of whom had been appointed by Washington and continued through good behavior. At the date of the appointment of most of them, Jefferson’s Republican party had no existence; so that the reasons given in the quotation do not comport with the facts. Washington’s rule was integrity and capacity, for he could have no regard for politics where political lines had been obliterated in his own selection. Doubtless these office-holders were human, and adhered with warmth to the administration which they served, and this fact, and this alone, must have angered the Republicans and furnished them with arguments for a change.
Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural. He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal, and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson, who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions. Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations; realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.
After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him, and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams, sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.
Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th, speaking of this contest, he says:
“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”
It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions, and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed from office on the ground of their public character, nor without complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered his assurance that these things would prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson replied that the points given corresponded with his views and intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.
This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe, March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In this he says:
“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed ā talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our plan.”
A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:
“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me.”
Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says:
“I am satisfied that the heaping of abuse on me personally, has been with the design and the hope of provoking me to make a general sweep of all Federalists out of office. But as I have carried no passion into the execution of this disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be excited. The clamor which has been raised will not provoke me to remove one more, nor deter me from removing one less, than if not a word had been said on the subject. In the course of the summer, all which is necessary will be done; and we may hope that, this cause of offence being at an end, the measures we shall pursue and propose for the amelioration of the public affairs, will be so confessedly salutary as to unite all men not monarchists in principle.” In the same letter he warmly berates the monarchical federalists, saying, “they are incurables, to be taken care of in a madhouse if necessary, and on motives of charity.”
The seventh Congress assembled. Political parties were at first nearly equally divided in the Senate, but eventually there was a majority for the administration. Jefferson then discontinued the custom established by Washington of delivering in person his message to Congress. The change was greatly for the better, as it afforded relief from the requirement of immediate answers on the subjects contained in the message. It has ever since been followed.
The seventh session of Congress, pursuant to the recommendation of President Jefferson, established a uniform system of naturalization, and so modified the law as to make the required residence of aliens five years, instead of fourteen, as in the act of 1798, and to permit a declaration of intention to become a citizen at the expiration of three years. By his recommendation also was established the first sinking fund for the redemption of the public debt. It required the setting apart annually for this purpose the sum of seven millions and three hundred thousand dollars. Other measures, more partisan in their character, were proposed, but Congress showed an aversion to undoing what had been wisely done. A favorite law of the Federalists establishing circuit courts alone was repealed, and this only after a sharp debate, and a close vote. The provisional army had been disbanded by a law of the previous Congress. A proposition to abolish the naval department was defeated, as was that to discontinue the mint establishment.
At this session the first law in relation to the slave trade was passed. It was to prevent the importation of negroes, mulattoes and other persons of color into any port of the United States within a state which had prohibited by law the admission of any such person. The penalty was one thousand dollars and the forfeiture of the vessel. The slave trade was not then prohibited by the constitution, nor was the subject then generally agitated, though it had been as early as 1793, when, as previously stated, an exciting sectional debate followed the presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania to abolish the slave trade.
Probably the most important occurrence under the first administration of Jefferson was that relating to the purchase and admission of Louisiana. There had been apprehensions of a war with Spain, and with a view to be ready Congress had passed an act authorizing the President to call upon the executives of such of the states as he might deem expedient, for detachments of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, or to accept the services of volunteers for a term of twelve months. The disagreement arose over the southwestern boundary line and the right of navigating the Mississippi. Our government learned in the spring of 1802, that Spain had by a secret treaty made in October, 1800, actually ceded Louisiana to France. Our government had in 1795 made a treaty with Spain which gave us the right of deposit at New Orleans for three years, but in October, 1802, the Spanish authorities gave notice by proclamation that this right was withdrawn. Excitement followed all along the valley of the Mississippi, and it was increased by the belief that the withdrawal of the privilege was made at the suggestion of France, though Spain still retained the territory, as the formalities of ceding it had not been gone through with. Jefferson promptly took the ground that if France took possession of New Orleans, the United States would immediately become allies of England, but suggested to Minister Livingston at Paris that France might be induced to cede the island of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. It was his belief, though a mistaken one, that France had also acquired the Floridas. Louisiana then comprised much of the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the Missouri.
The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood in with his friends in the political battle which followed.
The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory, and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans, English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves. There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed preparations for war with England, and while he had previously expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English navy.
Little chance was afforded the Federalists for adverse criticism in Congress, for the purchase proved so popular that the people greatly increased the majority in both branches of the eighth Congress, and Jefferson called it together earlier for the purpose of ratification. The Senate ratified the treaty on the 20th of October, 1803, by a vote of 24 to 7, while the House adopted a resolution for carrying the treaty into effect by a vote of 90 to 25. Eleven million dollars of the purchase money was appropriated, the remaining four millions being reserved for the indemnity of American citizens who had sustained losses by French assaults upon our commerce—from which fact subsequently came what is known as the French Spoliation Bill.
Impeachment trials were first attempted before the eighth Congress in 1803. Judge Pickering, of the district court of the United States for New Hampshire, was impeached for occasional drunkenness, and dismissed from office. Judge Chase of the U. S. Supreme Court, and Judge Peters of the district court of Pennsylvania, both Federalists, were charged by articles proposed in the House with illegal and arbitrary conduct in the trial of parties charged with political offenses. The Federalists took alarm at these proceedings, and so vehement were their charges against the Republicans of a desire to destroy the judiciary that their impeachments were finally abandoned.
The Republicans closed their first national administration with high prestige. They had met several congressional reverses on questions where defeat proved good fortune, for the Federalists kept a watchful defence, and were not always wrong. The latter suffered numerically, and many of their best leaders had fallen in the congressional contest of 1800 and 1802, while the Republicans maintained their own additions in talent and number.
In 1804, the candidates of both parties were nominated by congressional caucuses. Jefferson and Clinton were the Republican nominees; Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, the nominees of the Federalists, but they only received 14 out of 176 electoral votes.
The struggle of Napoleon in Europe with the allied powers now gave Jefferson an opportunity to inaugurate a foreign policy. England had forbidden all trade with the French and their allies, and France had in return forbidden all commerce with England and her colonies. Both of these decrees violated our neutral rights, and were calculated to destroy our commerce, which by this time had become quite imposing.
Congress acted promptly, and on the 21st of December passed what is known as the Embargo Act, under the inspiration of the Republican party, which claimed that the only choice of the people lay between the embargo and war, and that there was no other way to obtain redress from England and France. But the promised effects of the measure were not realized, and so soon as any dissatisfaction was manifested by the people, the Federalists made the question a political issue. They declared it unconstitutional because it was not limited as to time; that it helped England as against France (a cunning assertion in view of the early love of the Republicans for the cause of the French), and that it laid violent hands on our home commerce and industries. Political agitation increased the discontent, and public opinion at one time turned so strongly against the law that it was openly resisted on the eastern coast, and treated with almost as open contempt on the Canadian border. The bill had passed the House by 87 to 35, the Senate by 19 to 9. In January, 1809, the then closing administration of Jefferson had to change front on the question, and the law was repealed on the 18th of March. The Republicans when they changed, went all the way over, and advocated full protection by the use of a navy, of all our rights on the high seas. If the Federals could have recalled their old leaders, or retained even a considerable portion of their power, the opportunity presented by the embargo issue could have brought them back to full political power, but lacking these leaders, the opportunity passed.