During the ninth Congress, which assembled on the second of December, 1805, the Republicans dropped their name and accepted that of “Democrats.” In all their earlier strifes they had been charged by their opponents with desiring to run to the extremes of the democratic or “mob rule,” and fear of too general a belief in the truth of the charge led them to denials and rejection of a name which the father of their party had ever shown a fondness for. The earlier dangers which had threatened their organization, and the recollection of defeats suffered in their attempts to establish a government anti-federal and confederate in their composition, had been greatly modified by later successes, and with a characteristic cuteness peculiar to Americans they accepted an epithet and sought to turn it to the best account. In this they imitated the patriots who accepted the epithets in the British satirical song of “Yankee Doodle,” and called themselves Yankees. From the ninth Congress the Jeffersonian Republicans called themselves Democrats, and the word Republican passed into disuse until later on in the history of our political parties, the opponents of the Democracy accepted it as a name which well filled the meaning of their attitude in the politics of the country.
Mr. Randolph of Roanoke, made the first schism in the Republican party under Jefferson, when he and three of his friends voted against the embargo act. He resisted its passage with his usual earnestness, and all attempts at reconciling him to the measure were unavailing. Self-willed, strong in argument and sarcasm, it is believed that his cause made it even more desirable for the Republicans to change name in the hope of recalling some of the more wayward “Democrats” who had advocated Jacobin democracy in the years gone by. The politicians of that day were never short of expedients, and no man so abounded in them as Jefferson himself.
Randolph improved his opportunities by getting most of the Virginia members to act with him against the foreign policy of the administration, but he was careful not to join the Federalists, and quickly denied any leaning that way. The first fruit of this faction was to bring forth Monroe as a candidate for President against Madison—a movement which proved to be quite popular in Virginia, but which Jefferson flanked by bringing about a reconciliation between Monroe and Madison. The now usual Congressional caucus followed at Washington, and although the Virginia Legislature in its caucus previously held had been unable to decide between Madison and Monroe, the Congressional body chose Madison by 83 to 11, the minority being divided between Clinton and Monroe, though the latter could by that time hardly be considered as a candidate. This action broke up Randolph’s faction in Virginia, but left so much bitterness behind it that a large portion attached themselves to the Federalists. In the election which followed Madison received 122 electoral votes against 47 for C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and 6 for Geo. Clinton of New York.
Before Jefferson’s administration closed he recommended the passage of an act to prohibit the African slave trade after January 1st, 1808, and it was passed accordingly. He had also rejected the form of a treaty received from the British minister Erskine, and did this without the formality of submitting it to the Senate—first, because it contained no provision on the objectionable practice of impressing our seamen; second,[2] “because it was accompanied by a note from the British ministers, by which the British government reserved to itself the right of releasing itself from the stipulations in favor of neutral rights, if the United States submitted to the British decree, or other invasion of those rights by France.” This rejection of the treaty by Jefferson caused public excitement, and the Federalists sought to arouse the commercial community against his action, and cited the fact that his own trusted friends, Monroe and Pinckney had negotiated it. The President’s party stood by him, and they agreed that submission to the Senate was immaterial, as its advice could not bind him. This refusal to consider the treaty was the first step leading to the war of 1812, for embargoes followed, and Britain openly claimed the right to search American vessels for her deserting seamen. In 1807 this question was brought to issue by the desertion of five British seamen from the Halifax, and their enlistment on the U. S. frigate Chesapeake. Four separate demands were made for these men, but all of the commanders, knowing the firm attitude of Jefferson’s administration against the practice, refused, as did the Secretary of State refuse a fifth demand on the part of the British minister. On the 23d of June following, while the Chesapeake was near the capes of Virginia, Capt. Humphreys of the British ship Leopard attempted to search her for deserters. Capt. Barron denied the right of search, but on being fired into, lowered his flag, Humphreys then took four men from the Chesapeake, three of whom had previously entered the British service, but were Americans by birth, and had been formally demanded by Washington. The act was a direct violation of the international law, for a nation’s ship at sea like its territory is inviolable. The British government disavowed the act of its officer and offered apology and reparation, which were accepted. This event, however, strengthened Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinckney treaty, and quickly stopped adverse political criticism at home, Foreign affairs remained, however, in a complicated state, owing to the wars between England and the then successful Napoleon, but they in no wise shook the firm hold which Jefferson had upon the people, nor the prestige of his party. He stands in history as one of the best politicians our land has ever seen, and then as now no one could successfully draw the line between the really able politician and the statesman. He was accepted as both. His administration closed on the 3d of March, 1809, when he expressed great gratification at being able to retire to private life.
Mr. Madison succeeded at a time when the country, through fears of foreign aggression and violence, was exceedingly gloomy and despondent—a feeling not encouraged in the least by the statements of the Federalists, some of whom then thought political criticism in hours of danger not unpatriotic. They described our agriculture as discouraged, our fisheries abandoned, our commerce restrained, our navy dismantled, our revenues destroyed at a time when war was at any moment probable with either France, England or Spain.
Madison, representing as he did the same party, from the first resolved to follow the policy of Jefferson, a fact about which there was no misunderstanding. He desired to avert war as long as possible with England, and sought by skilful diplomacy to avert the dangers presented by both France and England in their attitude with neutrals. England had declared that a man who was once a subject always remained a subject, and on this plea based her determination to impress again into her service all deserters from her navy. France, because of refusal to accede to claims equally at war with our rights, had authorized the seizure of all American vessels entering the ports of France. In May, 1810, when the non-intercourse act had expired, Madison caused proposals to be made to both belligerents, that if either would revoke its hostile edict, the non-intercourse act should be revived and enforced against the other nation. This act had been passed by the tenth Congress as a substitute for the embargo. France quickly accepted Madison’s proposal, and received the benefits of the act, and the direct result was to increase the growing hostility of England. From this time forward the negotiations had more the character of a diplomatic contest than an attempt to maintain peace. Both countries were upon their mettle, and early in 1811, Mr. Pinckney, the American minister to Great Britain, was recalled, and a year later a formal declaration of war was made by the United States.
Just prior to this the old issue, made by the Republicans against Hamilton’s scheme for a National Bank, was revived by the fact that the charter of the bank ceased on the 4th of March, 1811, and an attempt was made to re-charter it. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress, but on the 11th of January, 1811, it was indefinitely postponed in the House, by a vote of 65 to 64, while in the Senate it was rejected by the casting vote of the Vice-President, Geo. Clinton, on the 5th of February, 1811—this notwithstanding its provisions had been framed or approved by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. The Federalists were all strong advocates of the measure, and it was so strong that it divided some of the Democrats who enjoyed a loose rein in the contest so far as the administration was concerned, the President not specially caring for political quarrels at a time when war was threatened with a powerful foreign nation. The views of the Federalists on this question descended to the Whigs some years later, and this fact led to the charges that the Whigs were but Federalists in disguise.
The eleventh Congress continued the large Democratic majority, as did the twelfth, which met on the 4th of November, 1811, Henry Clay, then an ardent supporter of the policy of Madison, succeeding to the House speakership. He had previously served two short sessions in the U. S. Senate, and had already acquired a high reputation as an able and fluent debater. He preferred the House, at that period of life, believing his powers better calculated to win fame in the more popular representative hall. Calhoun was also in the House at this time, and already noted for the boldness of his views and their assertion.
In this Congress jealousies arose against the political power of Virginia, which had already named three of the four Presidents, each for two terms, and De Witt Clinton, the well-known Governor of New York, sought through these jealousies to create a division which would carry him into the Presidency. His efforts were for a time warmly seconded by several northern and southern states. A few months later the Legislature of New York formally opened the ball by nominating DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency. An address was issued by his friends, August 17th, 1812, which has since become known as the Clintonian platform, and his followers were known as Clintonian Democrats. The address contained the first public protest against the nomination of Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. There was likewise declared opposition to that “official regency which prescribed tenets of political faith.” The efforts of particular states to monopolize the principal offices was denounced, as was the continuance of public men for long periods in office.
Madison was nominated for a second term by a Congressional caucus held at Washington, in May, 1812. John Langdon was nominated for Vice-President, but as he declined on account of age, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, took his place. In September of the same year a convention of the opposition, representing eleven states, was held in the city of New York, which nominated De Witt Clinton, with Jared Ingersoll for Vice-President. This was the first national convention, partisan in character, and the Federalists have the credit of originating and carrying out the idea. The election resulted in the success of Madison, who received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton.
Though factious strife had been somewhat rife, less attention was paid to politics than to the approaching war. There were new Democratic leaders in the lower House, and none were more prominent than Clay of Kentucky, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, all of South Carolina. The policy of Jefferson in reducing the army and navy was now greatly deplored, and the defenceless condition in which it left the country was the partial cause, at least a stated cause of the factious feuds which followed. Madison sought to change this policy, and he did it at the earnest solicitation of Clay, Calhoun and Lowndes, who were the recognized leaders of the war party. They had early determined that Madison should be directly identified with them, and before his second nomination had won him over to their more decided views in favor of war with England. He had held back, hoping that diplomacy might avert a contest, but when once convinced that war was inevitable and even desirable under the circumstances, his official utterances were bold and free. In the June following the caucus which renominated him, he declared in a message that our flag was continually insulted on the high seas; that the right of searching American vessels for British seamen was still in practice, and that thousands of American citizens had in this way been impressed in service on foreign ships; that peaceful efforts at adjustment of the difficulties had proved abortive, and that the British ministry and British emissaries had actually been intriguing for the dismemberment of the Union.
The act declaring war was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812, and is remarkably short and comprehensive. It was drawn by the attorney-general of the United States, William Pinckney, and is in the words following:—
“An act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.
“Be it enacted, &c. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America, and their territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof.”
This was a soul-stirring message, but it did not rally all the people as it should have done. Political jealousies were very great, and the frequent defeats of the Federalists, while they tended to greatly reduce their numbers and weaken their power, seemed to strengthen their animosity, and they could see nothing good in any act of the administration. They held, especially in the New England states, that the war had been declared by a political party simply, and not by the nation, though nearly all of the Middle, and all of the Southern and Western States, warmly supported it. Clay estimated that nine-tenths of the people were in favor of the war, and under the inspiration of his eloquence and the strong state papers of Madison, they doubtless were at first. Throughout they felt their political strength, and they just as heartily returned the bitterness manifested by those of the Federalists who opposed the war, branding them as enemies of the republic, and monarchists who preferred the reign of Britain.
Four Federalist representatives in Congress went so far as to issue an address, opposing the war, the way in which it had been declared, and denouncing it as unjust. Some of the New England states refused the order of the President to support it with their militia, and Massachusetts sent peace memorials to Congress.
A peace party was formed with a view to array the religious sentiment of the country against the war, and societies with similar objects were organized by the more radical of the Federalists. To such an extreme was this opposition carried, that some of the citizens of New London, Conn., made a practice of giving information to the enemy, by means of blue lights, of the departure of American vessels.
This opposition finally culminated in the assembling of a convention at Hartford, at which delegates were present from all of the New England states. They sat for three weeks with closed doors, and issued an address which will be found in this volume in the book devoted to political platforms. It was charged by the Democrats that the real object of the convention was to negotiate a separate treaty of peace, on behalf of New England, with Great Britain, but this charge was as warmly denied. The exact truth has not since been discovered, the fears of the participants of threatened trials for treason, closing their mouths, if their professions were false. The treaty of Ghent, which was concluded on December 14th, 1814, prevented other action by the Hartford convention than that stated. It had assembled nine days before the treaty, which is as follows:
This treaty was negotiated by the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and William Adams, Esq., on the part of Great Britain, and John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, on behalf of the United States.
The treaty can be found on p. 218, vol. 8, of Little & Brown’s Statutes at Large. The first article provided for the restoration of all archives, records, or property taken by either party from the other during the war. This article expressly provides for the restoration of “slaves or other private property.” The second article provided for the cessation of hostilities and limitation of time of capture. The third article provided for the restoration of prisoners of war.
The fourth article defined the boundary established by the treaty of 1783, and provided for commissioners to mark the same.
The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles established rules to govern the proceedings of the commissioners.
The ninth article bound the United States and His Britannic Majesty to end all hostilities with Indian tribes, with whom they were then respectively at war.
The tenth article reads as follows:—
“Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and, whereas, both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.”
The eleventh and last article provides for binding effect of the treaty, upon the exchange of ratifications.
The position of New England in the war is explained somewhat by her exposed position. Such of the militia as served endured great hardships, and they were almost constantly called from their homes to meet new dangers. Distrusting their loyalty, the general government had withheld all supplies from the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the year 1814, and these States were forced to bear the burden of supporting them, at the same time contributing their quota of taxes to the general government—hardships, by the way, not greater than those borne by Pennsylvania and Ohio in the late war for the Union, nor half as hard as those borne by the border States at the same time. True, the coast towns of Massachusetts were subjected to constant assault from the British navy, and the people of these felt that they were defenceless. It was on their petition that the legislature of Massachusetts finally, by a vote of 226 to 67, adopted the report favoring the calling of the Hartford Convention. A circular was then addressed to the Governors of the other States, with a request that it be laid before their legislatures, inviting them to appoint delegates, and stating that the object was to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section was exposed, “and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defence which might be consistent with the preservation of their resources from total ruin, and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union.” The italicized portion shows that there was at least then no design of forming a separate treaty, or of promoting disunion. The legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island endorsed the call and sent delegates. Those of New Hampshire and Vermont did not, but delegates were sent by local conventions. These delegates, it is hardly necessary to remark, were all members of the Federal party, and their suspected designs and action made the “Hartford Convention” a bye-word and reproach in the mouths of Democratic orators for years thereafter. It gave to the Democrats, as did the entire history of the war, the prestige of superior patriotism, and they profited by it as long as the memory of the war of 1812 was fresh. Indeed, directly after the war, all men seemed to keep in constant view the reluctance of the Federalists to support the war, and their almost open hostility to it in New England. Peace brought prosperity and plenty, but not oblivion of the old political issues, and this was the beginning of the end of the Federal party. Its decay thereafter was rapid and constant.
The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth Congresses had continued Democratic. The fourteenth began Dec. 4, 1815, with the Democratic majority in the House increased to 30. Clay had taken part in negotiating the treaty, and on his return was again elected to the House, and was for the third time elected speaker. Though 65 Federalists had been elected, but 10 were given to Federal candidates for speaker, this party now showing a strong, and under the circumstances, a very natural desire to rub out party lines. The internal taxes and the postage rates were reduced.
President Madison, in his message, had urged upon Congress a revision of the tariff, and pursuant to his recommendation what was at the time called a protective tariff was passed. Even Calhoun then supported it, while Clay proclaimed that protection must no longer be secondary to revenue, but of primary importance. The rates fixed, however, were insufficient, and many American manufactures were soon frustrated by excessive importations of foreign manufactures. The position of Calhoun and Lowndes, well known leaders from South Carolina, is explained by the fact that just then the proposal of a protective tariff was popular in the south, in view of the heavy duties upon raw cotton which England then imposed. The Federalists in weakness changed their old position when they found the Democrats advocating a tariff, and the latter quoted and published quite extensively Alexander Hamilton’s early report in favor of it. Webster, in the House at the time and a leading Federalist, was against the bill. The parties had exchanged positions on the question.
Peace brought with it another exchange of positions. President Madison, although he had vetoed a bill to establish a National Bank in 1815, was now (in 1816) anxious for the establishment of such an institution. Clay had also changed his views, and claimed that the experiences of the war showed the necessity for a national currency. The bill met with strong opposition from a few Democrats and nearly all of the Federalists (the latter having changed position on the question since 1811), but it passed and was signed by the President.
A bill to promote internal improvements, advocated by Clay, was at first favored by Madison, but his mind changed and he vetoed the measure—the first of its kind passed by Congress.
The Democratic members of Congress, before the adjournment of the first session, held a caucus for the nomination of candidates to succeed Madison and Gerry. It was understood that the retiring officers and their confidential friends favored James Monroe of Virginia. Their wishes were carried out, but not without a struggle, Wm. H. Crawford of Georgia receiving 54 votes against 65 for Monroe. The Democrats opposed to Virginia’s domination in the politics of the country, made a second effort, and directed it against Monroe in the caucus. Aaron Burr denounced him as an improper and incompetent candidate, and joined in the protest then made against any nomination by a Congressional caucus; he succeeding in getting nineteen Democrats to stay out of the caucus. Later he advised renewed attempts to break down the Congressional caucus system, and before the nomination favored Andrew Jackson as a means to that end. Daniel B. Tompkins was nominated by the Democrats for Vice-President. The Federalists named Rufus King of New York, but in the election which followed he received but 24 out of 217 electoral votes. The Federalists divided their votes for Vice-President.
Monroe was inaugurated on the 14th of March, 1817, the oath being administered by Chief Justice Marshall. The inaugural address was so liberal in its tone that it seemed to give satisfaction to men of all shades of political opinion. The questions which had arisen during the war no longer had any practical significance, while the people were anxious to give the disturbing ones which ante-dated at least a season of rest. Two great and opposing policies had previously obtained, and singularly enough each seemed exactly adapted to the times when they were triumphant. The Federal power had been asserted in a government which had gathered renewed strength during what was under the circumstances a great and perilous war, and the exigencies of that war in many instances compelled the Republicans or Democrats, or the Democratic-Republicans as some still called them, to concede points which had theretofore been in sharp dispute, and they did it with that facility which only Americans can command in emergencies: yet as a party they kept firm hold of the desire to enlarge the scope of liberty in its application to the citizens, and just here kept their original landmark.
It is not singular then that the administration of Monroe opened what has ever since been known in politics as the “Era of Good Feeling.” Party differences rapidly subsided, and political serenity was the order of the day. Monroe made a tour of the States, with the direct object of inspecting fortifications and means of defence, and in this way spread the good feeling, without seeming to have any such object. He was everywhere favorably greeted by the people, and received by delegations which in many instances were specially made up of all shades of opinion.
The Cabinet was composed of men of rare political distinction, even in that day of great men. It was probably easier to be great then than now, just as it is easier to be a big political hero in the little State of Delaware than it is in the big States of New York or Pennsylvania. Yet these men were universally accepted as great without regard to their localities. All were Republicans or Democrats, with John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State, Wm. H. Crawford (Monroe’s competitor for the nomination) as Secretary of the Treasury, John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, William Wirt as Attorney-General. All of these united with the President in the general desire to call a halt upon the political asperities which were then recognized as a public evil. On one occasion, during his tour, the citizens of Kennebunk and its vicinity, in Maine, having in their address alluded to the prospects of a political union among the people in support of the administration, the President said in reply:
“You are pleased to express a confident hope that a spirit of mutual conciliation may be one of the blessings which may result from my administration. This indeed would be an eminent blessing, and I pray it may be realized. Nothing but union is waiting to make us a great people. The present time affords the happiest presage that this union is fast consummating. It cannot be otherwise; I daily see greater proofs of it. The further I advance in my progress in the country, the more I perceive that we are all Americans—that we compose but one family—that our republican institutions will be supported and perpetuated by the united zeal and patriotism of all. Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to behold a perfect union among ourselves—a union which is necessary to restore to social intercourse its former charms, and to render our happiness, as a nation, unmixed and complete. To promote this desirable result requires no compromise of principle, and I promise to give it my continued attention, and my best endeavors.”
Even General Jackson, since held up to public view by historians as the most austere and “stalwart” of all politicians, caught the sweet infection of peace, and thus advised President Monroe:—
“Now is the time to exterminate that monster, called party spirit. By selecting [for cabinet officers] characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate those feelings, which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of government. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested; always bearing in mind, that he acts for the whole and not a part of the community.”
This advice had been given with a view to influence the appointment of a mixed political Cabinet, but while Monroe professed to believe that a free government could exist without political parties, he nevertheless sought to bring all of the people into one political fold, and that the Democratic. Yet he certainly and plainly sought to allay factions in his own party, and with this view selected Crawford for the Treasury—the gentleman who had been so warmly supported in the nominating struggle by the Clintonians and by all who objected to the predominating influence of Virginia in national politics.
Monroe, like his immediate predecessor, accepted and acted upon the doctrines of the new school of Republicans as represented by Clay and Calhoun, both of whom still favored a tariff, while Clay had become a warm advocate of a national system of internal improvements. These two statesmen thus early differed on some questions, but they were justly regarded as the leading friends and advisers of the administration, for to both still clung the patriotic recollections of the war which they had so warmly advocated and supported, and the issue of which attested their wisdom. Clay preferred to be called a Republican; Calhoun preferred to be called a Democrat, and just then the terms were so often exchanged and mingled that history is at fault in the exact designation, while tradition is colored by the bias of subsequent events and lives.
Monroe’s first inaugural leaned toward Clay’s scheme of internal improvements, but questioned its constitutionality. Clay was next to Jefferson the most original of all our statesmen and politicians. He was prolific in measures, and almost resistless in their advocacy. From a political standpoint he was the most direct author of the war of 1812, for his advocacy mainly brought it to the issue of arms, which through him and Calhoun were substituted for diplomacy. And Calhoun then stood in broader view before the country than since. His sectional pride and bias had been rarely aroused, and like Clay he seemed to act for the country as an entirety. Subsequent sectional issues changed the views held of him by the people of both the North and South.
We have said that Monroe leaned toward internal improvements, but he thought Congress was not clothed by the Constitution with the power to authorize measures supporting it, and when the opportunity was presented (May 4, 1822) he vetoed the bill “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road,” and accompanied the veto with a most elaborate message in which he discussed the constitutional aspects of the question. A plain majority of the friends of the administration, under the leadership of Clay, supported the theory of internal improvements from the time the administration began, but were reluctant to permit a division of the party on the question.
Mississippi and Illinois were admitted to the Union during the “Era of Good Feeling,” without serious political disturbance, while Alabama was authorized to form a state constitution and government, and Arkansas was authorized as a separate territorial government from part of Missouri. In 1819 President Monroe made a tour through the Southern States to examine their defenses and see and get acquainted with the people. From the first inauguration of Monroe up to 1819 party lines can hardly be said to have existed, but in the sixteenth session of Congress, which continued until May, 1820, new questions of national interest arose, prominent among which were additional protective duties for our manufactures; internal improvements by the government; acknowledgments of the independence of the South American States.
Upon the question of recognizing the independence of the South American States, the President made a record which has ever since been quoted and denominated “The Monroe Doctrine.” It is embodied in the following abstract of his seventh annual message, under date of Dec. 2d, 1823:
“It was stated, at the commencement of the last session, that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.
“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced, than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question to which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government, de facto, as the legitimate government for us: to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe, that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”
The second election of Monroe, in 1820, was accomplished without a contest. Out of 231 electoral votes, but one was cast against him, and that for John Quincy Adams. Mr. Tompkins, the candidate for Vice-President, was only a little less fortunate, there being 14 scattering votes against him. Neither party, if indeed there was a Federalist party left made any nominations.
The second session of the 17th Congress opened on the 4th day of March, 1820, with James Monroe at the head of the Executive Department of the Government, and the Democratic party in the majority in both branches of the Federal Legislature. The Cabinet at that time was composed of the most brilliant minds of the country, indeed as most justly remarked by Senator Thomas H. Benton in his published review of the events of that period, it would be difficult to find in any government, in any country, at any time, more talent and experience, more dignity and decorum, more purity of private life, a larger mass of information, and more addiction to business, than was comprised in the list of celebrated names then constituting the executive department of the government. The legislative department was equally impressive. The exciting and agitating question then pending before Congress was on the admission of the State of Missouri into the Federal Union, the subject of the issue being the attempted tacking on of conditions restricting slavery within her limits. She was admitted without conditions under the so-called compromise, which abolished it in certain portions of the then province of Louisiana. In this controversy, the compromise was sustained and carried entirely by the Democratic Senators and members from the Southern and slaveholding States aided and sanctioned by the Executive, and it was opposed by fifteen Senators from non-slaveholding States, who represented the opposite side on the political questions of the day. It passed the House by a close vote of 86 to 82. It has been seriously questioned since whether this act was constitutional. The real struggle was political, and for the balance of power. For a while it threatened the total overthrow of all political parties upon principle, and the substitution of geographical parties discriminated by the slave line, and thus destroying the proper action of the Federal government, and leading to a separation of the States. It was a federal movement, accruing to the benefit of that party, and at first carried all the Northern democracy in its current, giving the supremacy to their adversaries. When this effect was perceived, democrats from the northern non-slaveholding States took early opportunity to prevent their own overthrow, by voting for the admission of the States on any terms, and thus prevent the eventual separation of the States in the establishment of geographical parties divided by a slavery and anti-slavery line.
The year 1820 marked a period of financial distress in the country, which soon became that of the government. The army was reduced, and the general expenses of the departments cut down, despite which measures of economy the Congress deemed it necessary to authorize the President to contract for a loan of five million dollars. Distress was the cry of the day; relief the general demand, the chief demand coming from debtors to the Government for public lands purchased under the then credit system, this debt at that time aggregating twenty-three millions of dollars. The banks failed, money vanished, instalments were coming due which could not be met; and the opening of Congress in November, 1820, was saluted by the arrival of memorials from all the new States praying for the relief to the purchaser of the public lands. The President referred to it in his annual message of that year, and Congress passed a measure of relief by changing the system to cash sales instead of credit, reducing the price of the lands, and allowing present debtors to apply payments already made to portions of the land purchased, relinquishing the remainder. Applications were made at that time for the establishment of the preemptive system, but without effect; the new States continued to press the question and finally prevailed, so that now the preemptive principle has become a fixed part of our land system, permanently incorporated with it, and to the equal advantage of the settler and the government.
The session of 1820–21, is remarkable as being the first at which any proposition was made in Congress for the occupation and settlement of our territory on the Columbia river—the only part then owned by the United States on the Pacific coast. It was made by Dr. Floyd, a representative from Virginia, who argued that the establishment of a civilized power on the American coast of the Pacific could not fail to produce great and wonderful benefits not only to our own country, but to the people of Eastern Asia, China and Japan on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean, and that the valley of the Columbia might become the granary of China and Japan. This movement suggested to Senator Benton, to move, for the first time publicly in the United States, a resolution to send ministers to the Oriental States.
At this time treaties with Mexico and Spain were ratified, by which the United States acquired Florida and ceded Texas; these treaties, together with the Missouri compromise—a measure contemporaneous with them—extinguished slave soil in all the United States territory west of the Mississippi, except in that portion which was to constitute the State of Arkansas; and, including the extinction in Texas consequent upon its cession to a non-slaveholding power, constituted the largest territorial abolition of slavery that was ever up to that period effected by any political power of any nation.
The outside view of the slave question in the United States, at this time, is that the extension of slavery was then arrested, circumscribed, and confined within narrow territorial limits, while free States were permitted an almost unlimited expansion.
In 1822 a law passed Congress abolishing the Indian factory system, which had been established during Washington’s administration, in 1796, under which the Government acted as a factor or agent for the sale of supplies to the Indians and the purchase of furs from them; this branch of the service then belonged to the department of the Secretary of War. The abuses discovered in it led to the discontinuance of that system.
The Presidential election of 1824 was approaching, the candidates were in the field, their respective friends active and busy, and popular topics for the canvass in earnest requisition. Congress was full of projects for different objects of internal improvement, mainly in roads and canals, and the friends of each candidate exerted themselves in rivalry of each other, under the supposition that their opinions would stand for those of their principals. An act for the preservation of the Cumberland Road, which passed both houses of Congress, met with a veto from President Monroe, accompanied by a state paper in exposition of his opinions upon the whole subject of Federal interference in matters of inter state commerce and roads and canals. He discussed the measure in all its bearings, and plainly showed it to be unconstitutional. After stating the question, he examined it under every head of constitutional derivation under which its advocates claimed the power, and found it to be granted by no one of them and virtually prohibited by some of them. This was then and has since been considered to be the most elaborate and thoroughly considered opinion upon the general question which has ever been delivered by any American statesman. This great state paper, delivered at a time when internal improvement by the federal government had become an issue in the canvass for the Presidency and was ardently advocated by three of the candidates and qualified by two others, had an immense current in its power, carrying with it many of the old strict constructionists.
The revision of the tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called “The American System,” was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823–24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the Southern States. The presidential election being then depending, the subject became tinctured with party politics, in which so far as that ingredient was concerned, and was not controlled by other considerations, members divided pretty much on the line which always divided them on a question of constructive powers. The protection of domestic industry not being among the powers granted, was looked for in the incidental; and denied by the strict constructionists to be a substantive term, to be exercised for the direct purpose of protection; but admitted by all at that time and ever since the first tariff act of 1789, to be an incident to the revenue raising power, and an incident to be regarded in the exercise of that power. Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs; now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. Mr. Henry Clay was the leader in the proposed revision and the champion of the American system; he was ably supported in the House by many able and effective speakers; who based their argument on the general distress then alleged to be prevalent in the country. Mr. Daniel Webster was the leading speaker on the other side, and disputed the universality of the distress which had been described; and contested the propriety of high or prohibitory duties, in the present active and intelligent state of the world, to stimulate industry and manufacturing enterprise.
The bill was carried by a close vote in both Houses. Though brought forward avowedly for the protection of domestic manufactures, it was not entirely supported on that ground; an increase of revenue being the motive with some, the public debt then being nearly ninety millions. An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor.
Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, voted for and avowedly supported General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt; Mr. Crawford was opposed to it, and Mr. Calhoun had withdrawn as a Presidential candidate. The Southern planting States were dissatisfied, believing that the new burdens upon imports which it imposed, fell upon the producers of the exports, and tended to enrich one section of the Union at the expense of another. The attack and support of the bill took much of a sectional aspect; Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and some others, being unanimous against it. Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Kentucky being unanimous for it. Massachusetts, which up to this time had no small influence in commerce, voted, with all, except one member, against it. With this sectional aspect, a tariff for protection, also began to assume a political aspect, being taken under the care of the party, afterwards denominated as Whig. The bill was approved by President Monroe; a proof that that careful and strict constructionist of the constitution did not consider it as deprived of its revenue character by the degree of protection which it extended.
A subject which at the present time is exciting much criticism, viz: proposed amendments to the constitution relative to the election of President and Vice-President, had its origin in movements in that direction taken by leading Democrats during the campaign of 1824. The electoral college has never been since the early elections, an independent body free to select a President and Vice-President; though in theory they have been vested with such powers, in practice they have no such practical power over the elections, and have had none since their institution. In every case the elector has been an instrument, bound to obey a particular impulsion, and disobedience to which would be attended with infamy, and with every penalty which public indignation could inflict. From the beginning they have stood pledged to vote for the candidate indicated by the public will; and have proved not only to be useless, but an inconvenient intervention between the people and the object of their choice. Mr. McDuffie in the House of Representatives and Mr. Benton in the Senate, proposed amendments; the mode of taking the direct vote to be in districts, and the persons receiving the greatest number of votes for President or Vice-President in any district, to count one vote for such office respectively which is nothing but substituting the candidates themselves for their electoral representatives.
In the election of 1824 four candidates were before the people for the office of President, General Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford and Henry Clay. None of them received a majority of the 261 electoral votes, and the election devolved upon the House of Representatives. John C. Calhoun had a majority of the electoral votes for the office of Vice-President, and was elected. Mr. Adams was elected President by the House of Representatives, although General Jackson was the choice of the people, having received the greatest number of votes at the general election. The election of Mr. Adams was perfectly constitutional, and as such fully submitted to by the people; but it was a violation of the demos krateo principle; and that violation was equally rebuked. All the representatives who voted against the will of their constituents, lost their favor, and disappeared from public life. The representation in the House of Representatives was largely changed at the first general election, and presented a full opposition to the new President. Mr. Adams himself was injured by it, and at the ensuing presidential election was beaten by General Jackson more than two to one.
Mr. Clay, who took the lead in the House for Mr. Adams, and afterwards took upon himself the mission of reconciling the people to his election in a series of public speeches, was himself crippled in the effort, lost his place in the democratic party, and joined the Whigs (then called the national republicans). The democratic principle was victor over the theory of the Constitution, and beneficial results ensued. It vindicated the people in their right and their power. It re-established parties upon the basis of principle, and drew anew party lines, then almost obliterated under the fusion of parties during the “era of good feeling,” and the efforts of leading men to make personal parties for themselves. It showed the conservative power of our government to lie in the people, more than in its constituted authorities. It showed that they were capable of exercising the function of self-government, and lastly, it assumed the supremacy of the democracy for a long time, and until lost by causes to be referred to hereafter. The Presidential election of 1824 is remarkable under another aspect—its results cautioned all public men against future attempts to govern presidential elections in the House of Representatives; and it put an end to the practice of caucus nominations for the Presidency by members of Congress. This mode of concentrating public opinion began to be practiced as the eminent men of the Revolution, to whom public opinion awarded a preference, were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions, were coming upon the stage. It was tried several times with success and general approbation, because public sentiment was followed—not led—by the caucus. It was attempted in 1824 and failed; all the opponents of Mr. Crawford, by their joint efforts, succeeded, and justly in the fact though not in the motive, in rendering these Congress caucus nominations odious to the people, and broke them down. They were dropped, and a different mode adopted—that of party nominations by conventions of delegates from the States.
The administration of Mr. Adams commenced with his inaugural address, in which the chief topic was that of internal national improvement by the federal government. This declared policy of the administration furnished a ground of opposition against Mr. Adams, and went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinous, construction of the Constitution. It was clear from the beginning that the new administration was to have a settled and strong opposition, and that founded in principles of government—the same principles, under different forms, which had discriminated parties at the commencement of the federal government. Men of the old school—survivors of the contest of the Adams and Jefferson times, with some exceptions, divided accordingly—the federalists going for Mr. Adams, the republicans against him, with the mass of the younger generation. The Senate by a decided majority, and the House by a strong minority, were opposed to the policy of the new President.
In 1826 occurred the famous debates in the Senate and the House, on the proposed Congress of American States, to contract alliances to guard against and prevent the establishment of any future European colony within its borders. The mission though sanctioned was never acted upon or carried out. It was authorized by very nearly a party vote, the democracy as a party being against it. The President, Mr. Adams, stated the objects of the Congress to be as follows: “An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its own borders, may be advisable. This was, more than two years since, announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations, that they may feel it as an essential appendage to their independence.”
Mr. Adams had been a member of Mr. Monroe’s cabinet, filling the department from which the doctrine would emanate. The enunciation by him as above of this “Monroe Doctrine,” as it is called, is very different from what it has of late been supposed to be, as binding the United States to guard all the territory of the New World from European colonization. The message above quoted was written at a time when the doctrine as enunciated by the former President through the then Secretary was fresh in the mind of the latter, and when he himself in a communication to the American Senate was laying it down for the adoption of all the American nations in a general congress of their deputies. According to President Adams, this “Monroe Doctrine” (according to which it has been of late believed that the United States were to stand guard over the two Americas, and repulse all intrusive colonists from their shores), was entirely confined to our own borders; that it was only proposed to get the other States of the New World to agree that, each for itself, and by its own means, should guard its own territories; and, consequently, that the United States, so far from extending gratuitous protection to the territories of other States, would neither give, nor receive, aid in any such enterprise, but that each should use its own means, within its own borders, for its own exemption from European colonial intrusion.
No question in its day excited more intemperate discussion, excitement, and feeling between the Executive and the Senate, and none died out so quickly, than this, relative to the proposed congress of American nations. The chief advantage to be derived from its retrospect—and it is a real one—is a view of the firmness with which the minority maintained the old policy of the United States, to avoid entangling alliances and interference with the affairs of other nations; and the exposition, by one so competent as Mr. Adams, of the true scope and meaning of the Monroe doctrine.
At the session of 1825–26 attempt was again made to procure an amendment to the Constitution, in relation to the mode of election of President and Vice-President, so as to do away with all intermediate agencies, and give the election to the direct vote of the people. In the Senate the matter was referred to a committee who reported amendments dispensing with electors, providing for districts equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State was entitled in Congress, and obviating all excuses for caucuses and conventions to concentrate public opinion by providing that in the event of no one receiving a majority of the whole number of district votes cast, that a second election should be held limited to the two persons receiving the highest number of votes; and in case of an equal division of votes on the second election then the House of Representatives shall choose one of them for President, as is prescribed by the Constitution. The idea being that the first election, if not resulting in any candidate receiving a majority, should stand for a popular nomination—a nomination by the people themselves, out of which the election is almost sure to be made on the second trial. The same plan was suggested for choosing a Vice-President, except that the Senate was to finally elect, in case of failure to choose at first and second elections. The amendments did not receive the requisite support of two-thirds of either the Senate or the House. This movement was not of a partisan character; it was equally supported and opposed respectively by Senators and Representatives of both parties. Substantially the same plan was recommended by President Jackson in his first annual message to Congress, December 8, 1829.
It is interesting to note that at this Session of 1825 and ’26, attempt was made by the Democrats to pass a tenure of office bill, as applicable to government employees and office-holders; it provided “that in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President’s power to remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may have been removed.” It was also sought at the same time to amend the Constitution to prohibit the appointment of any member of Congress to any federal office of trust or profit, during the period for which he was elected; the design being to make the members wholly independent of the Executive, and not subservient to the latter, and incapable of receiving favors in the form of bestowals of official patronage.
The tariff of 1828 is an era in our political legislation; from it the doctrine of “nullification” originated, and from that date began a serious division between the North and the South. This tariff law was projected in the interest of the woolen manufacturers, but ended by including all manufacturing interests. The passage of this measure was brought about not because it was favored by a majority, but because of political exigencies. In the then approaching presidential election, Mr. Adams, who was in favor of the “American System,” supported by Mr. Clay (his Secretary of State) was opposed by General Jackson. This tariff was made an administration measure, and became an issue in the canvass. The New England States, which had formerly favored free trade, on account of their commercial interests, changed their policy, and, led by Mr. Webster, became advocates of the protective system. The question of protective tariff had now not only become political, but sectional. The Southern States as a section, were arrayed against the system, though prior to 1816 had favored it, not merely as an incident to revenue, but as a substantive object. In fact these tariff bills, each exceeding the other in its degree of protection, had become a regular appendage of our presidential elections—carrying round in every cycle of four years, with that returning event; starting in 1816 and followed up in 1820–24, and now in 1828; with successive augmentations of duties; the last being often pushed as a party measure, and with the visible purpose of influencing the presidential election. General Jackson was elected, having received 178 electoral votes to 83 received by John Quincy Adams. Mr. Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania, who was on the ticket with Mr. Adams, was defeated for the office of Vice-President, and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, was elected to that office.
The election of General Jackson was a triumph of democratic principle, and an assertion of the people’s right to govern themselves. That principle had been violated in the presidential election in the House of Representatives in the session of 1824–25; and the sanction, or rebuke, of that violation was a leading question in the whole canvass. It was also a triumph over the high protective policy, and the federal internal improvement policy, and the latitudinous construction of the Constitution; and of the democracy over the federalists, then called national republicans; and was the re-establishment of parties on principle, according to the landmarks of the early years of the government. For although Mr. Adams had received confidence and office from Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe, and had classed with the democratic party during the “era of good feeling,” yet he had previously been federal; and on the re-establishment of old party lines which began to take place after the election of Mr. Adams in the House of Representatives, his affinities and policy became those of his former party; and as a party, with many individual exceptions, they became his supporters and his strength. General Jackson, on the contrary, had always been democratic, so classing when he was a Senator in Congress under the administration of the first Mr. Adams; and when party lines were most straightly drawn, and upon principle, and as such now receiving the support of men and States which took this political position at that time, and maintained it for years afterwards; among the latter, notably the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania.
The short session of 1829–30 was rendered famous by the long and earnest debates in the Senate on the doctrine of nullification, as it was then called. It started by a resolution of inquiry introduced by Mr. Foot of Connecticut; it was united with a proposition to limit the sales of the public lands to those then in the market—to suspend the surveys of the public lands—and to abolish the office of Surveyor-General. The effect of such a resolution, if sanctioned upon inquiry and carried into legislative effect, would have been to check emigration to the new States in the West, and to check the growth and settlement of these States and Territories. It was warmly opposed by Western members. The debate spread and took an acrimonious turn, and sectional, imputing to the quarter of the Union from which it came an old and early policy to check the growth of the West at the outset by proposing to limit the sale of the Western lands, by selling no tract in advance until all in the rear was sold out; and during the debate Mr. Webster referred to the famous ordinance of 1787 for the government of the northwestern territory, and especially the anti-slavery clause which it contained.
Closely connected with this subject to which Mr. Webster’s remarks, during the debate, related, was another which excited some warm discussion—the topic of slavery—and the effect of its existence or non-existence in different States. Kentucky and Ohio were taken for examples, and the superior improvement and population of Ohio were attributed to its exemption from the evils of slavery. This was an excitable subject, and the more so because the wounds of the Missouri controversy in which the North was the undisputed aggressor, were still tender. Mr. Hayne from South Carolina answered with warmth and resented as a reflection upon the Slave States this disadvantageous comparison. Mr. Benton of Missouri followed on the same side, and in the course of his remarks said, “I regard with admiration, that is to say, with wonder, the sublime morality of those who cannot bear the abstract contemplation of slavery, at the distance of five hundred or a thousand miles off.” This allusion to the Missouri controversy, and invective against the free States for their part in it, by Messrs. Hayne and Benton, brought a reply from Mr. Webster, showing what their conduct had been at the first introduction of the slavery topic in the Congress of the United States, and that they totally refused to interfere between master and slave in any way whatever. But the topic which became the leading feature of the whole debate, and gave it an interest which cannot die, was that of nullification—the assumed right of a State to annul an act of Congress—then first broached in the Senate—and in the discussion of which Mr. Webster and Mr. Hayne were the champion speakers on opposite sides—the latter voicing the sentiments of the Vice-President, Mr. Calhoun. This turn in the debate was brought about, by Mr. Hayne having made allusion to the course of New England during the war of 1812, and especially to the assemblage known as the Hartford Convention, and to which designs unfriendly to the Union had been attributed. This gave Mr. Webster an opportunity to retaliate, and he referred to the public meetings which had just then taken place in South Carolina on the subject of the tariff, and at which resolves were passed, and propositions adopted significant of resistance to the act; and consequently of disloyalty to the Union. He drew Mr. Hayne into their defence and into an avowal of what has since obtained the current name of “Nullification.” He said, “I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain, that it is a right of the State Legislature to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws,*** that the States may lawfully decide for themselves, and each State for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its powers,*** that if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any State government require it, such State government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government, which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.” Mr. Hayne was evidently unprepared to admit, or fully deny, the propositions as so laid down, but contented himself with stating the words of the Virginia Resolution of 1798, as follows: “That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government as resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.”
This resolution came to be understood by Mr. Hayne and others on that side of the debate, in the same sense that Mr. Webster stated, as above, he understood the gentleman from the South to interpret it. On the other side of the question, he argued that the doctrine had no foundation either in the Constitution, or on the Virginia resolutions—that the Constitution makes the federal government act upon citizens within the States, and not upon the States themselves, as in the old confederation: that within their Constitutional limits the laws of Congress were supreme—and that it was treasonable to resist them with force: and that the question of their constitutionality was to be decided by the Supreme Court: with respect to the Virginia resolutions, on which Mr. Hayne relied, Mr. Webster disputed the interpretation put upon them—claimed for them an innocent and justifiable meaning—and exempted Mr. Madison from the suspicion of having framed a resolution asserting the right of a State legislature to annul an Act of Congress, and thereby putting it in the power of one State to destroy a form of government which he had just labored so hard to establish.
Mr. Hayne on his part gave (as the practical part of his doctrine) the pledge of forcible resistance to any attempt to enforce unconstitutional laws. He said, “The gentleman has called upon us to carry out our scheme practically. Now, sir, if I am correct in my view of this matter, then it follows, of course, that the right of a State being established, the federal government is bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, at least so far as to make an appeal to the people for an amendment to the Constitution. This solemn decision of a State binds the federal government, under the highest constitutional obligation, not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting State.*** Suppose Congress should pass an agrarian law, or a law emancipating our slaves, or should commit any other gross violation of our constitutional rights, will any gentlemen contend that the decision of every branch of the federal government, in favor of such laws, could prevent the States from declaring them null and void, and protecting their citizens from their operation?*** Let me assure the gentlemen that, whenever any attempt shall be made from any quarter, to enforce unconstitutional laws, clearly violating our essential rights, our leaders (whoever they may be) will not be found reading black letter from the musty pages of old law books. They will look to the Constitution, and when called upon by the sovereign authority of the State, to preserve and protect the rights secured to them by the charter of their liberties, they will succeed in defending them, or ‘perish in the last ditch.’”
These words of Mr. Hayne seem almost prophetic in view of the events of thirty years later. No one then believed in anything serious in the new interpretation given to the Virginia resolutions—nor in anything practical from nullification—nor in forcible resistance to the tariff laws from South Carolina—nor in any scheme of disunion.
Mr. Webster’s closing reply was a fine piece of rhetoric, delivered in an elaborate and artistic style, and in an apparent spirit of deep seriousness. He concluded thus—“When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and disfigured fragments of a once glorious Union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood. Let their last feeble and lingering glance, rather, behold the gorgeous ensign of the Republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured, bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as, What is all this worth? nor those other words of delusion and folly, Liberty first and Union afterwards; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing in all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart—Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!”