CHAPTER VI

THE FIELD ORDER, THE ESTIMATE, THE DECISION, THE EXPRESSION

“Upon the information of the enemy and of the terrain obtained by reconnaissance, and, as far as time will permit, upon the study of the terrain made by the leader in the field of probable operations, the plan of action is based.” So state our Field Service Regulations.[4] Decision, then, is built upon the amount of material that the observation and attention of a commander can collect. And it is only his observation and attention which count. It is only what he himself has fixed in his own mind which is going to do the troops harm or good. He may receive dozens of excellent messages, or may view the battle-field for twenty miles; yet it is only what he himself appropriates to his own straight thinking, which can influence the outcome. The reports or the visions of others cannot enter into the decision, unless he has transferred those reports or visions to his own calculations. How can he weigh what he has not handled—consider what he has not absorbed? The decision of a leader issues from the door of his own observation and attention. The most pertinent facts may be laid at that threshold only to be shut out because he has not increased his capacity to take them in. And no one else can enter there in order to do the work for him unless the intruder becomes virtually, if not actually, the leader.

THE ESTIMATE

Let us suppose that the observation and attention have taken in all that they should. These various items lying in a more or less jumbled mass must now be sorted. Information of one class must not be found mixed with that of another class. Each organized body of information must approach the leader’s judgment by itself so that: (1) nothing will be overlooked; so that (2) each item will be with its proper set. After they have all passed through his thought, certain ones, of course, may be discarded; but they all must none the less be first reviewed consciously by the leader. This process is called the estimate of the situation. In order, therefore, to comply with the full conditions of such an estimate, a fixed classification of all the essentials which should go through the hopper of a leader’s judgment has been made. After his information has been obtained and before his decision has been formed, the leader must say to himself:—

1. What is my mission?

2. What are the forces—the enemy’s and my own?

3. What conditions are favorable and what unfavorable?

4. What is the enemy doing and what will he probably do?

5. What effect has the terrain upon my mission?

6. What different courses are open to me in order to carry out my mission, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each?

The method just described is no more than that of collecting, classifying, and weighing data. It is the very process we must follow before we can write a decent theme, article, report, or anything fit to read. An estimate of a situation is nothing more than an outline of observations made in order to arrive at a proper conclusion. The leader has no time to write down the points. But he nevertheless assembles in his own mind everything which bears on his subject—unity; he classifies all this into groups with a certain orderly arrangement—coherence; and he considers the effect of each item upon his mission and situation—clear thinking.

THE DECISION

As soon as he has finished with this estimate of the situation, there should stand forth as a result of this clear thinking his decision. If he has been in the habit of making his ideas unmistakable in conversation or writing—if he has been accustomed to dealing in good exposition, his plan ought to be clear and simple. For no man can make clear statements without first thinking clear thoughts. If then he has habitually insisted upon his own use of only the clearest phraseology, he ought certainly to arrive at a clear plan whatever may be its tactical value.

THE EXPRESSION

To give this plan expression is the purpose of the field order. Certainly if the decision is clear and simple, the translation into language ought to be easy. Infantry Drill Regulations state: “Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or inability to formulate orders.” Since vacillation is a matter of character, the discussion of such a trait is outside of this course; but the inability to formulate orders is not. In fact it belongs only in the course of Rhetoric or English. The following terms are found in our Regulations and Text Books: “Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in combat”;[5] “an order must be definite and the expression of a fixed decision”;[5] “field orders are brief”;[6] “field orders must be brief and definite”;[6] “clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and sure decisions and are the means of transforming the decision into action”;[6] “Make your order short and make it definite”;[7] “above all do not give vague orders”;[7] “be positive and definite”;[7] “a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct expression in an order.”[8] And so our manuals keep on telling us to use correct English, but failing to tell us how. Putting the clarified decision into the form of an order is the business of Rhetoric. And the process requires the application of every rule for correct English we have learned or are going to learn.

“Often a faulty expression, a word too much or too little, or an omission, may become the source of serious consequences,” declares Buddecke. Even in the orders of the greatest commanders, a twist of phrase or a wrong word has given an unintentional meaning, so that troops have from the very construction of the order acted contrary to the will of the chief. Napoleon, in a despatch to Davout before the battles of Auerstadt and Jena, stated: “If the Prince of Portecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned him at Dornberg.” Bernadotte, as it happened, had not gone to Dornberg. He was with Davout. He determined, from the last clause of the order and from the word “may,” that Napoleon desired him to be at Dornberg. To Dornberg he marched, and there he calmly waited within sound of the guns, while the battles of Auerstadt and Jena were fought. He was useless both to Napoleon and to Davout. Indeed, he was seriously needed by Davout who, with 27,000 was opposed to 51,000 Prussians. Yet the error is attributable not to Bernadotte but to Napoleon, who meant to say, “You should march together; but the Emperor hopes that he has arrived,” etc. Napoleon for once did not say what he meant. It is likely we may be found more wanting in this regard.

There is no error in the expressiveness of a field order which the analytical and synthetical study of English will not overcome. We must first learn by analysis to recognize mistakes when we see them. We must then try to manipulate our language so that those mistakes will not occur. Indeed, we must go further than the mere negative avoidance of mistakes. We must not be satisfied until we have made our expressions exert a positive force. The ways and means of so doing are found in the simple rules of rhetoric.

It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the American works against heavier odds than the European. The syntax of the inflected languages of Europe demands that the speaker pay a proper attention to the changes of number, gender, and case, if he would not appear ridiculous, whereas the English language, being almost without inflections, permits its speaker to toss his words about with an ease unknown to Continental speech, and still be intelligible. The result is that the European is trained to more care, and, therefore, greater exactness, than is demanded of the American. Moreover, the average American’s commercial education does not include a careful, analytical study of an inflected language. His geographical aloofness from the rest of the world insures him also a linguistic isolation. The European, on the other hand, has an added advantage in that by traversing a territory no larger than three or four of our big states, he will encounter a half-dozen languages, of all of which he must have some knowledge if he is to be a financial success.

The American, then, in writing orders is competing against a handicap. Von Kiessing, a foreigner, states that “the best of plans, the most skilful combinations, may fail, if the commander or his staff officers cannot express them properly”; and Buddecke, also a foreigner, insists that “a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct expression in an order.” If these men, schooled in language as well as in tactics, find admonition so emphatically necessary, how must we look upon the matter?

The form and composition of the order, if practiced now, ought to give us a certain amount of independence when we come to practical and strategical considerations later. For certainly, we shall be far ahead of our fellows who must try at once, and for the first time, both tactics and composition.

THE FORM OF THE FIELD ORDER

“To enable the will of the commander to be quickly understood, to secure prompt cooperation among his subordinates, and for ready reference, field orders are required to follow a general form. This form divides an order into sections or parts and assigns to each a particular class of information.

The parts of the field order are:

The Heading.
The Distribution of Troops (in certain orders).
The Body.
The Ending.”[9]

The only difference between the divisions of the field message and the field order, then, is that the latter contains in certain orders The Distribution of Troops.

The Heading.—The heading contains:

The Title or Name of Issuing Officer’s Command.
The Place.
The Date.
The Hour of Issue.
The Number of the Order.
The Reference to Map Used.

The Title or Name corresponds to the Name of Sending Detachment in the field message. But a title is the name applied to the temporary duty of a command, such as, “Advance Guard, Det. 21st Div.,” whereas the name itself might be “162d Inf., Det. 21st Div.” The Place does not need to be given so specifically as in the field message, because the command issuing a field order takes up much more space than a reconnaissance party. The Date and Hour of Issue are written as in the field message. Field Orders are numbered in sequence usually annually. The Reference to Map Used is placed immediately below the number. The Heading of a field order would appear thus:

The Distribution of Troops.—“The distribution of troops shows the tactical components into which a command is divided (advance guard, main body, etc.) and the troops assigned to each. It is generally used in march orders and in the first field order applying to a command newly created or organized. In other cases it is usually more convenient to name the troops in the body of the order, where their duties are prescribed.

When a ‘distribution’ is used, it is headed ‘Troops,’ and in written or printed orders is placed on the left of The Body, occupying about one-third of the page. The tactical components are marked with lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the troops listed under each performing the task prescribed in the similarly marked paragraph of the body of the order.

When orders are dictated or sent by wire or signals, the distribution of troops (if used) is given immediately after paragraph 2, without number.”[10] In orders for a regiment and smaller bodies the Distribution of Troops is usually omitted.

The Distribution of Troops in a field order would appear thus:

The Body.—The Body, of course, is the main part of the order. It contains the information and instructions for the command. It is to this part that Buddecke refers when he says: “The order, which is to transform decision into action, is of the utmost importance.”

The Sentence and the Paragraph, then, should be perfectly constructed. Each one of those elements should be tested to see that it is unified, coherent, and emphatic. The examples herein given, or any set phrasing, should never be imitated. Every leader must compose his own words, his own decision. He must give to his subordinates the language that best suits the particular occasion. Otherwise there will be no unity of structure and little likelihood of unity of action. Every military situation is a a law unto itself, and the language of the field order should fit that law.

Nevertheless there are certain aids, as we shall see, in composing the Body. The topic of each paragraph is to be found in our Regulations. We must see that nothing enters the paragraph or sub-paragraph but that which belongs in the topic assigned. We must see, also, that all of the matter belonging in a paragraph is placed there, and that every sentence in the paragraph is free from violations of Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis.

“Paragraph 1 contains such information of the enemy and of our supporting troops as it is desirable that subordinates should know.”

“Paragraph 2 contains the general plan of the commander, or so much thereof as will insure cooperation of all parts of the command.”

“Paragraph 3 contains the detailed tactical dispositions adopted by the commander to carry out the plan outlined in paragraph 2, including the tasks assigned to each of the several combatant fractions of the command. These tasks are given under lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the leading fraction, or the one having the most important duty to perform, being generally considered first. For instance: In an attack order it is customary to consider the artillery first; in a march order troops are considered according to their position in column.”

“Instructions applicable to all of these fractions may be embodied in a sub-paragraph, letter (X), at the end of paragraph 3.”

“Paragraph 4 contains instructions for the trains, and may designate the position of ammunition distributing stations, dressing stations, and stations for slightly wounded.”

“The last paragraph, usually paragraph 5, shows where the commander can be found or messages may be sent. In orders of subordinate commanders, this paragraph also gives the location of lines of information, if any have been established.”

“If additional paragraphs are necessary, they are incorporated, properly numbered, after paragraph 4. Sometimes it is unnecessary to include instructions for the trains; but whatever the number of paragraphs the last always shows where the commander can be found, etc.”[11]

Briefly, then, the paragraphs may be epitomized as follows:

1. Enemy (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

    Your own troops (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

2. Plan (single paragraph).

3. (a) Task of the leading, or the most important, fraction of command.

   (b) Task of next, or next important, fraction of command. (X) Anything which applies to all fractions of command.

4. Trains.

5. Location of commander or place to which messages are to be sent (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

    Location of lines of information (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

The Body of a field order would appear thus:

The Ending.—“The ending contains the authentication of the order and a statement of how it is communicated to the command. This statement is an important feature of a field order and is made by the officer signing the order, he being responsible that it is properly distributed.”[12]

The ending then would appear thus:

The various parts of the field order, when assembled, appear as follows:

There are certain
Special Cautions
in regard to the writing of the field order.

1.—What is required in paragraph 3 of the Body is that the order be logical—coherent.[13]

2.—An order tells a subordinate what to do but not how to do it.

3.—Conjectures, expectations, reasons for measures adopted, and detailed instructions for a variety of possible events, do not inspire confidence, and should be avoided.

4.—As a rule, an affirmative form of expression is used. Such an order as: “The supply train will not accompany the division,” is defective, because the gist of the order depends upon the single word “not.” It is far better to say, “The supply train will remain at so-and-so until further orders.”

5.—Do not use such expressions as “attempt to capture,” “try to hold,” “as far as possible,” “as well as you can.” Besides being indefinite, they divide responsibility. You, for example, receive an order “to try to capture” a certain position. Immediately there pops into your mind the suspicion that the commanding officer did not believe that the place could be taken, or was not anxious about having it captured. The commanding officer by the very wording of his order has taken on himself a part of the responsibility in the event of a repulse. At least he has not placed all the burden of the undertaking upon you. In the latter case he has been guilty of improper subordination.