We return once more to the Adirondacks—to Lake Champlain—to the Northern Gateway of the Nation as it was found in the war of 1812. Let the reader travel the whole nation over—travel from Eastport to San Diego and from Whatcom to Key West, he cannot find a region that stirs the blood of the patriot more than does the Adirondacks. Three times since the Americans first fought for liberty came the hosts of the enemy with the north wind into the narrow gulch where lies Lake Champlain—they came in whelming drifts to the Split Rock, to Saratoga, and to Plattsburg. And then, like the snow on the sunny southern slopes in May, they melted away. Remarkable—even astounding, as it seems to the tourist of these days—was the ending of two of these invasions. For though Champlain is but a narrow water, and in those days the region round about was in great part an unexplored wilderness, both invasions ended in naval battles between squadrons, and in the later one there was a ship that rated with the Constellation and the Macedonian—a frigate fit to sail on any sea.

How the British under Carleton saw “the face of the enemy” near the Split Rock, and Carleton abandoned forever his hope of glory, has already been told, and it now remains to recall to the memory of the reader how Macdonough met the British forces behind Cumberland Head and, in spite of their superior force, destroyed their power.

Of great moment and far-reaching were the campaigns planned by the British against the young American republic in the summer of 1814. Napoleon had fallen. On March 31st the Duke of Wellington had marched into Paris, and on May 11th Napoleon abdicated the throne of France and was sent away to the island of Elba in the Mediterranean. The hosts of veterans that had accomplished the defeat of the French emperor could then be carried across the Western Ocean to fight the Yankees.

What the character of the veterans who were thus sent to the United States was, has been accurately and in detail told both by the Duke of Wellington himself and by Napier.

Says the Duke, who commanded but failed to restrain them, regarding their deeds in a friendly country:

“It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. There is not an outrage of any description that has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received them as friends.”

And Napier describes as follows the sacking of Badajos by these veterans:

“All the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and reports of muskets used in violence resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos.”

These veterans, who “shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity,” (Napier), were sent across the Atlantic to subjugate a people fighting for freedom from equally brutal press gangs. Some of them were sent to the South that they might take New Orleans and so add the whole watershed of the Mississippi to the British domains, and the number sent on that invasion seemed overwhelming. Washington had been taken meantime, and the public buildings, including the national library, burned. The region of the Chesapeake was overrun. The whole Atlantic coast was blockaded by the tremendous fleets that the British were able to send at the end of the European war. And then came other hosts of “Wellington’s Invincibles” to the Sorel River, bound, through the northern gateway, to the head-waters of the Hudson, that they might cut off New England from the middle and southern States.

As the reader will remember, the Americans had two small sloops (one-masted vessels) on Lake Champlain during 1813—the Growler and the Eagle, each mounting eleven guns. These were sent by Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough in chase of three British gun-boats, and so eager were the Yankee crews that the sloops followed the British into the outlet of the lake and so far toward the St. Lawrence as to arrive in sight of Isle-aux-Noix, where the British had a fort and where three more British gun-boats were lying. It was now the turn of the British to force the fighting, and they gathered in great numbers on both shores of the river, while the gun-boats, that had, as usual, a long gun each, turned and opened fire at long range. The indiscreet zeal of Lieutenant Sydney Smith, who commanded the American sloops, was fatal, for both were captured.

To repair the loss thus sustained Macdonough seized a merchant sloop called the Rising Sun (built at Essex, in 1810, for E. A. Boynton), and converted her into a war-vessel by mounting seven long nine-pounders on her deck. She was renamed the Preble. But he was unable to secure a sufficient sea-power to prevent an invasion by a British force that reached the Saranac River a little later, though he undoubtedly hastened the retiring of that force and prevented any further invasions during 1813.

Then as fall came on he repaired to the village of Vergennes, on the Otter Creek (seven miles up from the lake) in Vermont. Vergennes had a brisk community in those days. There were an iron foundry and a rolling-mill and a wire factory there, besides saw-mills and a lot of other industries, the whole dependent on the water-power found in the falls of the creek. Macdonough found there just the workmen needed, and to insure the control of this gateway to the American Union during the next season, he laid, early in the spring, the keel of a full-rigged ship—a corvette—to which he gave the significant name of Saratoga. The forests furnished timber in abundance, the rolling-mills made the bar iron for fastenings, and the foundry turned out no less than one hundred and seventy-seven tons of shot for the great guns.

Then a vessel that had been built as a merchant steamer was taken for the use of the Government, and because her machinery got out of order at every trip it was removed and she was rigged as a schooner under the name of Ticonderoga.

With the melting of the ice, came the news that the British intended to come to the Otter and destroy the new ships. A fort that mounted seven twelve-pounders on naval carriages had been erected to command the mouth of Otter Creek, and Macdonough sent a party of seamen to reinforce the militia that manned this battery. It was on May 14, 1814, that the British appeared. There were eight gun-boats, each with a long gun (presumably eighteen and twenty-four pounders) and a bomb-sloop with a big mortar on her deck. The battery on shore opened fire as soon as the enemy came within range, and the enemy replied for an hour, when they gave it up and retired.

A few days later Macdonough brought his new ship, the Saratoga, the rebuilt steamer Ticonderoga, and the sloop Preble out of the creek, and with his gun-boats added was, for the time, master of the lake.

Meantime, however, the British Government had determined, as said, on an invasion like that of the defeated Burgoyne, in the Revolutionary war—an invasion that should cut the nation in two on the line of the Hudson. To accomplish this it was necessary to gain complete control of Lake Champlain. The country had been so far improved that an army could find a roadway along the lake and away to the south, where Burgoyne had been obliged to hew his way through a wilderness; but the control of the lake was, nevertheless, essential. To hold the control they supposed they had when they captured the sloops Growler and Eagle, they had built the brig Linnet, a vessel of the exact size of the American schooner Ticonderoga. But when they found that Macdonough had brought out a corvette (she measured about seven hundred and thirty-four tons) they laid down the keel of a frigate, the exact size of which is nowhere given, but it rated, later, in our navy with the frigates of 1,400 tons. The lowest estimate of her size places it at 1,200 tons. She was built at Isle-aux-Noix in the Sorel—the outlet of Lake Champlain—and was launched on August 25, 1814.

Hearing of the work upon her, Macdonough returned to Vergennes, on the Otter Creek, and once more made the air resound with the slash and rasp and click of broadaxe, saw, and maul. The keel of a brig was laid on July 29th, and on August 16th she slid into the water—she had been built in nineteen days! And yet she was about as large as the Lawrence and the Niagara, with which Perry won the victory of Lake Erie—she measured well up toward five hundred tons. She was called the Surprise, at first, but the name was changed to Eagle later on.

The fleet which Macdonough now commanded was as follows: the Saratoga, manned by a crew of two hundred and forty and carrying eight long twenty-fours, six short forty-twos, and twelve short thirty-twos; the brig Eagle, Captain Robert Henly, manned by a crew of one hundred and fifty, and carrying eight long eighteens and twelve short thirty-twos; the schooner Ticonderoga, Lieutenant Stephen Cassin, manned by a crew of one hundred and twelve, and carrying four long eighteens, eight long twelves, and five short thirty-twos; the sloop Preble, with a crew of thirty and an armament of seven long nines. In addition to these he had the gun-boats Borer, Centipede, Nettle, Allen, Viper, and Burrows, mounting each a long twenty-four and a short eighteen, with the Wilmer, Ludlow, Aylwin, and Ballard, each carrying a long twelve. The larger gun-boats had in all two hundred and forty-six men and the smaller one hundred and four. On the whole, the squadron carried crews that aggregated eight hundred and eighty-two men, and eighty-six guns that threw at a broadside 1,194 pounds of shot, of which four hundred and eighty pounds were from long guns and seven hundred and fourteen from short.

Because so small a weight of shot was thrown from long guns, and because the American force has been so grossly misrepresented by the British historians, it is proper here to remind the reader of the very great superiority of long over short guns. The fact that short guns (carronades) went out of use long ago is sufficient proof of this, but it is just as well to keep in mind that the short thirty-twos such as were used in the battle of Lake Champlain, could bear a charge of but two and a half pounds of powder, at most, while a long twenty-four, the shot of which was four-tenths of an inch less in diameter, used a charge of not less than five pounds, and it could stand a pound and even two pounds more. By the tables of ranges given by Sir Howard Douglas in his famous work on gunnery, Macdonough’s short thirty-twos could carry but two hundred yards with an elevation of one-half of a degree (at point-blank the range was less than one hundred yards) while the long twenty-fours of the British fleet, at an elevation of one-half of a degree, carried five hundred yards. This is the range at which the ball would strike smooth water when fired from a point five feet four inches above the water. It would bound along much farther, of course, but the figures are worth quoting, to show approximately the difference in penetrating power of the long gun and the short gun.

To meet the American squadron came the British with a frigate, a large brig, two sloops, and thirteen gun-boats. The frigate Confiance was manned by a crew of not less than three hundred and twenty-five men, and she was armed with thirty-one long twenty-fours (one on a pivot forward) and in addition carried six short guns that were probably forty-twos, but may have been thirty-twos. She could fire sixteen long twenty-fours in a broadside—her long-gun broadside was but ninety-six pounds short of the long-gun broadside of the whole American fleet. This weight was exactly made up by the British brig Linnet, that was armed with sixteen long twelves—fired ninety-six pounds in a broadside. At the range of this battle these two vessels alone should have been equal to the entire American squadron, for not only was their long gun metal equal to the Americans, but they had the very great advantage of concentrating in these two ships the weight of long metal that was scattered over fourteen vessels on the American side. The advantage of concentration of power into few ships is so well understood in these days of huge battleships that nothing more need be said on that subject.

In addition to these powerfully armed vessels they had the two vessels captured from the Americans the year before, which had been rebuilt and now measured one hundred and twelve and one hundred and ten tons, respectively, and were armed, the Chubb with one long six-pounder and ten short eighteens, the Finch with four long sixes and seven short eighteens. And then there were the gun-boats. The Sir James Yeo, the Sir George Prevost, and the Sir Sidney Beckwith carried a long twenty-four and a short thirty-two each. The Broke carried a long eighteen and a short thirty-two. The Murray carried a long eighteen and a short eighteen. The Wellington, the Tecumseh, and another whose name is not recorded carried a long eighteen each, while the Drummond, the Simcoe, and three others whose names were omitted in Macdonough’s report (from which this list of gun-boats is taken) carried short thirty-twos. The British threw at least six hundred and sixty pounds of metal from long guns where the Americans could throw but four hundred and eighty. The American short guns threw seven hundred and fourteen pounds of metal to five hundred and sixty-four at least from the British.

When we come to a consideration of the crews it is worth noting first of all that the Americans were commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, a man of twenty-eight years, who was called commodore by courtesy because he commanded a squadron. The British were under Captain George Downie, a man of mature years and wide experience. The whole number of men on each fleet cannot now be ascertained beyond dispute, but the Americans had, as already said, eight hundred and eighty-two, as near as can be determined. The British historians place their force at a smaller figure, and denounce as cowards the Canadians who manned the British gun-boats. The highest number of men they allow to their flagship is three hundred, although there were more than this number of dead and prisoners taken out of her after the battle, and not a few of the dead were thrown overboard from her during the battle to get them out of the way. Moreover, there was no reason why any vessel of their squadron should be undermanned, for they had a great army on which to draw for men who could handle cannon and muskets. The lowest American estimate in any printed table of the forces is given by Roosevelt, who says they had nine hundred and thirty-seven men, and then adds, in a footnote, “About; there were probably more rather than less,” nevertheless the reader must keep in mind that this battle was fought and won at long range, save for a small part at the tail of the line, and neither the actual nor the relative number of men engaged is of any material consequence. Each side had enough men to handle the guns and the ships when the fight began, and that was all either side could wish for. It was a battle of practical seamanship and accuracy in aiming long-range guns. The men that could show the better seamanship and the greater accuracy were to win, in spite of odds; and this is the way they did it:

To begin at the beginning of the preparations, Macdonough chose the best place on the lake for receiving the enemy that was to come against him. With the chart of the lake in mind—possibly with the story of Arnold’s battle behind Valcour Island also in mind—Macdonough carried his squadron to Plattsburg Bay. For Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, with an army that, at the lowest estimate, contained 11,000 men, chiefly “Wellington’s Invincibles,” was coming to Plattsburg, where General Alexander Macomb could muster at first only 1,500 effective men to meet him, although some thousands of militia, including 2,500 hardy Green Mountain Boys, came to help before the battle occurred. But the supporting of Macomb was only one of the lesser reasons that led the able Yankee lieutenant to anchor his squadron in Plattsburg Bay. As was said in describing Arnold’s battle, the wind comes either from the north or the south when it blows in the gorge of Lake Champlain. The British were coming from the north. Their ships were of shoal draught. The water was very narrow. The current runs toward the north. They could come only when the wind was from the north. Now Plattsburg Bay opens toward the south. It is enclosed on the east by a point of land that, at places, is two hundred feet high, called Cumberland Head. The British squadron in coming from the north with a fair wind would have to round Cumberland Head and then go up into this bay against the wind that had brought them before they could reach the Yankee ships. And reach the Yankee ships they must—they could not go on to the south leaving a Yankee squadron behind them any more than Carleton could go on leaving Arnold behind him.

So the position in Plattsburg Bay gave Macdonough the weather gage of the enemy beyond peradventure. But that was not all of the advantage. Macdonough anchored his vessels in a line, nearly north and south, at a distance of about one hundred yards from each other, placing the brig Eagle, that was at the north end of the line, so near to Cumberland Head that the enemy could not easily pass around that end of the line and double up on it. Indeed, since the enemy was sure to have a head wind in the bay, it was practically impossible to double around the north end of the line. Next to the Eagle lay the corvette Saratoga; astern of her was the Ticonderoga, and, last of all, was the little sloop Preble. Observe that the head of the line was the Eagle, the second best Yankee ship, and next to her lay the best of the Yankee squadron. The head of the line concentrated the strength of the squadron and the tail held the weakest ship. The tail was therefore strengthened by the gun-boats; but more than that was provided for, because in case the weak Preble were attacked by the British flagship the big Saratoga or the Eagle could go down-wind to help her.

Still another advantage is found in this position chosen by Macdonough. The British were obliged to come in between his line and Cumberland Head, and so could not take a position wholly beyond the range of the Yankee short guns. As a matter of fact, the British commander anchored as far away as he could, but he was obliged by the conformation of the land to come in and take his chances with the carronades.

Having placed his ships in the best possible position for receiving the enemy, Macdonough made one other provision for the battle, and it was one that really saved the day. He hung anchors from the sterns as well as from the bows of his ships. Just how he arranged the stern anchors is not made clear to a landsman in Macdonough’s report or in any documents relating to the fight. If the reader will keep in mind the fact that a ship when at anchor always swings with her bow toward the wind, the matter will appear clearer. As the Yankee ships swung thus a hawser was carried from the stern of each ship either to the anchor or to some point on its cable, and made fast. These were the springs. So, then, the ship was held at each end to the anchor and could be made to swing broadside to the wind. And that means that while the wind was blowing out of the bay and the British ships had to come into the bay against it, the Yankee ships lay with their broadsides toward the enemy. But that was not all. Both cable and spring might be shot away, although both were on the side of the ship away from the enemy. So an extra anchor was planted broad off on each bow. By hauling on hawsers leading to the various anchors the ship could be turned one way or another. Further than that, an anchor was provided at the stern. If this was dropped and the bow cable cut, the wind would swing the ship around so that she would lie stern to it instead of bow to it. And this is called “winding” a ship. In short, Macdonough, though but twenty-eight years old, was a thorough seaman. He prepared and could handle every device for working his ships in the battle that was to come. He could, in perfect confidence, await the onslaught of the enemy.