The last of the expeditions of the navy in the Civil War, and the greatest in the number and force of the ships and men, was that sent to capture Fort Fisher, guarding the entrance to Cape Fear River, on which Wilmington, North Carolina, stands. The preparations for this expedition began in the fall of 1864, and one cannot help wondering that no determined effort was made to capture the port early in the war, for, because of its situation and the peculiar nature of the entrances to the mouth of the river, it was the favorite resort of the blockade-runners, and therefore the chief source from which the Confederates drew their foreign supplies. “From it Lee’s army in front of Richmond was kept supplied, and the great Confederate commander had plainly informed Colonel Lamb, the officer in charge of Fort Fisher, that the Confederates must fall back from before Richmond, through inability to procure food, if the port was lost.”

Fort Fisher was planned early in the war, and no fort built by the Confederates received greater care. A look at the chart will show that a long arm of land comes down from the north between the river and the sea—an arm that at last is split like the claw of a lobster into two fingers. One, very fat, and extending in toward the channel of the river, is called Federal Point, and the other, very slender, continues the coast line to what is called New Inlet. A shoal body of water called the basin lies between the two fingers. Fort Fisher was erected right where the two fingers split apart—right on the wrist.

Beginning a few yards back from the beach and north of the split of the fingers, the Confederates erected a mound of sand eighty feet high. On this they mounted an eight-inch (150-pounder) rifle and a ten-inch medium-length (columbiad) shell gun. From this mound a series of connected batteries or earthworks, of the most approved form, extended away to the north for about 1,400 yards. In this stretch were mounted seventeen great guns, including rifles from four and a half inches up to seven inches, with a number of ten-inch smooth-bore shell guns. In height and thickness these batteries were all that could be wished in that day, and there were immense traverses (big mounds of sand) between the guns to protect the gun crews from an enfilading fire and from shells bursting on either side of them. At the north end of the north-and-south line so far described, the wall of the fort turned at a right angle toward the west. This part of the wall extending to the west was about 500 yards long, and it crossed the arm of dry land to the swamps of the river. Looking from the north, the whole fort was a very good L. The east-and-west arm mounted twenty-one great guns, and these were, for the most part, placed to defend the garrison from a land attack.

It was plain that the Confederates erected this huge structure to keep the Federal forces from entering Cape Fear River by the way of New Inlet. As a matter of fact, it was, in the judgment of engineers, built too near to the sea. The inlet was shoal at best. Only the lightest of vessels could enter it. Had Fort Fisher been erected back from the sea, where it would have been out of range of the deep-draft Union ships, a different story would have been told of it in history. As it was, Col. William Lamb, commanding it, gave a right good account of himself.

When an attack was at last planned by the Union forces, a very grave error was made in placing Benjamin F. Butler at the head of the army forces after Admiral David D. Porter had been assigned to command the naval part of the expedition. This is not to disparage the talents of either man. It is said because the two leaders heartily disliked each other. It was therefore utterly impossible for them to coöperate.

Ships and transports were assembled at Hampton Roads in September, but the publicity given to the destination of the expedition caused a postponement until December. In the meantime Butler had conceived an idea, and in order not to be unfair his exact words, from page 775 of “Butler’s Book,” are given. He says:

“In that time, after hearing of the great destruction for many miles around made by an explosion of gunpowder at Erith, England, I made an examination into the various instances of the explosive effect of large quantities of powder; and I believed that possibly, by bringing within four or five hundred yards of Fort Fisher a large mass of explosives, and firing the whole in every part at the same moment—for it was the essence of the experiment to have the powder all exploded at the same instant—the garrison would at least be so far paralyzed as to enable, by a prompt landing of men, a seizure of the fort.”

The reader is requested to note that he says “within four or five hundred yards of Fort Fisher.” His idea was submitted to the Administration and approved, although Mr. Lincoln accepted it “with more caution” than the others. Admiral Porter accepted it because “it was considered advisable to try almost any expedient.” When it came to details, Butler says on page 800 of his book: “My proposition to the Navy Department contemplated using but one hundred tons of powder ... that this one hundred tons of powder should be put into a light-draught steamer, and arranged and packed in such a way that either by electrical or other apparatus fire could be communicated all through the vessel into every part of the mass of powder at one and nearly the same instant; that that vessel should be run ashore; that time fuses or other means of calculating the time necessary for the explosion should be put in operation, and that with the vessel hard and fast on shore so that none of the powder substantially could go down into the water until it had time to take fire, the whole mass should explode. The effect that I expected from that was that the gases from the burning powder would so disturb the air as to render it impossible for men to breathe within two hundred yards; that the magazines of the fort would be burst in and possibly the magazines themselves be exploded; that by the enormous missiles that would be set in motion and by the concussion many men would be killed, and if the explosion were to be followed immediately by an attack of even a small number of effective men, the fort could be captured.”

Accordingly, an old and worthless steamer, the Louisiana, was fitted for the purpose. Instead of 100 tons, 215 tons of powder were put on board. Part of it was not of full power, but nearly 200 tons of the best was stowed in the ship. The work of preparing her delayed the expedition some days, and it was valuable time. However, the expedition finally arrived on the coast, Butler, with his transports, at Masonboro’ Inlet, twenty-five miles up the beach from Fort Fisher, and Porter out at sea, twenty-five miles from the fort. The transports had water and coal for but ten days, but there were delays due partly to weather and partly to the ill feeling between the commanders, and eventually Butler, with most of his transports, went away to Beaufort to take on water for the troops.

Favorable (smooth-water) weather was had on the night of December 23, 1864, and the powder-boat Louisiana was sent in. She was in charge of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had with him Lieut. S. W. Preston, Engineer A. T. E. Mullen, Master’s Mate Boyden, and seven men. The tug Wilderness towed the Louisiana in toward the fort near the north end of the sea-front until the water was fifteen feet deep, when the Louisiana cast off the line and proceeded under her own steam until she was in nine feet of water, when she was anchored. She was then 300 yards or less from the fort. Butler says she should have been beached, although he also says (see ante) 400 or 500 yards was near enough. Captain Rhind says he did not beach her because she would have been strained on the sand, and was likely to open a seam and let in the water and spoil the experiment. Clocks had been arranged to drop weights on explosive mixtures, and these were now set. Then a fire was built in the shaft tunnel in the stern to make sure that she exploded if the clocks failed, after which Rhind and his men returned to the tug. It was then exactly midnight. The tug ran twelve miles out to sea and stopped to watch the explosion. It took place at 1.40 o’clock, and amounted to absolutely nothing.

An army engineer found the wreck of a blockade-runner, called the Condor, 800 or 900 yards from the fort, assumed that it was the wreck of the Louisiana, and so reported. This report was used to discredit Commander Rhind. It seems, on the face of it, to have been a fraud, for the army officer should have known that nothing would remain of the Louisiana after such an explosion. But if so much had remained, what became of Butler’s theory?

The idea that exploding any possible mass of gunpowder in the open air outside of such a fort could hurt any one or anything inside was simply childish. But Butler never ceased to argue that it ought to have been a tremendous success. And it is a most sorrowful fact that, because of Butler’s political influence, the magnificent bravery of the powder-boat’s crew was never in any public manner recognized.

The next day, December 24, 1864, the warships steamed in and anchored at fair range, with the ironclads in one line and the wooden ships some distance outside. They bombarded the fort from 11.30 A.M. until sunset. At night Butler, with a part of his transports, came from Beaufort, and next morning the others arrived. It was arranged to land the troops, undercover of the gunboats, at a point two miles up the beach from the fort. Butler’s orders were to make an assault, if that were deemed feasible, but if not, he was to throw up intrenchments and lay siege to the fort in the usual fashion. Soundings were made in the morning, a more effective line of fire was planned, and, late in the forenoon, the fleet steamed in and once more opened fire. This was on December 25, 1864.

Nearly 3,000 troops were landed, with General Weitzel in command. They captured a couple of little outworks three miles north of the landing place, and then advanced with skirmishers. One of the skirmishers captured a flag from one point on the parapet, and another passed through the sally-port, bayoneted a man on a horse inside, and captured the horse. Weitzel says (see “Butler’s Book”) that he was within 600 yards of the fort, and from a sand-dune examined the work carefully. Butler ran down the beach in a shoal-draft transport, and at a range of 500 yards, as he says, looked at the fort for himself. He continues: “I there met General Weitzel returning from a reconnoissance. He stated to me that he had been out to the front line, and had seen Fort Fisher. As a defensive work the fort was uninjured.” He continues: “I said to Colonel Comstock, who was on board with me [Butler did not land], ‘jump into a boat with General Weitzel, pull ashore and examine with him and report to me if an assault is feasible; to me it does not look so, but I am unwilling to give it up.’” This is from “Butler’s Book,” page 794. Being so primed by Butler, Comstock reported an assault not feasible, and Butler wrote to Admiral Porter that night as follows:

“Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach, and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle.... I shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order.”

By Confederate reports it appears that the fort was garrisoned by “900 veterans, sixty C. S. N. sailors and marines and 450 junior reserves between sixteen and eighteen years of age.” On December 24th three guns had been disabled in the fort, and on the 25th five others were disabled. Two more had exploded. Including howitzers, the fort had left thirty-four guns, of which twenty pointed up the beach toward an assaulting column. There were also some torpedoes planted in the sand, and a very good line of palisades “made of heavy timber pointed on top.” But for the delay due to the wild powder-boat scheme, the Confederates would have been caught with only 667 men in the fort, according to General Whiting, who commanded the Confederate forces of the Wilmington district. Whiting wrote that he believed an assault on Christmas day would have failed. In his official report he said of the fort: “The delay due to the heavy weather of Wednesday and Thursday after the arrival of the fleet was its salvation.”

With these facts in mind, a student of history may find the following words in Admiral Porter’s report of December 27, 1864 (see Report Sec. Navy, 1865, p. 51): “My despatch of yesterday will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up and torn up that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer.”

Certainly this is not true. Porter guessed at the facts. The Confederate officers (see Scharf) had to use the flat of their swords to get some of the reserves out to man the parapet, but they had a force of nearly 1,000 that would have made a fight. But if Butler had been as anxious to carry the fort by assault as he was to report a failure on the part of Admiral Porter, he would have carried the fort inside of an hour with even the partial force he had landed. Moreover, when he said the beach was “the only practicable route” for an assaulting party, he was mistaken, for General Terry, three weeks later, found a much safer route “under the river bank.” It is an interesting fact that Butler in his book does not attempt any explanation of his lack of knowledge, when before the fort, of the river-bank route.

Thomas E. Taylor, a noted blockade-runner, who has printed a book on his experiences, was in Richmond in consultation with the Confederate chiefs at the time of this assault, and wrote the following in a letter to his employers regarding the matter: “They nearly had Fort Fisher; they were within sixty yards of it—and had they pushed on as they ought to have done, could have taken it. It was a terrific bombardment.”

Anyway, Butler did not even throw up intrenchments. He abandoned the enterprise altogether.

However, the operations against the fort were only suspended. Admiral Porter filled up his ships with ammunition. On January 13, 1865, Gen. Alfred H. Terry landed with 6,000 men. The ships anchored with the monitors at a range of half a mile, and the others outside at three-quarters of a mile (in some cases further), and a storm of bursting shells poured over the fort. It lasted all that day, was continued at intervals during the night and all the next day. The fort replied slowly, partly because ammunition was scarce and partly because of the effect of the Union fire.

That night an assault was planned, and 1,600 sailors and 400 marines were landed to help the soldiers. At 9 o’clock on the morning of January 15, 1865, the fleet once more opened fire. The soldiers, who had been lying at the river side of the arm of land, charged up to attack the extreme west end of the fort. The sea force, in three divisions, led by Cushing (he who destroyed the Albemarle), Lieut.-commander James Parker, and Lieut.-commander T. O. Selfredge, Jr., charged up the barren beach, where Butler did not dare to go, to attack the sea front. They had the post of greatest danger, for they were wholly uncovered.

“The attacking column of the army was hid and protected by the river bank as it approached the left flank of the work, but the naval column came up the open beach upon our center. As its success would have been disastrous, I concentrated all available guns upon this column, and met its assault with the larger portion of my men, posting them upon the ramparts so as to fire down upon the sailors and marines.” The quotation is from a letter by Colonel Lamb, commanding the fort.

Some of the sea force reached the row of palisades, and there found shelter, but when eighty-two had been killed and 269 wounded, the others broke and fled out of range. They were armed (except the marines) with cutlasses and revolvers only. It was not a good place for boarders. Nevertheless, this assault was not in vain, as W. R. Mayo, one of the Confederate officers in the fort, testifies in Scharf’s work. He says:

“Though proving a great failure in itself, this assault occupied the nearly worn-out and depleted garrison, and had the direct result of admitting the army to the ramparts of the disabled land face of the fort before attention could be given to the assaulting column in that direction.”

There were forty-two ships in the line bombarding Fort Fisher on January 15, 1865, of which six were ironclads—five monitors and the New Ironsides. The total number killed afloat during the three days of fighting was seventy-four, and 289 were wounded. Ammen estimates from the reports in the department that 21,716 shells were thrown at the fort. In the first attack 15,000 were thrown.

Scharf has this to say of the capture of Fort Fisher:

“The fall of Wilmington was the severest blow to the Confederate cause which it could receive from the loss of any port. It was far more injurious than the capture of Charleston, and, but for the moral effect, even more hurtful than the evacuation of Richmond. With Wilmington and the Cape Fear River open, the supplies that reached the Confederate armies would have enabled them to have maintained an unequal contest for years, but with the fall of Fort Fisher the constant stream of supplies was effectually cut off and the blockade made truly effective—not by the navy fleet, but by its captures on land.”

The other forts about the river soon fell into government hands. The Civil War was already drawing to a close before the assault was made. It was a question only of how many days the able and determined men of the South would struggle against overwhelming numbers. The fall of Fort Fisher was therefore fortunate for both sides. It the sooner brought a hopeless fight to an end.