After crossing into Europe, Darius commanded the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellospontines, who conducted the fleet, to sail to the Ister, and while waiting for him there, to build a bridge over the river. They went two days’ sail up the stream, and constructed one at or near the head of the Delta.7 The first point indicated in the route taken by the army is the source or sources of the Tearos. This was a subtributary of the Agrianes (the modern Ergene), which was itself a tributary of the Hebrus.8 The Arteskos river, which is the next point mentioned, is not capable of certain identification at the present day.

The tribes of the coast of the modern East Rumelia or South Bulgaria yielded without a blow. The Getæ, between the Hæmus (Balkans) and the Ister, were the first to offer any resistance; but they were subdued. So far the tale is comprehensible. The army must have passed near to the Greek colonies, Salmydessos, Apollonia, and Mesembria, which are indeed mentioned in relation to the tribes south of the Hæmus. From these, probably, vague tales of this part of the expedition arrived in Greece.

From this point onwards the story is full of inconsistencies and improbabilities.

Arrived at the Ister, Darius, a commander of great and manifold experience, is represented as having ordered the Ionian Greeks to break down the bridge over the river after he had passed it, and to follow him into the unknown north. No reason is either given or is conceivable for such a suicidal plan. The ships, moreover, are to remain in the Ister. He was dissuaded from this by the advice of Koës, the Greek tyrant of Mytilene. He then gave orders that the Greeks should remain at the river sixty days, and if he did not return in that time, should loose the bridge and sail away.

No advantage can possibly be gained by treating this as serious history. It is inconceivable that any general of experience should either propose to deliberately cut his own line of communications when about to enter an unknown region, or even that he should have appointed a set limit of time, and that not very long, after which it might be cut.

The story is in all probability merely a peg whereon to hang an indictment of the Greek tyrants of the Asian coast, and is designed for the glorification of the part played by Miltiades in the subsequent debate on the advisability of leaving Darius to his fate.

The truth it contains may amount to no more than that the fleet did not go farther than the Ister, and that Darius did not intend to remain north of the river for any length of time.

The tale of the actual campaigning in Scythia is more extraordinary still. The Persians are represented as having penetrated beyond the river Tanais (Don) to the Oarus, (probably the Volga), on which they built a series of forts. They then returned to the Ister by a circuitous route, and, as might indeed be expected, the sixty days had elapsed before their arrival. Such is Herodotus’ story.

A reference to this campaign in the works of the geographer Strabo shows that Herodotus’ version of its history was not the only one current among the Greeks. He says that the king and his army, when between the Ister and the Tyras (Dniester), were compelled to turn back under stress of thirst.

Ktesias, a Greek who spent a large part of his life at the Persian Court, and who, though unreliable, is not likely to understate Persian exploits, Ktes. Pers. 17. says that the king only penetrated fifteen days’ march beyond the Ister.

The impossibilities of Herodotus’ story are so manifest that it is hardly necessary to point them out. How could the commissariat of a large force have been provided for on a march of that length through a hostile country where the natives, according to the historian’s own account, destroyed all local food supplies in advance of the army? How could the army and the transport required for it have been carried across such rivers as would have to be passed ere the Volga was reached,—the Sereth, the Pruth, the Dniester, Dnieper, Boug, and Don, not to mention numerous minor unfordable streams? If this long march was undertaken, why did not Darius employ the fleet for commissariat purposes, as was the custom in Persian campaigns of this age, where the fleet could possibly be employed?

If the fleet did remain at the Ister, which seems to be one of the few absolutely reliable statements in the story, the fact itself is strong presumptive evidence that Darius did not intend to go far beyond that river. Ktesias says he only proceeded fifteen days’ march. Strabo implies that he never reached the Dniester.

Inasmuch as the reliability of Herodotus as an historian is in question, it is important to make an attempt to surmise, in so far as possible, what was the source or sources of this extraordinary tale which he has preserved.

It must be remembered, in the first place, that at the time at which he wrote, anything of the nature of reliable information with regard to events before the war of 480 must have been very difficult to obtain. The palpable gaps in the story of the Ionian Revolt, the confusion in the account of the relations between Athens and Ægina, the meagreness of the story of Marathon, are striking proofs that such was the case; and if he experienced such manifest difficulty in arriving at a detailed knowledge of the great events of the beginning of the fifth century, in which Greeks played a foremost part, how much greater difficulty must he have experienced in gaining information as to the events of the later years of the sixth century, in which the part played by the Greeks was but secondary?

It seems probable that his sources of information in the present instance were two in number:⁠—

(1) A tale current in the Athens of his own day, which had come thither by way of the principality of Miltiades in the Thracian Chersonese.

(2) Reports collected by the historian himself, either in the course of a journey to the Greek colonies on the north coast of the Euxine, or from persons who were natives of those parts, or had visited them.

To the first of these must be attributed the account which he gives of the events on the Danube, and especially the celebrated tale of the proposal of Miltiades to break down the bridge and leave Darius to his fate.

The story is one of the most famous in Greek History. Twice, it is said, did the Scythians, while Darius with his army was still far north of the river, ride down to the Ister and call upon the Greeks to break down the bridge. H. iv. 133, 136. On the first occasion the Ionians promised to do so. The tale seems to imply that the promise was merely made with a view to getting rid of the Scythians. On the second occasion the Scythians made much the same appeal, calling on the Ionians to strike one grand, effective blow for their freedom.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the minor difficulties of the tale, how, for instance, it came about that the Scythians knew of Darius’ orders that the bridge should be loosed after the expiration of sixty days.

After this second appeal the Ionians held a consultation.

A list, intended doubtless as a black list, of these tyrants is given.

To prevent the Scythians seizing the bridge, and to give them the impression that they were going to follow their advice, the northern end of the bridge was removed for the space of a bow shot. The Scythians accordingly withdrew. Some time afterwards Darius and his army returned, and were alarmed to find the bridge apparently removed. They soon discovered their mistake. H. iv. 141, 142. The bridge was restored by Histiæus. “Thus the Persians escaped.” The Scythians’ judgment of the Ionians, as reported by Herodotus, is not without its significance in the story: H. iv. 142. “Their cowardice as free men was only equalled by their fidelity as slaves.”

Herodotus himself would be naturally inclined to seize upon a tale which so strikingly confirmed his own estimate of the Ionians.

But is the story true?

The historian Thirlwall suggested that, in its existing form, it is an excerpt from the defence made by Miltiades in answering the charge of “tyranny” brought against him at Athens about the year 493. Such stories are, however, very rarely pure fabrications from beginning to end; and, in accordance with general probability, it is more likely than unlikely that it contains a considerable element of truth. There are, furthermore, certain considerations deducible from evidence outside the story itself which tend to support the view.

Herodotus regards the expedition as the one great disaster of Darius’ career. Regarded as evidence, this is not of itself very important. The story as he told it was intended to point the great moral which runs throughout his history,—that special phase of the great Hellenic idea of the “tragedy” of life in which he most firmly believed. The career of Darius, without this great disaster, would have formed too startling an exception to that divine and natural law of the incontinuity of human fortune which he had so consciously and conspicuously illustrated in his account of the lives of Cambyses, Crœsus, and Polykrates of Samos.

But there are other reasons for supposing that the expedition was not without disaster, rumours of which,—probably, too, emanating from the Greeks at the Ister,—reached the cities of the Propontis.

Ktes. Pers. 16 (Justin, ii. 5). Ktesias states Darius’ losses to have been 80,000 men. Even if the actual number stated be untrustworthy, it shows that this historian, who would be naturally inclined to minimize them, had reason to regard them as serious.

But, furthermore, it is evident that during Darius’ absence north of the Danube, Cf. H. v. 26. a large number of the Hellespontine cities had seized the opportunity for revolt. Byzantion, Kalchedon, Antandros, and Lamponion were among the number. This caused Darius to return to Asia by way of Sestos. It is inconceivable that these towns should have chosen this time of all others, when a large portion of the levy of the Empire was actually under arms, for insurrection, had they not some reason to believe that it had gone whence it could never return their way. They must have received, either from the Greek colonies on the North Euxine, or, more probably, from the Greeks on the Ister, some tidings of a great disaster.

Even if the Greeks on the Ister were not the authors of such tidings, it is unlikely that reports which came to the towns of the Propontis failed to reach them.

May it not then be that the fictitious element in the report of the discussion on the desertion of Darius, in so far as the general details of the lines which the discussion itself followed are concerned, is confined to the part which Miltiades is alleged to have played in it? It is not necessary on this assumption to further assume the veracity of the tale of the orders given by Darius to the guardians of the bridge. That tale simply served to heighten the colouring of the picture of the treason of those Asiatic Hellenes to Hellenic freedom, in that it robbed them of the excuse of fidelity to a trust imposed upon them.

It is quite possible, then, that some report of disaster did lead to the formation of a plot in which all the tyrants were more or less implicated, but which for some unknown reason never came to a head. If it had been a one-man plot, in which Miltiades had played a solo part, surely his design must have become known to Darius. ORIGIN OF THE LEGEND. And yet on return to Asia Darius passed through Miltiades’ dominions, the only part, apparently, of the Hellespontine region to which the infection of rebellion had not spread. If Miltiades had taken part in the plot, and if any judgment can be formed from the general practice of Persian kings, it can hardly be supposed that he would have lived to fight at Marathon.

It now remains to consider briefly how the extraordinary story of the march beyond the Ister can possibly have originated.

Doubtless the Greeks in the cities on the north coast had many a tale brought to them by the native traders from the interior of the commotion caused by the sudden appearance of this strange army within the Scythian borders.

These tales, probably wild exaggerations even in their original form, would not, it may be certain, lose aught in the course of their evolution. An element common to all of them would be that somewhere in the Hinterland this army had appeared; and it may well be that within a comparatively short period the most easterly of the Greek cities came to regard their own Hinterland as the scene of its operations. This would bring the imaginary march of the army to the neighbourhood of the Don and the Volga.

In actual fact, however, it is impossible to suppose that the most extreme point ever reached by Darius was far north of the Ister. It is in the highest degree improbable that he ever passed the well-defined boundaries set by the Carpathians and the Pruth.

With regard to the motives of the expedition, Herodotus declares that it was intended as a retaliation for the Scythian invasion of Western Asia, which spread desolation through part of the continent, and was about synchronous with, and largely the cause of, the fall of the Assyrian Empire. Apart from the improbability of Darius cherishing resentment for occurrences of such ancient date, or for injuries of which he was in no real sense heir, he was probably aware, though Herodotus was not, that the people who lived to the north of the Euxine were wholly distinct from the Sakæ, whom Herodotus calls Scyths, who had troubled the continent more than a century before this time.

The unreliability and vagueness of the story of the campaign have led to the formation in modern times of many conjectures as to the object with which it was undertaken.

It has been represented as an attempt to make the Euxine a Persian lake. Such a theory must assume that Darius carried his operations far beyond the Ister. On this point sufficient has been said. But apart from this the theory is met by two other difficulties. What object could be gained by success in so bald a design? And if such a design existed, why was the fleet left at the Ister?

Again, it has been ascribed to mere lust of conquest. That is, indeed, not an uncommon characteristic with Eastern rulers. But Darius was not an Eastern ruler of the ordinary type. His wars, in so far as their history is known, are not waged from mere irrational land-hunger, but in obedience to rational policy, whose main lines are even now distinguishable. That he intended in this campaign to conquer something is obvious. But did he intend to make conquests in Scythia? Had he, too, no other conceivable motive than mere land-hunger behind the intention of conquest?

A more attractive theory which has been put forward in explanation of the object of the expedition is that, in accordance with his commercial policy, he attempted to open up, possibly to acquire, the rich region north of the Euxine. In that case it would certainly have been expected that he would have made one of the Greek harbours on the north coast of that sea the base of his operations, and have transferred his fleet thither. He could have got plenty of information on the subject from his Asiatic Greek vassals.

A theory which has been recently put forward is that his real object was to get hold of that gold region in the land of the Agathyrsi, a tribe mentioned in Herodotus’ account of the campaign. THE INTENT OF THE CAMPAIGN. This gold-bearing region must be identified with that on the western border of the modern province of Transylvania, which was included in the Roman province of Dacia. It is, however, impossible to say that there is even presumptive evidence of such an intention on Darius’ part.

It must be confessed that the evidence is not of such a nature that any theory as to the object of the campaign can be put forward with confidence. There are, however, two questions which must be taken into account in any theory on the subject which is to have the merit of plausibility:⁠—

(1) What were the net results of the campaign?

(2) Did the acts of Darius in any way declare his intentions?

The net results of the campaign were the submission of the Thracian tribes on the Euxine coast south of Hæmus, and the conquest and apparent submission of the Getæ between Hæmus and the Ister.

The intention of Darius to cross the Ister existed apparently from the beginning of the campaign. He sent the fleet thither with orders to prepare a bridge; but the intention not to proceed far beyond that river is almost equally clearly shown by his leaving his fleet at the point of crossing. Whether this second intention was part of the original design is another question. The tale of the countermanding of the orders given to the Greeks at the river, absurd though it is, may rest on a remote foundation of fact; and the fact may have been that Darius did actually modify his original plans on his arrival at the Ister.

The expedition north of that point seems to have been either of the nature of a reconnaissance in force, on the results of which the king decided against further advance and attempt at conquest, or a display intended to strike awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory. Whether any attempt at conquest in these northern regions formed part of the original programme may be doubted: one thing is certain, that the expedition in the form it was made was not anything of the kind.

It is noticeable that at this period the great river formed a very marked and striking ethnographical boundary between the tribes of Thracian stock and the Scyths of Europe. It has already been pointed out that Darius had within his dominions in Asia Minor—mainly in the region of Bithynia—people of Thracian origin. May he not have undertaken the expedition with intent to minimize the chances of disturbance on the weak imperial frontier formed by the Propontis and its two straits by subduing the free kinsmen of his Thracian subjects? It is a precaution such as the rulers of empires at every time in history and in every part of the world have frequently had to take. It may be, then, that Darius was in search of an ethnic frontier, and when he had found it on the Ister he sought not for further conquest, but confined himself to measures intended to secure what he had won.

The Ethnic Frontier.

It is perhaps unnecessary to insist on the importance of an ethnic frontier. It is, of course, frequently coincident with a physical frontier. Where such a coincidence exists, a “scientific” frontier is attained. But in cases where the two are not coincident, history has shown again and again that the ethnic is the more “scientific” of the two.

Regarding the question from another point of view,—it is infinitely more dangerous for a state to have on its borders a race who have kin immediately beyond the border in the enjoyment of a form of government which assures them their independence, or in which they are paramount, than to have on its frontier a race alien to their neighbours beyond the border.

The first of these alternatives is an almost inevitable source of trouble and danger to the state in which the circumstances exist. The danger is twofold. It may arise from the desire of those within the frontier to attain to the position enjoyed by their kinsmen outside it, or from the sympathy of the latter with those of their race who are in subjection to aliens.

Such considerations are not the mere abstractions of political philosophy, but are plain, practical questions which have called for practical solution from men to whom the very idea of political philosophy may never have been presented. They appear in actual history in a concrete form, and are therefore hard to recognize amid the numerous factors which are involved in the complicity of human action. ETHNIC FRONTIERS. The very use of such modern terms as “scientific” or “ethnic” frontier in reference to policies of ancient date has a tendency to create the idea that the person using them is mistakenly attributing to the past conceptions which are essentially of modern date. But are such conceptions of modern date? Is it not rather the form in which they are expressed which is of recent creation? The very creation of such a form of expression indicates, indeed, that the conception itself has become clearer in course of time; it rarely, if ever, indicates the actual birth of the conception. It is quite possible to grossly exaggerate the difference between the nature of the problems presented to the rulers of empire in the sixth century before Christ, and those which call for solution at the present time.

It is not difficult to illustrate from both ancient and modern history:⁠—

(1) The dangers of a frontier which is not ethnic;

(2) The appreciation of this practical fact by those who have had to face the circumstances.

The circumstances present themselves in a complex form, consequently the traceable motive which induces those in power to deal with them is never simple. It is necessary therefore for the student of history to abstract from the complex motive that part with which he wishes specially to deal; and that must be done in the present as in every other instance in which human motive is in question.

The problem of the ethnic frontier was one which presented itself at every stage of the making of the Roman Empire. It was perhaps most strikingly illustrated in the relations with the Gauls and Germans.

The original Gallic province had indeed a marked physical frontier in that elevated region of Auvergne and the Cevennes, together with those ranges which come from the Alps to meet the Gallic mountain system on the middle Rhone. It was, however, bordered on two sides by the lands of the free Gauls. So long as this continued its history was a stormy one. The Gauls of the province were ever restive under the Roman yoke. Every commotion outside the province was echoed within it. The haphazard provincial policy of the last century of the Republic ignored, in so far as possible, discomforts which it had not the energy to remedy. It was not until Cæsar became governor that the work was undertaken by the conquest of the Gauls who remained free.

But while solving one ethnic problem, Cæsar found himself face to face with another. Germans had made their way into Gaul, and showed every disposition to go farther. He invented a new solution. He converted the German settlements along the river into a military frontier, allowing the immigrants to retain their lands on condition that they prevented their kinsmen from crossing the Rhine. He sought to create an antipathy of interests where there existed no antipathy of race. The plan was but partially successful, and in the end the Roman legionary had to do the work that the German provincial was intended to do. Cæsar evidently aimed in his Gallic wars at the establishment of a physical frontier in the shape of the Rhine. The same policy has been tried again and again since his day. It has invariably been unsuccessful in modern times, simply because the Rhine is not an ethnic boundary. Cæsar left the problem unsolved, and his successors had to take it up where he left it. Under Augustus the policy of advance was first tried. Its failure was due to various causes,—some of them, perhaps, preventible; but one, and perhaps the major, reason for failure was the impossibility of reaching the far borders of the Germanic races. The problem presented itself on the Elbe in a still more difficult form even than on the Rhine, in that the new-sought frontier was farther from the Roman base.

After the disaster to Varus in A.D. 9, the policy of advance was given up. The apparently natural, but really artificial, frontier of the Rhine was definitely decided upon. The maintenance of it, owing to its artificiality, absorbed for well nigh a century a large part of the military resources of the empire. But the denationalization and romanization of the Germans within the border created in course of time an ethnic boundary where none had previously existed, and with its creation the problem was for the time being solved. Here, as elsewhere, Roman Imperial policy created an ethnic boundary where it found none.

Britain furnishes at least two prominent examples of the problem. Reference has been already made to the motive underlying the expedition of Julius Cæsar. Agricola, the greatest and the most humane of the governors of the province in the early years of its existence, found himself dragged ever farther northwards by sheer necessity of conquest. By his time, moreover, the problem had taken a more or less definite shape in men’s mind. Tac. Germ. 1. Tacitus, his biographer, recognized at least one side of it. “Germania,” he says, “a Sarmatis Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separatur”—an ethnic or physical frontier. He reports, too, a significant remark of Agricola in reference to the possibility of the conquest of Ireland: “Idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturum, si Romana ubique arma et velut e conspectu libertas tolleretur.” The practical ethnic question was evidently in Tacitus’ time in process of becoming crystallized into a political theory.

It would require too much space to recount in detail all the examples of the ethnic problem which have been conspicuous in mediæval and modern history. It has cropped up again and again within the memory of the living generation.

Austria had to face it in Italy in 1859–60. She has to face it now in the Sclav provinces of the North.

Denmark’s attempted solution of the problem in Schleswig-Holstein cost her those provinces in 1864.

The demand for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 would hardly have been made by Germany had not the problem in these regions presented itself to her in a seemingly favourable form.

The Turkish Empire presents, and has presented, numerous examples of the problem—Servia in 1876; Bulgaria in 1878; the Greek populations of the Ægean coast at the present day.

In South Africa Great Britain has been within the last year forced to solve the problem in the special phase in which it presented itself to her there.

To sum up, the circumstances which give rise to the ethnic problem are, stated briefly, of the following nature⁠—

(1) The existence within but on the borders of a state of a race alien to the ruling race, but akin to the race beyond the frontier.

(2) The real or fancied inferiority in respect to liberty of the aliens within the state to their kinsmen outside it.

(3) The consequent setting up of two currents of feeling, one from the outside to the inside, and another from the inside to the outside of the state. These are usually coexistent, though in exceptional cases one may exist without the other.

(4) The dangers to the state arising from the existence of circumstance (3).

The various solutions which have been tried by different states at different periods of history have taken one of two main forms of policy⁠—

Either (1) the pushing forward of the borders by conquest to the ethnic frontier;

Or (2) the denationalization of the alien race within the border.

Of these the second requires time. Any attempts to bring it about rapidly must end in failure, and may end in disaster; witness the case of Denmark in 1864.

Rome under the early Principate adopted, by the precept of Augustus, the policy of denationalization as against that of conquest. Augustus had tried both policies, but had deliberately laid aside the latter in A.D. 9.

But there was a vast difference between the Rome of Augustus and the Persia of Darius. Two centuries of past existence as the greatest power in the world made the Roman regard the future with a confidence with which Darius, heir to the maker of a new empire, and himself its re-maker, can never have regarded it. The Roman speculated in eternity, the Persian in time; hence the latter was naturally led to adopt methods which promised to bear fruit in the immediate future.

The question whether this is the sole motive which can be suggested for the expedition remains for consideration.

The evidence as to the real drift of the policy of Darius during the last fifteen years of the sixth century is so obscure and uncertain, that there has been much debate among historians as to whether this expedition was the first deliberate step in a large scheme of conquest in Europe. In order to form a judgment on this question it is necessary to take into consideration not only the immediate sequel of the expedition, but also the history, in so far as it is known, of the years which intervened between it and the outbreak of the Ionian revolt.

Darius took back with him to Asia the greater part of the great army which he had employed in the Scythian expedition; but he left his general Megabazos in Europe with a considerable force to complete the work of conquest which he had begun in Thrace, and, presumably, to suppress the revolt of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of the Propontis. This force is reported by Herodotus to have amounted to 80,000 men.

Megabazos proceeded, says the historian, to reduce “the Hellespontians who had not medized.” Who are these Hellespontians? They are certainly in Europe. CAMPAIGN OF MEGABAZOS. They are also not the populations of the revolted cities,9 for he expressly states that these were subsequently reduced by Otanes. They must be some small places in the neighbourhood of Miltiades’ principality in the Thracian Chersonese.

Of the history of this campaign Herodotus gives no detail, save that he says that Perinthos was taken; and this incident is obviously mentioned in order to introduce a story which has but a very remote connection with the circumstances of the time.

After the capture of this town “Megabazos marched his army through Thrace, reducing every state and race of those parts to subjection to the king; for Darius had ordered the reduction of Thrace.”

This is a very remarkable statement. The coast districts of the Euxine had submitted to Darius on his advance to the Danube. It may be doubted whether this submission was very real or permanent.

But now Megabazos appears to be represented as having reduced the whole of Thrace, of which region Herodotus takes the opportunity of giving a comprehensive description. Bearing in mind the language of the sentence which suggested the description, it is somewhat startling to read in the closing sentence of it the words, “Megabazos then reduced the coast regions (of Thrace) to subjection to the Persians.”

These two apparently conflicting statements form one of the many examples of the highly composite character of the sources from which Herodotus drew his history of these obscure years. It is impossible to say that the one is true and the other false. It is probably the case that here, as in some other similar instances in Herodotus’ history where two irreconcilable accounts of the same thing are either deliberately or inadvertently given, that either both are true in a sense, or that both contain elements of the truth. May it not be that this is an instance of the first of these two alternatives, and that the assertion with regard to the whole of Thrace refers to a position of weak dependence, whereas that with regard to the coast region refers to actual subjection?

It will be seen later that this matter is not unimportant in its bearing upon the conclusions which must be drawn as to the history of the years which follow.

The hypothesis is supported by the fact that though in those thirty years the coast region does appear to be, save during the interval of the Ionian revolt, under Persian rule, there is no evidence of the real subjection of the hinterland.

Herodotus next recounts two incidents, the first of which is connected indirectly, the second directly with this campaign.

These are (1) the grant of Myrkinos to Histiæus;

(2) The removal of the Pæonians to Asia.

Of the prominent Greeks who had accompanied the king to the Danube, Koës the Mytilenian, and Histiæus the Milesian were singled out for special rewards. To Koës was given the tyranny of Mytilene. H. v. 11. Histiæus was already tyrant of Miletus, and he asked not for further tyranny, but requested the grant of Myrkinos on the Strymon. This Darius gave him.

There can be no question that he knew for what he was asking. This place, which stood within a short distance of the site of Amphipolis of later days, was the key of the North Ægean lands. It commanded not merely the great coast route from east to west, but the trade route which ran up the Strymon valley towards mid-Europe. It may well be that it was the latter circumstance, together with its nearness to the Thracian gold region, which made its value known to the tyrant of the great trading city.

The sequel to this story is in all probability not unconnected with the policy which led to the removal of the Pæonians to Asia. THE LOWER STRYMON. It is evident that Herodotus had no idea of the reasons which induced Darius to adopt a measure which, though not uncommon in the previous history of the Eastern empires, was an unusual one with him. The tale which he tells in order to account for it was doubtless a commonplace among the stories of his time, and one which was told in relation to more than one event in the history of the past. It is unnecessary to reproduce it here, and still more unnecessary to point out the inadequacy of the motive which it suggests.

The strategic importance of the country occupied by this people is amply sufficient to account for the policy which Darius adopted with regard to them. They commanded the short stretch of the Strymon river between Lake Prasias10 and the sea, and were thus in a position whose natural strength was again and again demonstrated in later history, and whose importance lay in the fact, already pointed out in the case of Myrkinos, that it commanded not merely the trade-route north, but also the great route westward from Eastern Thrace and the Hellespont region.

The substantial details in the account of the incident indicate that it must have taken place during, not after, that conquest of the coast districts of Thrace of which Herodotus has already spoken.

The story is told as follows:⁠—

From the last detail it must be presumed that he had not as yet been campaigning in the Pæonian region.

The Persians, however, turned the position by taking the inland road.

H. v. 16.

The Pæonians between Lake Praslas and the sea immediately surrendered and were removed to Asia. Herodotus then adds that those about Mount Pangæus were “not substantially” subdued by Megabazos.11

If this were indeed the case, it is evident that the assertion which he has previously made to the effect that Megabazos reduced the “coast districts” of Thrace must be understood in a restricted sense in so far as this part of the country is concerned.

The net result of this part of the campaign seems to have been that Megabazos got possession of the most critical point of the coast road.

In accordance, it may be presumed, with his instructions, Megabazos next sent seven Persians of high rank to the neighbouring kingdom of Macedonia to demand the earth and water of submission from Amyntas, its then ruler. The extraordinary tale of this embassy,12—how it came to Amyntas; how he agreed to give earth and water; how the envoys were murdered at a banquet at the instigation of his son Alexander; how the murder was hushed up:⁠—contains what are evidently elements of fact combined with a large amount of fiction whose intent is to glorify Alexander in the sight of the Greeks.13 That such a murder could, if it ever took place, be hushed up, is incredible. H. v. 21, ad fin. The parts of the story which appear to be true, are (1) that Macedonia did in some way tender submission to Persia; (2) that a Persian, Bubares, probably the son of the general Megabazos, did marry a Macedonian princess. It is, however, a doubtful question whether the submission was very real.

After the negotiations with Macedon, Megabazos went to the Hellespont and thence to Sardes, taking the Pæonians with him.

On arriving there he heard, says Herodotus, of the grant of Myrkinos to Histiæus; and that the latter was fortifying the place. If this be true, it must be presumed that he had not marched direct from Pæonia to the Hellespont and Sardes, otherwise he would have known all about the proceedings of Histiæus at Myrkinos. It is, however, much more probable that Darius first heard from him the measures which Histiæus was taking to secure his new possession. Megabazos was evidently alarmed at the idea of this Greek tyrant holding a position which commanded the North Ægean route; and, if the matter of his representations to the king be truly reported, he pointed out to Darius the possibility of Histiæus establishing Myrkinos as a rallying centre for the Thracians, which might become the nucleus of a powerful state.

The subsequent history of Histiæus shows conclusively that the great Persian officials had the deepest distrust of this scheming Greek.

Megabazos’ representations had their effect. Histiæus was recalled to Sardes, and when, later, Darius went up to Susa, he took him with him, an honoured but unwilling guest.

Before departing for Susa, Xerxes appointed Artaphernes satrap of Sardes, and Otanes to succeed Megabazos in the command in Thrace.

Otanes proceeded to take Byzantion and Kalchedon. He also took Antandros in the Troad, and Lamponion. Then, by means of ships obtained from Lesbos, he reduced the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. That, according to Herodotus, was the sum of his exploits.

There follow words, one at least of which has got corrupted in the text; but there seems little cause to doubt that Herodotus wrote either: “After this there was a respite from troubles, though not a long one:” or, “After no long time there was a renewal of troubles.”14

He then enters upon the description of that affair at Naxos which immediately preceded the Ionian revolt.

The story of these operations in Thrace which are subsequent to and the direct outcome of the so-called Scythian expedition, is one of the most obscure chapters in Herodotus’ history. He had manifestly the greatest difficulty in obtaining information with regard to the events of the time. That which he did get he got from various sources, whose discrepancies he only partially succeeded in reconciling.

The modern writer is obliged to face the historical situation with the courage alike of necessity and despair; of necessity, inasmuch as the history of these years is of the utmost importance in the story of the Persian relations with Europe, and, consequently, with Greece; of despair, in that he must feel that detailed criticism of such material must border on mere eclecticism. On the main outlines the question it is, however, possible to arrive at conclusions which have some sound foundation in evidence.

It seems quite clear that these campaigns of Megabazos and Otanes aimed at the reduction of the Thracian races in Europe. In ordering them Darius was probably pursuing the policy which had underlain the so-called Scythian expedition. His stay at Sardes, for what cannot have been less than the better part of a year after his return from that expedition, indicates certainly that he considered that the affairs of the westernmost extremity of his empire demanded his personal attention more imperatively than affairs elsewhere, and may well imply that they were of a nature to cause him some anxiety. There had certainly been some disaster in the Scythian expedition. It had been followed by the revolt, not merely of the towns on the European side of the Propontis, but of places like Antandros in the Troad, which Otanes had subsequently to reduce.

The strategic policy observed in the campaign of Megabazos is striking in that the revolted cities are practically ignored. Its results are in many respects uncertain. Herodotus describes them in a descending scale;—first, as having consisted of the subjugation of all the Thracians; secondly, as being confined to the conquest of the coast regions; thirdly, as leaving even the conquest of these regions incomplete in the neighbourhood of Mount Pangæus. DESIGNS OF DARIUS IN EUROPE. It has been pointed out that the first two statements may be reconciled as implying subjugation in two different degrees; but the third constitutes, in whatever way it be regarded, a significant exception.

As far as the revolted cities are concerned, it is possible that Darius thought he could bide his time for dealing with them, and that the larger Thracian policy first demanded his attention. The cities were not powerful enough to do any active damage meanwhile.

How far was Megabazos successful in carrying out this larger policy? If any conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that Darius before leaving Sardes put Otanes in command in place of him, it is that the king was not satisfied with what he had achieved. Nevertheless, the success of his operations seems to have been sufficient to convince the Macedonian king Amyntas of the advisability of submitting to Persian suzerainty. What Megabazos certainly did was to open up the coast road to the West; and this, if the tale of the Pæonians is to be regarded as significant, he seems to have done by the express orders of the king. In any case the advance along this line is certainly a significant fact.

The objects, then, of Megabazos’ campaign appear to have been⁠—

(1) To complete the reduction of Thrace;

(2) To open up the route westwards.

Of these the first seems to have been but half accomplished; and though more success had been attained with the second, the failure to fully accomplish the first made it impossible for Darius to avail himself for the time being of the advantages won along that western route. He had found the Thracians, as others found them in later days, a much more difficult conquest than he had in all probability anticipated.

It is now possible to consider whether the attempt to arrive at an ethnic frontier is the only object which may be suggested as guiding the policy with regard to Thrace. Despite the obscurity of the evidence, it seems clear that Darius intended the conquest of Thrace to be a prelude to further conquest westwards, and that, in pursuance of this design, European Greece was to be the next object of attack. Whether the conquest of Greece was to be merely a second stage in a great scheme of conquest along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, or whether it was merely designed for the purpose of securing the western borders of the empire by subjugating the free kinsmen of the most western subjects of the empire, cannot now be said, inasmuch as there is no evidence which throws light upon the question.

It now remains to consider the evidence,⁠—

(1) As to Darius’ design of conquest westward;

(2) As to the reasons why the attempts to carry it out was postponed for many years.

The operations of Megabazos on the Strymon, followed by the demand for the submission of Macedonia, are certainly strong indications, if not conclusive evidence of, the design to get hold of the coast route to Northern Greece.

For the carrying out of operations on the scale requisite for an expedition aiming at the reduction of Greece as a whole, the command of a land route was necessary. The carrying capacity of a ship of those days was so small that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to transport a force of the magnitude required across the Ægean. The expedition of 490 represents in all probability the utmost that Persia could accomplish by sea transport, and that was merely directed against Athens and Eretria, and had as its declared object the punishment of the only two states of European Greece which had interfered in the Ionian revolt.

But the results of Megabazos’ campaign, if unsupported by other facts, would afford very inadequate evidence of a design on Greece.