A naval advisory board was appointed which, in 1881, recommended that thirty-eight armoured cruisers should be built, of which eighteen should be of steel and twenty of wood, besides several other vessels. An influential minority of the board objected to steel lest it should be imported instead of being manufactured in the United States. But in 1882 a House of Representatives committee decided upon steel, not only as the best but as the only proper material for the construction of war vessels. The committee, cautious but determined, recommended the building of two 15-knot cruisers, four 14-knot cruisers, and one steel ram. The advisory board desired five rams, but one was tried as an experiment. This was the Katahdin, and she was a failure and the experiment was never repeated. Congress in 1883 decided on two cruisers, not six, of which one should be between 5,000 and 6,000 tons displacement and have the highest attainable speed, and the other of between 4,000 and 4,300 tons displacement; and both were to have full sail power and full steam power. But as no money was voted the ships did not appear. Another naval advisory board recommended the construction of a 4,000-ton vessel and three of about 2,500 tons, all of steel, and a smaller iron despatch boat. Congress in March, 1883, adopted the programme, eliminating only one of the smaller cruisers, and this time voted an appropriation.

The Chicago was the largest of these vessels; the other three were the Boston, Atlanta and Dolphin. They were built of American materials, and were the first vessels of the modern American navy. The Chicago, besides being a twin-screw vessel, had engines which recalled the type installed in the famous Stevens battery. The advocates of the old order adopted with alacrity the role of Job’s comforters, and predicted with as much cheerfulness as the role would allow, the absolute failure of the new vessels. The Chicago’s designed displacement was 4,500 tons, her engines, gave her a sea-speed of fourteen knots, and she was armed with four 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and two 5-inch breech-loading rifled guns. The Atlanta and Boston, each of 3,000 tons displacement and speed of thirteen knots, carried two 8-inch and six 6-inch guns. The Dolphin, of 1,500 tons and fifteen knots, the despatch boat, was given one 6-inch gun. All four vessels had secondary batteries of smaller guns. The three cruisers at their trials attained sixteen knots or over.

Europe, which had treated the American fleets with derision, began to take a tolerant and amused interest in American naval construction when it became known that the new navy had been decided upon. The European powers only mustered eight 16-knot vessels among them, and when three American ships of that speed appeared, Europe became profoundly interested. These ships and the Yorktown, built later, constituted the White Squadron which visited Europe about 1891, and showed the Old World what the New World could do.

The Charleston, the designs for which were purchased abroad, was provided with machinery and boilers supposed to embody the best features of the boilers and machinery of various foreign cruisers, but they had to be altered considerably before she was considered to meet American requirements. She was the first vessel of the new navy to be employed on a warlike service. The supposed filibustering steamer Itata, at the time of the Chilian insurrection in 1891, escaped from the custody of the U.S. marshal at San Diego, and the Charleston was successful in the mission of overtaking her, which she did at Iquique, after steaming 6,000 miles. The Charleston was wrecked off Luzon in 1900.

In 1886 the United States made another extraordinary advance by authorising the construction of the second-class battleship Texas, the armoured cruiser Maine, the protected cruiser Baltimore, the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, and the torpedo boat Cushing. The Texas and the Maine were the first modern armoured cruising ships constructed in the United States. They were decided upon as the result of the knocking to pieces in half an hour of China’s wooden fleet by the French in the Min River, in August, 1884.

The Cushing, besides being the first American steel torpedo boat, was the first American warship driven by quadruple expansion engines. She was named to commemorate the officer who commanded the launch which rammed and broke a protecting boom, and blew up the Albemarle in the Civil War. The Vesuvius should be included rather in the category of freaks or comparative failures, for though her three pneumatic dynamite guns of 10½-inch calibre, designed by Lieut. Zalinski, could each hurl shells containing 200 lb. of dynamite or other high explosive at least a mile, they were soon outclassed by other artillery. These projectiles were thrown by compressed air, and not by explosions of dynamite. The Vesuvius was employed at the blockade of Santiago de Cuba in 1898, where she frightened the Spaniards with her dynamite shells, but did very little actual damage. Her three pneumatic guns projected abreast through the forward part of the deck, some distance aft of the bow, and sloped at an angle of about 45 degrees. The breech of each gun was in the hold, and the supports of the weapons were so connected with the ship itself as to be practically built into it. The guns were therefore fixtures; their elevation was unalterable and when it was desired to discharge them to right or left or to alter the range the whole position of the ship had to be moved. The Texas and Baltimore were also built on designs purchased abroad. With the exception of three vessels acquired just before the war with Spain, all the American ships are entirely the products of American naval science. The first triple-screw warships were the Columbia—a very handsome ship, sometimes called the Gem of the Ocean—and her sister, the Minneapolis. Up to the attack upon the Spaniards in Cuba, the United States had retained a number of monitors, but the experiences of 1898 convinced the naval department that vessels of that class were out of date and unsuitable for modern warfare.

Although the American vessels were built in the United States the compound armour for the turrets had to be imported at first, and it was not for some years that American-made armour was available for the navy. Four battleships were launched in the early ’nineties, and with the Texas comprised the American battleship force in the war with Spain in 1898. The Americans showed their inventiveness in the matter of their warships, and not being content always to follow the lead of other nations, and being convinced that they could not make more or greater mistakes than some European naval architects had perpetrated, produced some remarkable vessels. They were the first to try the superposed turrets, or one turret placed on top of another. The Kearsarge and Kentucky were thus equipped, but the experiment did not give the results anticipated, and was not repeated. But the Americans had shown that the guns of one turret could fire over another turret, and some of the latest and most powerful ships of the super-Dreadnought types have their turrets arranged so that this may be done.

The Maine, really an armoured cruiser, but described as a second-class battleship, was sent to Havana for political reasons in January, 1898, and was blown up at her moorings on the evening of the 15th of the following month, two hundred and sixty-six lives being lost. The explosion was attributed to the Spaniards, but this has been questioned, as an examination of the wreck, completed in the summer of 1911, was stated to have revealed that the cause of the disaster was the explosion of the vessel’s magazines, but a later examination is said to have shown that the explosion was external. War between the two countries was now regarded as inevitable, and both made preparations for the struggle, Spain in that lazy and incompetent fashion which assured her defeat in advance, and the United States with as much thoroughness and care as the time allowed. The resources of the latter country were far superior to those of her opponent, but Spain by no means made the best of what she had. The American naval preparations were well conceived and as well carried out. The most notable exploit in this work was the remarkable voyage of the battleship Oregon from Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, and thence at her utmost speed round Cape Horn to Key West. It was the first time any steam warship had essayed such a feat, and that an American ship should have accomplished it was a feather in the American cap. Two or three foreign-built warships were acquired, but the European powers were friendly to Spain rather than to the United States in the war, and the latter acquired ninety-seven merchant steamers to act as auxiliaries to its fighting fleet, and distributed among them no fewer than five hundred and seventy-six guns in order that they might take part in the fighting if circumstances required.

In the Pacific the American preparations were no less extensive than in the Atlantic. The first of the great naval battles of the war was that of Manila Bay. Admiral Dewey’s flagship was the protected cruiser Olympia, 5,800 tons displacement, launched at San Francisco in 1892, and having four 8-inch and ten 5-inch quick-firers, fourteen 6-pounders and ten smaller guns. With her were the protected cruisers Baltimore 4,600 tons; Raleigh, 3,217 tons; Boston, 3,000 tons; all heavily armed for their size, and a couple of gunboats.

The Spanish naval force consisted of the steel cruiser Reina Cristina, 3,520 tons, built at Ferrol in 1886, and carrying six 6·2-inch Hontoria guns, two 2·7 inch, and three 2·2 inch quick-firers, and ten smaller guns; a wooden cruiser, the Castilla, 3,342 tons, built at Cadiz in 1881, and armed with four 5·9 inch Krupps, and sixteen quick-firers of various sizes; two steel gunboats of English build and 1,045 tons, and some smaller Spanish-built gunboats and a number of torpedo boats. The shore fortifications had also been strengthened by the addition of a few heavy guns.

Though there was not a great deal of difference between the Spanish and American fleets at Manila, according to a comparative statement issued by the American navy department, the difference was on the side of the Americans, but with the land forces as well the advantage on paper lay with the Spaniards. The only instructions to Admiral Dewey were to “capture or destroy” the Spanish fleet. This, as it happened, was not a difficult task, for the Spanish vessels were in a deplorable condition of inefficiency, and the best that the Spanish admiral could do was to get his ships under the protection of the forts and keep them there. Not finding the Spanish ships at Subig Bay, the Americans entered Manila Bay to look for them, heedless of the mines supposed to be strewn about the channel, but choosing a dark night illumined only by the flashes of lightning from the thunder clouds, as though the very elements were desirous of taking part in the coming struggle and were flashing their signals preparatory to the discharge of the sky’s artillery. The American ships showed no light other than that at the stern of each vessel but the last, to enable that behind to follow in line. The defenders sighted them and opened fire, but the ships never paused, firing upon the batteries as they passed. The Spanish admiral, who, conscious of the condition of his ships, knew that his command was doomed before ever a shot had been fired, estimated his available tonnage at 10,111 as against the American 21,410 tons; his h.p. at 11,200, as against 49,290; his guns at seventy-six, as against the American one hundred and sixty-three; but he had a slight superiority in the number of men.

After day broke the Spaniards opened the battle, the batteries of Cavité and Manila starting the firing and being supported by the Spanish vessels. The Concord sent two shells at the Manila battery by way of reply, but the rest of the ships steadily steamed towards the Spanish ships, and it was not until the Olympia was within 5,600 yards of the ships that Dewey gave permission for the Americans to fire.

“You may fire when you’re ready, Gridley,” Admiral Dewey said in his imperturbable way. A second later, and one of the Olympia’s forward guns had answered the Spanish challenge.

The American ships passed parallel to the Spaniards, and one after another concentrated its fire upon the Reina Cristina, the best ship the enemy possessed, and only fired upon the others when the cruiser was out of range. The Spanish admiral essayed to attack the Americans by advancing against them with his one good fighting ship, thinking that possibly at closer quarters he might be able to meet his opponents with a better chance of inflicting damage. For bravery and audacity the feat ranks high in the annals of naval combats. But the chance he hoped for was never allowed him. A shell penetrated the Reina Cristina near the bows and, exploding, set her on fire. Almost at the same time a heavy projectile crashed into her stern and an 8-inch shell entered the hole thus made and exploded, setting her on fire at that end also, and damaging her engines. She retreated under as heavy a fire as a modern warship could withstand and yet keep afloat. Of her crew of four hundred and ninety-three men, but one hundred and sixty, of whom ninety were wounded, answered to the roll call after the battle.

Three times the Americans passed up and down before the Spanish ships, gradually decreasing the range to 2,600 yards. Ship after ship was disabled. Some took refuge behind the Cavité arsenal and were sunk by the Spaniards rather than be allowed to fall into the Americans’ possession. One little iron gunboat, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, whose commander disregarded the Spanish admiral’s orders to sink his ship, with sublime audacity prepared to offer battle to the whole American fleet. The Baltimore, Olympia and Raleigh opened fire upon her. The odds were too great. She fought bravely for a few minutes, but the guns of the assailing cruisers riddled her sides, and her crew left as she listed and sank with her colours flying. The American ships made short work of the shore batteries. The Americans in the battle of Manila Bay had seven men wounded, while the injury to the vessels was trivial. The Spaniards lost ten ships and had three hundred and eighty-one men killed and the wounded numbered hundreds more.

Determined to make no mistakes, the Americans took the Spanish fleet in the Atlantic at its strength on paper, ignoring the rumours of its neglect and inefficiency, and prepared to meet it accordingly. Spain possessed five armoured cruisers and a battleship, which were admitted by the Americans to be equal to America’s six best ships, a few other vessels, and some torpedo boat destroyers. The real state of the Spanish ships is best revealed by Admiral Cervera himself. In one letter he wrote:—

“The Colon has not received her big guns; the Carlos V. has not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artillery is not yet mounted; the Pelayo is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt, and, I believe, her secondary battery; the Victoria has no artillery, and of the Numancia we had better not speak.”[51]

In another letter he complained of the absence of plans and of the supplies he had asked for not being forthcoming. “The Colon has not yet her big guns, and I asked for the bad ones if there were no others. The 14-cm. ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred shots, is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the Colon cannot be recharged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo.... The repairs of the servomotors of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya were only made after they had left Spain.” And after his defeat at Santiago, when asked where were certain large guns which should have been on his ships, he answered that he supposed they were in the pockets of certain officials in Spain.

On May 19th, the Spanish fleet entered Santiago, after having crawled across the Atlantic to Curaçao, much to the relief of the Americans, who wondered where the fleet was and feared lest it should attack New York or some other wealthy Atlantic port. Once the fleet was inside, a strict blockade was maintained to see that it did not get out unnoticed. But the venture had to be made sooner or later.

“The fleet under my command offers the news, as a 4th of July present, of the destruction of the whole of Admiral Cervera’s fleet. Not one escaped.”

This was the message Admiral Sampson despatched on July 3rd to the Secretary of the Navy at Washington.

The situation had become a question of days when the Spanish fleet should find itself exposed to the fire of the American forces ashore. While his ships, in spite of their condition, were yet able to offer fight, Admiral Cervera decided on making a desperate sortie, or attempt to escape. It was the forlornest of forlorn hopes at best, for he had nowhere to flee to with any hope of reaching a place of safety, and turn which way he would, the American ships, well cared for, within easy reach of their base, with almost unlimited supplies, and eager for battle, were waiting for him. The Admiral, in the Cristobal Colon, led the way seaward through the narrow entrance to Santiago Bay, and fled down the coast. The other ships followed as best they could. The Americans sought to ram the Spaniards, but could not do so because of the latter’s superior speed. The fleeing admiral’s ship did succeed in getting away for the time being. The other ships as they appeared were fiercely assailed by the American ships. The Spaniards fought with that gallantry and reckless bravery which have been a prized Spanish tradition for centuries, but their shooting was so indifferent that few of the American ships were hit, some were not touched at all, and only one Spanish shell got home effectively on an American ship. The Americans, on their part, fired to hit, and hit they did. The armour of the Spanish ships proved its value, and rang under the blows like anvils under the strokes of mighty hammers, and the ships shivered and heeled under the force of the impact.

The engagement began about half-past nine in the morning; by two o’clock in the afternoon the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, was run ashore sixty miles down the coast, and Admiral Cervera himself was a prisoner. In the interval the Infanta Maria Teresa, the Oquendo, and the Vizcaya were forced ashore and burnt, blown up, or surrendered, within twenty miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of the port. Cervera’s ship was about two knots faster than the American ships which first assailed it, but it could not hope to escape the other American vessels lying off the coast, nor did it. In respect to fighting power, weight of metal, armour protection, and condition for fighting, the Spanish ships were hopelessly overmatched; and the Spanish guns, whatever may have been their value on paper, were as inferior as the Spanish gunnery. One knows not whether to wonder more at the state of mind of an administration which could send so ill-equipped and neglected a fleet to the seat of war, or at the extraordinary bravery of the crews who went in a patriotic cause to what was little else than certain death. The indifferent shooting which the Spaniards displayed in the Santiago affair, from first to last, prompted Captain (afterwards Admiral) Robley D. Evans, otherwise “Fighting Bob,” to declare that they “couldn’t hit a d——d thing but the ocean” when they missed his ship with unfailing regularity.

When the Cristobal Colon appeared, the Indiana headed close in shore to get within short range. The Spaniard fired her 11-inch Hontoria gun and missed. The American ship replied with her 13-inch guns, and then discharged every weapon she could bring to bear upon her ill-fated antagonist, one shell exploding on the Spanish cruiser’s deck. The Iowa and Texas took up the attack upon the Cristobal Colon; the Indiana joined with the Brooklyn and Texas in smashing the Oquendo, which stranded on fire. The Vizcaya next appeared to run the gauntlet, with two destroyers close behind her. The destroyers tried to torpedo the Indiana, but the American ship’s secondary battery soon accounted for them, one drifting ashore and blowing up. The Vizcaya was set on fire by the American shells, but was fought until she was no longer tenable before she was surrendered. The Eulate was also surrendered. The Cristobal Colon raced with the Brooklyn and Oregon for 3,000 yards, until she struck the rocks bow-on and remained fast.

The destruction in such short spaces of time of the Spanish fleets in the Pacific and then in the Atlantic, with such little injury to the American side, demonstrated most unmistakably the importance and power of the new American navy. A few years later the famous cruise round the world was undertaken by an American fleet, and enabled the powers of the Old World to inspect some of the ships, and others of later date, which wrought such havoc. Yet such has been the progress of naval construction that not one of the ships which made the cruise is now included in the first rank of the American fighting line.

After the Japanese had decided to adopt war vessels of the Western types, they ordered a number of vessels of various kinds from builders in the United Kingdom. Their first ironclad frigate was the Foo-So, launched from the slip in Messrs. Samuda’s yard at Poplar, from which the Thunderbolt, the first ironclad ever built for the British Navy, took the water. Another coincidence was that both the Thunderbolt and the Foo-So were launched with every armour-plate upon them. The Foo-So had as her main deck battery, which was protected by armour 8 inches thick, four Krupp’s long 23-cm. breech-loading guns, each weighing 15¼ tons. On the upper deck were placed two long 17-cm. Krupp guns of 5½ tons each, but these were unprotected. The main deck battery projecting beyond the sides, permitted of a greater training to the guns. She carried a powerful ram, and her bowsprit, as was the custom with all vessels at that time fitted with a ram and bowsprit, was made so that it could be hauled inboard when a ramming attack was to be made. The ship was belted on the water-line with 9-inch armour and the vital parts were equally well protected. She was of 3,700 tons displacement, and fitted with trunk engines of 3,500 h.p. which, with a steam pressure of 60 lb., were calculated to give her a speed of fourteen knots; her coal capacity was expected to enable her to cover 4,500 miles at moderate speed. The first warship on Western lines which the Japanese built was a little barque-rigged vessel, the Seika, launched in 1875, a model of which is now (1911) in the Museum at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich.

The naval engagements in the Chino-Japanese war were not remarkable for much in the way of fighting, but chiefly for a pronounced objection by the Chinese officers as a whole to anything of the sort. A few of them, Admiral Ting among the number, did their best, but they were so hindered by their colleagues’ incompetence and cowardice that they never had a chance of success. Guns that had been neglected, and shells from which the powder had been extracted and its place filled with charcoal, are not the best weapons for warfare, and when to these are added coal that was not much use and ships that were not in fighting condition, it will be seen that the victory of the well-organised Japanese was a foregone conclusion. One or two of the Chinese ships offered the best resistance they could, but it was a hopeless resistance from the start. The Battle of the Yalu was won by the Japanese before a shot was fired. The few survivors of the Yalu fell victims at Wei-Hai-Wei. The training which a cavalry officer received in the Chinese army was not such as to fit him to command a fleet at sea, even of Chinese ships, but the former cavalryman who became commander of the Chinese fleet tried his utmost; his personal bravery was unquestioned, and he had preferred death to dishonour when he was found lifeless in the cabin of his beaten ship with a revolver by his side and a bullet through his brain.

Disciplinarian he was not. It is recorded that like most Chinamen he was an inveterate gambler, and that on one occasion when the fleet, as usual, was doing nothing, he found the time heavy on his hands, and when a visitor went on board the sentries were engaged in fan-tan in a secluded corner of the deck, the officers who should have been on duty were similarly engaged elsewhere, and the admiral himself was acting banker in that charming game with one or two other officers, and the sentry, who should have been on duty at the door of the admiral’s cabin, joining whole-heartedly in the gamble.

Of China’s principal battleships, two fine vessels of 7,400 tons displacement, one the Chen-Yuen, surrendered at Wei-Hai-Wei, and having been repaired, was taken to Japan and added to the navy of her captors, and the other was sunk by a Whitehead torpedo during a night attack by torpedo boats at Wei-Hai-Wei. Similar fates befell a couple of armoured cruisers, and of the six smaller cruisers which completed China’s fleet at the Battle of the Yalu, five were sunk or wrecked, and one surrendered. One was raised and added to the Japanese navy. Some of the ships of which China was despoiled distinguished themselves in the Japanese attack upon the Russians at the Battle of Tsushima.

The Battle of Tsushima, which ended Russia’s naval pretensions in the war between that country and Japan a few years ago, is the only one in which modern ships and guns have been employed on both sides in anything approximating to equal terms. After the Russian squadron already in the Far East had suffered so severely at Port Arthur and the few vessels at Vladivostok deemed it advisable to stay there, Russia collected as many sea-going war vessels of all shapes and sizes as she could muster, and sent them out in two detachments from Europe in the hope that they would reach Vladivostok, Japan permitting. The voyage was exciting enough at the start when, through a bad attack of nerves, the Russians opened fire upon and damaged one or two British trawlers in the North Sea under the delusion that they were Japanese torpedo boats advancing to attack them. Loud was the outcry in Great Britain and great was the clamour that the British fleet should make short work of the Russian ships before they did any more damage. But the Government saved its powder and money and put its trust in the Japanese, confident that the Mikado’s ships would do all that was necessary if the imaginative Russians ever got that far. The Russian ships were very slow, the best speed of which the fleet was capable was nine knots, and as the Russians themselves estimated the Japanese speed at sixteen knots, and this estimate was endorsed by the naval experts, it was taken for granted that the Russian fleet was going out to certain disaster.

The progress of this heterogeneous fleet was a matter of some months, but at last it approached the Japanese coast, off which the ships of the Mikado’s fleet were waiting. The Japanese vessels, being of superior speed, were able to choose their own position for the attack. No innovations in the way of tactics were attempted. When the Japanese were ready they attacked, and they selected a moment for doing so when the slow-moving Russian ships were attempting to carry out an order of their admiral and were, in consequence of the order being incompletely executed, unable to offer a resistance to the suddenness of the attack. This very suddenness, indeed, threw them into greater disorder, and rendered them the more easily assailable by their relentless antagonists.

The Russian ships, too, were so overloaded with stores and coal that the upper edges of their heavy armour-plates were well below the water-line and, therefore, in so far as the hull protection was concerned, they were armoured cruisers and not battleships. The cabins, passages, etc., were so filled with coal that the sanitary arrangements for the men were blocked in some of the ships since leaving Leghorn, and the decks were in consequence in an indescribable condition.[52]

The Russian ships are said to have rolled very heavily owing to their having so much coal on board, and to the circumstance that their bunker coals were used before their extra supplies carried on their decks were consumed. However, the Russians fought their ships with the utmost bravery and determination, but the superior training of the Japanese sailors and their better gunnery told its tale, and in less than a couple of hours the Russian fleet was hopelessly defeated.

Admiral Togo, according to Lieut.-Commander W. S. Simms, must have gone into action with two principal objects clearly defined in his mind. One was to fight at the maximum range at which actual experience of battle practice had shown him that he could hit effectively, viz. about 6,000 yards, and at which he knew the Russian fire would not be dangerous; and the other was to manœuvre so as to maintain as exactly as possible that range upon the head of the enemy’s column. If he had not been able to accomplish these two objects, says the American authority, he might still have won the battle because of the Russian inferiority in many other respects, but the Japanese fleet would certainly have suffered more. If the Russians had been able by superior speed to run into 1,800 yards range, the battle range of their choice, they would have made a large percentage of hits, and those hits would have been very effective, especially from their modern ships of French design, the Suvaroff, Alexander III., Borodino, and Orel.

The Japanese at first scored three hits to every one they received, and as the battle progressed and their men became more used to their work their hits averaged four to every one the Russians could manage to inflict on them. The accuracy of shooting at a greater distance than was formerly thought possible in an engagement showed the necessity of cultivating this branch of naval gunnery, and its value was demonstrated when the Japanese were able to concentrate the rapid fire of their best battleships upon the leading vessels of the Russian columns at such a range that the Russian fire was ineffective and wide of its intended mark.

Most of the Japanese big guns had lengths equal to thirty-five or forty times their calibres, and had already seen a great deal of hard work. This to a great extent may account for the Japanese not having hit oftener. The Japanese shooting in the later naval stages of the war, as compared with that in the naval attack on Port Arthur when the Russian squadron already in Far Eastern waters was crushed, is said to have shown a slight falling off.

The value of superior speed, of accurate long range firing, and of protective armour is the principal lesson of the Battle of Tsushima. The one gives choice of position and all its attendant advantages; the second enables an enemy to be partially crippled so that he can be attacked by torpedo boats and sunk or rendered helpless, or can be overtaken and assailed by a fast cruiser if an attempt be made to escape. The battle also demonstrated the value of uniformity in speed of the principal ships, or ships of the line, for the Japanese admiral, knowing that his six battleships had each a speed of about twenty knots, knew exactly the positions he could expect each one to maintain. He had also a number of first and second-class armoured cruisers, and his scouts were reinforced by some of the best vessels in the Japanese mercantile marine.

The actual fighting resulted in the Osliabya being driven out of the fighting line in less than thirty minutes after the battle began, and in about an hour after the first shot, the gun-fire to which she had been subjected had set her on fire and caused her to founder. The Kniaz Suvaroff was obliged to leave the fighting line about forty minutes after the battle commenced, both these ships being rendered ineffective before the Russians had travelled five miles. Becoming isolated from her consorts, the Suvaroff was severely pounded. One of her masts and her two funnels were shot away, and a couple of torpedo boats attacked her and injured her below the water-line, so that she soon had a heavy list, but her watertight bulkheads kept her afloat for a time. Two Japanese destroyers then took charge of her and torpedoed her three times, inflicting such injuries that she soon went down. Shortly before this the Borodino received a shell in her magazine, which blew up and sent her to the bottom. The Orel surrendered after the battle, and presented an excellent object lesson of the service her armour had rendered her, for her partially protected and unprotected parts were wrecked by the Japanese gun-fire, but not one of the shells had penetrated her heavy armour, though it bore ample evidence of the severity of the ordeal through which she had passed.

Enough has been written to show that the range at which naval engagements have been fought since steel took the place of iron for guns and armour has steadily increased. The old practice of getting close to an enemy and blazing away as fast as the guns could be loaded, in the hope of smothering his fire and a certainty of hitting something sometimes, has become as extinct as the dodo. Guns are too powerful for anything of the sort to be attempted now, and the object at present is to hit at the longest range at which the guns are considered really effective.

The Dreadnought is the logical outcome.