The Stupendous Cost of Armaments.—Although the people of the United States dislike war and desire peace the national government is now spending about $750,000,000 every year to maintain the country’s military and naval forces. Seven dollars per head of population is our annual contribution for national defence. The people of the United States are spending far more on national defence, on payments for past wars, and on preparations for wars of the future, than they are expending upon all branches of civil government. The cost of a single battleship is greater than that of all the school buildings in a state like Ohio or California. And this does not reckon the loss caused by the withdrawal of more than two hundred thousand able-bodied young men from the farms and factories. Why is it necessary to support armies and navies? The leading nations of the world, at the Washington conference of 1921-1922, reached an agreement for the reduction of naval armaments. Would it not be practicable for the world to abolish armies and navies altogether? We have all heard the arguments of the pacifists to the effect that great armaments are not necessary, that they are in fact an encouragement to war, and that they merely impose upon the people a grievous burden in taxes without any substantial advantage in return.^[269]

Let us first look at this problem from a different angle, close at home. We spend large sums of money in all American cities for the maintenance of police, police courts, and prisons. Why do we do it? If people would only obey the laws, respect the rights of others, and refrain from interfering with their neighbors, there would be no need for these armed guardians of the law. The trouble is, however, that without police and prisons we would have disorder, injustice, and oppression. A community certainly would not promote the cause of law and order by leaving itself helpless against those who set out to do wrong. Now the army and the navy are our police writ large. They are, against wrong-doing from without, what the police are against wrong-doing from within—a measure of protection and security.

Defence is an Essential Function of Government.—Many years ago one of the Fathers of the American Republic, James Madison, stated this point in a single sentence. “Security against foreign danger”, he wrote, “is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed object of the American union.” We set great value in this democracy on the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”, but no people can be secure in their rights to any of these things so long as they permit themselves to remain defenceless against the assaults of their enemies. When one citizen injures another there are courts to render justice. But when one nation treats another unjustly the injured country has no such redress; it must depend upon its own strength to assert its rights. The impulse to self-defence is deeply implanted in human nature. A man’s first care is to defend himself and those dearest to him. So a nation’s first care should be for the safety of those within its borders. A country that is not ready and able to protect its own citizens can scarcely be said to deserve their patriotism. Fear God and take your own part! is a good motto.^[270] A man who cannot take his own part, when occasion demands, is a weakness in any community, for his impotence is an encouragement to wrongdoers. The same applies to nations. A country that cannot defend itself against external injustice puts a premium on aggression.^[271] The day may come when, as it is written in the Scriptures, “nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more”; but until that long-looked-for time arrives it is the duty of every land to make sure that its territories shall not be invaded with impunity. Wanton or unjust war is an abhorrent evil, and even a just war of self-defence brings immeasurable suffering. The permanent avoidance of war is assuredly a goal which human effort should strive by some means or other to attain.

National Defence and Militarism.—It is often said that armaments lead to militarism and the encouragement of a warlike spirit among the people, and that the nation which keeps a sharp sword is always under a temptation to unsheathe it. The history of European nations proves that there is a measure of truth in this assertion. Huge armies are not merely an economic burden, a source of enormous expense; but they create suspicion and distrust among a nation’s neighbors. During the fifty years preceding 1914 the various countries of Europe kept each other’s tempers constantly on edge by reason of their being armed to the teeth. The standing armies of Germany, Austria, Russia, France, and Italy prior to the outbreak of the World War totalled nearly two million men. These men had to be fed, clothed, and supported by the labor of those who were not in the military service. How much better it would have been if most of them had spent their time behind the plough!

The Causes of War.—Intelligent people everywhere are agreed that war is the greatest curse of humanity and that some means of prevention must be found. If the world, within the next generation, should have the misfortune to engage in another titanic conflict like the last, it will not much matter who wins. Victor and vanquished will alike go down in a welter of blood and chaos. There is no difference of opinion among thoughtful men of all nations on this point. So far as the desirability of permanently avoiding war is concerned, there is entire agreement between pacifists and other people. But how is war to be permanently avoided? One way, and probably the only effective way, is to remove the causes of war.

In past years a great many different things have drawn nations into war. Greed for territory has been a prolific cause of armed conflict during many centuries. Governments, like individuals, often violate the tenth commandment and covet the possessions of their neighbors. Rivalry in trade sometimes leads to ill-feeling, suspicion, and in the end to hostilities. The press, or certain sections of it, is sometimes given to fomenting this bad feeling and so are politicians occasionally. The misgovernment of a helpless people has at times led to outside intervention on their behalf, as when the United States in 1898 interposed to terminate Spanish oppression in Cuba. Alliances among nations, particularly secret alliances, have aroused jealousy to a point where some relatively minor mishap sufficed to send armies forth to battle. In the case of the World War the murder of an Austrian archduke at Serajevo was the match which set Europe aflame; but it was not the underlying cause of the conflict. The real causes are to be found in the rivalry, the jealousies, and the militarism which turned Europe into a huge armed camp during the years preceding 1914.

There is no reason why nations should be natural enemies. Like men they can live together in amity if, like men, they learn to secure respect for their own rights by respecting the rights of others. Up to a certain point rivalry between different countries makes for progress, but when rivalry engenders bitterness it becomes a menace to peace. A large part of the mutual suspicion which exists among governments would be obliterated if secret diplomacy were abolished and the burden of great armaments removed.

The Regular Army of the United States.—Until these causes of war are permanently removed by some agreement among the nations of the world no country can venture to give up reasonable measures for its own defence. For military protection the United States relies first of all upon the regular army. In proportion to the total population of the country this army has never been large in time of peace. The policy of the United States has always been to maintain a standing army of very moderate size and to depend, in emergencies, upon the assistance of units raised from among the able-bodied men of the civilian population.^[272] |How the regular army is organized.| The size of the regular army is fixed from time to time by Congress; it is always recruited by voluntary enlistment and has never contained any regiments raised by conscription. Enlistments are for a term of years, at the end of which time an honorable discharge is given if the soldier has served faithfully. The regular army is completely and at all times under the control of the War Department; its officers are appointed by the President as commander-in-chief; its discipline is regulated by federal law and its entire cost of maintenance is borne by the national government.

The National Guard.—But the military forces of the United States do not consist of the regular army alone. Each state maintains a militia in which every able-bodied citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five is under obligation to serve when called upon. The effective portion of this militia, however, consists of organized units known as the national guard. In time of peace the national guard is under the control of the states, the governor in each state being its commander-in-chief; but Congress has authority to provide for the arming and disciplining of this force so that it may be serviceable in time of war. The present regulations relating to the size, organization, arming, and disciplining of the national guard were framed by Congress in 1916. Its officers, in time of peace, are appointed in each state by the governor; but the national government furnishes the arms and equipment besides giving an annual money grant to each state. The national guard, like the regular army, is recruited by voluntary enlistment. In time of war or other emergency it may be called into the service of the federal government and then becomes, for all practical purposes, an integral part of the United States army.^[273]

The Volunteers.—During practically all the wars in which the United States was engaged prior to 1917 a call was made for volunteers. In the Civil War more than a million soldiers were brought to the colors in response to the six successive calls which President Lincoln issued. But recruits did not always come readily and it was necessary on occasions to offer bounties or money grants to all who would volunteer. During the war with Spain in 1898 volunteers were again called for, and many regiments were raised in this way, notably the First Volunteer Cavalry, better known as the Rough Riders.^[274] The serious defect of an army raised in this way is that no one can foretell the number of men who will respond. The volunteer system, moreover, rests upon the idea that military service is an optional, not a universal duty, on the part of citizens.

The National Army.—When the United States entered the World War in 1917 it was realized that a sufficient military force could not be obtained by using the regular army, by ordering out the national guard, or by calling for volunteers. So, on May 18, 1917, Congress passed the Selective Service Act which authorized the President to summon all male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one to be registered. It further provided that the President should call into service (subject to certain exemptions made in the act and in accordance with regulations which he might frame) a sufficient number of men to form a national army. |How the draft was applied.| The first registration took place in June, 1917, and immediately thereafter the local draft boards, under the supervision of the Provost-Marshal-General, selected the persons who were called into service. In due course it was found advisable to classify all the registrants and to summon, first of all, unmarried men without dependents who were not engaged in any essential occupation. In the summer of 1918 an extension of the age limit was authorized by Congress, to include all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; but it did not prove necessary to call into service any considerable number of men from among these later registrants. The classification of the men, the physical examinations, and the order in which men were called to the colors were all provided for in the body of rules known as the Selective Service Regulations.

The men drafted under these regulations were sent to military camps or cantonments located in different parts of the country. There they were organized into military units, equipped, and trained. As soon as each division had completed its preliminary training it was sent to Europe. Forty divisions of the national army, mobilized in this way, were in Europe before the armistice was signed. These, with the non-combatant troops, made up a total of about two million men. |The American army in the war.| In the spring of 1918, when the last great German drive against the French and British armies took place, there were only half a million American troops in Europe. The need for more was urgent and America was asked to hurry. By almost superhuman effort great bodies of troops were rushed from the camps to the Atlantic ports and sent across the water during the summer at the rate of more than two hundred thousand men a month. When the final united assault of the Allied armies carried them through the German lines in the autumn the strength of the American forces contributed decisively to the ultimate victory. The speed with which America drew a great army from the ranks of her citizenship, trained it, sent it overseas, used it to turn the scale, and brought it home again—these things made a profound impression upon the whole world.

The Control of the Army in War.—According to the constitution of the United States the power to declare war rests with Congress. The usual method of declaring war is the passage of a resolution by both houses of Congress, signed by the President. War may begin, however, without a formal declaration on either side. It may begin by an act of war, an attack by one nation upon another, or by one section of a country upon another. The Civil War began with the firing upon Fort Sumter; there was no declaration of war by either side. Once war is declared the movements of the army depend upon the discretion of the President. He appoints the officers who command it and has the final decision as regards the course of military operations. Congress votes the money for carrying on a war, but the President directs the spending of it. Congress determines the size and character of the army, but as commander-in-chief the President controls all its operations in the field.^[275] This division of functions might possibly lead to friction and even to disaster if Congress and the President did not work in harmony, but on the whole the two branches of the government have always shown a spirit of co-operation in war-time.

The Use of Armed Forces in Time of Peace.—In time of peace the regular army and the national guard may be used under certain conditions to put down riot or disorder. The President has the right to use United States troops within the limits of any state in order to enforce the national laws, to facilitate the carrying of the mails, or to maintain any other function of the national government. This he may do without the invitation or permission of the state government, or even against the wishes of the state authorities. In 1894 when a railway strike in Chicago interfered with the free passage of mails, President Cleveland sent a detachment of regular troops to the state of Illinois and cleared the way. The Supreme Court held that he was within his rights. If a state is invaded, the President may also act on his own volition; but when internal disorders occur, it is the primary function of the state authorities to suppress them. The governor is vested with authority to call out the national guard for this purpose. Federal troops cannot be sent in such cases except upon the request of the state authorities, unless, of course, the disorders reach a point where they obstruct the national government in the performance of its functions. In any event, troops are not called out for active service in time of peace save under conditions of serious emergency. Soldiers are not well qualified to handle ordinary disturbances; they have not been trained for that purpose and their presence is likely to make mild disturbances more serious. Bodies of state constabulary, like those maintained in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, are better adapted to use in such situations.

Military Law.—The citizen, under normal conditions, is subject only to the law of the land. But the soldier (and this term includes officers) is subject not only to the ordinary laws but to a special code of military law the provisions of which are embodied in the Articles of War and are administered by courts-martial. The Articles of War are enacted by Congress, and anyone entering the army, whether as a commissioned officer or an enlisted man, becomes subject to their provisions both in time of war and in time of peace. These articles deal with such matters as desertion, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, absence without leave, the wrongful use of military equipment, and kindred military offences.

Military law is not enforced by the ordinary courts but by special courts known as courts-martial, which are composed of army officers.^[276] Punishment may be inflicted in the form of dishonorable discharge from the army, or imprisonment—even the death penalty may be imposed in extreme cases during war. The accused person has the right to have his own counsel and the customary rules of evidence are followed, as in the civil courts.

Martial Law.—Military law and martial law are often confused with each other, but they are in fact wholly different. Martial law is the entire legal administration which is applied to any area of conflict or insurrection by order of Congress, or by the President in case such action is urgently needed before action by Congress can be taken. It is not proclaimed except in case of invasion, insurrection, or civil or foreign war, and then only in districts where the ordinary laws and courts prove themselves unable to secure the public safety.

When martial law is proclaimed in any district the ordinary laws cease to function there. The orders of the commanding military officer take the place of the laws. Special military tribunals are usually appointed to enforce these orders; but if practicable, the ordinary courts may be retained. Martial law applies to everybody within the district, soldiers and civilians alike. The commanding officer issues his orders and, whatever they are, they must be implicitly obeyed. He may order, for example, that there shall be no public gatherings, no traffic in the streets after nightfall, and no keeping of weapons in private houses. He may require every inhabitant to carry a pass signed by the military authorities. There is no definite code of martial law; the will of the commanding officer is supreme so long as the citizen is not deprived of his rights as guaranteed by the constitution of the United States. This constitution, however, is the supreme law of the land and not even the army can disregard it. Martial law is never proclaimed except in urgent circumstances when it appears to be the only way of securing public order and protecting property. During the Civil War it was administered in some sections of the South which were occupied by the Northern armies.^[277]

The Navy.—The navy is commonly called the “first line” of the national defence inasmuch as the most vulnerable boundaries of the United States extend along two great seacoasts.^[278] Like the army its organization is under the jurisdiction of Congress, which appropriates the money for its maintenance; but the President is also the commander-in-chief of the navy and is responsible for directing its operations. In this he is assisted by the Secretary of the Navy who in turn is advised by a staff of naval officers. Men are enlisted in the navy, and officers are commissioned as in the army, but with different ratings and ranks. |Administration of the navy.| The navy also has its code corresponding to the Articles of War and its system of courts-martial. The Marine Corps, which in organization, drill, and discipline, is really a military organization, comes under the control of the Secretary of the Navy because it is primarily intended to furnish a landing force after attack. The marine, as Kipling says, is “a soldier and sailor too”. In connection with the work of the navy mention should also be made of the coast defences which are located at points where they may serve to protect the commercial seaports. These consist of concealed land batteries, floating batteries, channels guarded by mines, submarines, and naval airplanes.

The Problem of Disarmament.—Is there any reasonable ground for the hope that the burden of maintaining an army and navy may be reduced at some time in the near future? Proposals for a general disarmament by international agreement have been put forth at various times for a hundred years or more. Following the long Napoleonic Wars which exhausted the chief countries of Europe, the Czar of Russia suggested that the nations should agree to place a limit upon their respective armaments. But nothing came of this proposal, and although the question of disarmament was discussed during the next three-quarters of a century in unofficial circles no concrete plan for an international conference on the matter was formulated until 1898, when Russia once more brought to the attention of the other European powers the urgent desirability of considering some effective measures for disarmament.

As a direct result of this action delegates appointed by all the leading governments of the world assembled at the Hague in the following year and discussed the possible methods of securing international disarmament. A resolution was adopted affirming the desirability of such action but no definite plan was formulated. A second Hague Conference was held eight years later but it likewise managed to procure no definite promises of disarmament because Germany refused to enter into any such agreement, believing that more could be gained by war than by disarming. So the feverish activity in preparations for war continued until the great world conflict began. In the negotiations which took place at the close of this war it was generally agreed that a reduction of armaments on the part of all countries should begin at the earliest practicable moment, but the disordered state of affairs in several European countries, notably in Russia, delayed any important steps in that direction. This led President Harding, in the summer of 1921, to propose that the chief naval powers should send delegates to a conference at Washington in order that some plan of limiting naval expansion might be prepared.

This conference assembled in the autumn of 1921 and at once proceeded to consider a proposal, made on behalf of the United States, that a fixed tonnage of capital ships agreed upon and that this limit should not be exceeded during the next ten years. With some slight amendments the American proposal was ultimately accepted and embodied in an international treaty. The conference also framed agreements for the future limitation of submarine warfare, the prohibition of poison gas in war, and the restriction of fortifications in the Pacific regions. No action was taken towards the limitation of armies.^[279]

Universal Military Training.—If the leading nations do not agree upon a plan of general disarmament, is it desirable that the United States should adopt a system of universal military training? There is a popular aversion to the maintenance of a large regular army. On the other hand it would be folly to permit the United States to stand unprepared if other nations go on arming themselves as in the years preceding the World War. |The Swiss plan.| The suggestion has been made that we could avoid the necessity of maintaining a large regular army and yet secure the advantages of military preparedness by adopting the plan used in Switzerland where every able-bodied young man is required to undergo a short period of military training. This training would be taken at some convenient time between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one; it would last from three to six months. The claim is made that this training would have educational as well as military value and that it would conduce to the physical upbuilding of American manhood. In opposition to the plan of universal military training it is contended that anything of this sort would involve a great waste of energy, would withdraw large numbers of young men from productive labor, would foster militarism, and would involve enormous expense.

What is Real Preparedness?—Under present-day conditions one must recognize that preparedness for war does not consist in merely training men to march and shoot. No war is ever like any previous war. No amount of human ingenuity or foresight can avail to train men for “the next war”, because nobody knows where, when, or how the next war is going to be fought. The Civil War was fought in the open; it was a war of movement. The World War was fought, for the most part, in trenches; it was a war of positions. In the Civil War, cavalry played an important part; in the World War cavalry had very little share. Artillery was the great factor. For example, it has been estimated that all the artillery ammunition used during three whole days at the battle of Gettysburg would have lasted the American artillery just about thirty minutes in one of the Argonne battles! New weapons and devices are brought forth in every new conflict, and they greatly change the conditions of warfare. The great European struggle utilized the airplane, poison gas, incendiary bombs, gas shells, hand grenades, liquid flame, tanks, wireless telegraphy, wireless telephony, dirigible balloons, submarines, seaplanes, and artillery with a range of over fifty miles—none of these things figured in any previous war.

It has been predicted that the next war will be fought, for the most part, in the air and under the sea; that the entire populations of great cities may be wiped out during a few days by a deluge of poisonous gas-bombs hurled from the sky;^[280] that science under the pressure of war emergency will discover some form of lethal ray (we have X-rays, light rays, heat rays,—why not rays of a deadlier sort?) which will be shot from the clouds to shrivel and poison human beings by the thousands; that disease germs will be called into service to spread pestilence among the people;—all these things have been soberly predicted as likely to feature the next great conflict if one ever comes.^[281]

Progress in science and in the arts completely changes the methods of warfare in one generation after another, If General Hooker had possessed a single airplane, you may be sure that “Stonewall” Jackson would never have slipped around his flank at Chancellorsville. A squadron of “tanks”, if the Army of the Potomac had been provided with them in 1863, would probably have cleared the road to Richmond within a week. Who can tell what weapons, appliances, and tactics the nations will need for use in the next war, if another war should ever come? Preparations of a strictly military sort are essential, to be sure, but it is not wise to place entire reliance upon an army which is trained to use certain tactics in a prescribed way. That, of itself, does not constitute true “preparedness”.

Three words sum up the reasons for the Allied victory in the World War; these words are men, munitions, and morale. France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy had civilian reserves to draw upon. They had great peace-time industries which they converted into munition factories. Above all things the moral strength and steadfastness of free peoples counted in the long struggle against autocracy. |What real “preparedness” means.| The lesson to be drawn from this is that if a country builds up a vigorous manhood, both physically and mentally; if it creates great, varied, and well-managed industries; if it fosters patriotism and a sense of righteousness through its system of public education; if it cultivates intelligently all the progressive arts of peace—if a nation does all these things, it is accomplishing real preparedness for whatever may come. Great wars are won, paradoxical as it may sound, in times of peace.

The War-Time Powers of Government.—There is an ancient Latin maxim: inter arma silent leges. It means that under the stress of armed conflict the ordinary laws give way. In the United States this maxim does not strictly apply; the constitutional rights of the citizen remain intact and the ordinary laws of the land continue to apply in war-time. Nevertheless it is true that a state of war requires strict vigilance on the part of the government and this may lead it to impose upon individual freedom various restrictions which would not be imposed in time of peace. |Limitations on civic liberty during wars.| During the World War, for example, the national government laid certain restrictions upon the consumption of food, the use of coal, and the manufacture of luxuries. This it did under its constitutional authority “to raise and support armies”. |The Espionage and Sedition Acts.| Congress also passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts which provided penalties for making or circulating false statements with intent to injure the United States or using “abusive language about the government or institutions of the country”. By these laws, in brief, it was made a crime to favor the cause of the enemy by any word or act. In some quarters this legislation was regarded as an unwarranted interference with freedom of speech but on the whole it was a justifiable war-time precaution. Those who found their personal freedom restricted by the Espionage and Sedition Acts suffered very little hardship compared with that borne by the soldiers and sailors who went into active service.

Freedom of Speech in War-Time.—During the World War there was considerable complaint in some quarters because the national government placed certain limitations upon freedom of speech, and a good deal of discussion arose as to what freedom of speech really means. The issue is one which cannot be argued in general terms, for it is not a question of principle but of practical policy. On the one hand it is generally agreed that men ought to have all reasonable liberty to express their own thoughts in their own way; on the other hand it is just as fully agreed that people must not be allowed to go about preaching treason, uttering slanders, and by word of mouth infringing the rights of others. The question, then, is not whether we should grant freedom of speech or deny it; but how much of it we should grant or deny.

In a democracy the presumption should be in favor of freedom. It should be curtailed no further than is clearly demanded by the general interest. Just where that point comes is something that cannot be fixed by any general rule. In time of peace, for example, we may safely permit a greater freedom of speech than in time of war. We may rightly allow a citizen, whose loyalty is not in doubt, a greater latitude than a foreigner who professes his hatred of the United States. The problem is an exceedingly difficult one and the courts may at times do injustice in dealing with outspoken persons; but the nation in its sober senses is not likely to let the fundamental right of free speech be permanently restricted beyond a reasonable point.^[282]

Mobilizing the Economic Forces.—In order to ensure victory it also becomes necessary to mobilize all the economic forces of a country, the industries, the means of transport, and even the professional skill. During the years 1917-18 the government of the United States established a War Industries Board whose function it was to supervise and speed up industrial production; likewise a Food Administration, a Fuel Administration, a War Labor Board, a Censorship Board, a Committee on Public Information, a War Finance Corporation, an Alien Property Custodian, and various other war-time authorities with duties which are in a general way indicated by their titles. Both the work and the authority of a government enlarge under the stress of war.

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War’s Aftermath.—War is waste. It destroys life and property, uses up the accumulated wealth of nations, and saddles them with huge debts which future generations have to pay. The cost of a war can never be reckoned in full until long after the treaty of peace has been signed. The Civil War came to an end more than fifty years ago, but we are still paying more than two hundred million dollars per annum in pensions to veterans of that struggle or to their widows. The number of Civil War pensioners and their widows now on the roll is more than five hundred thousand. It was not until 1906 that the last surviving widow of a veteran of the Revolutionary War died. The burden of pensions growing out of the World War is just beginning to accumulate; the country will not feel its full weight for many years to come. A generation born after this war ended will be required to defray its cost. War also leaves, as its tragic aftermath, large numbers of wounded, disabled, or invalided soldiers who must be cared for at the public expense. No nation which values its own honor can afford to leave its veterans unaided in suffering and want. In the United States we have made provision for affording medical care to those soldiers of the World War who require it and for giving vocational education to those partially disabled men who need it in order to fit them for success in life.

C. A. Beard, American Government and Politics, pp. 342-357; Ibid., Readings in American Government and Politics, pp. 308-322;

Everett Kimball, National Government of the United States, pp. 423-444;

W. B. Munro, The Government of the United States, pp. 265-276;

A. B. Hart, Actual Government, pp. 459-480;

P. S. Reinsch, Readings in American Federal Government, pp. 610-650;

Edward F. Allen and Raymond Fosdick, Keeping Our Fighters Fit, passim;

B. A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, passim;

R. M. Johnston, Leading American Soldiers, especially pp. 3-65;

E. H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service, pp. 59-92;

R. R. McCormick, The Army of 1918, pp. 207-243.

1. In what ways did the World War differ from previous wars? What predictions have been made concerning the weapons and tactics of the next war? How can preparedness best be made for such a war? References: J. F. Rhodes, History of the Civil War, pp. 1-46; B. Crowell and R. F. Wilson, How America Went to War, Vol. I, pp. 3-14; Will Irwin, The Next War, pp. 33-66; Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, passim; Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, passim; Baron Horff von Dewitz, War’s New Weapons, pp. 5-48; W. L. McPherson, The Strategy of the Great War, pp. 80-118; D. W. Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, pp. 1-40.

2. How can the causes of war be removed? Should we have international disarmament? References: G. L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us, pp. 166-186; H. M. Kallen, The Structure of Lasting Peace, pp. 141-187; A. T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, pp. 15-35; F. W. Holls, The Peace Conference at The Hague, pp. 66-92; J. B. Scott, The Status of the International Court of Justice, pp. 1-30; John Bakeless, The Economic Causes of Modern Wars, pp. 177-195.

3. The National Army of 1917-1918: how it was raised, trained, and used. References: E. H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service, pp. 115-175; Selective Service Regulations (revised edition), pp. 1-30; R. B. Perry, The Plattsburg Movement, pp. 173-214; Leonard P. Ayres, The War with Germany, pp. 13-48; R. R. McCormick, The Army of 1918, pp. 1-57.

1. The War Department. John A. Fairlie, National Administration, pp. 133-151.

2. The war powers of the President and Congress. Cyclopedia of American Government, Vol. III, pp. 646-648; G. Glenn, The Army and the Law, passim.

3. The growth of the navy. G. R. Clark, History of the United States Navy, pp. 406-444; E. S. Maclay, History of the United States Navy, Vol. III, pp. 11-36.

4. Great American soldiers. R. M. Johnston, Leading American Soldiers, pp. 137-192 (Grant); 256-310 (Lee).

5. The Grand Army of the Republic. W. H. Ward, Records of Members of the Grand Army of the Republic, pp. 5-15.

6. The American Legion. G. S. Wheat, The Story of the American Legion, pp. 12-30; 193-211.

7. How the nation mobilized in 1917-1918. P. L. Haworth, The United States in Our Own Time, pp. 422-440.

8. Military law, martial law, and military government. Everett Kimball, National Government of the United States, pp. 434-444.

9. The human cost of the war. Homer Folks, The Human Costs of the War, pp. 119-167.

10. The use of regular troops in labor troubles. Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 79-117.

11. The Hague Conferences. F. W. Holls, The Peace Conferences at The Hague, pp. 1-35; J. H. Choate, The Two Hague Conferences, passim.

12. The United States Food Administration. 1917-1918. W. F. Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time, pp. 258-292.

13. How the National Army was drafted. E. H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service, pp. 115-175; see also Second Report of the Provost Marshal General (1918).

14. Military pensions. John A. Fairlie, National Administration, pp. 205-208; W. H. Glasson, History of Military Pension Legislation, pp. 70-107.

15. Freedom of speech in war time. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech, passim.