The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question: What are the relations of the United States to the rest of the world?

The Old Policy of Isolation.—For more than one hundred years it was the settled policy of the United States to keep aloof from all entanglements in the affairs of the rest of the world. |The doctrines of Washington and Jefferson.| This tradition of aloofness was given a definite form by Washington, who solemnly warned his countrymen against getting mixed up in the “ordinary” conflicts of European states, and it was subsequently endorsed by Jefferson.^[296] Yet even in Jefferson’s own administration it became apparent that if the United States intended to carry on trade with all parts of the world, the government must intervene for the protection of its own citizens whenever this should become necessary. So, in 1803, the American fleet was sent to the Mediterranean, where it bombarded a nest of pirates who had been interfering with American commerce. Then came the War of 1812, which grew out of foreign interference with American trade. On several subsequent occasions during the nineteenth century the policy of protecting and promoting foreign trade drew the United States into negotiations with various countries of Europe and Asia. In a sense, therefore, the United States has never pursued a policy of complete isolation; on the other hand no permanent alliances have been made with any country, and the principle of independence in all matters of foreign policy has been consistently maintained. So far as diplomatic matters did not directly concern North, Central, or South America, the statesmen of the world could safely leave the United States out of their reckonings during the greater part of the nineteenth century. In diplomacy the United States belonged, so to speak, to a different world.

Why Isolation was Possible.—This substantial isolation was made possible for more than a hundred years by three features. |1. The fortunate geographical position of the United States.| The first is the favored geographical position of the country. The United States, as a strong nation, has stood alone in the Western Hemisphere. Her only neighbors were European colonies and the struggling states of Latin-America. So long, therefore, as the powerful nations of Europe could be held at arm’s length there was no reason why the United States should give much thought to problems of defence, alliances, and diplomacy. Nature gave the United States an advantage in this respect which is not possessed by any other strong nation with the exception of Japan. Countries like England, France, and Germany could not have pursued a policy of isolation even if their people had desired it, for they are too close to each other.

In the second place the United States was encouraged to hold aloof from the older countries of the world by the fact that there was plenty of room for expansion at home. For a hundred years there was no need to go abroad seeking new territories. It took the United States a whole century to develop and populate the solid block of country which extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific. When other countries desired places of overflow for their population and new fields of investment for their capital, they engaged in a race for colonial possessions. The United States had no such need or ambition; there was quite enough opportunity at home.

Finally, the traditional policy of isolation was made possible by the good fortune which prevented European interference at critical times, notably during the American Civil War, when there was serious danger that Great Britain and France might combine to aid the South. If that had actually happened, it is not unlikely that Russia would have come to the aid of the North, and the Civil War would then have developed into a world conflict. In that case American isolation would have ended more than a half century ago. But good fortune, aided by competent diplomacy, enabled the United States to settle its own troubles without foreign interference and to continue the traditional policy of incurring no obligations to any other country. In a word there was the will to keep aloof and, what is quite as important, the opportunity to do it.^[297] From the War of Independence down to the year 1917 the United States entered into no military alliance or association with any other country; when the American armies fought, they fought alone.

America’s Entry into the World War.—The World War created a situation which the United States had never faced before. |The old policy of isolation comes to an end.| All Western Europe burst ablaze; one country after another was drawn in; and hostilities soon spread beyond the borders of the Old Continent. From the outset the United States endeavored to maintain a strict neutrality; but American commerce was subjected to interference by the belligerents on both sides. Particularly offensive to the United States, however, was the German practice of sinking without warning passenger vessels upon which American citizens were traveling. The torpedoing of the British liner Lusitania, and the consequent loss of many American lives, stirred public opinion throughout the United States. This and other offences against the law of nations moved President Wilson to demand from the German government a pledge that the practice of sinking vessels without warning should cease, and this pledge was conditionally given. Early in 1917, however, the German government decided to inaugurate, as a desperate stroke, a campaign of “unrestricted submarine warfare”, and the government of the United States was informed that even neutral vessels, unless they observed certain strict precautions, would be torpedoed without warning.

This action settled the matter of America’s continued neutrality. |The declaration of war in 1917.| Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off and in April, 1917, Congress passed a declaration of war. The events of the next eighteen months are still fresh in everyone’s mind. America entered the struggle with a determination to turn the scale, and on November 11, 1918, the German military authorities were brought to terms. By signing an armistice they acknowledged defeat and agreed to terms dictated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Fourteen Points.—Some months before the signing of this armistice President Wilson, in an address to Congress, set forth the principal aims of the United States in the war. These aims were grouped under fourteen heads and soon came to be known as the Fourteen Points. Every one of them had to do with matters which, prior to the war, would have been deemed of no immediate concern to the United States. Taken as a whole, however, they outlined the principles upon which, in President Wilson’s opinion, a durable peace could be erected and the future security of the world maintained. The German government, in asking for an armistice, declared its acceptance of these principles.

The Treaty of Versailles.—After the armistice had been signed on behalf of the various belligerents a conference was convened at Versailles to draw up a definite treaty of peace. This conference included delegates from the countries which had shared in the winning of the war. Germany and her allies, the vanquished, were not represented. For several months the conference wrestled with the problems involved in the making of a treaty—the rearrangement of boundaries, the recognition of new states, the disposal of German colonies, the payment of reparations, and, most difficult of all, the forming of a league of nations to prevent future wars. When the work was finished the German representatives were called in and were required to sign the treaty substantially without any changes. The treaty was then communicated to the various countries to be ratified and in due course it was ratified by all the important countries except the United States.

The New World Order.—The war and the changes which accompanied it served to alter the whole world environment. America was brought into more intimate contact with Europe than ever before. Even before the war, however, it had become apparent that the traditional policy of isolation could not be permanently maintained. To all intents and purposes the world has become much smaller in these latter days. In point of miles America is just as far away from Europe as ever, but a thousand miles count for less nowadays than did a hundred in our great-grandfathers’ time. During the summer of 1918 the United States transported to Europe in less than four months a million men. Fifty years ago that would have been deemed to be an utterly impossible achievement. |1. The annihilation of distance.| The fast steamship of today can cross the ocean in a hundred hours; in Washington’s time the fleetest sailing-ships could not skim the Atlantic in less than three weeks on the average. The time is soon coming, in all probability, when men can be in London one day and in New York the next. This is not a mere dream; it is well within the range of possibilities. So we can no longer talk of geographical isolation. The progress of mankind has virtually annihilated distance.

Again, the United States is no longer, as in the old days, devoid of tangible interests in distant parts of the earth. Beginning in 1898, Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam were acquired from Spain, and Hawaii was annexed. Later the Panama Canal was built and a zone of territory on both sides of it acquired. More recently, the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark. All this has involved a departure from the traditional policy of acquiring local interests only. It has given America, in the case of the Philippines, an outpost several thousand miles away. Whatever, therefore, concerns the Malay Archipelago or, indeed, any part of the Far East, concerns the interests of the United States. Isolation is no longer possible because the United States has surrendered, in this case at any rate, the geographical advantage of isolation.

Finally, during the past few years, the relation of the United States to the rest of the world has been changed by reason of the interests acquired through the war. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles did not receive the approval of the Senate does not in any way impair the rights and interests which the United States acquired as one of the victors in the war. Those interests, obtained at great sacrifice and acknowledged by Germany in the separate treaty which the United States made with that country in 1921, are spread over virtually the entire world. They are of incalculable value, present and future. No policy of isolation is now possible unless the country is ready to abandon these privileges altogether, and, for reasons which will presently be stated, the surrender of these various American interests is out of the question. In the new world order the United States cannot hold off from the rest of the world. The policy of a nation is determined by what it regards as its own vital interests.

The New American Interests.—Some important interests in various parts of the world were acquired by the United States before the war; others have been obtained or intensified as a result of it. The scope and nature of these interests may best be explained, perhaps, by grouping them under four main heads, according to their general geographical location, namely, Europe, Central and South America, the Far East, and the Near East. It is not possible to arrange them in the order of their relative importance, for only the future can determine what this order of importance may turn out to be. Certain it is, however, that in all four world-areas the interests of the United States are of vast consequence not only to the American people but to the cause of world peace and prosperity. Above and beyond all, moreover, is the vital interest of America in the maintenance of international amity. Apart from the loss of life, America’s participation in the World War cost the country, directly and indirectly, more than thirty thousand million dollars. That is indeed a heavy price to pay for helping to settle a quarrel which the United States had no part in promoting. It surely requires no argument to prove that America has a vital interest in avoiding another such calamity.

America and Europe.—The war resulted in placing Great Britain, France, Italy, and the other victorious countries of Europe under heavy obligations to the United States. To a certain extent these obligations are sentimental; in return for America’s help towards winning the war the other victorious countries are under a natural obligation to give the United States an adequate share in determining the permanent conditions of peace. This they have been willing to do; but it involves responsibilities which the United States has shown no great willingness to accept. The old tradition of non-interference in strictly European affairs is still strong and this has led the American government to distinguish, wherever possible, between questions of local and of world-wide concern. The distinction, however, is practically impossible to make. The boundaries of some small European state may seem to be a matter of no concern at Washington; but if a disagreement over this question should bring once more a general European clash of arms, the importance of the issue would speedily be recognized. So long as the general preservation of world-peace is among the primary interests of the United States, as it seems bound to be, no menace to peace, anywhere, at any time, can be lightly regarded by the people of America.

The Loans to Associated Nations.—But the war did not result in the creation of sentimental obligations only. Obligations of great importance and a tangible nature on the part of Europe to America grew out of it. During the conflict the United States loaned large sums of money to Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the other Associated Powers.^[298] These loans were made generously, in the midst of a grave emergency; but nothing definite was arranged as to when or how they should be repaid. |How the loans were made.| In view of the disorganized conditions in Europe created by the war no request for the payment of interest was made by the United States during the conflict or for some years after its close. In 1922, however, Congress authorized the President to appoint a commission of five persons to arrange with the European countries for the funding of the debts by the issue of bonds. These bonds will be given to the United States.

Now it must be reasonably clear to anyone who gives the matter a moment’s thought that until these bonds are paid off by the various European countries (which will be thirty or forty years hence) the United States will be vitally interested in what Washington called the “vicissitudes” of the Old World. |America’s mortgage on Europe.| America, in effect, holds a mortgage on Europe, and it is the practice of mortgage-holders to keep a sharp eye on their invested funds. Great Britain, France, and the other debtor countries expect to redeem these loans, in considerable part, out of reparation payments made to them by Germany. If Germany does not pay them, it will be much harder for them to pay America.^[299] In this roundabout way, therefore, the United States has acquired a tangible interest in the pledges made by the German government.

America’s Interest in the Industrial Reconstruction of Europe.—The sum total of America’s interest in the peace and prosperity of Europe is not represented, however, by these ten billion dollars of loans. The commercial relations of the two continents have become so intimate that whatever is an injury to the one is a detriment to the other. Europe is America’s best customer. Our exports there are greater than to all the rest of the world put together. |Importance of Europe as a market.| The farmer, the cotton grower, the manufacturer—all depend in part upon the European market. There is not sufficient demand at home for all the foodstuffs, materials, and manufactured goods which the United States can now produce. The European market, however, has been broken down as the result of the long conflict and it is greatly to the interest of the United States that it should be built up again. This can only be done by keeping the world at peace until the damage done by the war has been repaired. For that commercial reason, if for no other, the United States cannot well afford to remain entirely isolated from the rest of the world.

The United States and Latin-America.—The relations of the United States with most of the Latin-American states have been at all times friendly. We have never been at war with any of them except Mexico. When these various countries revolted against Spanish control about a hundred years ago, the people of the United States, remembering their own experience, were in sympathy with them. The announcement of the Monroe Doctrine was regarded by Latin-America as an act of friendliness. And for more than a century since that time the United States has served as a protector to the sister republics of the southern continent. When the War with Spain began in 1898 Congress announced that the United States had no intention to annex Cuba and this pledge, at the close of the war, was kept. Cuba was given her independence. Naturally this evidence of good faith made a strong and favorable impression upon the Central and South American states.

With Mexico, however, relations have not been cordial for several years. Ever since the invasion of their country by an American army in 1846 the Mexican people have been suspicious of American aggression; but the relations between the two governments remained cordial enough so long as President Diaz continued in power south of the Rio Grande, which was from shortly after the close of the American Civil War until well into the twentieth century. Diaz ruled Mexico in the fashion of a dictator; but he kept the country peaceful as well as on good terms with the outside world. Since the expulsion of Diaz the Mexicans have had several changes in the presidency and for ten years the government has been denied recognition by the United States. The successors of Diaz have professed their desire to place the government of the country on a truly democratic basis and to some extent they have succeeded in doing so; but they have not managed to maintain order and justice with a firm hand. Twice during the past decade it has been deemed necessary to send American troops into the country. The government of Mexico is republican in form, but elections have not, as a rule, been fairly conducted. The leaders who have control of the government try to manipulate the elections so as to maintain their own hold upon the country, and they usually succeed.

Between Mexico and the United States there are today no questions of great importance in dispute. The United States is ready to recognize the existing government of Mexico but only upon condition that certain pledges are made in writing. These include assurances that payments will be made by Mexico as compensation for the lives and property of American citizens destroyed during the troubles of the past ten years; that there shall be no confiscating of property without legal reason in the future; and that payments of interest on Mexico’s foreign obligations shall be resumed. These do not appear to be unreasonable conditions.

There are large American investments in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining districts. Some of those who hold these investments would like to see the United States intervene by force of arms, but it is quite unlikely that there will be anything of the kind unless all other means of securing the rights of Americans in Mexico prove unavailing. The United States has a certain moral responsibility for the good behavior of Mexico, even though the Mexican government may not recognize the existence of such an obligation. |Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine.| If the Monroe Doctrine gives the United States the right to keep European countries from interfering in Mexican affairs, even when their citizens have been wronged, it may also be said to carry the duty of seeing that Mexico does not abuse this protectorship.

In the region of the Isthmus the interests of the United States are especially important because of the Canal. The Panama Canal is not only of commercial but of military value to the United States, and no serious disturbance of the peace in this section of Central America can well be tolerated.

Many years ago the United States government made the suggestion that from time to time a Pan-American Congress made up of delegates from all the republics of the New World should be held to discuss matters of common interest. The suggestion was accepted and several Congresses have been held during the past three decades. There has also been established at Washington a Bureau of American Republics whose function it is to carry out the resolutions of each Congress and to spread information concerning the common interests of all the countries.

The United States and the Far East.—In ordinary usage the term “Far East” includes the Japanese and Chinese empires, Siberia and the other Russian territories to the north of China, and the Malay Archipelago to the south. Until a quarter of a century ago the interests of the United States, whether political or commercial, were relatively small in this part of the world. |The Philippines.| But the acquisition of the Philippines and the growth of American trade with the Orient have combined to alter the situation. Another factor which has impelled the United States to pay greater attention to the Orient today is the progress of Japan. The rapid growth of this empire in military and naval strength means that the United States has a rival for the mastery of the Pacific.Pacific. During the nineteenth century the eyes of America were turned entirely towards Europe; in the twentieth they will have to be turned towards Asia as well.

Apart from affairs in the Philippines the problems of the Far East, so far as the United States is concerned, center around two present-day international phenomena, the weakness of China and the strength of Japan. China is a vast country with at least three or four times the population of the United States. Although nominally a republic its government is weak, inefficient, unable to exercise firm control over all parts of the country, and without effective means of national defence. Quite naturally, therefore, China offers a temptation to any strong country desiring exclusive trade advantages for itself. Her nearest neighbor, Japan, would speedily be able to secure entire control of the Chinese Republic and make China a vassal state were it not for the deterring influence of the other great powers of the world.

In 1899, after the close of the Spanish War, the government of the United States addressed a note to all the great powers urging that they agree to seek no further special trade advantages in China, that the integrity of Chinese territory be preserved, and that the principle of “equal and impartial trade” should be adopted. |The “open door.”| To this suggestion all the powers agreed. This policy thus accepted has become known as the policy of the “open door”, and until the outbreak of the World War it was substantially followed, except that the various powers retained the commercial advantages that they had already acquired.

During this war, however, Japan attacked and captured Kiao-Chao, a port which had been leased by China to Germany for a long term of years, and this territory the Japanese continued to hold after the war was over. Not until the Washington conference of 1922 did Japan agree to give it up. |Recent developments.| In 1918, moreover, the government of Japan made a list of twenty-one demands upon China for special privileges, and although some of these demands were later modified or withdrawn entirely, several important privileges were wrung from the Chinese. In connection with these negotiations the United States government gave assurance in the so-called Ishii-Lansing agreement that the United States would recognize the “special interest” of Japan in Chinese affairs. It is avowedly the policy of Japan to acquire, if she can, the same predominance in Asia that the United States has exercised in North and South America.

The Conference on Pacific Problems. Regarding it as highly desirable that all controversies affecting the Far East and the Pacific should be amicably settled, thus forestalling the growth of large naval armaments on both sides of the Western ocean, President Harding in the summer of 1921 proposed that the Washington conference should discuss these questions and should endeavor to secure a satisfactory solution of them. |The Washington conference.| The conference did so, and embodied the results of its negotiations in certain agreements, particularly in what is commonly known as the “Four Power” treaty. By the terms of this treaty the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan mutually agree to respect the integrity of each other’s possessions in the islands of the Pacific.^[300] The nations represented at the conference also agreed to refrain from the erection of fortifications in certain places now unfortified.

Out of the negotiations at Washington, moreover, came the agreement on the part of Japan to restore Kiao-Chao and the adjacent province of Shantung to China. First and last, therefore, the Washington conference succeeded in promoting an amicable agreement on most of the questions at issue. It did not, however, take up the question of Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast of America, nor did it discuss the grievances of the Japanese immigrants already there. These matters are left for further negotiation through the regular diplomatic channels.

America and the Near East.—The expression “Near East” is commonly regarded as including the areas which lie at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and thereabouts; it comprises Turkey, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and other territories in the same general region. As a result of the war the Turkish Empire has been disintegrated; most of its territories have been virtually placed under the control of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece through the instrumentality of mandates (see p. 636). The United States was offered the mandate for Armenia, but declined to accept it.

Now some of these territories are rich in natural resources. Mesopotamia, for example, is known to possess extensive oil fields. The question arises, therefore, whether the European countries which hold the mandates are to have the lion’s share of this natural wealth. And it is a question of considerable importance when one bears in mind the fact that the oil fields of the United States will probably be exhausted before many decades have passed (see p. 330). The direct interest of the United States is less immediate, perhaps, than in the other areas (Europe, Central and South America, and the Far East), but it is sufficiently vital to deserve mention.

The Wide Scope of America’s Interests.—From this brief and general survey some idea of the scope of American interests can be gained. But the preceding paragraphs have not listed them all. The people of the United States have a sentimental interest in many foreign problems where no economic considerations are at stake. Ireland is an example. America’s interest in a just and peaceful settlement of the Irish question is not inspired by economic motives. It arises in large part from the sentimental desire to see a people, with whom there are close ties of kinship, attain contentment and prosperity. So with Poland and the new Slavic countries of Continental Europe. America would regret to see them lose a status of independence which was gained at so great a sacrifice.

There is no part of the world, in fact, to which the interest of the United States, direct or indirect, sentimental, political, or economic, does not now extend. The enormous strength and prestige of America, as disclosed during the war, have made a profound impression in every part of the globe and have given the United States a potent influence upon the destinies of mankind. The United States has become a world power of the first order. Whether the American people like it or not, that inexorable fact remains.

A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in International Conditions, pp. 127-185;

W. E. Weyl, American World Policies, passim;

A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 95-120;

C. E. Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, pp. 148-192;

J. H. Latané, America as a World Power, pp. 255-268; Ibid., From Isolation to Leadership, pp. 3-39;

H. H. Powers, America Among the Nations, pp. 197-239;

W. A. Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp. 357-371;

A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1-52;

Woodrow Wilson, State Papers and Addresses, pp. 464-479;

P. S. Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 327-362.

1. How the United States became a world power. Early relations with Europe. The Monroe Doctrine. The opening of Japan. The war with Spain and the new acquisitions. John Hay and the “open door.” The World War and its aftermath. Scope of American interests today. References: J. H. Latané, America as a World Power, pp. 3-28; 63-81; Ibid., The United States and Latin America, pp. 61-291; A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 121-147; J. W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, pp. 399-438; W. M. Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 11-43; P. S. Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 309-336.

2. How foreign trade affects the national welfare. Foreign trade and national prosperity. Foreign trade and world power. “Dollar Diplomacy.” Trade and imperialism. References: C. M. Pepper, American Foreign Trade, pp. 3-32; 62-89; 110-139; J. D. Whelpley, The Trade of the World, pp. 391-425; A. J. Wolfe, Theory and Practice of International Commerce, pp. 495-522; C. L. Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, pp. 1-16; L. C. and T. F. Ford, The Foreign Trade of the United States, pp. 1-27.

3. How the building of the Panama Canal extended American interests abroad. References: Lincoln Hutchinson, The Panama Canal and International Trade Competition, pp. 46-97; F. A. Ogg, National Progress, pp. 246-265; A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation, pp. 340-348; W. M. Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 300-315.

4. The open door in China. What it means. Obstacles in its way. References: K. K. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, pp. 117-166; J. H. Latané, America as a World Power, pp. 100-119; W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, pp. 245-266; A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation, pp. 282-298; W. R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. II, pp. 231-249; A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 327-374; K. K. Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, pp. 160-196; John Dewey, China, Japan, and the United States (New Republic Pamphlets, No. 1).

1. Pan-Americanism. What it means. R. G. Usher, Pan-Americanism, pp. 203-231; J. V. Noel, The History of the Second Pan-American Congress, pp. 9-30; Pan-American Union, Bulletins, March, 1911.

2. The United States as an international policeman. Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, pp. 543-553; D. C. Munro, The Five Republics of Central America, pp. 227-264; A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation, pp. 223-242.

3. Our Mid-Pacific possessions. E. J. Carpenter, America in Hawaii, pp. 192-251; J. M. Callahan, American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East, pp. 114-145.

4. World competition for oil. F. A. Talbot, The Oil Conquest of the World, pp. 17-34; F. R. Kellogg, The Mexican Oil Situation (in Clark University Addresses, Mexico and the Caribbean, pp. 54-72).

5. The United States in Panama. C. L. Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, pp. 193-228; Ralph Page, Dramatic Moments in American Diplomacy, pp. 227-259; Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, pp. 553-571.

6. America’s interest in China. W. E. Griffin, America in the East, pp. 203-225; B. A. Robinson, America’s Business Opportunity in China (in Clark University Addresses, Recent Developments in China, pp. 237-255; also Clark University Lectures, China and the Far East, pp. 95-119).

7. The United States and the Latin American republics. J. H. Latané, America as a World Power, pp. 269-284; C. E. Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, pp. 106-124.

8. Isolation as an American policy. A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1-52; J. H. Latané, From Isolation to Leadership, pp. 3-53.

9. America’s maritime power. E. N. Hurley, The New Merchant Marine, pp. 122-166; A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, pp. 3-27.

10. America’s interest in the reconstruction of Europe. D. J. Hill, The Rebuilding of Europe, pp. 236-282; Walter Weyl, The End of the War, pp. 50-72; R. S. Baker, What Wilson Did at Paris, pp. 3-35.

1. Give reasons why a policy of isolation was possible during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.

2. Was the entry of the United States into the war in 1917 in keeping with American traditions or a departure from American traditions? Give your reasons.

3. Look up the Fourteen Points. Indicate the ones which were incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles. Name the ones which were not so incorporated.

4. Explain why America is interested in the reconstruction of Europe. How can this reconstruction be best aided by the United States?

5. It has been suggested that the loans made by the United States to European countries ought to be canceled. Why is this proposal made and what is your opinion of it?

6. What policy do you think the United States ought to pursue toward Mexico? Has the United States any responsibility for the good behavior of Mexico towards European countries? Why or why not?

7. To what extent should America insist upon the maintenance of the “open door” in China? Has Japan a special interest in the Orient similar to that of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?

8. What did the Washington Conference accomplish? Why did it not accomplish more?

9. Was the United States wise or unwise in declining to accept any mandates from the League of Nations?

10. Does the strength and prestige of America entail any responsibilities of leadership? If so, give some idea as to how these can be carried out.

1. The United States should maintain the Monroe Doctrine.

2. The United States should recognize a Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” in the Far East.

3. The United States should not participate in international conferences dealing only with European questions.