The U. S. S. Maine, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee commanding, entered the port of Havana, Island of Cuba, on the morning of January 25, 1898, and was assigned an anchorage by the harbor authorities.
The occasion for the presence of an American ship in those waters was the desire on the part of the United States to impress upon the Spanish Government her friendly attitude towards Spain. The usual visits of ceremony between the officers of the visiting ship and the Spanish officials followed.
At 9.40 on Tuesday evening, February 15th, an explosion occurred in the forward part of the Maine, so terrific in its character that it was heard for miles. Subsequently, Captain Sigsbee, in writing of the explosion, said: “I find it impossible to describe the sound or shock, but the impression remains of something awe-inspiring, terrifying—of noise, rending, vibrating, all-pervading. There is nothing in the former experience of anyone aboard to measure the explosion by.”
The whole city was shaken by the force of the explosion, lights were put out in the streets, and the bay was illuminated by the flames of the burning ship.
The quarters of the crew were forward, and the destruction of life among them was appalling; of the 354 men and officers on board the Maine, only 101 escaped death, and many of those were severely wounded. Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt were among the lost.
Copyright L. M. Palmer.
Blowing up of the U. S. S. Maine in Havana Harbor.
The ship went down very soon, bow first, and many of the crew were drowned in their quarters; the officers succeeded in getting three boats into the water, both captain and crew acting in the coolest and bravest manner conceivable.
Immediately after the explosion, the Spanish warship Alfonso XII. and the passenger steamers in the harbor lowered boats and all that was possible was done to save the few victims of the explosion scattered over the waters.
Captain Sigsbee, who commanded the Maine, telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy: “Maine blown up in Havana harbor 9.40, and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed and drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tender from Key West for crew and few pieces of equipment still above water. No one had clothes other than those upon him.”
The news of the disaster was spread broadcast over the length and breadth of the land.
The Maine was a battleship of the second class, and was regarded as one of the best ships in the new navy. She was built at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and was 318 feet long, 57 feet broad, 21.6 feet mean draught, and 6682 tons displacement.
She had two ten-inch vertical turrets and two military masts, and her motive power was furnished by twin screw vertical expansion engines, having a maximum horse-power of 9293, capable of making a speed of 17.45 knots. She carried four ten-inch and six six-inch breech-loading guns in her main battery and seven six-pounders and eight one-pound rapid-fire guns and four Gatlings in her secondary battery, and four Whitehead torpedoes.
The officers of the Maine were: Captain, Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding; Lieutenant-Commander, Richard Wainwright; Lieutenants, George F. W. Holman, John Hood, and Carl W. Jungen; Lieutenants (junior grade), George P. Blow, John G. Blandin, and Friend W. Jenkins; Naval Cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Walt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, and David F. Boyd, Jr.; Surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; Paymaster, Charles W. Littlefield; Chief Engineer, Charles P. Howell; Passed Assistant Engineer, Frederick C. Bowers; Assistant Engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt; Naval Cadets (engineer division), Pope, Washington, and Crenshaw; Chaplain, John P. Chidwick; First Lieutenant of Marines, Albertus W. Catlin; Boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; Gunner, Joseph Hill; Carpenter, George Helms.
Upon receipt of Captain Sigsbee’s telegram, Secretary Long sent orders to the lighthouse tenders at Key West to proceed at once to Havana. Their orders were in plain language, thus avoiding the delay that would have arisen from the use of cipher.
Divers were also sent from the United States to Havana, and on the Sunday following brought up Captain Sigsbee’s money, papers, and keys. The only question which arose between the Spanish and American authorities was in regard to the right of the former to send divers down to investigate the condition of the ship; and that was promptly settled by an amicable arrangement that American divers should first do what was possible in the way of interior examination and salvage, and that Spanish divers should then be permitted to join them in the work outside the vessel.
The most thoroughly equipped wrecking apparatus in the country was sent to the scene of the disaster, but, after consultation between the expert wreckers and the naval officers on the spot, it was decided that all that could be done was to recover as many of the guns and other valuable appurtenances of the Maine as possible, and then leave in Havana harbor the smoke-begrimed wreck above which floated pathetically the ensign of the United States. There was indeed little to save. The great ship was literally riven apart from her keel up and from her sharp-spurred prow to a point aft of her midship section. There was scarcely a plate in her frame that was not sprung or shivered so severely as to preclude the hope that she could ever be made worthy of reconstruction. Work on the wreck was continued until early in April, when the flag which had been kept flying over the remains of the ill-fated ship was hauled down and the U. S. S. Maine declared out of commission.
Immediately after the receipt of Captain Sigsbee’s telegram, the administration ordered an investigation. The order was issued by Admiral Sicard on Febuary 19th, and appointed a Court of Inquiry consisting of Captain William T. Sampson, commanding the Iowa; Captain French E. Chadwick, and Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, with Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix as judge advocate.
The court met on February 21st, on board the United States lighthouse tender Mangrove, in the harbor of Havana. The first day was taken up with the examination of Captain Sigsbee. The second and third days were largely taken up in the examination of survivors of the explosion, giving their personal experience, and in detail explaining the precautions taken at all times, and particularly while in Havana, against any possible accident.
At the close of the third day, Ensign W. V. N. Powelson, serving on board the lighthouse tender Fern, lying in the harbor of Havana, appeared and gave the first testimony about the condition of the ship as disclosed by the divers. Mr. Powelson is a young man who graduated from Annapolis in 1895. He had paid special attention to construction, and in spite of his youth was detailed to look after the divers. All that he said on the first day was that apparently the explosion had taken place on the port side, forward of amidships, and that the vessel had been shifted by the explosion from port to starboard; that is, from left to right. He was asked to continue his investigation, and the examination of survivors continued, lasting for several days, and including witnesses who were not on board the Maine at the time. The testimony showed that there were two explosions, the first lifting the forward part of the vessel considerably out of the water, and the second, which almost immediately followed, was much louder and longer.
Diver Olsen then appeared and told of what he had been able to discover. As he was not an educated man, and was not familiar with construction, his testimony was not entirely intelligible. An arrangement was then made by which all the divers were to report to Mr. Powelson, who was to summarize their findings and to testify to the same in the presence of the divers themselves.
U. S. S. Katahdin.
Steel harbor defense ram. Twin screw. No main battery. Secondary battery, four 6-pounder rapid fire guns. Thickness of armor 6 inches at top, 3 inches at bottom. 7 officers, 91 men.
The testimony of some of the survivors was thrilling in the extreme. Such hair-breadth escapes as some of them told seemed almost impossible of belief. The court sat only six days in Havana, and then adjourned on February 26th, to meet in Key West on February 28th, to take the testimony of the survivors who had been sent there. In the meantime, Mr. Powelson was directed to continue his work and report when the court resumed.
The testimony at Key West occupied only three days, during which time testimony was taken of the survivors and others which confirmed the previous statement that there were two explosions, the first of which lifted the Maine and the second destroyed her forward part.
On March 6th the court resumed its session in the harbor of Havana, and Ensign Powelson was enabled to give testimony which showed conclusively that the Maine was blown up by a submarine mine, and that this resulted in the partial explosion of two or more magazines within the ship, which completely destroyed the forward part of the Maine.
From the 10th to the 18th day, inclusive, the court again met in the harbor of Havana, during which time Mr. Powelson produced a great deal of corroborative testimony. It was shown that the boilers were in fair condition in the after-part of the ship and had not exploded. These were the only boilers under which there was fire at the time of the explosion. Several of the divers found a deep hole near the ship’s ram, but whether it was caused by the submarine mine or dug out by the end of the ram as the forward part of the vessel sunk and turned over on its side could not be definitely ascertained. Around the vessel was found a great deal of powder mixed with the mud. When this was brought up and fired it burned freely. It was the testimony of experts that if the original explosion had taken place inside the Maine all of the powder would have been consumed, or at least all of it would have been consumed in those magazines which were affected. As a matter of fact, it was found that in two magazines part of the powder had exploded and a part of it had not, showing that the explosion did not take place until the vessel was sinking and the powder in some places was wet. A great many powder cans, as already stated, were found containing a little powder, and many which had burst at the seams and had allowed the powder to dissolve in the water.
The court left the harbor of Havana on March 14th and convened March 17th, on board the battleship Iowa, off Key West, where it met for five days, going over the testimony and preparing the report. This report was signed March 21st and sent to Admiral Sicard on board the flagship New York, who approved it on the 22d of March and forwarded it to the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn handed it to the President, who sent it with a special message to Congress on March 28th. The court was formally dissolved on the fifth day of April. As the report was of great importance, it is here given in full:
U. S. S. IOWA, FIRST RATE.
KEY WEST, Fla., Monday, March 21, 1898.—After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court finds as follows:
ONE. That the United States battleship Maine arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the twenty-fifth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from five and a half to six fathoms of water, by the regular government pilot.
The United States Consul-General at Havana had notified the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the Maine.
TWO. The state of discipline on board the Maine was excellent; and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out.
All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.
Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell-rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.
The magazines and shell-rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine the keys were found in their proper place in the captain’s cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 P. M. The temperatures of the magazines and shell-room were taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the Maine was destroyed. The forward boilers were wrecked by the inner explosion.
The torpedo warheads were all stowed in the after-part of the ship under the ward-room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the Maine.
The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft and remote from the scene of the explosion.
Waste was carefully looked after on board the Maine to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.
Varnishes, dryers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine.
The medical stores were stowed aft under the ward-room and remote from the scene of the explosion.
No dangerous stores of any kind were stored below in any of the other store-rooms.
The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazine and shell-rooms four were empty, namely, “B 3,” “B 4,” “B 5,” “B 6.”
“A 5” had been in use that day, and “A 16” was full of new river coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time, on account of bunkers “B 4” and “B 6” being empty. This bunker, “A 16,” had been inspected Monday by the engineer and officer on duty.
The fire-alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the Maine.
The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam and being tended by a reliable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers and are in a fair condition.
On the night of the destruction of the Maine everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 P. M., by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the Maine was destroyed the ship was quiet and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.
EXPLOSIONS.
THREE. The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9.40 P. M., on the 15th day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival.
There were two explosions, of a distinctly different character, with a very short, but distinct, interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion.
The first explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun; while the second explosion was more open, prolonged and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine.
CONDITION OF THE WRECK.
FOUR. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after-part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part.
The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony:
That portion of the port side of the protective deck which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41 was blown up aft and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up aft and slightly over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after-part.
This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine.
FIVE. At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel, when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured. The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.
At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet above its normal position.
In the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship.
SIX. The court finds that the loss of the Maine, on the occasion named, was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.
SEVEN. In the opinion of the court, the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines.
EIGHT. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.
W. T. SAMPSON, Captain, U. S. N.,
President.
A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N.,
Judge Advocate.
The court, having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 A. M., to wait the action of the convening authority.
W. T. SAMPSON, Captain, U. S. N.,
President.
A. MARIX, Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N.,
Judge Advocate.
U. S. Flagship New York,
March 22, 1898.
Off Key West, Florida.
The proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry in the above case are approved.
M. SICARD,
Rear Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.
This in brief is the story of how the causes of the disaster were reached. Too much credit cannot be given to young Ensign Powelson for his intelligence and energy in proving to a mathematical demonstration that the Maine was blown up by a submarine mine.
The Spanish officials in Cuba made a perfunctory investigation. Altogether, their divers were down below about five hours, during which time they made a most cursory examination. This court then reported that the Maine had been blown up as the result of an interior explosion, one of the principal reasons for this being that no dead fish were found in the harbor afterwards. Our own experts testified that an explosion underneath the water would not necessarily kill fish, nor would it throw up a great volume of water, as the Spaniards claim.
When the news of the terrible calamity reached the United States, public feeling reached the highest pitch of excitement. Rumors of all kinds were in the air. Enormous editions of the great journals were printed, and the one topic of conversation was the cause of the disaster and the effect of the occurrence upon our relations with Spain. Hourly bulletins were displayed at the newspaper offices.
The provocation to excitement caused by the appalling disaster was great, but the country bore the news with a calmness and steadiness which indicated its inherent strength, and greatly impressed foreign observers. Great credit was given to Captain Sigsbee, who, in that terrible moment when, in a foreign port, surrounded by what must be regarded as a hostile population, his ship sunk under him as the result of a mysterious and deadly blow, showed not only intrepidity, but perfect self-possession. His quiet, dignified, self-restrained dispatch, with its calm statement that any judgment upon the cause of the disaster must be postponed, gave a fine example, which was instantly responded to by the Government and the nation.
Most hearty were the words of praise for Chaplain Chidwick of the Maine, who, day after day, worked incessantly among the ghastly spectacles as the dead were brought to shore, identifying the bodies, performing short religious rites over each, making records of all clues to identity, and in the intervals consoling the wounded at the hospitals.
As time wore on, each succeeding day bringing its rumors of retaliation and intervention in Cuban affairs, and in the midst of war preparations on an unprecedented scale, which were being carried on by the War and Navy Departments, President McKinley and his advisers, and both branches of Congress, acted as strong men act under great blows and great provocation. There was no hasty denunciation. The spirit of the brave men at Havana and of the heads of the Government at Washington was fully shared by the people at large. The United States had a President in whom they trusted.
Admiral Dewey and his Flagship Olympia.