[661] For all this see Rey’s letter in the Pièces justificatives of Belmas’s History of Sieges in Spain, iv. p. 662.

[662] Under General Deconchy, who got a new brigade when his old one was thrown into San Sebastian.

[663] Dubourdieu’s battery belonging to the British 1st Division, and four guns of Giron’s own small artillery equipment.

[664] Lecestre’s Lettres inédites de Napoléon, ii. p. 265.

[665] Severoli reached Valencia on May 2 (Vacani, vi. p. 207), so was not drawn down in consequence of Murray’s move of May 25, as Mr. Fortescue seems to imply in British Army, ix. p. 49. He had with him two battalions each of the 1st Line and 1st Ligero, with a weak cavalry regiment.

[666] 2nd of Burgos, detached by Wellington’s order. See Murray’s Court Martial, p. 371.

[667] These changes of units had caused some re-brigading. Murray had transferred the 4th K.G.L. and the Sicilian ‘Estero’ regiment to Clinton’s division, but taken away from the latter and given to Mackenzie the 2nd Italian Levy, the 1/10th and the 1/81st. But Clinton was given charge over Whittingham’s Spaniards, and authorized to use them as part of his division, so that his total command was now much larger than Mackenzie’s.

[668] Pontevedra and Principe.

[669] It is interesting to compare the May 31 morning state of the Army of Catalonia with the list of battalions which Murray reports as having been brought down to the neighbourhood of Tarragona. All are there save two (Fernando 7th and Ausona) left at Vich under Eroles (see Table in Appendix), twelve battalions were with Copons.

[670] One of the 20th Line, one of the 7th Italian Line.

[671] Not only was the whole of the enceinte of the lower city abandoned, but the outer enceinte of the upper city on its east and north sides, from the bastion of El Rey to that of La Reyna (see map of Tarragona, p. 524 of vol. iv).

[672] Court Martial Proceedings, p. 228. He adds that his only chance (as he thought) was that conceivably he might find Tarragona so ill-fortified that he might risk an immediate assault on unfinished defences.

[673] Ibid., p. 292.

[674] Court Martial Proceedings, p. 183.

[675] Ibid., p. 165.

[676] The Quartermaster-General of the Army.

[677] Proceedings, p. 168.

[678] Note, Napier, v. p. 147.

[679] All this from Vacani (vi. p. 321), the only full French source: I can find no mention of this abortive demonstration from the British side.

[680] Court Martial Proceedings, p. 49.

[681] Murray’s evidence at the Court Martial, p. 50.

[682] Prevost’s very moderate loss was 1 officer and 4 men killed, 1 sergeant and 38 men wounded. This includes Spaniards.

[683] Court Martial, Murray’s defence, p. 228.

[684] Murray’s Defence, p. 232.

[685] Murray to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 467.

[686] Musnier’s division had 4,100 men present, by its return of June 15th. Pannetier’s column consisted of two battalions each of the 3rd Léger and 20th Line and one of the 5th Léger and a squadron of Westphalians—by the return of the same date 2,600 in all. The hussars were 650 sabres—adding the squadron of dragoons (200), the gunners of three batteries, train, &c.; the whole may have made just under 8,000 of all arms. See Tables in Appendix, p. 755.

[687] Decaen to M. Mathieu, 5th June: see Vidal de la Blache, i. 353.

[688] Suchet to Decaen, Valencia, May 31. See Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 352.

[689] Report of Brigadier Llauder, commanding Copons’ left wing, to Murray, Proceedings, p. 190. Llauder adds that he had discovered that Mathieu’s column was only 5,500 strong.

[690] See especially Clinton’s evidence on pp. 180-2 of Murray’s Court Martial.

[691] See Manso’s letter and Guillot’s report on pp. 275-6 of the Court Martial Proceedings.

[692] For which see Court Martial Proceedings, pp. 282-3.

[693] His main blunder was that he took Pannetier’s brigade to be a separate item of 3,000 men, over and above the 9,000 men coming from Valencia of whom his emissary had written. He also doubled Suchet’s cavalry, by supposing that the 9th bis of Hussars and the 12th Hussars were two separate regiments. But they were the same unit, the number having recently been changed by order from Paris.

[694] Court Martial Proceedings, p. 285.

[695] See evidence of Bentinck, p. 175, and Clinton, p. 180, of Court Martial Proceedings.

[696] Evidence of Captain Milner, ibid., p. 397. This was not true at the moment, early in the morning.

[697] Donkin to Murray, 3 p.m. 11th June. Court Martial Proceedings, p. 360.

[698] He recalls this forgotten disaster in his defence (p. 300). A landing force cut off by storms from its transports had to surrender whole.

[699] Court Martial Proceedings, pp. 285-6.

[700] Donkin’s evidence, Court Martial Proceedings, p. 448.

[701] Williamson’s evidence, Proceedings, p. 124.

[702] Williamson’s evidence, ibid., p. 125.

[703] Mr. Fortescue has, I think, misinterpreted this order, when he says that it told Clinton to march to the same spot as the first (British Army, ix. p. 63), for Constanti is not in the direction of the Gaya, but on the opposite flank, west of the Francoli river.

[704] A queer misprint in this dispatch makes it say ‘the enemy will march.’

[705] Evidence of Captains Withers and Bathurst, R.N., Court Martial Proceedings, pp. 86 and 95.

[706] Mackenzie in his evidence says his men began at 2 p.m. to get into the boats.

[707] Evidence of Bentinck, ibid., p. 176. The cavalry went off at 3 p.m.

[708] The hours of this belated work are stated very differently by various naval witnesses, some of whom say that they worked till 1 a.m., others till 4 a.m., others till 7; one thinks that embarkations continued till well into the forenoon of the 13th—say 11 o’clock. At any rate, the hour must have been long after daylight had come—which was at 4.15, as is recorded by one witness.

[709] The total loss of Murray’s Army during the Tarragona operations was:

Bertoletti’s garrison lost 13 killed and 85 wounded = 98. The enemies did each other little harm!

[710] Not apparently the whole division, for Mackenzie calls it ‘a small body of infantry.’

[711] Suchet, Mémoires, ii. p. 315.

[712] Date stated by some as the 16th, but the earlier day seems correct. See Mackenzie’s evidence, pp. 152-3: he was uncertain as to the date.

[713] Hallowell says on the evening of the 14th or the 15th, he forgets which. But the latter date must be the true one.

[714] Hallowell’s speech, p. 554 of the Court Martial Proceedings.

[715] Pannetier’s rearguard followed on the 17th. See letter of the Alcalde of Perello, Court Martial, p. 361.

[716] Hallowell’s speech, Court Martial Proceedings, p. 556.

[717] By Mr. Fortescue, History of the British Army, ix. 67.

[718] See above, p. 515.

[719] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 18-19, June 23.

[720] Ibid., p. 20.

[721] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 22.

[722] Wellington to Murray, July 1, Dispatches, x. p. 487.

[723] Dispatches, x. p. 495, to Lord Bathurst, July 2.

[724] To the same, Dispatches, x. p. 496.

[725] To O’Donoju, Minister of War, Dispatches, x. pp. 492-3; to Castaños, x. p. 475; to Lord Bathurst, x. pp. 473-4.

[726] ‘We and the powers of Europe are interested in the success of the War in the Peninsula. But the creatures who govern at Cadiz appear to feel no such interest. All that they care about really is the praise of their foolish Constitution.... As long as Spain shall be governed by the Cortes, acting upon Republican principles, we cannot hope for any permanent amelioration.’ Dispatches, x. p. 474, Wellington to Bathurst, June 29.

[727] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Dispatches, x. p. 491.

[728] Dispatches, x. pp. 523-4.

[729] Ibid., x. p. 521.

[730] Ibid., x. pp. 553-4. When this letter was written to Lord William Bentinck, Wellington had received no London dispatch for twenty days, mainly owing to bad weather in the Bay of Biscay.

[731] Ibid., x. pp. 613-14, to Lord Bathurst.

[732] Ibid., x. p. 478, to Bentinck.

[733] Ibid., x. pp. 477-9.

[734] Ibid., x. p. 531.

[735] Full details in O’Donnell’s report to Wellington of July 1, 1813. Dispatches, p. 503. Toreno makes an odd mistake in calling the French commander de Ceva: this was the name of the junior officer who drew up the capitulation.

[736] Not to be confounded with General Cassagne, who long commanded a division in the Army of Andalusia.

[737] Late Hamilton’s division in 1810-11-12.

[738] Lord Dalhousie was left in command—a great slight to Picton—all the more so after what had happened at Vittoria. See Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 249.

[739] Late Cadogan’s.

[740] Pringle arrived and took command of this brigade a fortnight later. Meanwhile the senior battalion commander led it.

[741] Reille had only two chasseur regiments with him.

[742] See the indignant letters of French officials quoted in Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 69 and 165-7.

[743] For the Army of Portugal only two chasseur regiments were left: for the Army of the North only one: for the Army of the Centre only the weak Nassau squadrons. But 13 out of the 14 cavalry regiments of the Army of the South remained behind.

[744] Chassé’s brigade lost 850 men of 1,700 present, and the Nassau regiment in the German brigade had similar casualties, though the Baden regiment got off more lightly.

[745] It should be noted that Daricau’s 6th Division was now led by Maransin—its old commander having been badly wounded at Vittoria. Maransin’s late brigade, still extra-divisional as at Vittoria, had been made over to Gruardet.

[746] Jourdan answered that it was a false movement, but that on June 29th he could not possibly foresee that the King would change his mind as to the destination of the Army of the South. See Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 103.

[747] See Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 103-4.

[748] Under Cameron of the 92nd as senior colonel—Cadogan who fell at Vittoria not having yet been replaced.

[749] Viz. Villatte’s and Maransin’s divisions, and Gruardet’s brigade of his own army, and Braun’s brigade of the Army of the Centre.

[750] On May 1 the three 2nd Division brigades had shown 7,200 bayonets—they had lost 900 men in action at Vittoria. If we allow for sick and stragglers and other casual losses, they cannot possibly have had 6,000 men in line on July 5.

[751] All these absurd theories are to be found in Gazan’s reports to Jourdan of July 4 and 5. See Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 106-7.

[752] The troops of the Army of the North which Foy had collected from the Biscay garrisons, the brigades of Deconchy, Rouget, and Berlier of which we have heard so much in a previous chapter.

[753] Foy, Lamartinière, Maucune and Fririon (late Sarrut). There were behind them the King’s Spaniards and the raw Bayonne reserve.

[754] Dispatches, x. p. 512. The total losses having been 124 on all three days, Wellington’s ‘no loss’ means, of course, practically no loss.

[755] The clearest proof of Gazan’s resolute resolve not to stand, and of the complete mendacity of his dispatches concerning his heavy fighting on the 4th-5th and 7th, is that he returned the total of his losses at 35 killed and 309 wounded. As he had six brigades, or 13,000 men at least, engaged, it is clear that there was no serious fighting at all—a fact borne out by Hill’s corresponding return of 8 killed, 119 wounded, and 2 missing in the whole petty campaign.

[756] Cf. Lecestre, Lettres inédites, ii. p. 1037, where the Emperor says on July 3 that he cannot make out what is happening; and that Joseph and Jourdan are incapables.

[757] See, e. g., Joseph to Clarke, p. 336 of vol. ix of his Correspondance.

[758] See vol. v, p. 97.

[759] ‘Les malheurs de l’Espagne sont d’autant plus grands qu’ils sont ridicules.’ Napoleon to Savary, Dresden, 20 July: Lecestre, Lettres inédites, ii.

[760] Even that he was withdrawing the British Army from Portugal. Lecestre, ii. 998, May 5.

[761] Though he did once make the observation that ‘on ne conduit pas des campagnes à 500 lieues de distance,’ in a lucid interval.

[762] See v. pp. 194-6.

[763] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, ii. 1055.

[764] See above, p. 88.

[765] See the very interesting pages of Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 142-3.

[766] See Roederer’s account of the interview in Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 132-3. Napoleon had suggested him as the best person for the errand.

[767] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, Lettres inédites, ii. 1055.

[768] ‘Joey Bottles’ is the English equivalent.

[769] See especially the caustic paragraphs in Lecestre, ii. 1045, 1047, 1055, to Clarke and Cambacérès.

[770] So Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. viii. Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 140, says 5,000 francs only, which seems an impossibly small sum for Marshal’s half pay.

[771] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, ii. 1045.

[772] Napoleon to Maret, No. 28 in Lettres de Napoléon non insérées dans la Correspondance, Aug.-Sept.-Oct. 1813. Paris, 1907.

[773] Bathurst to Wellington, June 23, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 17-18.

[774] Liverpool to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 64-5, dated July 7.

[775] Wellington to Bathurst, July 12, from Hernani. Dispatches, x. p. 524.

[776] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 23, from Lesaca, ibid., x. p. 568. Cf. same to same, x. p. 596.

[777] Dispatches, x. p. 570.

[778] See Wellington to Torrens, Dispatches, x. p. 616.

[779] See Wellington to Bathurst, Dispatches, x. p. 599, and other epistles on same topic.

[780] Called the Mirador (’look-out’), Queen’s, and Principe batteries: there were others facing sea-ward, which were of no account in this siege, as no attack from the water-side took place.

[781] See Jones’s Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 94.

[782] The governor surrendered the town on August 1, but retired into the castle of La Mota, where he capitulated a few days later, just as Rey did in 1813.

[783] Jones’s Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 14.

[784] Dickson’s diary, July 12, 1813, p. 960 of Colonel John Leslie’s edition of the Dickson Papers.

[785] Jones, ii. p. 97.

[786] See above, p. 478.

[787] See Graham to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 62. The K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Division was present for a few days.

[788] Wellington to Graham, Dispatches, x. p. 512.

[789] Wellington Dispatches, x. p. 525.

[790] Melville to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 224-5.

[791] Wellington to Melville, Dispatches, xi. p. 115.

[792] See the interesting account of his cross-country ride on June 25-9 in his Letters from the Peninsula, pp. 167-74.

[793] See Frazer, p. 195.

[794] In detail Jones gives them as twenty 24-pounders, six 18-pounders, four 68-pound cannonades, six 8-inch howitzers, and four mortars.

[795] See Hartmann’s Life, pp. 153-4.

[796] Nos. 4, 5 in map.

[797] Nos. 1, 2, 3 in map.

[798] No. 6 in the map.

[799] Why does Belmas, who was very well informed, and used Jones’s book, call the stormers ‘les Anglais’ and say that they lost 150 men? (Sièges, iv. p. 608). He knew from Jones that they were Caçadores only (Jones, ii. p. 21), and that their loss was under 70.

[800] Right column, to attack the cemetery and fortified houses—150 of 5th Caçadores, 150 13th Portuguese Line, three companies 1/9th Foot, three companies 3/1st Foot (Royal Scots) all under Hay, Brigadier of the 5th Division. Left column: 200 of 5th Caçadores, 200 of 13th Portuguese Line, three companies 1/9th Foot—all under Bradford commanding Portuguese independent brigade. Why did not Oswald use his own Portuguese brigade, but draw on Bradford? Possibly because Spry’s brigade were discouraged by the failure of their Caçador battalion on the 15th.

[801] Generally in British narratives called the Cask Redoubt, because wine casks had been used to revet the shifting sand of which the soil was there composed.

[802] Batteries 8 and 7 in the map.

[803] Batteries 13 and 14 in the map.

[804] Batteries 12 and 11 in the map.

[805] No. 6 in the map.

[806] There is a curious contradiction between Jones and Belmas as to the fate of the Cask Redoubt. The latter says that the British took it—the former that the garrison abandoned it, though not attacked.

[807] ‘From the looseness of the sand in which the battery was constructed, it was found impossible to keep the soles of the embrasures sufficiently clear to use the three short 24-pounders mounted on ship carriages—after a few rounds they had to cease firing.’ Jones, ii. p. 28.

[808] Burgoyne’s Life and Correspondence, i. p. 267.

[809] Burgoyne, who took out the flag of truce, says that the French officer who met him on the glacis used very angry words (ibid.).

[810] See Dickson Papers, ed. Col. Leslie, p. 970. The second breach is marked as ‘Lesser Breach’ on the map.