[933] Ibid. Bainbrigge was standing close to both.
[934] Larpent, p. 243.
[935] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 219.
[936] Soult to Clarke, July 28.
[937] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 123.
[938] Ibid., p. 124.
[940] Reports of Maucune and Lamartinière dated August 3rd and 4th.
[941] Clausel’s report of August 2.
[942] There is a most curious and difficult point in this history of the first phase of the action. Clausel says, and he is of course a primary authority, that though Conroux was already deeply engaged with the 6th Division, ‘was being fired on from all sides, was suffering severe losses, and had already had one of his brigadiers disabled’ [Schwitter], he told him that he must join in the attack ‘swerving to the left so as to mount the hill in the direction originally assigned to him’, which was done and Conroux immediately repulsed. I cannot see how this was physically possible. How could Conroux, if already disadvantageously engaged with the 6th Division, and ‘fired at from all sides’, break off this fight and attack any point of the hill of Oricain? If he had gone away in that direction, who was there to hold Sorauren against Pack’s people, who were pressing in on it, and (as Clausel says) only a musket-shot away from it? As far as I can make out, Conroux must have been sufficiently employed in fending off Pack and maintaining Sorauren, so as to cover the flank of the other divisions, for the next hour or two. No other authority but Clausel gives any hint that Conroux got away from Pack and joined in the general assault. And I am constrained to think that Clausel (strange as it may seem) is making a misstatement—and that when Conroux is said to have been ordered to attack the hill by swerving to the left, he can only have been keeping off Pack. I note that Vidal de la Blache and Mr. Fortescue try to accept Clausel’s story, but that General Beatson (With Wellington in the Pyrenees, pp. 170-2) ignores it.
[943] I include, in reckoning Picton’s force at Bussaco, his own division and the three battalions of Leith’s first brigade which brought him help. In Cole’s Oricain figures are reckoned the 4th Division, Byng’s brigade, Campbell’s Portuguese, and two Spanish regiments.
[944] Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger.
[945] This exceptional use of grenadiers in the skirmishing line, I get from an observation of Bainbrigge of the 20th, who expresses his surprise that the troops with whom he was engaged, though acting as tirailleurs, were not light infantry, but men in tall bearskin caps like the Guard, ‘some of the finest-looking soldiers I ever met’ (p. 400).
[946] The 10th Caçadores, Campbell’s light battalion, was a very weak unit of only 250 bayonets.
[947] Clausel’s report of August 2.
[948] D’Haw of the 34th Léger.
[949] The fourth battalion of the brigade, the 1/40th was detached below on the Spaniards’ Hill.
[950] Lemonnier-Delafosse, pp. 227-8.
[951] The Buffs lost only 2 men, the 1st Provisional (2/31st and 2/66th) only 5—so can hardly have been engaged,—but the 1/57th had 63 casualties.
[952] The above narrative is reconstructed from Reille’s two reports (the divisional report of Lamartinière, however, is useless) and from narratives of Stretton of the 40th in Maxwell’s Peninsular Sketches, and Mills in the history of the regiment by Smythies.
[953] There is little about this affair in the British narratives. Diarists were rare in the 6th Division. The only point of interest I found in them is the mention of mule-guns used by the French.
[954] Larpent, p. 221. Cf. Napier, v. p. 226: ‘That will give time for the 6th Division to arrive, and I shall beat him’—words true in thought but perhaps never spoken by Wellington.
[955] Lapéne, p. 80.
[956] Soult to Clarke, report of the battle.
[957] See statistics in Appendix XXII.
[958] Narrative of Captain G. Wood of the 1/82nd, pp. 192-3.
[959] See Dickson Papers, Tulloh’s letter, p. 1022.
[960] Hill to Quartermaster-General, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 142.
[961] Dalhousie to Quartermaster-General, ibid.
[962] 28th Léger.
[963] 22nd Chasseurs.
[964] Soult’s general orders of July 23rd.
[965] Soult to Clarke, from Zabaldica, evening of the 28th.
[966] See St. Chamans, quoted above, p. 590.
[967] Expressed most clearly, perhaps, in the Orders issued by the Chief of the Staff, Gazan, to the Corps-Commanders on July 29: ‘L’intention du Général en Chef est de se porter avec toute l’armée sur la communication de Pampelune à St. Estevan.’
[968] Ordre du 29 Juillet; see also Gazan to Reille of same date.
[969] Quartermaster-General to Dalhousie and Hill, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 151.
[970] Ibid., Q.M.G. to Hill, p. 152. In this Da Costa’s brigade is called the Conde de Amarante’s division, but Campbell had not yet joined Da Costa.
[971] Q.M.G. to Alten, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 150-1.
[972] Foy (Girod de l’Ain), p. 219.
[973] These guns did not belong to Brandreth’s battery, the divisional artillery of the 6th Division, but oddly enough to Cairnes’s battery, which belonged to the 7th. See Duncan’s History of the Royal Artillery, ii. p. 190.
[974] Sympher’s, of the K.G.L.
[975] Foy in Girod de l’Ain, p. 220.
[976] That the firing began at dawn immediately is stated by Larpent, p. 210. That the troops were under arms before daylight is noted by the anonymous Soldier of the 42nd, p. 199. The attack by the 6th Division on Sorauren was appreciably before the descent of Cole and Byng from the heights of Oricain.
[977] Girod de l’Ain, p. 221.
[978] 43rd Line (2 battalions).
[979] Maucune’s 34th Léger reports 13 officers and 531 men prisoners out of a strength of 773. Why does Captain Vidal de la Blache, usually accurate, give this as Maucune’s total loss in prisoners? (cf. p. 251). His other battalions contribute another 550. Conroux’s 55th and 58th Line give respectively 282 and 348 prisoners—the other regiments smaller but appreciable lists of captured.
[980] Interesting accounts of this fight may be found in the narratives of Wood of the 82nd, Green of the 68th, and Wheeler of the 51st—all in Inglis’s brigade. They are, however, most confused, none of them having much notion of how or where they came into the general scheme of the fight. All speak of the steepness of the ground.
[981] I cannot make out for certain when Le Cor’s Portuguese joined Dalhousie on the 30th, coming from the Marcalain road, where they had been placed on the previous evening. Probably not early, as they had 64 casualties only (mostly in 2nd Caçadores), while the other brigades had 200 apiece. The fact that the losses are nearly all in the light battalion shows that a skirmishing pursuit was the task of Le Cor’s men.
[982] Clausel’s report is (perhaps naturally) very reticent, and would give a reader who had no other sources to utilize a very inadequate account of the day’s work—no one could possibly gather from it that Conroux lost 600 prisoners and Vandermaesen 300, or that the whole corps was in great disorder. For a picture of Conroux’s division scattered over the hills, and its general storming at the fugitives, see Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 232.
The hours at which events took place on Clausel’s wing are hard to settle. I follow him in making the artillery begin to play on Sorauren long before 7, the infantry attack soon after that hour, and the loss of Sorauren about 9.
[983] So Lamartinière, who admits that there was ‘un peu de désordre’ but confesses much less than Foy, for whose account see Girod de l’Ain, p. 221.
[984] Picton’s division lost 89 in Brisbane’s brigade, 20 among Power’s Portuguese, none in Colville’s brigade.
[985] So Foy. Reille thinks that it was Sarrasibar, 3 miles farther east.
[986] Girod de l’Ain, p. 223.
[987] See Vidal de la Blache, p. 280, for complaints by the French maires of atrocities committed.
[990] All this in Q.M.G. to Hill, &c., in Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 154-5, where it is stupidly printed after the evening orders given at 9 p.m.
[991] Soult says by way of Zubiri, Eugui, and Lanz, which seems a vast circuit—this march must surely have been made on the preceding evening: in the dark it would hardly have been possible.
[992] 75th Line. Darmagnac says in his report that its colonel attacked the second position without orders. Martinien’s lists show that it lost 16 officers—presumably therefore over 300 men.
[993] See casualty tables in Appendix. Maransin had no losses, having never been engaged. Hill made an astounding blunder in estimating his total loss at 400 in his report to Wellington. Nine British and 36 Portuguese officers were hit—exactly the same number as the French officer-casualties.
[994] Hill had Fitzgerald’s and O’Callaghan’s British brigades—2,600 deducting Maya losses, Da Costa’s brigade 2,300, Ashworth’s 2,800, and some squadrons of Long’s light dragoons—about 8,000 in all. D’Erlon had, also deducting 2,000 Maya losses, over 18,000 infantry in his three divisions—not to speak of the cavalry division just arrived.
[995] Soult to Clarke, August 2.
[996] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 152-3.
[997] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 154, written at Ostiz, 30th July, many hours after the preceding note to Alten, also written on the 30th but from Villaba. It is endorsed by G. Murray, Lizaso, 11 a.m., 31st July.
[999] Wellington to Q.M.G., Irurita, 3 p.m.
[1000] Narrative of L’Estrange of the 31st, p. 121.
[1001] In his report, as he explains, ‘je m’occupai de déblayer la route, qui était encombrée d’équipages et de cavalerie.’
[1002] D’Erlon in his report of August 3 says that ‘the majority of the enemy’s soldiers were drunk,’ an involuntary tribute to their wild pluck.
[1003] The 7th Division had a steep scramble and a tough fight; see the diary of Green of the 68th, p. 162.
[1004] A fact mentioned only by D’Erlon and by Rigaud’s history of the 5/60th, Fitzgerald’s corps.
[1005] So I deduce from there being precisely 10 officer-casualties in Abbé’s regiments, according to Martinien’s lists.
[1006] Hill and the Quartermaster-General, George Murray, had settled at 11 a.m. that Wellington’s original order was only ‘momentarily suspended’ and not cancelled, by the necessity for driving in ‘the column of the enemy now retiring by the Donna Maria road.’ Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 163.
[1007] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 159.
[1008] Wellington to O’Donnell, Irurita 6 a.m., on the 1st August. Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 163.
[1009] 1/120th Line of Lamartinière.
[1010] Who were picked up by Reille some miles north of Santesteban, having been sent forward on the Sumbilla road overnight, in charge of the convoy of wounded. See Reille’s Report.
[1011] Reduced to five battalions, since it had detached one regiment to the head of the column, and was short of two battalions which had escaped by Almandoz, and one which had escaped by Zubiri and Eugui following Foy. See above, pp. 699-700.
[1012] The chasseur regiments only—the dragoons having escorted the artillery to Roncesvalles. Place in the column not quite certain—but see the narrative of Lemonnier-Delafosse for P. Soult’s presence.
[1013] To Alten, 12 noon, from near Almandoz. Dispatches, x. p. 574.
[1014] Dispatches, x. p. 573.
[1015] Graham to Wellington, July 30, 5 a.m. Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 156.
[1016] Napier (v. p. 243) and Stanhope (pp. 71-2) both say that they had the anecdote from the Duke himself—but wrote many years after 1813. But Larpent’s absolutely contemporary diary also has the tale (p. 218) written down on August 3, only two days after the supposed event.
[1017] Wellington to O’Donnell. Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 163.
[1018] Some good diarists had been wounded at Sorauren, and fail us after the 28th July.
[1019] One of the French officers killed on August 1, Hutant of the 59th, is registered as ‘tué en défendant l’aigle.’ Now with such absurdly small casualty lists as those shown above, the eagle can only have been in danger if the regiment was ‘on the run.’
[1020] I had immense difficulty in identifying this battalion, which belonged to Barcena’s division, as Wellington mentions in his letter to Lord Liverpool of August 4 (Dispatches, x. p. 598). But Wellington calls it there a cazadore battalion, which it was not, but an old line battalion. The trouble was first to find the composition of Barcena’s division in July 1813, and then to hunt in Spanish regimental histories (those of the Conde de Clonard) for a claim by any of those corps to have been at the bridge of Yanzi on August 1. Alone among all the regiments Asturias makes this claim—but the corps-historian says not one word about its meritorious service—evidently unknown to him.
[1021] Reille says in his report that the order ‘halt,’ issued at the head of the column, was repeated down the column of dragoons and turned in the noise and confusion into ‘demi tour’. Whereupon the rear regiments thought the column was cut off, and galloped back in panic. ‘Halte’ is not very like ‘demi tour’—but there was no doubt about the panic.
[1022] We learn from Lamartinière’s report that it was one of the 118th regiment.
[1023] He declares in his report that he never heard of the trouble until nightfall.
[1024] Report of Maucune, dated August 3.
[1025] Report of Reille.
[1026] Report of the Right Wing—dated that night, August 1.
[1027] D’Erlon complains that he found no French troops whatever facing the bridge—i. e. the 118th and Maucune had disappeared long before his front battalion got up. The battalions engaged were the 5th Léger and 63rd and 64th Line—whose officer-casualties for that day were 1 killed and 8 wounded.
[1028] The best account of all this is in Graham’s report, Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 261.
[1029] All these marches are mainly detailed from the excellent narrative of Quartermaster Surtees of the 3/95th, pp. 223-6, supplemented by that of Captain Cooke of the 1/43rd.
[1032] See above, p. 710. It was written at Ostiz on the night of the 30th, but only sent off by G. Murray from Lizaso on the morning of the 31st.
[1033] See Cooke, i. p. 315.
[1034] Cooke, i. pp. 315-16.
[1035] Some, therefore, of P. Soult’s chasseurs must have been with the rearguard.
[1036] Cooke, i. p. 317.
[1037] Surtees, p. 226.
[1038] Dispatches, x. p. 591.
[1039] Probably also we must add the responsibility for Hill and the 2nd Division being at Elizondo this day, owing to the false march which they had made—on Wellington’s orders—from the Puerto de Arraiz to the Velate road.
[1040] Wellington in Dispatches, xi. p. 7, blames Barcena for this—one would have supposed that Graham and Giron were still more responsible, as they were in higher command.
[1041] Orders for Q.M.G. from Santesteban, 9.30 a.m. Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 164.
[1042] Wellington to Graham, 8 p.m., from Santesteban. Dispatches, x. p. 574.
[1043] Cooke, i. 819.
[1044] A brigadier in Maransin’s division.
[1045] Larpent’s diary, p. 214.
[1046] Harry Smith, i. p. 115.
[1047] Dalhousie to Cairnes in Dickson Papers, ed. Leslie, p. 1020.
[1048] 2/24th and 2/58th.
[1049] Wellington thought this the most desperate and gallant charge he had ever seen. Dispatches, x. p. 591.
[1050] Report of Clausel, August 2. ‘Les troupes relevées n’ayant pu, malgré les efforts des généraux Conroux et Rey, s’arrêter sur la position indiquée, et s’étant jetées sur celles qui repoussaient l’attaque de la direction d’Échalar, il s’ensuivit un peu de confusion, et on fut obligé de les laisser aller jusqu’à l’hauteur de la division Taupin.’
[1051] Ross’s brigade had a few casualties in each battalion—37 in all.
[1052] ‘Devant la division Maransin je n’ai vu que des tirailleurs,’ says Clausel. From the sequence of brigades in the 7th Division, I think these must have been Lecor’s people.
[1053] Cooke, i. p. 320. Both he and Surtees mention that the evicted French battalion was the 2nd Léger—a fact not to be found in the reports of Lamartinière or of Reille.
[1054] The total French loss was probably not very great—as happens when troops give at once, and are not pursued. Conroux’s division only records 5 officer-casualties, Vandermaesen’s 8—which should mean a total casualty list of 300 or so. But it is astonishing to find Reille reporting that Maucune lost only about 20 men; if so, the flank-guard cannot have stood at all.
[1055] Soult to Clarke, August 2, and August 6.
[1056] Dispatches, x. p. 591.
[1057] Ibid., x. p. 611. August 7.
[1058] 6,440 to be exact. Of which 4,708 were British and 1,732 Portuguese. The latter figure is worked out from the detailed Portuguese returns in Appendix No. XXI, and is perceptibly lower than Wellington’s original estimate of 2,300: stragglers no doubt had been rejoining.
[1059] e. g. the troops on the Roncesvalles road, the two battalions of Lamartinière which followed Foy, and Maransin’s 28th Léger from Elizondo—at least 2,500 in all.
[1060] Cassagne succeeded Barrois shortly after.
[1061] After D’Erlon was removed to command the Army of the Centre, this division was at different times under Remond and Semélé.
[1062] Attached to Whittingham. Regiments of Olivenza and Almanza.
[1063] 3rd Léger, properly belonging to Lamarque’s brigade from Catalonia, was short of four companies left in garrisons.
[1064] The second battalions of these corps were left behind, along with the 11th and 20th Ligne, two squadrons of 4th Hussars, one of 24th Dragoons, the 3/5th Léger, and some 250 Italian Light Horse, to hold down the kingdom of Valencia.
[1065] In Portuguese Units officers and men are given together.
[1066] The other Guards’ Brigade, 1st and 3rd batts. of 1st Guards, was left at Oporto and did not rejoin till August.
[1067] 2/31st and 2/66th.
[1068] 2nd and 2/53rd.
[1069] 2/24th and 2/58th.
[1070] These figures are estimated from what was still surviving of each unit when Soult reorganized the army in July 16. The Royal Guards infantry had then 2,019 men, the line cavalry 64 officers and 500 men, the line infantry 1,168, though it had lost over 300 men at Vittoria and a much greater number from desertion. I take it that to allow 300 extra men at the battle for the Guard infantry, 100 more for the Line cavalry, and 800 more for the Line infantry cannot be far out.
[1071] About 40 prisoners of the 1/71st are lost among the general total of 223 ‘missing and stragglers’: these were the only actual prisoners lost in the battle. See p. 416 of this volume.
[1072] i. e. 2/31st and 2/66th.
[1073] i. e. 2nd and 2/53rd.