Before dawn on March 21, 1918, a terrific bombardment along more than fifty miles of the British front, from east of Arras to south of St. Quentin, heralded the opening of the mightiest attack in the history of warfare. More than one hundred divisions—including many transferred from the Russian front—highly trained for the special purpose for which they were to be used, were suddenly launched against less than fifty. The German storm-troops were concentrated in depth on narrow fronts opposite what were judged to be the most vulnerable points in the British line; fresh troops passing through those of the exhausted or shattered divisions that had been used to break open the gaps. Before they could be brought to a standstill still further troops, with hordes of machine-guns, moved forward through the wreckage of the others, forcing their way to the flanks and even to the rear of the British positions. The greater the number shot down the more they seemed to multiply. The enemy was staking everything upon the success of this gigantic onslaught, and he was fighting with a courage, skill, determination, and confidence in numbers which would mean the triumph of Barbarism unless met by still greater resolution and endurance. Forced back by the weight of numbers, the Fifth Army, under General Sir H. de la P. Gough, on the right of the area attacked, and to a lesser extent the Third Army, under General Sir J. H. G. Byng, on the left, withdrew step by step, fighting desperately to stem the overwhelming onslaught, and again fell back still farther as their flanks and rear were enveloped. Village after village, town after town, recovered for France at a heavy price in the earlier British offensives, fell once more into the hands of the enemy; thousands of prisoners, many guns, and great quantities of material were lost.

Divisions in reserve were hurriedly brought forward to block the gaps, and to stem the onrush or check its pace. A certain amount of confusion was unavoidable. The enemy once more seemed to have established control over the weather, the ground remaining firm and dry and a mist screening his movements. At times it was impossible to carry out orders literally, as between their issue and receipt the situation had changed entirely, and defensive positions which brigades or battalions of the relieving divisions had been ordered to take up, were found to be in the occupation of the enemy.

On the morning of the 23rd March the infantry brigades of the 42nd Division, packed into many hundreds of motor-busses and lorries, pressed southwards through St. Pol to Doullens, and then turned north-east along the Arras road to Beaumetz-les-Loges, where they turned south-east in the direction of Ayette, a village more than eight miles south of Arras and nearly eight miles north-west of Bapaume. At this stage of the journey they were met by straggling groups of refugees, women, children, and old men, hastening with the more portable of their poor possessions out of the reach of Hun savagery and rapacity. Some of these homeless wanderers appeared haggard and despairing; some numbed and hopeless; others simply bewildered. It was a pitiful and pathetic sight, which aroused feelings of mingled pity and anger, and intensified the Lancashire men’s longing to get to close quarters with the oppressor. They were to have their wish. Those who had joined the Division since August 1915 found the few remaining days of March more crammed with incident and fighting than the whole of their previous careers.

As they drew nearer to their destination progress became more and more difficult, the roads being packed with troops moving in the same direction; and with an increasing stream of traffic retiring before the enemy’s advance. The Divisional Commander and G.S.O. 1. (Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Guy, D.S.O.) had gone on some hours in advance of the Division to reconnoitre, glean information, and attempt to unravel the tangled skein of conflicting reports. At 5 p.m. on March 23, D.H.Q. was established at Adinfer, about two miles north-east of Ayette. The 125th and 126th Brigades debussed at 7 p.m. and proceeded to Adinfer Wood to bivouac. In the wood were many green woodpeckers, which greeted the men with their jeering cry. “Aye, you can — well laugh!” growled a Salford man, for the night spent in this wood was not a cheerful or restful one. There was a keen frost, and as fires were forbidden, most of the men tried to find warmth by walking up and down during the night. Before midnight the 127th Brigade debussed on the Ayette—Douchy road and took up an outpost position, facing south-east, with two battalions in the outpost line on the Ablainzevelle—Moyenneville Ridge, a few miles south-east of Adinfer, with Brigade H.Q. at Courcelles Aerodrome. Owing to the congested state of the roads the transport was unable to rejoin the Division until the night of the 25th. The Division was therefore without horses or wagons; there were no telephones and no mounted messengers. The Divisional Commander succeeded in borrowing horses from the 40th Division for the many reconnaissances made prior to taking over command of the sector. But great as the difficulties were, they were many times greater when it came to actual command in battle.

The situation was obscure, changing as it did from hour to hour. As the enemy thrust forward, gaining here and there, by weight of numbers, a position of tactical importance threatening a flank, plans must be hurriedly re-cast and movements diverted or stopped. At 2 p.m. on March 24 orders were received from the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Haldane, for the relief of the 40th Division by the 42nd that night on the right sector of the 6th Corps front. The Divisional Commander went round the 40th Division’s advanced lines, and at 2 p.m., in the 40th D.H.Q. two miles east of Bucquoy, he issued orders to his Brigadiers. The 125th and 126th Brigades were moved up to Logeast Wood to facilitate the relief, and Divisional H.Q. was moved to Monchy-au-Bois. At 6 p.m. notification was received that the 40th Division would leave outposts in front of a line east of the Arras—Bapaume road, running north and south through the villages of Ervillers, Behagnies, and Sapignies, a few miles north of Bapaume, which was now in the enemy’s hands, and these would be withdrawn when the 42nd were in position. The 125th Brigade was ordered to take over the right sub-sector and the 127th the left, the 126th being in Divisional Reserve. A Special Order of the Day was issued by Major-General Solly-Flood—

Along the road from Bapaume, through Achiet-le-Grand, batteries of heavy guns were being withdrawn to positions farther back, and processions of wounded, and the personnel of stationary hospitals and clearing stations, were moving to the rear as the infantry brigades set off at dusk. They proceeded in a north-easterly direction towards Gomiecourt, where they expected to be met by guides who would lead them to the positions they were to take over from the 40th Division, which had been in action for forty-eight hours about Mory—more than two miles east of Gomiecourt—and had suffered heavily. Twice had Mory been taken by the enemy, and twice re-taken by counter-attack, and fighting was still in progress there. The region through which the Brigades passed was familiar to many, though it wore a very different aspect now, and as the rifle-range used during the previous summer and the old camp of the 125th Brigade were passed, the contrast between the conditions then and now was the subject of much comment. Instead of the lines of canvas tents one could see dimly the heavy artillery in action and, when the gun-flashes lighted up the surroundings, the horses harnessed ready to remove the guns in case of emergency. Soon after the leading battalion had left Gomiecourt a Staff Officer of the 40th Division brought word that “as the enemy are reported to have broken through between Sapignies and Behagnies,” the order for the relief had been cancelled, so he diverted the direction of the 125th and 127th Brigades. The report that the enemy had broken through at Sapignies was later found to be incorrect. The 127th Brigade, deflected to the right—that is, to the south instead of to the east—moved across the open in artillery formation, and the 125th before long passed diagonally across their lines. The enemy were pressing to the north and north-west through the gap made by their break-through at Bapaume, and the leading brigades had turned south and south-east to stand across their path. Near Forest Lodge the 126th Brigade met the same Staff Officer, but as Brigadier-General Seymour knew that the other Brigades had changed direction, he considered that they would be able to deal with the situation on the right, and decided to carry out the original orders. The 127th Brigade was therefore on the right of the divisional front, facing south and south-east; the 125th in the centre, facing south-east and east; and the 126th (supposed to be in Divisional Reserve) on the left, facing east and north-east. Commanding officers, subordinate officers and men of all three Brigades deserve the greatest credit for the skilful dispositions made under such unfavourable conditions. The difficult operation of taking up defensive positions on ground that had not been reconnoitred had been accomplished in darkness.

About midnight on the 24th-25th the 127th Brigade was in position, facing south-east, with outposts on the Bihucourt—Sapignies road, and the 6th Manchesters on the right, near Bihucourt, established touch with the 41st Division. At 1 a.m. on the 25th Sapignies and Behagnies were reported clear of the enemy by the Lancashire Fusiliers, who took up a line facing east on the high ground east of the Arras—Bapaume road, covering those two villages. Stragglers from other divisions passed through and gave much conflicting information as to what had happened and was happening. A telephone message from Corps H.Q. stated that the enemy had possession of Ervillers, as well as of Mory, but this report, like many others received from the rear at this time, proved unfounded, for patrols of the 10th Manchesters discovered that Ervillers was clear of the enemy. This battalion was then ordered to push two companies forward and take up a position on the south-western edge of the village, and send patrols through it. This was done and touch obtained with the 31st Division.

Thus the Division went into battle on the morning of March 25 with all three infantry brigades in the line. It possessed neither transport for units nor horses for reconnoitring, and the lack of means of rapid reconnaissance and inter-communication was sorely felt. Though the Motor-Cycle Dispatch Riders of the Signal Company proved invaluable, the Signal Company was unable to function properly until its transport arrived; and during the following two or three days a heavy expenditure of cable was caused by the continual moving of Divisional and Brigade Headquarters. The Division was not covered by its own artillery, and two infantry brigades of the 40th Division and one of the 59th Division were still in the line. However, Major-General Solly-Flood took over the command of the sector, and the Division was then transferred from the 6th Corps to the 4th Corps under Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper.

At dawn the enemy attacked along the whole divisional front. The 10th Manchesters pushed two companies forward through Ervillers to the north-eastern outskirts, and brought up a third company on their right into a trench which ran parallel with the Ervillers—Behagnies road. In this trench were men from various brigades, practically “done in” after four days of hard fighting without rest; but when Lieut.-Colonel Peel enrolled these oddments among his own men it was found that they could still fight gallantly. At 8.45 a.m. a message was received from the 125th Brigade reporting that other troops were falling back, and asking whether the Division was to conform. The Divisional Commander replied that the Division would fight on the position taken up, and no withdrawal would take place without orders. This message was repeated to the other infantry brigades, and two M.G. companies were moved up to cover the flanks. Machine and Lewis gunners had carried their guns into action a distance of seven to ten miles, and in the absence of transport all ammunition had been carried by the troops. It was not the ideal prelude to a thirty-hours’ battle against odds.

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. (March 25), owing to the withdrawal of troops of the 40th Division, the enemy penetrated the north end of Sapignies, in spite of a gallant attempt to check their advance on the part of the 5th L.F. and a company of the 7th, who held an angle in the line a little way beyond the village. The enemy massed his machine-guns, and brought up a battery of field-guns, concentrating his fire upon this point. “A” Company of the 5th L.F. was enveloped on three sides, but fought until all ammunition was spent. A dozen men got away, and a few were captured, but the rest of the company became casualties. Lieut.-Colonel Holberton, commanding the 5th L.F., brought up two companies of the 8th L.F., who were in support, and Major M. G. Bird and Captain Fairhurst, the O.C. and Adjutant of the 8th, collected headquarters details and led them forward. The counter-attack was a brilliant one, and Sapignies was regained, and a line established east of the village. Major Bird, who was awarded the D.S.O., was unfortunately seriously wounded. Shortly afterwards the enemy again succeeded in entering and pushing through Sapignies, but was met by the 5th Manchesters on the Sapignies—Bihucourt road, and driven back into the village.

As the enemy was reported to be assembling east and south-east of Bihucourt, a company of the 6th Manchesters under Captain S. L. Bridgford was ordered there. It arrived simultaneously with the Germans, and, in spite of their great numerical superiority, immediately attacked them. Fighting desperately, the company was forced out of the village step by step, but in a brilliant counter-attack the ground was regained by sheer grit, backed by superiority with the bayonet. Again overwhelming numbers prevailed, and the survivors of the company were once more driven out. With the handful that remained Bridgford made another gallant effort, but he was severely wounded and died in the enemy’s hands. The prompt and determined action of this company gained time for troops to be moved in support, and prevented the enemy debouching from Bihucourt. Had they been able to do so and reach Achiet-le-Grand, they could have commanded the reverse slopes of the ridge on which rested the centre of the Brigade. The O.C. 6th Manchesters was ordered to deny Achiet-le-Grand to the enemy at all costs, and the Pioneer Battalion (7th N.F.) was placed at his disposal. The 6th Manchesters, however, accomplished their task, though heavily engaged and under increasing artillery fire, without calling upon the Pioneers.

Towards midday the situation about Bihucourt on the right of the divisional front having become critical, the Tanks in Logeast Wood were ordered to counter-attack, and the 62nd Division, which had moved up to Bucquoy during the morning, was called upon to support the right flank of the Division about Achiet-le-Petit. This manœuvre was successful, four Tanks with a detachment of the 127th Brigade inflicting heavy casualties. About 2 p.m. scouts of the 5th East Lancashires on the left confirmed the report that the enemy had seized Behagnies and were advancing on Gomiecourt in strong force.[13] Lieut.-Colonel Clare, commanding the 5th East Lancashires, seeing that this move threatened to cut off his own battalion and also the 10th Manchesters between Gomiecourt and Ervillers, immediately sent forward headquarters details to hold the enemy back for a few precious moments. The handful of scouts, police, signallers, and runners reached the ridge in front of the enemy and, having good targets at short range, did great execution. Time was thus gained for two companies of the battalion to advance from the cross-roads south-east of Gomiecourt in artillery formation, shaking out into extended order below the crest, and doubling forward into fire positions from which they opened rapid fire, breaking up two lines of infantry in extended order not more than 200 yards away. Two Lewis guns were then brought to bear upon a large body in close formation farther back, scattering it. The remaining companies were brought up, and the battalion linked up with the 125th Brigade. The enemy’s losses were heavy, and the position appeared to be satisfactory.

Meanwhile the 10th Manchesters had achieved fame by their defence of Ervillers, and Oldham folk will always regard with pride the distinction their men earned here. Eight separate determined attacks upon the battalion had been made by superior numbers, but the 10th, assisted by a company of machine-gunners which had been pushed up to cover their left flank, had repulsed them all, losing good men, but inflicting far greater loss upon the enemy. For this day’s work the 10th Manchesters had the honour to be one of the very few battalions mentioned individually in Sir Douglas Haig’s despatch. But, owing to the withdrawal to the Courcelles line of a brigade of the division on their left, they were forced to withdraw from the village about 9.30 p.m., and take up a position 1000 yards east of Gomiecourt. The Divisional Artillery, which had arrived about noon, and had immediately come into action, now covered the divisional front, some of the batteries being within 800 yards of the front line, and Battery D/211 had every gun knocked out.

About 10 p.m. (March 25), the 125th Brigade, which had dug in on the ridge between Gomiecourt and the Ervillers—Behagnies road, with the 7th L.F. on the right, the 5th on the left, and the 8th in support, was again heavily attacked. Lieut.-Colonel Holberton, with his habitual disregard of personal safety, walked along the line encouraging and heartening his men, and was shot through the head and killed instantly. Colonel Holberton, who went out with the Division in September 1914 as Adjutant of the 6th Manchesters, was a fine soldier and cheery, gallant comrade, whose death was deplored by all ranks throughout the Division.

At 11 p.m. the Division was still fighting on the ground it had taken up the previous night, with a large extension of front, which had been increased from the original 4000 yards to nearly 10,000, with both flanks in the air, and the Divisional Reserve consisting of two half-companies of machine-guns, one company of pioneers, and a Field Company R.E. as escort to the guns. The right was now thrown back, with two Field Companies and the 7th Northumberland Fusiliers holding the railway, covering the gap between Achiet-le-Grand and Achiet-le-Petit. On the right the 127th Brigade held the spurs covering the former village, its left joining up with the 125th Brigade, which was fighting in the outskirts of Behagnies and Bee Wood, and the 126th, slightly echeloned back, continued the line to the trenches and Sunken Road just west of Ervillers. The Divisional Artillery were now ordered to withdraw to positions south of Ablainzevelle and, a few hours later, to the Essarts Valley. The transport rejoined late at night. The arrival of fresh divisions and the withdrawal of those which needed rest had blocked the roads for a time. Most of the roads crossed in Bucquoy village, and before noon on March 25 these were completely congested by masses of vehicles which could neither get on nor get out. The confusion appeared hopeless, and had the enemy seriously shelled or bombed these roads the result would have been appalling. The prompt freeing of the roads was essential, and the “A” and “Q” Staffs and the A.P.M. were ordered to concentrate their energies on this job. Ditches were filled in, barbed wire cut down, traffic diverted across country, and efficient controls posted. By 4 p.m. a steady stream of traffic was moving along the roads, and by 10 p.m. the Divisional Transport reached its rendezvous. The R.A. and R.A.S.C. were then admirably prompt and efficient in locating and supplying units under the most trying and difficult conditions. In particular the congestion on the Hannescamps—Essarts road during those days could only be overcome by combined skill, determination, and coolness. On this road the Divisional Artillery lost more drivers and horses than in any other place. But even under such abnormal conditions rations and ammunition never failed to reach the troops, and hot meals were frequently served to the men in the front line. For four days Dispatch Riders[14] were in the saddle day and night, and their endurance, pluck, and skill in dodging the traffic and getting their messages through had been of invaluable service to the Division.

The enemy was again working round the flanks, and, in the early hours of March 26, in accordance with orders from the Corps Commander, the withdrawal of the Division began, and was carried out in three successive bounds—first, to the line Achiet-le-Grand—Moyenneville railway; then to the Forest Lodge—Courcelles line, and finally to the Bucquoy—Ablainzevelle line. The troops were in position here at 10 a.m., and on this last line the enemy was successfully held.[15] The withdrawals were accomplished in good order, and, in the case of the 127th Brigade, units slipped away before the enemy was aware of their retirement, rifle fire being maintained on their late positions for some time after they had gone. Some units, however, were followed up hotly, and enemy pressure forced retiring troops to halt from time to time and open covering fire from different parts of the line, inflicting heavy casualties upon the Germans. A withdrawal in daylight, in close touch with the enemy, is a ticklish operation under any conditions, and the retirement of the troops on either flank some hours earlier added greatly to the difficulties. The companies of the M.G. Battalion did good work in covering each retirement, and the support from the artillery was always effective. Enormous losses were suffered by the enemy at each stage. During the day strong enemy attacks were delivered in front of Bucquoy, but were stopped by artillery, machine gun and rifle fire.

On the morning of the 27th March the headquarters of all three infantry brigades were established in deep dugouts in the vicinity of Essarts, about 2000 yards north-west of Bucquoy. From 8 a.m. enemy aircraft showed great activity, and at 10.15 a.m. heavy hostile shelling began. During the morning an enemy assembly for attack, in Nissen huts south of Ablainzevelle, and a massing near Ablainzevelle Cemetery, were broken up by our artillery. At 2.40 p.m. shelling of the front line became very heavy, but the enemy massing for attack in Ablainzevelle Wood and Village were dispersed by the Divisional Artillery, assisted by the German guns which, shooting short, did much damage to their own infantry. At 3 p.m. an attack from Logeast Wood was shattered by artillery, machine-gun, and rifle-fire. During the night a patrol of the 6th Manchesters entered Ablainzevelle, killed several Germans, and brought back two machine-guns, the officer in command being severely wounded just before regaining his own lines. The initiative shown in this little affair gained the Divisional Commander’s congratulations for the battalion.

The boundaries between the 4th and 6th Corps had been continually changing. This caused much alteration of wagon-lines, rear headquarters, etc., and the difficulties were not lessened by such alarmist rumours from the rear as that the enemy had broken through into the Ayette Valley to the north, and as there was a right-angle bend in the British line south of Bucquoy, on the right of the Division’s front, this would mean that both flanks of the Division were enveloped. The rumour was denied by the 126th Brigade, who stated that they were in touch with the 4th Guards Brigade, 31st Division. Patrols sent out to Ayette and Le Quesnoy Farm found that the line on the left of the Division had not been penetrated, and at 2 a.m. on the 28th the 126th Brigade and the 4th Guards Brigade reported the position satisfactory, the Guards Division having extended to its right and joined up with the 4th Guards Brigade, thus closing the gap. Two companies of the 125th were sent to reinforce the 126th. The trenches now taken over by the Division were as bad as they could possibly be, having been disused for years. They were, moreover, open to fire on three sides, and as rain had been falling for some time, and showed no sign of stopping, they were knee-deep in mud and water.

At 8.15 a.m. on the 28th after a heavy bombardment of the divisional front, an enemy attack developed from the direction of Ablainzevelle, and was broken up by rifle, machine-gun, and Lewis-gun fire. A second attack at 10.15 a.m., the enemy advancing in three waves from Logeast Wood, was repulsed, chiefly by infantry fire. An hour later large parties from the same direction were met in the open and driven back, except at one point where the enemy obtained a footing in our lines. The 6th and 8th Manchesters at once counter-attacked with the bayonet, and all Germans who had entered our lines were killed or captured. At 1.30 p.m. a bombing attack was made against the left of the 127th Brigade. The 6th Manchesters again counter-attacked and captured two machine-guns and an officer. While one of the hottest attacks of the day was in progress Corporal A. Brooks, 6th Manchesters, noticed that his men were short of rifle-oil and that the bolts of the rifles, from incessant use, were not working freely. In the face of the enemy machine-guns and rifles the corporal calmly moved along the line of his platoon with an oil-can, personally oiled the bolts—and survived. At 7.10 p.m. concentrated machine-gun fire inflicted heavy losses on the enemy assembling in Nissen huts between Ablainzevelle and Logeast Wood.

As Fonquevillers had become a shell storm centre D.H.Q. was moved to St. Amand. During the night of the 28th March the Division took over 1500 yards of front on its right flank from the 62nd Division, and a Field Company R.E. was moved up in close support of each infantry brigade. The 123rd Brigade, 41st Division, was placed at the disposal of the Divisional Commander as a reserve. Within the space of forty-eight hours the enemy had made eight attacks upon the Division, but only on the one occasion had he entered our line, to be driven out immediately at the point of the bayonet. The number of effectives in the three infantry brigades and their condition were now reported as follows—

But in spite of weary bodies cheerfulness pervaded the Division, though most of the men could not understand why they had been ordered to withdraw on the 26th, after proving that they could do more than hold their own against Jerry. Open warfare of this sort was more to their taste than the monotonous trench warfare had been. “Simply topping fighting!” was an officer’s opinion. “Bit of change like, this ’ere, from the trenches,” observed one Wigan man to another after four days of hard fighting without sleep. After due consideration the other replied: “Aye, mate, this is a bit of aw reet; it favours a b— picnic.”

The sappers had been sent up in support, and though instructions had been given that they were not to be used in the front line, they made their way into it and even sent out patrols. They and the 7th Northumberland Fusiliers, who were also being used as front-line troops, captured prisoners. The battle surplus of battalions had been formed into a composite battalion, to be used as a fighting unit if required, but this was not found necessary, as the enemy’s progress was stayed. March 29 was a comparatively quiet day. The great German Offensive had been definitely checked on this part of the Third Army’s front by the determination and fighting qualities of all ranks and all arms. On the night of the 29th-30th the Division was relieved by the 41st Division and given a couple of days in the second-line trenches, in the Hébuterne—Gommecourt sector, with the exception of the 126th Brigade and “B” Company, M.G. Battalion, which remained at Essarts at the disposal of the G.O.C., 41st Division. The Divisional Artillery now occupied positions around Essarts, and there was no chance of even two days’ rest for them.

The Division had entered upon these operations under exceptionally difficult circumstances. South of Arras the whole British front was being pushed back. Information was indefinite and conflicting. Owing to the congestion of the roads, the constant changes of positions and the consequent difficulties of keeping in touch, the troops had had to rely for a time on emergency rations solely. They had been pitted against specially selected and trained storm-troops, greatly superior in numbers and imbued with the confidence and enthusiasm which a triumphant advance is bound to inspire. On several occasions both flanks of the Division had been left in the air, but even then it had proved its ability to hold its ground stubbornly and cheerfully until ordered to retire; and its withdrawals had been carried out in good order and with exemplary steadiness. The Divisional Commander was more than pleased with his officers and men; he was now confident of their fighting spirit and skill, as they were confident in his leadership; and when the Division was relieved he issued the following Special Order of the Day—

Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper, commanding the 4th Corps, telegraphed—

The Division returned to the front line on the night of April 1-2, the 125th Brigade and the 1/7th Northumberland Fusiliers holding the right sub-sector, and the 126th Brigade and the three Field Companies, R.E., the left, with the 127th Brigade in support. All three infantry brigades had their headquarters in Essarts, a village on which a disproportionate amount of “hate” seemed to be concentrated. On the night of the 2nd the 125th Brigade raided a new enemy work east of the Bucquoy—Ablainzevelle road and established a strong point in the work; and at 2 a.m. on the 3rd the 32nd Division, on the left of the 42nd, made a successful attack upon Ayette, capturing 200 prisoners, and establishing a line east of Ayette.

At 5 a.m. on the 5th of April the 125th Brigade front and the neighbourhood of Essarts were heavily shelled, gas being freely used. The 126th Brigade, moving into support trenches at Essarts, suffered very severely, the 10th Manchesters losing more men than in the whole of the previous twelve days fighting. H.E. and gas shells alternately poured down for the space of five hours. The night was pitch-black, as the men stumbled along the muddy trenches, unable to see or breathe. The trenches, already a foot deep in mud, were described as “slime and blood, carpeted with bodies.” But when the bombardment lifted, the men extracted their dead and wounded comrades, and resumed their tasks, their resolve to “best the Boche” being no whit abated. The Composite Battalion, also near Essarts, had fifty casualties, and the Divisional Artillery also suffered, though less severely. At 8 a.m., under cover of a trench-mortar hurricane bombardment, which inflicted very heavy casualties, not only among the front-line troops but also in the reserve companies, and completely destroyed a machine-gun section, the enemy attacked and succeeded in throwing back the left of the 8th Lancashire Fusiliers, the two companies being wiped out almost to a man. The 7th L.F. and the right company of the 8th were able to hold their ground, and the latter began to work its way up the trench to the north, but was forced to fall back when nearly surrounded, owing to the retirement of the left company of the left battalion of the division on its right. All lines being down, communication was bad, but at 11.40 a.m. orders were issued that the survivors of the 8th L.F. must eject the enemy at once. They counter-attacked, and at noon reached the main cross-roads in Bucquoy, where hand-to-hand fighting took place amid the ruins of the village. Lieut.-Colonel St. Leger Davies[16] was mortally wounded by machine-gun fire, and Captain G. W. Sutton, M.C. assumed command and successfully organized the consolidation of the line regained until he, too, was severely wounded. Very fierce fighting continued, and two platoons of the 5th L.F. were brought up. The counter-attack progressed favourably until the line of the Bucquoy—Ayette road was reached, when it was held up by machine-gun fire. Touch had again been lost with the battalion on the right, and the 5th L.F., bringing up their remaining company, formed a defensive flank in touch with the 7th L.F., and the attack was brought to a standstill. The fighting, which had been very bitter all day, gradually died down, and at 8 p.m. the front was quiet, touch being regained on the right flank during the night.

The morning of the 6th was quiet except for artillery fire on both sides. Later information revealed the fact that the attack of the previous day on the divisional front formed part of one of the fiercest and last attacks with which the enemy followed up his initial offensive. Its repulse proved of very great importance. The 5th East Lancashires were put at the disposal of the 125th Brigade, and their place on Henley Hill, the key to the position between Essarts and Ablainzevelle, was taken by the Composite Battalion. Later in the day the 126th Brigade was moved to Souastre, and on the following night the other infantry brigades were also relieved by the 62nd Division, D.H.Q. being opened at Pas Château, about ten miles west of Bucquoy. On the night of the 8th the R.E., the M.G. Battalion, and the Pioneer Battalion were relieved, and also a company of the 8th Manchesters, which by some mischance had not been relieved on the previous day. Being naturally annoyed at this delay the company vented its displeasure upon the Boche by raiding Ablainzevelle, inflicting many casualties, and capturing prisoners and a machine-gun.

The casualties in the Division from March 24 to April 8 numbered 126 officers and 2839 other ranks, but heavy as this total was, the loss inflicted upon the enemy by the Division was far greater. The evacuation of the wounded had proceeded smoothly in spite of the heavy traffic and congestion at the Dressing Stations, and very few casualties had fallen into the hands of the enemy. No man did better work for the wounded than Padre E. C. Hoskyns, M.C., attached to the 7th Manchesters. At Achiet-le-Grand, on March 24, he collected a large number of casualties of many units and of various divisions, tended them under heavy fire, and, though himself slightly wounded, remained with them until they could be evacuated. Later, he collected wounded and stragglers, organized carrying-parties, and got the last party safely off just before the enemy arrived. Good work was done by the Military Police, who had a very difficult task in managing traffic about Bucquoy, Essarts, and Hannescamps, and who performed acts of conspicuous gallantry. The Signal Company had shown its usual efficiency, intrepidity and capacity for hard work.

Machine-gunners and Lewis-gunners were sorely tried by the need to carry their guns a distance of seven miles or more into action before undergoing the sufficiently severe strain of continuous fighting. The M.G. Battalion, splendidly led by its Commander, Lieut.-Colonel W. K. Tillie, D.S.O., had done its full share in the gallant and successful resistance made at Ervillers, Bucquoy, Ablainzevelle and elsewhere. The efficacy of the Lewis-gun was clearly brought out, and was enhanced by the initiative of the personnel who used it. It was also satisfactory to note the effective use of infantry weapons, particularly the rifle, and the reliance placed upon them by the men after the first few hours fighting. The attention that had recently been given to rifle practice proved invaluable, for the men discovered that provided they applied the lessons learnt, the enemy had little chance of getting to close quarters.

Two of the factors that contributed to the Division’s success may be summarized as follows—

(1) The spirit of mutual trust and camaraderie, from the highest to the lowest, which had been fostered in the Division. While the spirit of emulation to carry out the Divisional Motto animated every unit, each knew that it could rely confidently upon the others.

(2) The rigorous training of the Division in the offensive method of defence in depth, and the system of holding tactical localities by units—as opposed to long lines—combined with preparedness for immediate local counter-attack.

Every branch of the divisional organization had been severely proved in the fire of this epic struggle, and had stood the test gloriously. It is impossible to praise too highly the conduct of all ranks throughout the operations, the initiative of the subordinate commanders in directing and controlling their commands, and the tenacity, keenness and fighting spirit of all arms and all ranks. Whether repelling attacks, or counter-attacking, or withdrawing in accordance with orders, their cheerfulness and high spirits never flagged. They were quite confident that they could “lick Jerry” at any time or in any place, and however weak and exhausted the flesh might be the spirit was always willing. The reply given by a brigade to H.Q. inquiry as to its state of exhaustion is typical: “Can’t march, but can fight.”