Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd, 1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me.

“Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end—security against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged that, le cas échéant, Russia would be informed of the existence of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident. This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation. It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty, because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists in France may be endangered, and that the intimacy between Austria and England may cool down. I cannot conceive how such far-reaching political combinations can possibly be made to depend upon the hazard of a Minister of the French Republic who is on the point of being overthrown. The Anglo-Austrian intimacy must after all be very shaky if it depends upon the date of the ratification of a treaty. In view of the consideration shown by Austria for the susceptibilities of France and her apprehensions as to a coolness with England, Milutin’s opinion as to the possibility of a Triple Alliance may after all not be entirely unfounded.

“Now, another circumstance has arisen which may open a way out of the dilemma in which I find myself between my conscience and honour so far as Russia is concerned, and the objections raised to my views on the Austrian side. In reply to my telegraphic inquiry, you have informed me by wire of what Saburoff told you under instructions from the Emperor. You infer from these communications that Russia has already got wind of our Austrian negotiations (as is quite natural), and you wish to conclude from the defensive attitude, which, according to Saburoff’s assurance, Russia intends in future to maintain that this assurance must have been a consequence of the knowledge obtained respecting our negotiations. In these circumstances it might be possible to immediately carry out the suggestion made by me on page 3 as to the manner of communicating our proposed arrangement with Austria, and to give the treaty a general character, not only by omitting the name of Russia, but by inviting her to join in the treaty. You yourself have said to Saburoff that you are thoroughly in favour of the maintenance of the Three Emperors’ Alliance; and the same idea occurs in the memorandum, the protocol, and the treaty. What, then, could be simpler than to confirm in a real written treaty the Drei Kaiser Bündniss which has hitherto been merely verbal, or, at most, only had a written basis in the St. Petersburg-Vienna arrangement? You yourself have further told Saburoff that you would not be able to co-operate in any policy by which Austria would be endangered. It is as right as it is important that Russia should thus receive the first official intimation of that of which it has already got wind. Inasmuch as our Ambassador at St. Petersburg will have informed Minister Giers of your interview with Saburoff, I would ask whether his assurance that Russia would henceforth only pursue a defensive policy based on the Treaty of Berlin is authentic, and whether it signifies a defensive policy as against Germany and Austria. If a satisfactory answer were received, and this were immediately communicated to Austria, there would be no further obstacle in the way of ourselves and Austria acquainting the Emperor Alexander in the manner above mentioned (page 3) with the projected treaty, and inviting his adhesion.

“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2 would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire for the revanche is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With regard to our—Germany’s—position in a war with France I differ from Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts, which—even if broken through—would render it impossible to send reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in 1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege. Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river.

“For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war, but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard to Russia.”

Continuation of this Imperial communication to the Chancellor, dated Baden, October 4th: “I had not finished the enclosed letter to you yesterday when your long telegram arrived, so that I had still to add the last three-quarters of a page. The standpoint taken by me in this letter has not been affected by my resolve to approve conditionally of the Vienna proposal. But I again ask you what are we to reply if, in reference to the Memorandum to be communicated to him, the Emperor Alexander should ask: ‘What, then, have you decided to do in connection with this Memorandum? most probably concluded an agreement? Until I am acquainted with it, I can come to no decision, therefore show me this agreement.’ But as the agreement in its present form cannot be shown to Russia, we must decline to produce it; and what impression must this refusal make upon the Emperor Alexander? Certainly the very worst. The wording of section 2 is, to my mind, so very strange that I merely wanted to sum up the enclosure by proposing that the neutrality of Austria in case of our being attacked by France be struck out, and Austria be called upon to assume the same obligation to stand by us with her entire strength that we undertake towards Austria in section 1, in case of a Russian attack. Otherwise the conditions are not equal. Strongly impress this upon Andrassy once more.

“William.”

Letter from Andrassy to Bismarck, dated 3rd October, 1879: “I have received your much esteemed letter of the 29th of September, for which I return my warmest thanks. I have since then received through Prince Reuss some communications referring to the position of the negotiations. I enclose them herewith in the form in which they were written down by Prince Reuss himself. I am in a position to declare myself in agreement with the intention manifested in this proposal, but I have nevertheless some scruples as to two points. The first is that a treaty is spoken of, and the second that the conclusion of the treaty is described as impending in the future. My objection to the first is that, if the intention to conclude a treaty is expressly emphasised in the letter of his Majesty the Emperor William, it follows necessarily that they will ask for the text at St. Petersburg, and this will afford the Russian Cabinet, before things are settled between us, an opportunity to commence negotiations à trois from which I do not anticipate a satisfactory result for any of the parties. For this reason I venture to submit a counter, or, more correctly, a parallel proposal, the adoption of which would, it seems to me, be of advantage to both sides. This is:—

“After having sanctioned the signature of the Treaty (underlined by Bismarck in pencil) his Majesty the Emperor William can communicate the entire contents (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of the Memorandum agreed upon and signed by us, which, of course, implies an agreement, adding on his own part the explanation that this agreement at the same time involves a tacit understanding by both Governments that an attack upon either Empire will be regarded as directed against both, and will also be construed by his Majesty in that sense. His Majesty, satisfied with the statement made by Saburoff, respecting Russia’s love of peace, makes this communication as a proof of his loyalty and frankness. His Majesty may, perhaps, add that this understanding is of an entirely defensive character, and that there is nothing to prevent Russia from removing any antagonistic tendency by herself adhering to the principles laid down in the Memorandum. (Pencil-marked in the margin by Bismarck.) By this means the object of the Emperor William would be fully attained, namely, to communicate the significance of our understanding, while, on the other hand, no mention would be made of the existence of a more precise agreement, and, therefore, the necessity of communicating it would be avoided.

“Such a communication of the text would have among other things the disadvantage, first, that the adhesion of Russia to this text is inconceivable; secondly, that the passage in it referring to France and Italy would become known there almost immediately, and would, at the present time, give rise to quite unnecessary combinations; and, thirdly, that the affair might transpire in Parliament, and lead to undesirable discussions. These considerations commend my proposal. Should you not be able to secure its acceptance in the competent quarter, I could agree to any other method, including the suggestion made by Stolberg, my most gracious master having before his departure declared that he would not make a conditio sine quâ non of preserving secrecy as to the Treaty after signature.

“There is, on the other hand, one point which I would regard as entirely out of the question, namely, any communication of the existence and contents of the Treaty before the sanction of his Majesty, the Emperor William, is actually given or is assured. (Bismarck added in pencil: ‘Quite right.’) Without desiring to forestall the decision upon this point of my most gracious master, I should prefer to renounce altogether the conclusion of an agreement, and in any case I should be obliged to forego for my own part any further share in the negotiations upon such basis. Pray excuse, dear Prince, the somewhat abrupt tone of this statement, but as the matter appeared to me to be pressing, I desired to let Prince Reuss have the letter to-day. Begging you to present my respects to the Princess, I remain, with unalterable and cordial respect,

“Your sincerely devoted,

“Andrassy.”

The Crown Prince writes to Bismarck (quite confidentially) from Baden-Baden, on the 4th of October, 1879: “Count Stolberg will have already informed you prior to the receipt of these lines of the course of affairs up to the signing of the draft Treaty by the Emperor. I therefore say nothing more about this very exciting crisis, the result of which I confidently anticipate will be of far-reaching importance for the position of Germany. I must point out, however, that his Majesty is quite miserable, and keeps on repeating that he has dishonoured himself by his decision, and has been disloyal to his friend the Tsar; so that one clearly sees how fearfully difficult the decision was for him, with his extreme conscientiousness.”

Draft (dated Varzin, October 30th, 1879) of a verbal answer to be made to the Emperor Alexander in reply to any question which he might ultimately put: “An institution which arose under the influence of Alexander I. and which preserved the peace of central Europe for half a century, had to be sacrificed in 1866 to irresistible necessity. The German Confederation was an excessive burden to us Prussians, while it did not satisfy the aspirations of the other Germans. The discontent thus created was utilised by the revolutionary party, for the purpose of threatening every German Prince. It was necessary to deprive them of this weapon, and to satisfy the national sentiment. This was done at the expense of the security which the Confederation afforded, almost without cost, to its weaker members.

“That the breach caused by the secession of Austria, which extended from the Carpathians to the Lake of Constance, would have to be filled up was recognised even in the Paulskirche. Later on, after the war of 1866, attempts were unceasingly made to bind Austria to the States, with which it had been formerly united in the German Confederation, so as to prevent her from allying herself with France against them. This object has now been attained without any obligation on our part to defend Trient, Trieste, or, indeed, Bosnia, against Italians, or Turks, or Southern Slavs. Our agreement with Austria no more involves anything in the nature of a threat to our neighbours than would do the erection of a fortress on the frontier, which, of course, has never been regarded in that light, and it is even less of a menace for instance, than the construction of strategic railways. It has, indeed, the character of a mutual assurance society, which every one having similar interests is at liberty to join.”

1. September 5th.—“The Emperor Alexander began the conversation by an explanation of his letter to me. Nobody knew anything of it.” (Marginal note by Bismarck: “Gortschakoff revised it.”) (1) He had shown it to no one before it was despatched, and after it had been sent he only communicated it verbally without naming the persons. If, therefore, I had found anything offensive in the letter, as he saw from my answer, he alone was to blame, and he recognised that it was possible for me to have misunderstood him. (2) He was very sorry for that, and since it had had such a serious result as to cause me personal offence, he wished it to be regarded as if it had never been written. Nothing was farther from his intention than the idea of a threat. He had only wished to call my attention to the fact, which was perfectly true, that if the press of both countries continued to rail at each other it must lead in the course of time to a feeling of hostility between the two States, and his sole object was to avoid that. (3) He considered that the preservation of the peace of Europe was only possible in the future, as it had been in the past, so long as good relations between Prussia and Russia were maintained under all circumstances. (3A) The votes given, mostly against Russia, by my Commissioners in the proceedings of the European Commissions in the East had betrayed a hostile attitude on the part of Germany towards Russia, which had caused great irritation in the latter country, and gave rise to the excited comments of the press. (4) In these Commissions Russia was pursuing the object which she had had exclusively in view during the war, namely, to improve and render more assured the fate of the Christian populations, but not to make conquests. If opposition were now offered thereto in the delimitation of the frontier, and more or more Christians were restored against his wish to Turkish sovereignty, the Commissioners must have received instructions to that effect. (5) The German votes had already produced a bad effect in Turkey also, inasmuch as the disagreement which was there seen to exist between Germany and Russia rendered the Turks more obstinate, and caused work to drag on interminably. (6) Prince Bismarck, whom he had hitherto known only as the friend of the Russo-Prussian relations, seemed unable to forget Prince Gortschakoff’s—stupid—circular of 1875. He had strongly advised Prince Gortschakoff against sending this circular, and pointed out to him the evil consequences (of his vanity, en parenthese) because if there actually were anything to smooth over, that was not the way to set about it. Prince Gortschakoff had his way, however. Bismarck’s grudge, and his inability to forget, which began with this irritation against Gortschakoff, appeared to him to have been transferred to Russia, and it was to this that he referred in his letter to me when he said that he could not reconcile such conduct with the character of so eminent a statesman. This expression of his in the letter to me did not refer to the instructions given to the Commissioners with respect to Eastern affairs. Moreover (7), Prince Gortschakoff is a man who has outlived his usefulness, and whom he hardly ever consults now. “In reply to No. 1, I said I could not deny that I had been painfully affected by his letter, particularly because I had considered that his remarks referred only to the votes in question, and they seemed to me a matter of such slight consequence that I could not understand his irritation on that score. It was only through his declaration to the effect that his expression referred to the subject dealt with in No. 7 (doubtless No. 6 is meant) that I now for the first time understood it. I could assure him that Prince Bismarck still regards the relations between Prussia, Germany, and Russia as he always did, but that he saw a feeling gaining ground in Russia, chiefly owing to the press, which he could not understand, in view of the existing laws there, especially as semi-official organs contributed to this detrimental state of feeling. I added that I was prepared to admit that our press was also guilty of similar excesses, but, after all, these were mainly in self-defence against the Russian attacks. We are so tied by our press laws that we can only intervene in the way of personal appeal to the editors of the newspapers, but not legally unless a state of siege were proclaimed in certain districts. Nos. 2 and 3. If the words in question were to be understood as containing no threat I should feel reassured, as the interpretation which the Emperor gave to this passage of his letter was in perfect accord with my own convictions. As his Government had quite recently issued a serious reprimand with regard to improper articles in the newspapers, it was to be expected and hoped, from the power with which the Governor-General was invested, that energetic action would be taken. I, on my part, had caused certain advice to be given to the editors, the law did not permit any more. 3A. Our instructions to the Commissioners in question had remained the same from the very beginning: if Russia and Austria were in agreement always to vote with them; when points arose where that was not the case to vote with the majority, where the Russian proposal was not flagrantly untenable. That had been the case in the matter of Silistria, where I was entirely in favour of the Russian proposal to appoint a Commission to inquire into the question of the bridge on the spot, and also with regard to the military road through Eastern Rumelia. 4. This view was quite new to me, as nothing of the kind had previously been brought to my notice. At the same time, these little frontier details were after all so trifling that they could hardly affect the question of the Christians to any important extent. Unfortunately, the Greek frontier question had only been mentioned at the Congress as the expression of a desire, and not as a demand, and I foresaw, from the first, how it would be, mais pendant le congrès je n’avais pas voix au chapitre. I regarded in the same way the Jewish question in Rumania, the broader solution desired being, to my mind, impracticable, and therefore I wished to see the Greek modification adopted.”

Continuation of this report, dated September 12th, 1879:—

“Nos. 6 and 7. I had never noticed that Prince Bismarck was inspired by particularly hostile feelings towards Prince Gortschakoff on account of the latter’s circular of 1875. My opinion and his upon that note was exactly the same as that of the Emperor Alexander himself; but at the Berlin Congress the same view with regard to Prince Gortschakoff was manifested as was expressed above by the Emperor, and I therefore understood the peculiar position which was now assigned to him. I believe that in my answer to the Emperor I adequately emphasised how little change there has been in Prince Bismarck’s political views so far as Russia is concerned. He had always agreed with me that, remembering the attitude adopted by Russia towards us in 1870, we for two whole years, 1876 and 1877, tried to manifest our gratitude to the Emperor by our neutralité bienveillante, and actually succeeded in preventing a coalition of the Western Powers, including Austria. This seemed to me to disprove the suspicion of the Emperor that Prince Bismarck had out of spite against Prince Gortschakoff changed his political views, and on that account had adopted towards Russia an attitude to which expression had been given in such trifling questions. Up to the present Prince Bismarck’s sentiments towards Russia remained unaltered.

“On the forenoon of the 4th the Emperor came to see me again in order to take leave of me after lunch. He had received a telegram from Jugenheim, from the Empress Marie, who desired to be remembered to me, and was very pleased at our meeting at Alexandrowo. He added: ‘C’est à elle que j’ai communiqué la première ma lettre à Vous dont le brouillon était par differentes correctures presque illisible. I afterwards showed my letter and your answer to Adlerberg, Milutin and Giers; they know exactly what my political opinions are concerning Prussia and Germany, and being in perfect agreement with me on this subject, they are pleased that erroneous impressions will be dispelled by our meeting.’ The Emperor then read me a letter from the Russian envoy reporting a conversation which he had had at Kissingen with Prince Bismarck on the political situation; and a great deal had in particular been said about Prussia and Russia acting together. The envoy found that Prince Bismarck’s former view of the Three Emperors’ Alliance had remained entirely unchanged. The Emperor repeated, en aperçu, the views which we had exchanged, and was heartily glad the misunderstandings had been cleared up and that the old friendship would be maintained between the two States in association with Austria. As to the latter, he now added for the first time: ‘Certainly I had reason to be dissatisfied with her, as her attitude towards me during the war was louche as usual. Without firing a shot she occupied two Turkish provinces, of course never to surrender them again, as the English will never give up Cyprus, respecting which they entered into a separate treaty during the Congress without making any communication to the Great Powers.’ I interrupted him here, saying I believed there had been negotiations at Reichstadt respecting the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. ‘Yes,’ said the Emperor, ‘but under quite different conditions, that Austria should take part in the war in some way or other. All the same, the main point is that we should hold together à trois.’ Of course I could only confirm that view as my own conviction.