Before 1860, slavery was non-existent in all sections of the union except the tobacco, cotton and sugar cane belts. In upholding the institution of slavery, the south was opposed to the spirit of the age. Slavery was doomed by moral and economic pressure. It was a useless procedure for the south to demand the right to carry slavery into the western territory because it was unprofitable economically and was not wanted. For the same reason it was futile for the opponents of slavery to try to prohibit by law its extension westward—the westerners had no desire or use for it. It was this contention over slavery in western territory which was the abstraction over which the Civil War was fought.
Many people before 1860, saw the folly of this controversy. Governor Robert J. Walker of Mississippi recognized that the west would never be open to slavery, as did Stanton of Tennessee and Senator Toombs of Georgia. The status of slavery in the west had been automatically settled by the laws of nature. The two sections, however, cherished perverted ideas of each other. It was reported, and actually believed, in the north, that Senator Robert Toombs, of Georgia, had boastfully declared that he would call the roll of his slaves in Massachusetts.
The following incidents given in Macy's "Political Parties in The United States," pages 209 to 211, are illustrative of the state of public excitement preceding the Civil War. In an effort to dictate the slave policy of the west, Charlie B. Lines, a deacon of a New Haven congregation, had enlisted a company of seventy-nine emigrants for the war. A meeting was held in the church shortly before their departure, for the purpose of raising funds, at which many clergymen and members of the Yale College faculty were present. The leaders of the party announced that Sharpe's rifles were lacking and that they were needed for self-defense. After an earnest address from Henry Ward Beecher, the subscription began. Professor Silliman started the subscription with one Sharpe's rifle; the pastor of the church gave the second. Fifty was the number wanted. Then Beecher announced that if twenty-five were pledged on the spot, Plymouth Church would furnish the rest. Churches in both sections had by that time become agencies for propagating hatred. Another incident is a southern one. Colonel Bufort of Alabama sold a number of his slaves valued at $20,000, and invested the money to equip a troop of three hundred soldiers to fight for southern rights in Kansas. "The day that Bufort's battalion started from Montgomery they marched to the Baptist Church. The Methodist minister solemnly invoked the divine blessing on the enterprise; the Baptist pastor gave Bufort a finely bound Bible, and said that a subscription had been raised to present each emigrant with a copy of the Holy Scripture." This battalion left for the west armed with Bibles and Sharpe's rifles. The existence of such a condition of excitement made it an easy matter to precipitate war.
In political contests the natural tendency is for persons of extreme views to gain leadership—decided and partisan convictions are easily described and understood, whereas people of moderate and discreet judgment often lack conviction themselves and so cannot very well impress their views upon the masses. Garrison's extreme abuse of the south was met there with similar other extremes. The abolitionists had great sympathy for the oppressed but great hatred for the oppressor, and regarded the slave owner as personally responsible for slavery rather than as an agent of circumstances. Perhaps if the abolitionists had directed their appeal to the moral conscience of the south, avoiding sectional and personal abuse, secession would never have taken place. The south met this abuse by demanding that all anti-slavery publications be excluded from the mails. Books, papers, and all publications suspected of containing anti-slavery propaganda were taken from the mails and publicly burned at Charleston, S. C. There were many manifestations of disregard for the sanctity of the mails. The north judged the south by these extreme actions, and the efforts of the south to suppress anti-slavery agitation resulted only in greater propaganda for the abolitionists.
The public is quick to demand war, but is not so willing to accept its hardships. During the conflict it was necessary for both the north and the south to suspend civil liberties, including freedom of the press and speech. Expressions that might weaken war morale were punished—both sections suspended the writ of habeas corpus and arbitrarily imprisoned their citizens. About 38,000 people were imprisoned in the north while the number in the south is unknown. Both sections, as in all major wars, resorted to the draft to recruit soldiers. Yet, with all these weapons at their disposal, the northern army succeeded in enlisting only about 1,325,000 of its native white population out of a total of 23,000,000. Besides approximately 1,325,000 native whites, the northern army consisted of 300,000 whites from the south, 186,000 negroes, and 500,000 foreigners. Left to the voluntary support of its citizens neither section could have carried on the war, as no major war of modern times could have been fought with that voluntary support alone. The draft acts of both sections allowed for the employment of substitutes, which, of course, was hard on the poorer classes who could not employ substitutes, but the richer classes often avoided army service by this method. It is impossible to obtain an exact figure for the number of substitutes employed, but the Secretary of War under Davis considered 50,000 a low estimate for the Confederate army in 1864. Desertion was frequent on both sides. Rhodes estimates the number of deserters in the south at 100,000 in 1864.
Much has been heard of the heroism and sacrifice displayed during the conflict, but little of the crimes committed by both sections. Only the pleasant phases of the war have survived. When Joseph Holt and Robert Dale Owen were appointed by Secretary of War Stanton to adjust claims for materials supplied to the War Department, they found fraud at every turn, and before making their final report in July, 1862, secured deductions of nearly $17,000,000 from claims amounting to $50,000,000. One claim alone was reduced $1,000,000 and another was reduced $580,000. One senator had received $10,000 for securing an order from the War Department for a client. Colonel Henry S. Olcott, who was appointed special commissioner to investigate frauds, after a thorough examination of the facts announced that from 20% to 25% of the expenditures of the Federal treasury during the Civil War was tainted with fraud, and, according to his estimate, approximately $700,000,000 was paid through fraud. (See Rhodes, Vol. V, page 220.)
In commenting upon moral conditions during the conflict, the Springfield Republican said editorially: "It is a sad, a shocking picture of life in Washington, which our correspondents are giving us;—a Bureau of the Treasury Department made a home of seduction and prostitution; the necessities of poor and pretty women made the means of their debauchery by high government officials; members of Congress putting their mistresses into clerkships in the departments; whiskey drinking ad libitum." (See Rhodes, Vol. V, page 212.) These are some of the typical incidents of conditions in both sections, but text books in treating of this war, as of all others, present only those phases which glorify the conflict.
The cost of the Civil War, including the expenditures of both sections, pensions, destruction of property, and other indirect expenses, was $12,000,000,000. Its damage to the moral and spiritual development of the United States cannot be estimated.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dodd, W. E.—The Cotton Kingdom.
Lonn—Desertion During the Civil War.
Macy, Jesse—The Anti-Slavery Crusade.
Macy, Jesse—Political Parties in the United States. Chapters 7-22.
Rhodes, James Ford—History of the United States. Vols. I-V.
Stephenson, N. W.—The Day of the Confederacy.
Stephenson, N. W.—Abraham Lincoln and the Union.
Wood, William—Captain of the Civil War.
For almost a century, the Spanish possession of Cuba had been regarded with disfavor by certain elements in the United States. Reasons for this attitude varied from those of acquisition on grounds of "manifest destiny," to those of the highest altruism. When the Spanish American republics won their independence during the early years of the nineteenth century, Porto Rico and Cuba remained in the possession of Spain.
Thomas Jefferson advocated the acquiring of Cuba and its annexation as a state, chiefly for fear that it would be acquired by England. Later, pro-slavery leaders wanted to take the island in order to extend slave territory, as had been done in the case of Florida and Texas. Cuba's annexation was a part of the "manifest destiny" program which was rampant in the years preceding the Civil War. Many filibustering expeditions were sent there with annexation in view. The Cubans themselves often came to the United States, became naturalized citizens of this country, and would return to Cuba with an unfriendly attitude toward Spanish authority, counting for protection on their American citizenship, in case of trouble.
There had often been spasmodic rebellions or outbreaks in Cuba before 1895. In 1868, there broke out what is known as the "Ten Years' War" which lasted until 1878, but the causes of these conflicts were never clearly understood by the participants on either side. Sugar cane was the principal source of Cuban wealth. According to the customary policy of trade barriers, Spain imposed duties on goods coming from the United States and the United States imposed high duties on Cuban sugar. These duties severely hurt Cuban economic life, and as economic depressions as well as prosperities are always attributed to the party in power regardless of the real causes, the Cubans, no exceptions to this rule, blamed the political power then in authority.
During this "Ten Years' War" many filibustering expeditions were secretly fitted out in the United States by and for the Cubans. In 1873, a ship, the Virginius, sailing under American colors, carrying men and supplies to the Cuban insurgents Was captured by a Spanish gunboat. The crew and passengers were given a trial which resulted in the execution of fifty-three, of whom eight claimed to be American citizens. Immediately, the war cry Went up in the United States. But, due to the wise policy of President Grant, it never gained headway.
Finally, in 1878, Spain agreed to forget the past, abolish slavery in Cuba, and admit delegates from Cuba to the Spanish Cortes or Parliament. The Cubans agreed, and hostilities ceased. All men in Cuba were given the ballot if they paid taxes to the amount of $25.00 annually, which still excluded the poorer classes. Of the representatives sent by the island to the Spanish Cortes or Parliament in Madrid, about one-fifth were Cuban born. This arrangement lasted as long as the economic life of Cuba was normal.
But in February, 1895, a new war for independence broke out, which was caused by a severe depression of the sugar industry resulting from the repeal in 1894 of the McKinley Tariff which had permitted the free entry of Cuban sugar into the United States, giving the Cuban sugar industry access to the United States market. The closing of the United States to Cuban sugar was a great blow to Cuba's sugar industry. Spanish authority in Cuba was held responsible, and warfare was soon established between the insurgents and Spanish authorities. A humane governor-general tried to suppress the insurrection peaceably, but without satisfactory results. Accordingly, General Weyler became Governor-General of Cuba, on February 16, 1896, and inaugurated the concentration policy, by which the inhabitants of Cuba were assembled or crowded within certain military camps, for it was impossible to distinguish the loyalists from the insurgents. As a result of this, there was great suffering and destruction.
Gomez was leader of the insurgents. He destroyed all the property he possibly could, in an endeavor to compel the United States to intervene. By attempting to destroy Spanish authority, Gomez hoped to secure the help of the United States. The insurgents were often led by Cubans who had come to America, obtained United States citizenship, and returned to the island claiming the privilege of their acquired citizenship. Between February 24, 1895, and January 22, 1897, seventy-four persons claiming to be citizens of the United States were arrested by Spanish authority, because of their activities as insurgents. But fully three-fourths of those arrested were Cubans or sons of Cubans who had been naturalized in the United States. Often, the insurgents developed their plans on American soil and secured military aid here. The federal government took precautions to prevent this, but many expeditions were made in spite of action taken to prevent them.
Our Department of State protested to Spain against the concentration policy in Cuba carried out under Governor-General Weyler, but Spain contended that her methods in suppressing rebellion in Cuba were no more severe than the methods employed by our federal government during the Civil War. Attention was called by Spain to the Sherman march through the south and to Sheridan's activities in Virginia. Spain also called attention to the Cuban Junta in New York, and claimed that the principal insurgent assistance came from American soil.
Congress appropriated $50,000 for the relief of Americans in Cuba, but up to the fall of 1897, only $6,000 of the $50,000 had been used, so little need was there for it.
In this war in Cuba between insurgents or rebels and Spanish authority, both sides destroyed all the property possible, although the insurgents destroyed more than the Spanish authorities. It was not nearly so destructive as our Civil War, yet what should we have thought had Spain protested against the conditions of our Civil War? Such a protest would have been treated with contempt. We had no more legal ground for questioning Spanish authority in Cuba, than Japan today would have in questioning or protesting against our policy in the Philippines. In fact, two years later, in our guerrilla warfare with the natives of the Philippines, we adopted the same concentration policy, as we shall see, against which we then protested in Cuba.
William Randolph Hearst, who was then the leader of American yellow journalism, had at this time developed his chain of newspapers from California to Boston. Early in 1897, he began advocating intervention. Appeals were made daily. Stories, crimes, and conditions were pictured in his papers and greatly exaggerated. Mr. McKinley, opposed to intervention, became President on March 4, 1897. Mark Hanna who had elected Mr. McKinley President, now wished to be compensated by an appointment to the United States Senate from Ohio. To create a vacancy in the Senate, Mr. McKinley appointed as his Secretary of State Mr. John Sherman who was then Senator from Ohio, and Mr. Hanna was appointed by the Governor of Ohio to the United States Senate. Mr. McKinley's appointment of John Sherman as Secretary of State was a great blunder. Mr. Sherman was then very old and rapidly declining. His work was left in the hands of his assistants in the Department of State.
United States citizens owned wealth in Cuba, to the amount of $50,000,000 and our commerce with Cuba amounted to $100,000,000 annually. These interests, of course, demanded intervention. Our Department of State in its correspondence with Spain estimated that $16,000,000 worth of American property had been destroyed in Cuba at the close of 1897, for which property Spain was held responsible. This was a greatly exaggerated figure, for at the close of the war a claims commission was created by Congress to investigate those claims, and this commission recognized as valid claims amounting to only about $362,252.
In October, 1897, Spain recalled Governor-General Weyler, and appointed in his place Blanco. The concentration order was revoked. Spain offered the natives a larger share of self-government, with their own constitution and legislature. Autonomy was granted. If it had been offered three years before, this would, no doubt, have solved the problem. But now it was difficult to reconcile the two factions in Cuba. The native Spaniards in Cuba opposed home rule, as it would give the Cubans too much power. The Cubans wanted independence, and were unwilling to co-operate with the Spaniards in home rule. A Cuban parliament was called on May 4, 1898.
The Hearst newspapers were then demanding intervention on the part of the United States and moulding public opinion in that direction. Although the election of 1896 was over, and it had settled the issue of free silver, yet other social elements had entered American politics through the election and campaign of 1896, and it was in the interests of some people to make use of a "vigorous foreign policy" to keep public attention away from the new issues. This is an old device for obliterating home issues or differences. Lincoln had been advised to precipitate the United States into a foreign war as a means of preventing the Civil War.
On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal, a strong advocate of intervention, violated the sanctity of the United States mails by securing through criminal methods a private letter written by Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, to a friend. In this letter Lome severely criticised McKinley, and spoke of him with contempt. This letter was published by the New York Journal. It excited public opinion, and was, of course, made use of by the jingo press. However, it had nothing to do with the case, for a foreign minister naturally has a perfect legal and moral right to have any opinion of the President or any other public official he likes, and to express it privately to a friend. The actual crime was in stealing the letter from the United States mails, but that action was never investigated or punished by the United States, which should have been done. Lome's criticism of McKinley may have been unjust, but he had a personal right to it.
In the midst of the great excitement created by the Lome letter, another incident took place of advantage to the war party. On January 24, 1898, the Maine was ordered to Cuba on a "friendly visit." This trip was accepted officially as a complimentary visit, but privately both Spain and the United States regarding it in the opposite light. After being in Havana harbor for three weeks, the Maine was blown up on February 15, 1898. "Remember the Maine" now became the slogan of the war party. Spain denied any connection with its destruction, and no one now believes it was blown up by Spain. The actual cause of the explosion is not known, but it is now believed to have been done by the rebels in Cuba for the purpose of securing the intervention of the United States. It may have been an accident with which Spain could in no way be connected, yet, at the time, in the eyes of the public, Spain was held responsible.
McKinley, during this period, opposed intervention, but the war party, supported by the Hearst papers, was growing rapidly. Our able minister in Spain, General Woodford, was also opposed to our intervention. Congress, however, held the opposite attitude. A senator said to Assistant Secretary of State Day: "Day, doesn't your President know where the war-declaring power is lodged? Tell him that if he doesn't do something, Congress will exercise the power." Congressman Boutelle, who was opposed to the war, says that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress held a caucus and sent a committee to the President stating that unless he asked for a declaration of war, they would propose a resolution for war and carry it through. Secretary of War Alger, who was a notorious spoilsman, said to a senator: "I want you to advise the President to declare war. He is making a great mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him." Rhodes, in "McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations," on page 64, says: "McKinley feared a rupture in his own party, and on account of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President, there would have been no war with Spain."
McKinley was opposed to the war up to the last of March, 1898. Only two members of his cabinet were in favor of war. Also, the Vice-President was against it, as was Mark Hanna, the Speaker of the House, and nearly all the leading Republicans of the Senate.
On March 29, 1898, McKinley sent his ultimatum to Spain demanding the complete abandonment of the concentration policy, the granting of an armistice to Cuba, and the opening of peace negotiations through himself with the insurgents. Spain replied granting the complete abandonment of the concentration policy and did not refuse to grant the armistice, but told our minister, General Woodford, that she would gladly grant it, if the Cubans, who were the resistors, asked for it, for Spain could not first offer it. Our minister at Madrid then cabled McKinley that the Spanish government and people wished to settle the difficulty without war, and that in a few months' time, he would "get peace in Cuba, with justice to Cuba and protection to our great American interests."
Let us say, for example, that Japan had sent an ultimatum to McKinley during the Philippine insurrection, demanding that he change his policy of coercion and grant an armistice to the Philippines. Such a demand would have been treated with contempt, yet that is what we demanded of Spain.
On April 6, 1898, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Russia, and Italy made an appeal to McKinley to continue peaceful negotiations. The Pope also intervened for peace. He asked the Queen of Spain to comply fully with our ultimatum. Accordingly, on April 10, McKinley was notified by the Foreign Office at Madrid, that Spain would grant the armistice. But on the following day, Monday, April 11, 1898, McKinley appeared before Congress and asked for a declaration of war against Spain, without informing them of the latest concessions made by Spain. It is impossible to explain McKinley's action. Through the efforts of Minister Woodford, at Madrid, and others, a diplomatic victory had been won only to be thrown away by McKinley and Congress. The Spanish minister at Washington was notified that the President in his message to Congress on April 11, would explain the concession made by Spain, but this was not done—a reference only was made to it in his war message.
War was declared on April 18 by a vote of 324 to 19 in the House, and 67 to 21 in the Senate. On March 31, 1898, Woodford had cabled to McKinley: "I believe the ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has moved steadily towards peace." Then on April 3, 1898, Woodford sent this message to President McKinley: "The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that Spain will go as far and as fast as she can. I know that the Queen and her present ministry sincerely desire peace, and that the Spanish people desire peace, and if you can still give me time and reasonable liberty of action, I am sure that before next October 1st, I will get peace in Cuba." Again on April 10, the day before our declaration of war, Woodford notified our Department of State that before August 1, he could secure autonomy for Cuba, or a recognition of its independence by Spain or a cession of the island to the United States. He then added: "I hope that nothing will be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied the present government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can." It was an open secret that Spain would give up or sell Cuba as soon as she could.
One cannot read the Woodford dispatches and fail to see that the Spanish-American War was thrust upon Spain by our jingo press. President McKinley over-estimated its strength and lost his nerve, fearing the disruption of his party. Spain was not surprised but "stunned" when the United States declared war, a war which cannot be defended on any grounds. Cuba was Spanish territory and we had no more legal right to intervene than Spain, for example, had a right to demand that the United States change her methods of government in Alaska. Morally, the war was indefensible, for Spain was conceding and was ready to go to any extent to avoid war, even to the point of granting independence to Cuba. This conflict with Spain cost $300,000,000, not including the indirect expenses.
The most important result of the war was our acquisition of the Philippine Islands. In February, 1898, about two months before war was declared, Admiral Dewey of the American fleet was ordered to Hongkong, China, and instructed to be prepared to begin operations against the Philippines in case of a declaration of war. Until after the battle of Manila, the American people had practically never heard of the Philippine Islands. These islands were taken, however, and at the peace conference, Mr. McKinley instructed our commissioners not to be satisfied with anything less than the entire group of islands because of the "commercial opportunity,"—they were secured as a trading base in the Orient. At that time, it seemed that China would be dismembered by the European powers and that unless we secured the Philippines, the United States would have no share in the Orient. This was our first step in a policy of imperialism, clothed in mild terms.
For three years after our capture of these islands, the natives put up a guerrilla warfare to resist the United States forces. During this period, the American army resorted to every description of barbaric torture. Among other measures, the policy of concentrating the inhabitants in camps was resorted to, which was the same policy we objected to the use of by Spain in Cuba. Prisoners of war were executed in retaliation for crimes of which they knew nothing. One of our notorious army officers known as "Hell-Roaring" Jake Smith commanded that every building in a certain area be burned and every native over ten years of age be slain.
These three years of guerrilla warfare cost the United States $170,000,000. All of this cost and cruelty, aside from being unjust, was unnecessary, for the natives of the Philippines were willing to co-operate with the United States to develop their civilization by peaceful methods. The resistance was caused by the presence of United States soldiers in the islands.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beard, Charles A.—Contemporary American History. Chapter 8.
Chadwick, F. E.—Relations of United States and Spain.
Latane, J. H.—America as a World Power. Chapters 1-5.
Powers, H. H.—America Among the Nations.
Rhodes, James Ford—The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations. Chapters 3, 4, 5.
Schlesinger, A. M.—Political and Social History of the United States. Chapters 14 and 15.
Storey, M.—The Conquest of the Philippines.
We shall not undertake a long discussion of the causes of the World War but simply examine the reasons for the participation in it of the United States on the side of the Allies. For the first time in history the generation living through a great war has been able to ascertain the facts regarding its origin. These facts, however, have not yet become the common property of the great masses, although they are gradually becoming evident to everybody. A great many people are still influenced by the passions and hatreds aroused by the conflict.
Briefly stated, the causes of the conflict were trade rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, the scramble for territory especially in Africa, the conflict between Russia and Germany for the domination of the Balkan Peninsula, and the old inherited animosity between France and Germany. The accusation of "sole" guilt against Germany is held no longer by persons who have studied the facts, although there still are and will no doubt always be differences of opinion about minor points. The immediate occasion for the opening of hostilities in 1914 was the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. This murder took place while he was in Bosnia. The crime was committed by representatives of a Pan-Slavic organization working hand in hand with the Serbian government with a view to annexing Bosnia to Serbia.
Up to the nineteenth century, the Balkan Peninsula was owned by Turkey, but the last century has witnessed the gradual break-up of European Turkey on the Balkan Peninsula. In connection with this disintegration, Russia tried to gain territory at the expense of Turkey. Austria-Hungary also tried to penetrate the same area. A conflict was the inevitable consequence. This Balkan problem had been a source of trouble in Europe for a century. The people of Serbia were Slavs and looked to Russia for support,—in fact, Serbia was practically governed by Russian diplomacy. Austria-Hungary looked to Germany for support. In 1908, Bosnia, which was then a Turkish province but had been administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878, was annexed by Austria-Hungary. This act offended Serbia, who wished to annex it as part of the Pan-Slavic dream for the domination by Russia of Bosnia, Serbia, and the remainder of the Balkans. This annexation by Austria-Hungary defeated the Pan-Slavic dream and was a victory for Pan-Germany. Feeling became more and more acute when in 1914 the Archduke Ferdinand was killed. The incident was applauded by Serbia, and conflict followed. The details of events in 1914 are too complicated to go into for our brief space, but popular accounts reaching the United States were from Allied sources and were correspondingly biased.
In 1914 all Europe was divided into two great military camps—the Allied and the Central Powers. The following is the size of the principal armies of Europe in 1914: Germany, 806,000; Austria, 370,000; Italy, 305,000; France, 818,000; Russia, 1,284,000; Belgium, 280,000. All Europe was equipped as a military machine, and the murder in 1914 simply put the machinery in motion. It was an absurd fallacy to think that Germany was the only armed nation at the time, and to believe that Great Britain entered the conflict to defend Belgium is equally absurd. As early as 1911, Great Britain had made plans with France for marching an army through Belgium to Germany in the event of war with Germany. Belgium was regarded as part of the Allied powers. Great Britain has officially acknowledged to be false her ostensible reason for entering the war—the protection of Belgium. Her reason was the struggle between rival imperialisms, which secret treaties later exposed show clearly.
However, we are concerned here only with why the United States entered the war. The three outstanding causes were interference with neutral trade, economic ties with the Allies, and Allied propaganda in the United States. These causes overlap in such a way as to make it impossible to discuss them separately.
Soon after war was declared in 1914, Great Britain placed mines in the North Sea and with the aid of her navy blockaded Germany and the adjacent neutral portions of North Europe. As a result, all goods going in that direction were captured. The United States protested, but Great Britain refused to yield the point, claiming it to be a military necessity albeit illegal from the point of view of international law. Great Britain blockaded Germany by mines, and cut off all foreign trade with Germany and neutral ports near Germany to prevent the entrance of goods into Germany. Germany retaliated in February, 1915, by employing the submarine to blockade Great Britain. One policy was as legal as the other. Mr. Wilson protested, but neither side yielded. In no case in history has a nation at war observed the established rules if the rules conflict with military expediency. The United States has been no exception to this procedure. Since the object of warfare is the physical destruction of an opponent, once you justify the war you must justify any means employed to gain the victory. In protesting to Germany, we argued that the submarines could not warn ships to take off passengers before they were sunk, but neither could the mines planted by Great Britain. American ships kept out of the mine zones but disregarded the submarine zones for reasons we shall later explain. The Lusitania, a British ship, was sunk by a submarine on May 7, 1915. One hundred and fourteen Americans lost their lives. We immediately protested. But the facts have shown that the Lusitania carried a large quantity of munitions of war. At the time the boat was sunk a United States senator asked the Treasury Department for the bill of lading. He was told it had been turned over to the State Department. When the senator asked the State Department for a copy of the bill of lading in order to see what was on board, the State Department refused to disclose the contents, on the grounds that it was to be kept for diplomatic correspondence. It was not known till after the war was over what had actually been on board the ship. Since then it has been officially stated by the collector of customs then at New York that the Lusitania carried munitions of war. Besides, Germany had warned the passengers before getting on board that in all probability the ship would be sunk. This notice was officially published in the New York papers before the ship sailed. There is no question but that the passengers had been given due warning. Whether the sinking was legal or not depends upon the point of view. According to Germany, she did more than the law required by her warning before the ship left harbor, which is rather better than being warned a few minutes before being sunk in mid-ocean.
The British seized and searched the mails. United States officials below the rank of minister were searched by the British while traveling to and from the continent. Before the close of 1914, thirty-one cargoes of copper valued at $5,500,000 had been captured by Great Britain, but the United States owners were compensated. Their seizure, however, was illegal. Early in 1916, Germany agreed to give up the use of the submarine, but on condition that the United States make Great Britain obey international law. We could not force Great Britain to abide by international law, and consequently Germany resumed her submarine warfare in 1917, which was our official reason for entering the war. But this was only our legal excuse. The effective causes were our economic ties with the Allies, and Allied propaganda in the United States. We will examine these causes more carefully.
Modern warfare is a conflict of economic resources as well as armies. The British navy cut off all economic intercourse between Germany and the United States. In this way, the economic resources of the United States were in the hands of the Allies. American agriculture, credit, and industry soon became indispensable to the Allied cause. In 1915 an Anglo-French mission came to New York and secured a loan of $500,000,000. This money was left with various banks in New York for the purpose of buying supplies from America. The Allied governments continued to borrow in Wall Street, and these banks loaned England and France money with which to buy materials. Soon the House of Morgan became the purchasing agent of the Allies. The Morgan firm selected Edward R. Stetinius, President of the Diamond Match Company, as the purchasing agent. Mr. Stetinius selected one hundred and seventy-five men to assist him in the task. They were soon purchasing supplies for the Allies at the rate of $10,000,000 a day. By September, 1917, the Morgan firm had purchased $3,000,000,000 in merchandise and munitions for the Allies in addition to the selling of Allied bonds. The day the United States declared war against Germany the British government's bank account with Morgan was heavily overdrawn.
When Kitchener became Minister of War in Great Britain in 1915 one of his first acts was to cable Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Company to come to England immediately. Schwab went and agreed to sell all the output of the Bethlehem Steel Company to the British government. In less than two years, he shipped about $300,000,000 worth of war material to England. Twenty submarines were built and sent in parts to Canada where they were assembled and sent across to England. This was done a year before the German submarine Deutschland came to the United States and was advertised as the first to cross the Atlantic. (See John Moody, "Masters of Capital," pages 162-172.)
American industry had become one with the Allies. Our greatest banking and industrial institutions had become dependent upon an Allied victory and an Allied victory was dependent upon them. American industry became pro-Ally because the British blockade cut off our trade with Germany. German and Austrian agents such as Dumba, Karl Boy-Ed and Franz von Papen were expelled from the country because of their un-neutral activities on behalf of the Central Powers.
"Patriotic" societies such as "The Navy League," "The American Defense Society," and the "National Security League" were all tied up financially with munition plants. These societies were propaganda bureaus for "preparedness" and later for our entrance into the conflict. The nineteen men who founded the Navy League had among their number representatives of the three manufacturers of armor plate in America,—the Midvale, Bethlehem, and Carnegie Companies. The Navy League was in practice the propaganda bureau of the three companies working together to sell armor plate.
Modern warfare has become even more than a conflict of armies and of economic resources. Propaganda to secure popular support, has become more and more necessary. Both sides in the European conflict made great efforts to present their propaganda before America, but the Central Powers failed primarily because of the British blockade. The Allies, on their side, had the co-operation of American business, and easily accomplished their purpose. Professor Hayes in his "Brief History of the Great War" says: "The British resorted to every known device of propaganda from employing secret service agents in New York to maintaining at Washington the great journalist, Lord Northcliffe, with a host of assistants, as a publicity director." These propagandists had the co-operation of the bankers who had made loans to the Allies or had acted as purchasing agents. All this happened in 1916, but the American people never knew the source of their "war news" until the conflict was over. Mr. Rathom, of the Providence Journal, of Providence, R.I., was notorious for his accounts of German "crimes." The Boston Herald of December 30, 1923, in an editorial comment, says: "It is, of course, true, as most well informed people now understand, that the Rathom disclosures which made the Providence Journal famous during the war were fiction—but Rathom did this for the praiseworthy purpose of arousing his countrymen to a war fury. He took one of the practical ways of doing so." Captain Ferdinand Tuohy of the British Secret Service in "The Secret Corps" says: "All the trickery and subterfuge and war-wisdom of the ages brought up-to-date, intensified and harnessed to every modern invention and device, ... a Machiavelli, a Talleyrand or some other master schemer of the ages come back to earth, would have thrilled at the amazing cunning and corruption of it all." The Belgium authorities themselves have denied the truth of the crimes given out in the Bryce Report. Mr. Lloyd George has stated in print that careful investigations disclosed no case of Belgian children with hands cut off. Yet these are some of the crimes with which the American public were fed during 1916, 1917 and 1918. The peoples of the Central Powers were, of course, furnished similar crimes attributed to the Allies. There were many crimes committed as in all wars, but every nation, including the United States, was guilty of them.
It is not easy to explain the attitudes of many prominent officials of the United States during the years preceding our entrance into the war. Ambassador Walter H. Page, our representative in London, was guilty of direct disloyalty to the American Government and people. When President Wilson protested to the British Government against her disregard of neutral rights Mr. Page did not give the messages to Sir Edward Grey of the British Foreign Office. He would read them to him and would then ask Grey to co-operate with him in making a reply to the United States. Sir Edward Grey says in his memoirs: "Page came to see me at the foreign office one day and produced a long dispatch from Washington contesting our claims to act as we were doing in stopping contraband in going to neutral ports. 'I am instructed' he said 'to read this dispatch to you.' He read and I listened. He then said 'I have now read the dispatch but I do not agree with it. Let us consider how it should be answered.'" In all diplomacy there is no other example of such a procedure. Page was determined upon our entrance from the very beginning of the war. Many of our representatives at the principal courts of Europe were connected with the Allies personally through business or banking interests in this country.
Mr. Wilson himself was pro-British in scholarship. He was a great admirer of the cabinet-parliamentary form of government used in England. All his heroes in political science were English authorities. Mr. Wilson's former attorney-general, Thomas W. Gregory, says in a letter to the New York Times of February 9, 1925, that Wilson was "by inheritance, tradition, and reasoning at all times the friend of the Allies." Mr. Tumulty also now says Mr. Wilson was never neutral.
President Wilson had become converted to the idea of intervention by the spring of 1916. Sir Edward Grey says in his memoirs that Colonel House assured him in February, 1916, that Wilson would do his best to bring the United States to the aid of the Allies. In April, 1916, the President consulted Champ Clark, Speaker of the House; Claude Kitchen, Democratic Leader; H. D. Flood, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; and other Democratic leaders regarding their willingness to bring the United States into the war on the Allied side. This is known as the famous "Sunrise Conference." They refused, and Mr. Wilson allowed his party to use as the 1916 slogan, "He kept us out of war." At the time he was afraid to advocate intervention for fear of splitting his party. There were demands on the part of certain political leaders and the press for immediate intervention but these demands were not representative of public opinion at the time. Ambassador Page brought his influence to bear on preventing the Allies from considering German proposals for peace offered in 1916 and 1917.
Allied propaganda represented Germany as lustful for world dominion. Careful examination now shows that there was no such policy except that which is common to all powers. This was part of the false propaganda spread in the United States to inflame public opinion and make our entrance "defensive." Both sides resorted to trickery of every description. Much stir was created by the Zimmermann note published in March, 1917. It was a proposal by Germany to Mexico to enter on the side of Germany should the United States join the Allies, with a view to recovering New Mexico and the surrounding territory taken by the United States from Mexico in 1848. But this was exactly what the Allies had done, when they persuaded Japan to enter in order to capture the German sphere of influence in Shantung, China. It is obvious that every nation at war will try to weaken its opponent. We encouraged the Latin American republics to declare war on Germany, which was no more than Germany did in encouraging Mexico to declare war on the United States, should we declare war on Germany. This note was distorted and reported in 1917 in a manner to give the impression that Germany was actively trying to create trouble for the United States even in peace. The fact remains that the Zimmermann proposal was not to apply unless we entered the war against Germany, when it would be a legitimate defensive measure for Germany to secure the aid of Mexico.
Brigadier General J. C. Charteris, Chief of Intelligence of the British Army during the war, stated boastfully, in New York, in an address in the fall of 1925, before the National Arts Club, that he had invented the report that Germany was boiling down the bodies of her dead soldiers to be used as fertilizer. He made the statement under the impression that no reporters were present. The Richmond Times-Dispatch, on December 6, 1925, said editorially:
"Not the least of the horrors of modern warfare is the propaganda bureau which is an important item in the military establishment of every nation. Neither is it the least of the many encouraging signs which each year add to the probability of eventual peace on earth.
"The famous cadaver story which aroused hatred against the German to the boiling point in this and other allied nations during the war has been denounced as a lie in the British House of Commons. Months ago, the world learned the details of how this lie was planned and broadcasted by the efficient officer in the British intelligence service. Now we are told that 'imbued with the spirit of the Locarno pact,' Sir Austen Chamberlain rose in the House, said that the German Chancellor had denied the truth of the story and that the denial had been accepted by the British government.
"A few years ago, the story of how the Kaiser was reducing human corpses to fat, aroused the citizens of this and other enlightened nations to a fury of hatred. Normally sane men doubled their fists and rushed off to the nearest recruiting sergeant. Now they are being told, in effect, that they were dupes and fools; that their own officers deliberately goaded them to the desired boiling point, using an infamous lie to arouse them, just as a grown bully whispers to one little boy that another little boy said he could lick him.
"The encouraging sign found in this revolting admission of how modern war is waged is the natural inference that the modern man is not overeager to throw himself at his brother's throat at the simple word of command. His passions must be played upon, so the propaganda bureau has taken its place as one of the chief weapons.
"In the next war, the propaganda must be more subtle and clever than the best the World War produced. These frank admissions of wholesale lying on the part of trusted governments in the last war will not soon be forgotten."
After the United States entered the war in April, 1917, we immediately created a government propaganda bureau, which was known as "The Committee on Public Information," with George Creel as chairman. Since the war, Mr. Creel has given us an account of the propaganda activities in his book—"How We Advertised America." No effort was made to present the truth. Allied propaganda was accepted and to it we added ours. This "Committee on Public Information" issued 75,099,023 pamphlets and books to encourage the public "morale." They hired the services of 75,000 speakers who operated in 5,200 communities. Altogether, about 755,190 speeches were made by these people known as the "Four Minute Men." Exhibits were given at fairs, and war films were prepared for the cinema, from which the Committee on Public Information received a royalty. A total of 1,438 drawings were employed to arouse popular hatred. An official daily newspaper was issued which had a circulation of 100,000 copies. A propaganda bureau was established by the United States, in the capitals of every nation in the world except those of the Central Powers. The total expenditure by the United States for propaganda was $6,738,223. (See George Creel, "How We Advertised America," Chapter I.) This was the greatest fraud ever sold to the public in the name of patriotism and religion.
The Espionage Act was passed making it illegal to spread "false" reports that would hinder recruiting. Every report was false which did not harmonize with the propaganda released by this Committee on Public Information. The best we can now say for Mr. Wilson and the American public is that they were the victims of Allied propaganda, and contributed to the wrecking of civilization.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beard, Charles A.—Cross Currents in Europe Today.
Barnes, Harry E.—The Genesis of the World War.
Creel, George—How We Advertised America.
Chafee, Zechariah—Freedom of Speech.
Fay, A. S.—Origin of the World War.
Flick, A. C.—Modern World History. Chapter 34.
Grattan, C. H.—Why We Fought.
Lasswell, H. D.—Propaganda Technique in the World War.
Moody, John—Masters of Capital. Chapter 9.
Nock, A. J.—The Myth of a Guilty Nation.