CHAPTER VII.
OUTPUT OF TONNAGE IN THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICTS.

With the change from wood to iron shipbuilding, and with the development of propulsion by steam instead of sails, the shipbuilding industry has become localised and concentrated in those districts which, besides possessing the sine qua non of ready outlet to the vast ocean, are specially favoured in being the repositories of immense natural wealth in the form of coal and ores. What may now fairly be considered the great centres of shipbuilding are the valleys of the Clyde, Tyne, Wear, and Tees, and also the Thames and Mersey, although these latter rivers have for a considerable number of years been overshadowed as building centres by the immensity of their shipping. In several other districts, of course, shipbuilding is carried on to a considerable extent, and some of these may yet attain much greater importance than they at present possess. Barrow-in-Furness, notwithstanding the remarkable progress of recent years, is still advancing. Belfast occupies a prominent position, not alone because of the large annual output of tonnage, but by reason of the number of high-class ocean steamships which have been, and continue to be, built there. Dundee, Leith, Hull, Southampton, and other places throughout the United Kingdom, are not without claims to recognition on account of the shipbuilding carried on.

The supremacy of one shipbuilding centre over another in the matter of work accomplished, both with regard to its character and its quantity, not infrequently forms the subject of comment in the columns of journals circulating in the districts concerned. The publication, by these journals, at the close of each year, of the returns of new tonnage produced by the various firms, affords an opportunity for vaunting on such matters, and it is, as a rule, taken advantage of by the compilers of the statements, who are usually members of the staff on the journals in question. These statements, through the interesting nature of the statistics they contain, are widely read, and the labour attaching to their preparation must indeed be considerable. The figures are, as a rule, supplied by the shipbuilders themselves, and from a summation of these the compiler draws his conclusions. The accuracy of the returns and the fairness of the comments based upon them, if not always completely satisfactory, are thus seen to be matters for which the compiler is not wholly responsible.

Frequent exception has been taken by correspondents to discrepancies in the tonnages of individual vessels given in these reports, as compared with the tonnages measured by the Board of Trade officials, and entered in their records. Attention was called to this matter at the close of 1883 by a correspondent in Engineering, whose assertions were afterwards corroborated in other journals. From a careful checking of the returns made by the Glasgow press of the shipbuilding on the Clyde for the three previous years this correspondent maintained that the aggregate tonnage was overstated to the extent of about 11,000 per year, or over 34,100 tons for the period named. One very gross instance of the misstatement complained of was given by a second correspondent writing to the Glasgow Herald, who drew attention, along with the returns of other firms, to that of a firm building the smaller class of vessels, who were stated in the Herald’s account to have produced 8,300 tons, when by a careful comparison with the actual tonnages of the vessels as recorded in Lloyd’s Register, their total output was found to fall short of the figure given by as much as 2,172 tons, equivalent to 35 per cent. of the actual output. In commenting on these discrepancies several obvious considerations suggested themselves to the critics: such as possible misapprehension, caused by the existence of several kinds of “tonnages,” and the difficulty of stating accurately the tonnages of vessels recently launched. It was questioned, however, after all such allowances were made, whether those furnishing the figures could be exonerated from the sin of carelessness, or indeed, of pure falsification with the view of figuring prominently in the list. The accuracy of these criticisms has not in any way been disproved, nor has any satisfactory explanation been offered.

While no attempt will here be made to solve the matter, it has been felt that, in justice to the subject, these charges could not be ignored when presenting statistics which are derived mainly from the sources thus challenged. Indeed, in comparing for the present work the statistics given by various journals—even in journals confined to the same district—innumerable disparities have been met with, and the agreement has only been en grosse. Such being the case, it may be asked, could not other and more reliable sources be consulted? The obvious alternative of using the authoritative returns of the Board of Trade, or of Lloyd’s Register, at once suggests itself, but objections to this are even more serious than to using the press statistics. The returns issued annually by the Board of Trade only relate to “Merchant Shipping” registered as such, whereas it is well known that in the returns furnished by the shipbuilders all sorts of vessels built by them are included, and that a very considerable tonnage in war vessels and small vessels for military purposes, also in light-draught river craft, both for our own and other countries, is annually turned out from merchant shipyards. The same objections apply to Lloyd’s Register Summary, although, strangely enough, the figures there more nearly correspond with the builders’ than with the Board of Trade returns, the information given in both cases being the gross tonnage of merchant shipping built and registered in the United Kingdom. Everything considered, the statistics compiled from press returns more accurately represent the work accomplished throughout the districts than those afforded by any of the sources named. In the statistics which follow, therefore, the press returns have been adopted, but to simplify matters for purposes of comparison—the degree of unreliability warranting it—the terminal figures in large quantities have been reduced or increased to hundredths, according as they have chanced to be under or above fifty.

The fluctuation from year to year in the shipbuilding industry of the principal districts over an extended period is exhibited in an interesting manner by the diagram facing page 188, consisting of curves set up on equidistant ordinates representing years, to the scale shown on the right of the diagram. The figures from which the curves have been constructed will be found to the left of the diagram.[32]

It is matter of considerable regret to the author that his utmost efforts to obtain statistics for the Tyne over a period corresponding to that for which the Clyde figures are available have not been rewarded with success. Many likely sources have been consulted, and several gentlemen connected with the river and its industries have been appealed to, but without any satisfactory result. No systematic record of shipbuilding output has been kept by anyone officially concerned with the river, although in every other respect its progress has been abundantly and accurately chronicled. It is only so recently as 1878 that the Newcastle Chronicle begun the practice of giving, in the systematic and complete manner for which it is now justly noted, the returns of shipbuilding throughout the Kingdom. To this journal the author is indebted for the figures of work done on the Tyne during the years subsequent to 1878. The figures for the Wear have been taken from an article descriptive of that district appearing in the Shipping World for June of the present year.

With regard to the Clyde, it is interesting to observe how in the curve the periods of greatest activity, and consequent output, are recurrent every tenth year. Thus at 1864, 1874, and, at all events, 1883, the curve forms decided crests as compared with the general undulations over the intervening years.

During the seven years from 1846 to 1852 inclusive the number of steam vessels built on the Clyde amounted to 14 with wood hulls, 233 with iron hulls—total, 247, of which 141 were paddle-steamers and 106 screw-steamers. The tonnage of the wooden steamers amounted to 18,330, and of the iron vessels to 129,270 tons; the horse-power of the engines in the wooden hulls being 6,740, and in the iron hulls 31,590. In 1851, or nearly a decade earlier than the year at which the curve begins, the number of ships produced was 41, with an aggregate tonnage of 25,320. In 1861, a decade later, 81 steamers were built, the tonnage of which amounted to 60,185, and the horse-power of the engines, 12,493. The tonnage for both steamers and ships, however, during that year was 66,800, as shown by the diagram. During the seven years immediately prior to 1862 the extent and progress of shipbuilding on the river were such that 636 vessels, having an aggregate tonnage of 377,000 tons, were launched from the yards of Glasgow, Greenock, and Dumbarton.

TABLE OF YEARLY TONNAGE
Years	Clyde	Tyne	Wear
	Ton’age	Ton’age	Ton’age
1860	47,800		40,200
1861	66,800		46,800
1862	69,900		56,900
1863	123,300		70,000
1864	178,500		72,000
1865	154,000		73,100
1866	124,500		62,700
1867	108,000		52,200
1868	169,600		70,300
1869	192,300		72,400
1870	180,400		70,100
1871	196,300		81,900
1872	230,300		131,800
1873	232,900		99,400
1874	262,400		88,000
1875	211,800		79,900
1876	174,800		54,100
1877	169,700		87,600
1878	222,300	126,300	109,900
1879	174,800	139,800	92,200
1880	248,700	149,100	116,200
1881	341,000	177,200	148,000
1882	391,900	208,400	212,500
1883	419,600	216,600	212,300

With the year just spoken of a first and very considerable rise in the tonnage output set in and continued till the year 1864, in which year it amounted to 178,500 tons. Various causes of an exceptional nature, or at least, causes apart from the natural progress due to the growth of shipping, were at work in bringing about this increase in the output. The most prominent of these was the necessity which arose for filling up the gaps produced by the withdrawal of many swift steamers from the river and coasting trade to meet the requirements of individuals interested in running the blockade of the ports of the Southern States of America. Between Aprils 1862-3 alone, as many as 30 vessels actively connected in some way with the Clyde and coasting service, were sold for that purpose, and the replacement of these vessels went a considerable way in occasioning the briskness. Another and more abiding cause, however, was the demand for vessels for the cotton-carrying trade. This arose chiefly from the blockade of the American ports, causing cotton to come right from the East Indies and China; and in consequence of the longer voyage many more ships were necessary to carry on the trade. The fact that more than an average number of wrecks had occurred during the two previous winters, together with an increase of the trade between Britain and France as the result of Mr Cobden’s commercial treaty, were elements lending impetus to the briskness in the shipbuilding of the time.

In 1865 the output of tonnage was lessened considerably through what appears to have been but the natural course of commerce in its reactionary stage. This lessened activity was much aggravated when 1866 was reached, and in that year a serious interruption to the trade was caused by a lock-out of the workmen consequent on a partial strike made to enforce what the employers considered an unreasonable demand on the part of the men. In 1867 the output was as low as 108,000 tons, but thereafter it took an upward tendency, its rise to the previous level being sudden, but thereafter very gradual, and spread over a number of years. The output kept steadily improving each year, outreaching former totals, until in 1874 the curve, or, as it may be called, the output wave, formed a crest of exceptional altitude. For that year the aggregate output reached the unprecedented figure of 262,430 tons, a result which made natural all subsequent references to 1874 as the “big year.” The year 1875, although showing an increase in the number of vessels built, yet fell considerably short of 1874 in the matter of tonnage, thus giving to the output curve a decided downward turn. Matters continued to grow worse during 1876, and many of the Clyde firms had painful experiences of “bare poles” until about the beginning of the year 1877, when a slightly improved state of matters set in. Then there was a general desire amongst the workmen for an advance in wages, which ultimately resulted in the great shipwright strike of midsummer, 1877. This strike, it may be remembered, lasted twenty-four weeks, and was one of the most determined struggles which ever took place in this country, both parties having evidently made up their minds to hold out to the last. The strike culminated in the general lock-out of workmen in the autumn of the same year, which, when withdrawn in favour of arbitration as regards the shipwrights, settled down into a keen fight with the ironworkers. The shipwrights’ claim was settled by arbitration, the umpire (Lord Moncrieff) deciding in favour of the employers, and the men accordingly resumed work. The ironworkers’ dispute was likewise a difficult matter to decide, but ultimately the men resumed work on the understanding that their claim for an advance upon their wages of 10 per cent. would be considered six months subsequently. The struggles were exceedingly costly alike to masters and workmen, one of the results being seen pretty distinctly in the diminished output of tonnage during 1877.

About the spring of 1878 matters had not improved in any very material sense; and the ironworkers insisting on a settlement of their former claim for an advance, were met by the employers with a proposal to increase the working hours from 51 per week, as arranged in 1872, to 54 hours per week, or to reduce the then rate of wages. The men were not unnaturally averse to the increase of working hours, and signified their opposition. Subsequently a reduction in wages of 7½ per cent. was enforced, with the result that the ironworkers came out on strike for a time. Ultimately in the spring of 1879 a return to the 54 hours was made. The prevailing great depression continued well on into the autumn of 1879. In October of that year the shipbuilding industry experienced an unexpected but very welcome revival, and an unusually large amount of work came to the Clyde. The output which in 1879 had fallen to 174,800 tons, now took a sudden and remarkable jump, the figure for 1880 amounting to no less than 248,650 tons, affording ample grounds for the belief that the impetus at the close of 1879 was no mere temporary spurt, but a solid revival. Subsequent experience has more than justified this belief. In 1881 the output reached the aggregate of 341,000 tons, in 1882 it overstepped even this, and the output curve continued in the ascendant until for the year 1883 the stupendous aggregate of 419,600 tons was reached. Following the course which accepted theories regarding industrial activity and depression suggest, and which actual experience in the past exemplifies, the curve of output ought still to be in the ascendant, reaching its maximum in 1884, and thereafter declining. Although the close of the year is still some distance off, there is already ample reason to believe that this will not hold good for 1884. This result is after all only very natural when the most exceptional activity of the past four years, coupled with the present very unhealthy state of the shipping trade, are taken into consideration.

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The history of iron shipbuilding on the North-East Coast district does not commence until the year 1840. In March of that year the John Garrow, of Liverpool, a vessel of 800 tons burthen, the first iron ship seen in the North-East Coast rivers, arrived at Shields, and caused considerable excitement. A shipbuilding firm at Walker commenced to use the new material almost immediately, and on the 23rd of September, 1842, the iron steamer Prince Albert glided from Walker Slipway into the waters of the Tyne.

During the next eight or ten years very little progress was made, the vessels mostly in demand being colliers, in the construction of which no one thought of applying iron. About the year 1850, the carriage of coal by railway began seriously to affect the sale of north country coal in the London market, and it became essential, in the interest of the coal-owners and others, to devise some means of conveying the staple produce of the North Country to London in an expeditious, regular, and, at the same time, economical manner. To accomplish this object, Mr C. M. Palmer caused an iron screw-steamer to be designed in such a manner as to secure the greatest possible capacity, with engines only sufficiently powerful to ensure her making her voyages with regularity. This vessel (the John Bowes), the first screw collier, was built to carry 650 tons, and to steam about nine miles an hour. On her first voyage, she was laden with 650 tons of coals in four hours; in forty-eight hours she arrived in London; in twenty-four hours she discharged her cargo; and in forty-eight hours more she was again in the Tyne; so that, in five days, she performed successfully an amount of work that would have taken two average-sized sailing colliers upwards of a month to accomplish. To the success of this experiment may be attributed, in great measure, the subsequent and rapid development of iron shipbuilding in the Tyne and East Coast district. The district has maintained by far the largest share—almost amounting to a monopoly—in the production of the heavy-carrying, slow-speed type of cargo steamers, of which the John Bowes may be said to have been the prototype.

Statistics for the Tyne, as already explained, are not available to any extent until within recent years,[33] but from a paper on “The Construction of Iron Ships and the Progress of Iron Shipbuilding on the Tyne, Wear, and Tees,” written by Mr C. M. Palmer, and forming part of the work, “The Industrial Resources of the Tyne, Wear, and Tees,” published in connection with the British Association’s visit to Newcastle in 1863, it appears that the tonnage of iron ships launched from the Tyne during 1862 amounted to 32,175 tons, and during 1863, to 51,236 tons. Comparing this with the output for 1883—twenty years later—it is found that the figures are more than quadrupled, for in that year the output of the Tyne reached as much as 216,600 tons.

In the year following the launch of the John Bowes, namely, in 1853, the first iron vessel built on the Wear, was released from its blocks. The Tees followed the example with great energy and considerable success, and on both these rivers trade in iron shipbuilding has been correspondingly developed.

What may be described, however, as the opening of the age of iron on the Wear did not begin till the year 1863. During that year 17,720 tons of iron shipping were launched, and from that time the declension of wood shipbuilding, which had long made the Wear a distinguished shipbuilding port in the United Kingdom, proceeded apace. The causes of fluctuation in the trade throughout the subsequent years cannot be traced with any circumstantiality, but the general progress made can be readily gathered from the subjoined tabular record of the number of ships built yearly, with their aggregate and average tonnage. Wood vessels, it may be stated, formed part of the aggregate till the year 1878, when wood dropped out of the arena altogether:—

Year.	No. of	Gross Tons.	Average	Year.	No. of	Gross Tons.	Average
	Ships.		Tons.		Ships.		Tons.
1860	112	40,200	359	1872	122	131,825	1081
1861	126	46,778	371	1873	95	99,371	1046
1862	160	56,920	356	1874	88	88,022	1000
1863	171	70,040	410	1875	91	79,904	878
1864	153	71,987	470	1876	60	54,041	901
1865	172	73,134	425	1877	75	87,578	1168
1866	145	62,719	432	1878	85	109,900	1293
1867	128	52,249	408	1879	65	92,200	1418
1868	138	70,302	510	1880	77	116,200	1509
1869	122	72,420	594	1881	88	148,000	1681
1870	103	70,084	681	1882	123	212,500	1727
1871	97	81,903	844	1883	126	212,300	1685

During the years 1871, 1872, and 1873 the output from the Clyde yards averaged 50 per cent. of the total shipping produced throughout the United Kingdom. That high proportion fell for the years 1874, 1875, and 1876 to as low as 37½ per cent. In 1882 the Clyde’s contribution to the grand total did not exceed 32½ per cent., so that in one decade the premier shipbuilding centre has fallen from the proud position of producing half the total shipping built within the United Kingdom to that of turning out less than one-third. Mr William Denny, dealing with this subject in a paper on the “Industries of Scotland,” read before the Philosophical Society of Dumbarton, in December, 1878, attributed the then condition of affairs with regard to the tonnage output of the Clyde to the keen competition of the builders on the North-East Coast of England, who managed to produce their favourite type of heavy-carrying, slow-speed steamers at very much less cost than could be done on the Clyde. Their success in this he attributed to four causes—1st, to the enterprise of the small shipowners and the general public on the North-East Coast of England in supplying capital for steamers of this kind; 2nd, to the great cheapness of iron in that district; 3rd, to the long hours worked, enabling the shipbuilding plant to be more profitably employed, and to the great development of piece-work; 4th, to the fact that all the builders being engaged upon work of the same class, the price of which could be measured per ton of dead-weight carried, or per ton gross, and per nominal horse-power, they were able easily to compare the efficiency of each other’s yard in point of production, and by that means a keen competition was produced amongst each other. On the Clyde the great variety and frequent speciality of the work prevented any such common measure of prices existing. This way of accounting for the altered relative positions of the chief shipbuilding centres was doubtless at that time the correct one, and to a large extent it still holds true. The productiveness of the North-East Coast ports has in no way declined since, notwithstanding that a larger number of the higher class passenger ships which have long been so much a Clyde speciality are now being constructed there. But the number of yards everywhere have increased in a higher ratio than on the Clyde, and consequently the aggregate of new shipping produced annually in the United Kingdom is made up of a greater number of separate contributions. That this is mainly the reason of the present position of the Clyde relatively to the whole United Kingdom is proved by the figures contained in the accompanying table, which show, amongst other things, that the ratio of tonnage produced by each of the principal districts to the total produced by the whole of them, has not very much altered during the past six years, or since Mr Denny spoke on the subject. If anything, indeed, the Clyde shows in this respect an advance over its northern rivals: although the advance of the Wear during the past two years is equally marked.

Districts.	1878.				1879.
	No.	Tons.	Av’rage	Ratio	No.	Tons.	Av’rage	Ratio
			Ton’ge.	to Total.			Ton’ge.	to Total.
Clyde	254	222,300	875	43·5	191	174,800	915	39·8
Tyne	115	126,300	1096	24·7	130	139,800	1075	32·0
Wear	85	109,900	1293	21·5	65	92,200	1418	21·0
Tees	37	52,500	1419	10·3	25	31,800	1272	7·2
Totals	491	511,000		100·0	411	438,600		100·0
Districts.	1880.				1881.
Clyde	209	248,700	1189	44·2	261	341,000	1306	47·0
Tyne	109	149,100	1367	26·5	123	177,200	1440	24·5
Wear	77	116,200	1509	20·6	88	148,000	1681	20·4
Tees	38	48,500	1279	8·7	34	58,600	1723	8·1
Totals	433	562,500		100·0	506	724,800		100·0
Districts.	1882.				1883.
Clyde	297	391,900	1319	44·6	329	419,700	1276	45·1
Tyne	132	208,400	1578	23·8	159	216,600	1362	23·3
Wear	123	212,500	1727	24·2	126	212,300	1685	23·0
Tees	40	65,000	1625	7·4	44	81,800	1859	8·6
Totals	592	877,800		100·0	658	930,400		100·0

With respect to the progress of shipbuilding in steel, little requires to be added to the general account given in Chapter I. The tonnage annually produced in steel is a constantly-increasing quantity. Hitherto the Clyde has contributed quite three-fourths of the tonnage of steel vessels, owing chiefly to the vigorous way in which certain of the shipbuilders there have adopted the practice, and also to the openness of the local field for the extensive manufacture of the new material. The North-East Coast, however, bids fair, in the immediate future, to become as productive in steel tonnage as the Clyde district. Recently-discovered processes by which the vast stores of Cleveland ironstone may be made profitably available in steel manufacture are working great changes in the way of modifying old and causing the erection of new works.

The extraordinary growth of steel shipbuilding since its commencement in 1878 is well illustrated by the accompanying tables, which are taken from a paper by Mr W. John, on “Recent Improvements in Iron and Steel Shipbuilding,” read at the meetings of the Iron and Steel Institute in May of the present year. The figures relating to steel may be taken, where any divergence occurs, as more authoritative than those occurring in the general account of work in steel in Chapter I. The tables, however, partake of the imperfections already fully alluded to in the present chapter. With regard to them, Mr John says:—“Unfortunately, neither of these tables show the actual amount of shipping, either steel or iron, built in this country, because there would have to be a small percentage, perhaps between ten and twenty, to be added to those classed at Lloyds on Table I. for unclassed ships, and there would be a certain proportion, which I am unable to ascertain, to be added to the figures on Table II. for ships built for foreign owners in this country, and not entered upon the British register. However, the figures in themselves are sufficiently significant of the enormous growth of steel shipbuilding within the last six years, and it will be seen at once, as I have said before, that steel as a material for shipbuilding has passed entirely out of the experimental stage, and must be judged henceforth by the results of its working in the shipyards, and by the results of the performances of the ships already afloat, both as profit-earning machines for their owners, by their general wear and tear, for their safety against strains at sea, and in cases of collision and stranding.”

Year.	Steel.				Iron.
	Steam.		Sailing.		Steam.		Sailing.
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Ton’ge.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
1878	7	4,470			329	406,196	106	111,496
1879	8	14,300	1	1,700	318	436,339	30	34,630
1880	21	34,031	2	1,342	324	422,622	31	37,372
1881	20	39,240	3	3,167	401	622,440	51	74,284
1882	55	113,364	8	12,477	457	742,244	68	108,831
1883	94	150,725	15	15,703	576	817,584	68	116,190

Year.	Total.				Percentage.
	Steel.		Iron.		Steel.		Iron.
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Ton’ge.	No.	Ton’ge.
1878	7	4,470	435	517,692	1·6	0·85	98·4	99·15
1879	9	16,000	348	470,969	2·52	3·28	97·48	96·72
1880	23	35,373	355	459,994	6·1	7·14	93·9	92·86
1881	23	42,407	452	696,724	4·8	5·74	95·2	94·26
1882	63	125,841	525	851,075	10·7	12·9	89·3	87·1
1883	109	166,428	644	933,774	14·47	15·12	85·53	84·88

Year.	Steel.				Iron.
	Steam.		Sailing.		Steam.		Sailing.
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Ton’ge.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
1879	22	19,522	1	1,700	337	428,082	33	35,332
1880	26	36,493	4	1,671	362	447,389	39	40,015
1881	34	68,366	3	3,167	411	590,503	50	68,650
1882	65	115,449	8	12,478	446	672,740	83	112,852
1883	92	141,552	11	14,193	548	742,292	72	114,698

Year.	Total.				Percentage.
	Steel.		Iron.		Steel.		Iron.
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Ton’ge.	No.	Ton’ge.
1879	23	21,222	370	463,414	5·83	4·38	94·15	95·62
1880	30	38,164	401	487,404	6·96	7·26	93·04	92·74
1881	37	71,533	461	659,153	7·43	9·79	92·57	90·21
1882	73	127,927	529	785,592	12·14	14·0	87·86	86·0
1883	103	155,745	620	856,990	14·24	15·37	85·76	84·63