CHAPTER XVII.

Although one or two of the more important questions with which the Commissioners had to deal, cannot be materially advanced without an arrangement with other nations, there are others entirely within our own power. To retrace our steps, therefore, with regard to some of these is as worthy of consideration as to devise any new enactments. But these subjects can only be properly dealt with in a calm and impartial spirit. So many exaggerated statements have been recently made, in and out of Parliament, with reference to the extent of the loss of life caused by men being sent to sea in “coffin ships,”[267] as if such occurrences had no existence except in our own time, and were the creation of a prevailing eagerness to be rich too soon, that it is, above all things, necessary to adhere strictly to facts, in considering further legislation, should such be necessary, and to regulate any measures to be enforced on this subject by such facts alone. Nothing can be more dangerous than legislation founded on sentimental or sensational reports.

But if “coffin ships” still exist, and I fear they do, this cannot arise from lack of legislative enactments. Indeed, the wisdom of Parliament has, for the last quarter of a century, been seriously directed every Session to the improvement of our ships and of their crews.[268] Nor have individual efforts of the most effective and laudable description been wanting to prevent the construction of vessels of an unseaworthy character:[269] while it is not the case, as has been alleged, that, either our ships or the officers by whom they are navigated have deteriorated. On the contrary, they have, within the last quarter of a century, vastly improved in almost every respect. If any of my readers have any doubts on this question, let them refer to the answers to Mr. Murray’s circular of 1843,[270] and to those sent by our consuls abroad to Mr. J. G. Shaw Lefevre’s circular of 1872.[271] It may be that our seamen do not “hand, reef, and steer,” with the same alacrity as they did in the days of our forefathers, simply because such duties are less required now than they were then; but our masters and mates are infinitely superior to what they were a short time since, and in our regular lines of steamers and packet-ships, there are to be found a class of seamen much more sober and steady than could be found in any merchant service twenty-five years ago. Men now exist, who are quite as competent for the duties required of them, as any seamen of the days of Duncan or Nelson, and far more to be depended on for the performance of their duties on board of merchant ships than was the case in my own boyhood, although there are, still, far too many who are inefficient, drunken, and worthless. There are likewise still many ships lost which ought not to be lost, but the assertions which have been made with regard to an increase in the amount of loss during recent years have been greatly exaggerated, as I shall now endeavour to show.

Among the multifarious duties imposed on the Board of Trade, not the least important is that connected with wrecks, casualties, and collisions of ships at home and abroad. For many years, a sort of record had been kept of those casualties, but it is not until 1855, when the duty devolved on the Board of Trade, that we have any reliable statistics.[272]

Of course the number of wrecks, casualties, and collisions reported for any one year, increases or diminishes according to the prevalence or absence of gales of remarkable violence and duration. These sometimes tell in an appalling manner, in the greatly increased loss of life which occurs in one year over another. A Table,[273] copied from the wreck returns of the Board of Trade of 1874, classifies the reports so far as regards the loss of life, showing how far one year has been more disastrous than another; for instance, in 1859-60, the number of lives lost was five times greater than in the previous year, and three times more than in the year following, arising, in a great measure, from the disastrous gale in October 1859 in which 343 lives were lost in the Royal Charter, wrecked on the Anglesea Coast. Again, in 1867-68, nearly double the number of lives were lost than during any year either before or since: in fact, no less than 326 vessels were lost or damaged, and 319 lives sacrificed by tempest, between the 1st and 3rd December inclusive of the former year.

But, though between 1855 and 1873, 13,466 lives were lost on the coasts of the United Kingdom, more than 71,000 lives were saved,[276] during the same period, from the shipwrecked vessels; and, though the duty of a seafaring man is proverbially a dangerous one, and the navigation of our coasts is attended with greater perils than those in any other parts of the world, it is astonishing how small is the percentage of loss either of life or property, when compared with the amount of shipping frequenting our shores.

In the frontispiece to this volume will be found a wreck chart of the British Islands, prepared from the last Board of Trade Returns for the year 1873-4. A red dot signifies a case of total loss; a blue dot signifies a case of partial damage. The first glance of this chart is very appalling; but it becomes less so when we consider the enormous number of vessels annually frequenting our coasts. Many hundreds of vessels at times leave the northern coal ports, alone, in one day; and I estimate that, in the year to which this chart refers, no less than 500,000 vessels of 90,000,000 tons! including their repeated voyages, frequented the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.[277]

But, however startling these figures as a measure of the immense number of vessels frequenting our coasts, they affect the mind much less than a glance at the actual facts, the fleets themselves. Until I made a course from the Thames to the Tyne, and saw the sea covered with ships, steamers, and fishing boats, of all kinds and sizes, and saw what an industry even the fishing alone employed, I never had clearly in my own mind a notion of what our mercantile marine really was. Let anyone survey from the fort of Tynemouth and ancient churchyard adjoining—a favourite walk of mine when I represented that borough in Parliament—and see from 200 to 300 ships going out at one tide, or watch the passing ships from Flamborough Head or from the cliffs of Dover, or let him steam through the endless crowd of herring boats off the Scotch coast, and he will have a stronger impression of the magnitude of the mercantile marine of Great Britain than can be derived from the most careful study of all our Blue Books on the subject.

In dealing with this question, it becomes our duty to consider carefully such realities as these. We should not be led astray by a mere glance at the wrecks and casualties which appear on the face of the chart—a chart which has too frequently been used as a picture to alarm the public mind, and induce people, who will not take the trouble to inquire for themselves, to believe that the question of the loss of life and property at sea has not received that consideration from Government or Parliament which its great importance demands.

I have frequently remarked, in the course of this work, that, however great our exertions have been to save human life, more might still be done, but, without all the facts, further legislation, based on general impressions, and still more so on popular clamour (valuable in itself, though but too often deplorable in its results), will prove of the most mischievous character. We must, also, remember that every act fettering free navigation, renders our Shipowners less able to compete with those of other countries, and, if it does not forward the main object in view—the safety of life—must be a clear national loss, because it renders us less able to make our ships a source of profit, a result which, if not carefully watched, might easily be carried to such an extent as to discourage investments in British shipping.[278]

Now if we take the total disasters on our coasts, including trivial accidents, it does not amount to anything like one-half per cent. per annum, and to not three out of every thousand of the vessels frequenting these shores; indeed, when we consider the dangerous character of these shores, the rocks and shoals with which they are surrounded, the storms with which we are visited, the frequency and uncertainty of these storms, and the dense fogs which often prevail, we may, so far from being startled by the sight of the wreck chart, be surprised that the casualties are not far greater. But, to arrive at the true bearing of the case, it is desirable to analyse the disasters. Besides the red and blue dots on the chart, indicative of total loss or partial damage to vessels, I have indicated by similar dots, with a cross above, the number of disasters in the course of the year, which were attended with loss of life. When my readers examine these, they will be still more agreeably surprised. From the Frith of Forth to Spurnhead, a distance of somewhere about 150 miles of the most rugged, unprotected, and dangerous coast in the world, where numerous fleets of vessels are constantly wending their way, and in every description of weather, there were only seven vessels wrecked with loss of life during 1873-4, and two of these were partial losses. In calling attention to this fact, I must remind my readers that, on the part of our coast in question, the most inferior description of vessels, and the most deeply laden, carry on their hazardous trade. If we next cast our eye over the line of coast extending from London to the Lizard Point, and embracing the whole coast of the English Channel, a distance of somewhere about 400 miles, we will see that during the whole of the same year there were only fifteen wrecks with loss of life, and seven of these were partial. Nor is the proportion greater on any other portion of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

But we should do well to inquire still further, and not merely compare the present number of disasters with those of former years, but likewise their extent and character; and, as far as is practicable, the different causes of loss, so as to endeavour to apply, to the best advantage, any further remedies that may be necessary. I have shown[279] that the average loss of life during the three years ending 1835 was 894 per annum, when we owned 2,780,000 tons of shipping; but the loss of life for the year 1873-4, when our Merchant Shipping had increased to 7,294,230 tons, of which no less than 1,825,738 tons consisted of steamers, in which the risk of navigating our coasts is greatly increased, amounted only to 506, of whom 103 were lost in foreign vessels. Many of the remaining 403 were lost on fishing boats, and other vessels not registered under the Merchant Shipping Act.[280] Very material progress towards the saving of life on our coasts has, therefore, been made during the last forty years—a progress which will appear the more striking when I direct attention to the fact, that, while the entrances and clearances of British ships engaged in the foreign trade were, in 1835, not much more than 4,000,000 tons, they had increased to more than 26,000,000 tons in 1873-4.[281] Of the 506 lives lost, 61 were lost in vessels that foundered; 76 through vessels in collision; 200 in vessels that stranded or were cast ashore derelict; and 101 in missing vessels. The remaining 68 lives were lost from various causes, such as by being washed overboard and by other accidents on board. The whole of the above lives were lost in 130 vessels, 87 of which were laden, and 40 in ballast. It is not known whether the remaining three were laden or light.

If we take the last five years from 1869 to 1873-4 inclusive, we find the total number of wrecks and casualties of vessels of every kind, arising from all causes and including collisions, amounted to 8952, giving an annual average of 1791; the average loss of life in these vessels during the five and a half years, including the disastrous half-year 1873, being 755 per annum. Although no return is kept in minute detail of the approximate cause of these disasters, we learn from the wreck register, that in the year 1873-4, 381 were from collisions, and 1422 from wrecks and casualties other than collisions; 346 were wrecks, &c., resulting in total loss; and 1076 partial damage more or less serious. Of the total losses, 128 happened when the wind was at “force 9 or upwards” (a strong gale), and they are classed as having been caused by stress of weather; 93 from inattention, carelessness, or neglect; 30 from defects in the ship or equipments (and of these thirty, 19 appear to have foundered from unseaworthiness); the remainder seem to have arisen from various other causes. Of the 1070 casualties, 525 arose from stress of weather; 180 from carelessness; and 91 from defects in equipments; and the remainder from various other causes. In 1873-4, there were, on or near the coasts of the United Kingdom, 165 wrecks and casualties to smacks and other fishing vessels, which are included in the above returns, and in these, 76 lives were lost, while 195 lives were lost in vessels of the collier class.

These returns are, no doubt, very valuable as far as they go, and have become more so since they were extended to the loss of all British ships, and, where practicable, to the cause of the loss. But the class of the vessel, whether built of wood or iron, and the draught of water when she left her last port, might be added to advantage. Nor should we omit the familiar S.S. to distinguish steam from sailing ships. However, they amply show that no charge can be justly made against either the Government or the Legislature of any dereliction of duty in their endeavours to save the life of all persons who “go down to the sea in ships.” Nor can we charge the people of this country with any callousness or want of sympathy for the seafaring portion of the population. The number of Acts of Parliament passed in recent years, and the grants of public money voted for the purpose of saving life, are an answer to all such charges; while noble private institutions, like the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, the Lifeboat Establishments, the Royal Alfred Asylum, besides various other charitable associations for the benefit of seamen, testify in this respect to the liberality of the public.[282]

Nor have the lights, beacons, and buoys on our coast, all tending materially, as they do, to save life, been neglected. On the contrary, while we have greatly reduced the charges, we have increased the number and highly improved the quality of our lights. By the Act passed in 1836,[283] a number of lighthouses, which formed part of the hereditary estate of the Crown and had been allowed to get into the hands of private persons, were transferred to the Trinity House, provision being made for reducing the exorbitant tolls previously levied. By an Act of 1853,[284] the expenditure of the Trinity House on lighthouses, and that of the Scotch and Irish lighthouse boards, was subjected to the control of the Board of Trade, and, since then, the reduction on the charges for lights, buoys, beacons, &c., has been fully 75 per cent. Nor has the question of Harbours of Refuge been overlooked; for, besides the construction of various national harbours, large sums of public money have been advanced at a low rate of interest for the improvement of local harbours, expressly for the benefit of merchant ships and seamen, and these, while facilitating commerce, have, in no small degree, tended to the safety of life and property.

Indeed, so anxious has Government been to rectify any shortcomings in legislation, which might tend to the loss of life, or inflict a hardship on seamen, that the Bill of Mr. Fortescue (now Lord Carlingford), passed in 1873,[285] contained not merely clauses about “load-lines” and “clear sides,” but a provision giving seamen a claim for compensation when, having been detained on a charge of desertion, the ship, upon survey, was shown to be unseaworthy. This Act further contains a provision, strengthening the power of the Board of Trade to detain unseaworthy ships, whereby that “Board are enabled to act of their own accord, and without complaint from without,” the result of which has been that, up to the last return,[286] out of the 474 vessels detained and surveyed by the Board of Trade under this Act, 435 have been on the report of their own officers, and 39 only on complaints made ab extra.[287] To these facts I may add, as having a very important bearing on the opinions I have hitherto ventured to express, that only 24 out of the 474 vessels were detained because they were overladen; and that, out of these, not a single vessel detained was alleged to be overladen on information given by the crews, notwithstanding the encouragement they had to become informers against their employers. This power to detain is extended to cases of overloading and improper stowage or imperfect loading, and the conditional orders of release are of a very elaborate character, while the provisions concerning payment of expenses, and the mode of appeal, are made far more full and explicit.

This Act further gives power to vary the requirements contained in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 with regard to boats—requirements, I may add, which it had been found practically impossible to comply with. It likewise contains a clause, which ought to have been the law long since, making it criminal (though the dictates of humanity, it had been thought, were in themselves sufficient), in a master, after collision with another vessel, not to stand by and render assistance. In the same statute, a code of signals of distress has been adopted and very properly enforced, as well as a general code of pilot signals.

Many losses having occurred from spontaneous combustion of coal on board ship, Government, in 1874, appointed, on the recommendation of Lloyd’s Committee, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Childers, to inquire into this subject, but this Commission has not yet concluded its labours.

Early in the Session of 1875, the Government introduced another Merchant Shipping Bill, containing various amendments of the then existing law, and among them a special clause which had for its object the abolition of all advance notes. This Bill met with very considerable opposition (partly of a frivolous character), rendering its progress through the House so slow, that Government found it desirable to withdraw it, more especially as the Bill had been materially altered and curtailed in the course of various divisions, especially in the clauses referring to the advance notes and other matters of importance.

When Government intimated its intention of withdrawing the Bill of which they could no longer approve, and which they had not time to pass, a scene arose[289] happily of rare occurrence in the debates of the British Parliament. It was closed, however, with great dignity by the Prime Minister and leader of the Commons. He had introduced such a measure as he no doubt, after grave consultation with his Cabinet, considered necessary and sufficient. The House, and more especially those members of it who were more immediately interested in maritime affairs, and who either approved or opposed the views of Mr. Plimsoll had so mutilated the Government measure, that Mr. Disraeli would no longer be responsible for it. To use his own words, he “declined to deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner,” and no man of prudence or common sense can blame him for the course he adopted under these circumstances.[290]

Unfortunately, however, the popular outcry was so great against the course he had adopted, aroused as this had been for the moment by the well-meaning but rhapsodical protests of Mr. Plimsoll, backed, as they no doubt were, by many really benevolent men, that Mr. Disraeli, in the end, considered it expedient to introduce another Bill, embodying a portion of his own views together with those of the philanthropists. Although this Act contains some necessary and useful provisions, it is not a wise measure, nor can the Government have considered it perfect, as it was hurriedly passed so late in the Session as the 6th of September, and is only to remain in force until the 1st of October 1876.[291]

This Act confirms the powers previously given to persons, specially appointed by the Board of Trade, to detain what they consider unseaworthy ships, without previous orders from the Board, an addition which, however necessary, ought not to have been conceded to any individuals without much further consideration and discussion than it received. This addition opens the door to corruption in its most pernicious and dangerous forms, by giving, as it does, to each one of a great number of subordinate officers, personal authority to detain “unseaworthy vessels,” thus transferring to a single person a power the Board of Trade alone possessed under the Act of 1873, and laying down a principle contrary to all good government, while relieving that Board of its administrative responsibility. Otherwise the Bill contains some useful provisions, and none more so than where it prohibits the carriage of a cargo of which more than one-third consists of grain, &c., unless the grain is secured from shifting by suitable boards or otherwise. But, while this clause may be necessary or right in itself, its meaning may be misconstrued, and it may lead to further and more detailed legislation, making its vague language specific, and calling on Government officers in Foreign ports to enforce its provisions.[292]

The Act also amends the clause in the Act of 1871, which makes the sending an unseaworthy ship to sea a misdemeanour, by providing—

(a.) That criminal liability shall attach to any one who attempts, or is party to an attempt, to send such a ship to sea, and to a master who knowingly takes such a ship to sea.

(b.) That every ship shall have a registered managing owner, and that if she is sent to sea from any port in the United Kingdom in an unseaworthy state he shall be liable, unless he proves that he has done all he can to prevent it.

The Act further provides that every British ship shall be marked permanently with lines on her sides showing the position of her decks.

It also provides that the owner of every foreign-going British ship shall, before clearance outwards from any port in the United Kingdom, mark upon her sides a maximum load-line, and shall insert the distance between this and the deck marks in the entry outwards at the Custom House and in the agreement with the crew.

The Act further stipulates that every contract with a seaman shall imply an obligation on the part of the owner and his agents to use all reasonable efforts to make and keep[293] the ship seaworthy. The effect of this clause is to give the seaman or his family a remedy against the owner. But it does not extend to damage or loss of life caused by the act of a fellow seaman other than the master.

Happily it is not necessary, in reviewing the recent changes in our Mercantile Marine Laws, to notice those personal matters which have unfortunately been raised in the course of their discussion, except to express regret that Mr. Plimsoll in dealing with a subject of such great public importance should have made grave assertions and charges alike against Government and private individuals, too many of which he has not merely entirely failed to prove, but has neglected to withdraw.

Had Government been persistently neglectful of its duty in its endeavours to mitigate the loss of life and property at sea, there might have been an excuse for some of these charges, especially if it had neglected necessary legislative enactments.[294] But such has not been the case. On the contrary, Parliament of late years, while producing some excellent measures, has interfered far too much with the details of the affairs of individuals connected with Merchant Shipping: and, though yielding for the moment to a popular cry, Mr. Disraeli may well have had reasonable doubts whether further legislation might not, so far from lessening, tend to increase those dangers and disasters which must ever attend the navigation of the ocean.

Having, however, officially announced his intention to review the whole subject, and to consider it in all its bearings, I venture to invite the attention of my readers to the more important points now pending. They are: a compulsory load-line, and the production of an official certificate of seaworthiness by all ships before they are cleared at the Custom House.

So far as regards the proposed compulsory load-line, a very competent and intelligent witness who gave his evidence before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, says,[296] “I think nothing could be more serviceable and nothing more excellent than to obtain and, if it were possible, enforce a load-line; but I also think there is nothing more impossible. A load-line, do what you may, is the opinion of an expert. How can you, by authority, enforce the opinion of an expert? I have had before me,” he continues, “a great many proposals for ascertaining load-lines for ships. Some of them are very ingenious. By the best of them you may get, with considerable accuracy, the cubical displacement of the empty ship, the displacement of the cargo, and so you may arrive at the cubical space left in the ship available for floating. And getting that you get a valuable and useful fact for some objects. But the supreme difficulty remains untouched, viz., What ought the floating capacity to be? I cannot imagine it possible to enforce by any Government intervention a rule which must depend in every individual case upon the opinion of an expert.”

Such, also, was the purport of the evidence of the great majority, if not of all the witnesses examined before the Commission; but I quote that of Mr. Harper, because he is not merely thoroughly competent to offer an opinion on the subject, but is altogether disinterested. Indeed, from the appointment he holds, it would be to his interest to recommend a compulsory load-line, and he would no doubt have done so, had he not thought that any such legislative measure would be likely to aggravate the evils sought to be remedied. In fact, the whole tenor of the evidence is that a fixed load-line would do more harm than good.[297] And such was the opinion of the Commissioners, who state, “that any rule of freeboard founded on surplus buoyancy gives to a vessel of light scantling an advantage over a stronger vessel. Thus the inferior ship would by law be allowed to carry the heavier cargo. Such an enactment would not contribute to the safety of life at sea. From all the evidence we have collected on this subject, we are of opinion that an Act of Parliament enforcing any scale of freeboard would be mischievous.”... “A law presenting such a rule would therefore enhance the perils of a seafaring life.”

Nor can impartial persons who have studied this question arrive at any other conclusion, for as the Commissioners justly add, “There is no general agreement as to a rule by which the requisite amount of reserve buoyancy could be determined, and it appears that, except under definite circumstances, it is not a determinable problem. The proper load-line in each particular case depends not only upon the principal dimensions of the ship, but also upon her form and structural strength, the nature of her cargo, the voyage, and the season of the year.”

The Commissioners, consequently, limited their recommendation so far as regards freeboard to the extent that “every merchant ship should have marked upon each of her sides amidships, a vertical scale of feet downwards from the edge of her main-deck,” and that a note of her draught of water “should be entered in the log after the vessel has received her full load, immediately before the time of her starting on her voyage, which should, wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom it should be recorded.”

This recommendation was proposed to be carried out in the Government Bill which was withdrawn, but, in the Act now temporarily in force, the provisions are somewhat different. The advantages of either system are problematical. Shipowners will continue, as they have hitherto done, to load their vessels to such draught as they consider prudent, and if one of their vessels is lost, and other persons remark that she was too heavily laden, the answer will either be that the draught was as usual, or that safety in proportion to depth is a matter of opinion depending on many varying circumstances. The mere fact of publicly recording the draught of water would, it is to be feared, have little effect on unprincipled or avaricious Shipowners, against whom alone the law is aimed. Practically, I think the system of marking now in force will be of little or no avail, and that the result will not be as the framers of the law intended. A Shipowner being now required by law to mark upon the sides of the vessel amidships a circular disc 12 inches in diameter, to be so placed that “the centre of the disc shall indicate the maximum load-line in salt water to which the owner intends to load the ship for that voyage,” will perceive that to place the disc only slightly above the usual line of load draught would, on the one hand, fetter him to some extent; while, on the other hand, he would incur no disadvantage by placing it so much higher as to ensure its being well clear of the water under any circumstances of loading. A maximum load-line will, therefore, in practice mean the line down to which the ship will certainly not be loaded. Indeed, from the information I have gained on the subject, the practice with some Shipowners seems already to be that the discs are placed one, two, and in some cases, three and even four feet above the water-line. The mere marking it would, therefore, appear in a great measure worthless, as surveyors will still require to wait until a ship has her cargo on board and is ready for sea, before they can form any opinion as to her safety. Whether it is wise, on the part of Shipowners, to place the disc so far above the vessel’s ordinary water-line as to make it meaningless has been doubted by many, but the fact remains that it is so placed in very many instances. It would, certainly, have been better to have omitted from the clause of the Act I have just quoted the word “maximum,” as few Shipowners would have placed their discs too high if, by doing so, this indicated an intention on their part to overload their vessels.

However, if it can be shown that this new mode of marking the sides of a ship tends in any degree towards the greater safety of life and property at sea, the shipping community, generally, will not complain of the expense and trouble. In all good governments there is a pervading principle to which all classes submit, that the interests of the few must be made subservient to the good of the many, and that, especially where life is at stake, no reasonable trouble or expense should be spared to preserve it. But if, on the other hand, it is found that this system of marking or registering the draught of water is useless, or even injurious, Shipowners will have great cause of complaint against Government for an unnecessary interference with their business, provided they can show that they have made an earnest endeavour to apply the provisions of the Act fairly and in the spirit in which they were framed.[298]

The other important point on which Mr. Plimsoll insisted is of a different character. But to carry it out in the way suggested, or as it was argued in the House of Commons and before the Royal Commission, would be impracticable, and even if practicable, it would be most mischievous: the Commissioners in their Report state the question as follows:—“With the view of providing for the greater safety of life at sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade shall superintend the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the extent of our mercantile marine and the mode in which business must, necessarily, be conducted if we desire to maintain our present high position as a maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply absurd and, if carried into effect, would be most ruinous. That we have already too much legislation in matters of detail the Commissioners themselves admit. Referring to the pernicious effects of inquiry into such matters by Government surveyors on Emigrant ships, they say, and from the evidence before them they would have been justified in expressing their opinion in still stronger terms, “We consider it to be a question worthy of serious consideration, whether, in the case of passenger ships, the certificate of the Board of Trade, so far as regards specific approval, should not be expressly confined to the number of passengers to be allowed, and to the accommodation for their health, comfort, and general security; all questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery, and equipment being left to the owners, subject only to a general power of interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify special intervention.”

I have been unable to ascertain who made the extraordinary proposal, that every ship from the time her keel was laid until she was loaded and ready for sea should be under the superintendence of officers appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll I must state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his speeches, I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant ships of this country should be placed, either as regards construction, inspection, or repair, altogether, under the control of the Board of Trade or of any other Government department.[299] What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems to me, to be a matter to which I have often referred in the course of this work, that we do not utilise to anything like the extent we might the vast private resources within ourselves, and that we might do so to advantage, so far as regards the survey of our merchant ships, not one of which he suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she is seaworthy. Now this is a suggestion which few men would be bold enough to decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how this may be secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the way he puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could not be overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in principle.

To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution, not on a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might create as many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides creating jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions or associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as various other associations now are, and empowered to grant certificates of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain tonnage would require to produce before she was cleared at the Custom House. Or they might be welded into one great national institution directly controlled by all the various branches of the shipping community in harmony with their sentiments, and alive to the wants and necessities always arising through the growth and development of trade and commerce.

Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did, they would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check, one against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on the other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those immediately concerned. Were Government to require these associations to classify ships, then I agree with the Commissioners, that it is not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the conveyance of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in Parliament, and numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that many persons are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be reasonably satisfied that a ship is seaworthy before she proceeds to sea. We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and manufactures of various kinds, and events have shown, however much we may have already done to save life and property at sea, that the exercise of a similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of consideration in the case of ships.

As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners, are so well known for their good qualities as not to require classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least, survey for seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious hardship to them.

Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former I should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do not class their ships either because they do not care to incur the expense (underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their own way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification. But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than any government or private surveyor, and in which they take a laudable pride (for such men are the pillars of our maritime greatness), would, I doubt not, have no objection to an authorised surveyor inspecting their ships, and would readily pay the moderate fee required to cover the cost of a certificate of seaworthiness.[300]

For the information of the general public I may state that there is a very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and those which any surveyor who knew anything about his business would pronounce to be unseaworthy. In the case of classed ships, the certificate of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of ships who do not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that a certificate of seaworthiness should be required. They argue, and with great force, that those persons who do not class their ships, because they will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the lives of others for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it were, the rich would live, and the poor would die. And when a Shipowner declines to bear the expense of making his vessel seaworthy, he places in jeopardy the life of the sailor to benefit himself.