(Vide Map I.)

During the first fortnight of July 1917 the Divisional Artillery marched north into the Ypres Salient. Headquarters was opened at Elverdinghe on the 15th and batteries moved at once into position between 1500 and 3000 yards further east. The C.R.A. (Brig.-General Browell) took over command of the Left Group of the Right Artillery, XIVth Corps, consisting of the 91st and 92nd Brigades and the 93rd (Army) Brigade, which again fought under its old Divisional Artillery. Immediately after coming into the line preparations were begun for an attack which was to be made on the Allied front between the river Lys, south-east of Messines, and Bixschoete.

The plan underlying the operations of 1917 consisted in striking a series of blows in different parts of the front, so that each of the succeeding attacks might fall on the enemy before he had recovered from the last. After the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line, operations were begun on the 9th of April at Arras. At the end of the first six days’ fighting our lines had been pushed forward four miles on this front, and included the important Vimy Ridge, which gave to us and denied to the enemy most valuable observation. The 93rd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Stillwell) took part in this battle.

As the French were preparing to launch an attack on the Aisne, the Arras operations were continued in order to hold as many as possible of the German reserves from moving south. The French opened their offensive on the 16th of April, and on the 5th of May carried the Chemin des Dames. The fighting on the Arras front had then fulfilled its rôle, but activity in this area was still maintained until preparations for an offensive in the Ypres Salient were complete.[7]

The whole of the country round Ypres is overlooked by the ridge which runs up from Messines and Wytschaete, passing east of Hooge and Zonnebeke to Passchendaele. The British line until the 7th of June lay in a semicircle round Ypres at a general distance of 4000 yards from the town, following the foot of the high ground as far as Sanctuary Wood south of Hooge. From this point, while the main ridge continues north-east, the line curved in a general north-westerly direction past Wieltje to Boesinghe, but was still overlooked by the German positions on the long spur which extends as far as Pilckem.

On the 7th of June the very successful battle of Messines gained the whole of the southern part of the ridge as far as a point about a mile south of Hooge. The object of the operations which began at the end of July was to extend this success and to push forward our lines east and north of Ypres so as to embrace the whole of the high ground which at present dominated our position in the salient. On the front of the XIVth Corps this meant an advance north-east, of which the first stage was to be the capture of Pilckem Ridge and the ground as far as the Steenbeek.

The Divisional Artillery covered the right sector of the XIVth Corps front, occupied till the beginning of July by the 29th Division, and after that by the 38th. The line, which extended from a point opposite Krupp Farm to the canal bank just short of the railway, was little changed since the 20th Division had held it in the spring of 1916. It had been pushed forward and straightened at certain points, and to the left of this sector the British had taken over a further stretch of 1500 yards along the canal, but the general situation of the trenches remained the same.

The conditions, on the other hand, had been very greatly improved. Many miles of new tram lines had been laid, so that nearly every battery had a line running to within a hundred yards of the gun positions, and a large number of ammunition dumps had been formed. The flatness of the country made it impossible to get complete flash cover for all guns. Camouflage screens, however, had been erected all along the front, and with the natural cover afforded by numerous small copses and farms, most batteries were able to obtain fair flash cover.

The Divisional Artillery had to occupy entirely new positions; these were reconnoitred on the 13th; work was begun on them that night, and on the 14th, 15th and 16th the batteries came into action and took their part in the preliminary bombardment.

The divisions detailed to carry out the attack in the XIVth Corps were the 38th on the right and the Guards on the left; the 29th Division was in reserve behind the Guards, and the 20th was to arrive in this area in time to come into reserve behind the 38th.

The bombardment continued throughout the rest of July, for the operations originally planned to begin on the 25th were put off till the 31st. A marked feature of this period was the silence of the German guns by day, a great contrast to the continual shelling of 1916. This was the result of the very thorough counter-battery work which had been carried out in the salient by the heavy artillery, assisted by our aeroplanes. It is known that the Germans withdrew their guns by day and brought them up each night, when they shelled the whole area heavily, especially with gas. They had been engaged, when the 20th Divisional Artillery came into the line, in moving back their battery positions across the Steenbeek, and the increased activity which they showed after the 21st of July pointed to the completion of this manœuvre.

The enemy’s night firing, by killing and wounding many of the drivers and horses as well as by continually breaking the Decauville railway, made the supply of ammunition exceedingly difficult, especially for the Divisional Ammunition Column, which was working day and night forming dumps in the forward area for future operations. There were considerable losses, too, among the gunners; B/92 Battery had 24 casualties in two nights, and on the 22nd had to be withdrawn from the line for a short rest. The 93rd (Army) Brigade was in the most forward position, and it had been decided to keep this as a silent brigade. Owing to the casualties incurred in the Divisional Artillery, this plan had to be abandoned on the 22nd in order to keep up the programme of night firing that had been laid down.

With the exception of a few raids on the enemy’s lines, the only operation carried out before the battle began took place on the 27th, when information was received that the enemy had retired from his front line. Strong patrols sent out to verify this report crossed No Man’s Land unopposed, entered the enemy’s front line, and even pushed on beyond it. Later they met with strong resistance from numbers of the enemy concealed in large concrete dug-outs, and when reinforcements came up from the direction of Pilckem, the patrols were forced back to the original line. Prisoners stated that the enemy was much shaken by our bombardment, but had no intention of retiring on this front. Opposite Boesinghe, however, the enemy did retire, leaving in our hands both banks of the Yser Canal, which had formed till then a serious obstacle to the advance of the Allied left flank.

During this time the Divisional Ammunition Column worked very hard and earned the congratulations of the C.R.A. Between the 19th and the 26th the column delivered over 35,000 rounds to the batteries, besides sending out rations, water, and large quantities of camouflage and material. In the latter half of July the casualties in the column were 3 officers, 37 other ranks, and 113 animals.

Meanwhile the Division had entrained at Domart on the 20th of July and concentrated in the XIVth Corps area, with headquarters at Proven. For the rest of the month it remained in Corps reserve behind the 38th Division.

As the day of the attack drew near various units of the Division were attached for special work in connection with the operations. The 10th K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. went to the 38th Division on the 25th to provide carrying parties to the front line. They came under severe shelling, meeting for the first time the new German gas, in which it was possible to work for some hours before the effects of the gas were felt. This gas, which could not be seen and could be detected only by the faint smell of sour apples, was very deadly, but few casualties were caused to these two battalions from this source owing to the efficiency of the gas helmet and the special rattles which had been provided to give warning. The 10th R.B. suffered heavy casualties from shell-fire.

During the operations both battalions were employed on reclaiming roads under the C.R.E., and the 11th K.R.R.C. did the same work under the 38th Division. The 59th and 217th Machine Gun Companies moved to forward positions on the 22nd to assist in the barrage on the 31st, when the 59th Machine Gun Company fired over 20,000 rounds on the S.O.S. lines, The 59th Brigade, the 83rd Field Company R.E., and the 11th D.L.I. moved to positions south and west of Elverdinghe on the 30th and 31st. During the operation the 83rd and 96th Field Companies and the D.L.I. constructed artillery tracks under the C.R.E.

The attack was launched at 3.50 A.M. on the 31st of July and went well. The infantry quickly gained the Pilckem Ridge, and by 11.35 A.M. both the 38th and the Guards Divisions were reported to be holding their final objective, the line of the Steenbeek. At 3.30 P.M. the S.O.S. went up from this line and the 92nd and 93rd Field Artillery Brigades opened fire; the barrage came down right on the attacking wave, which broke and ran.

During the advance the barrage, which had been practised daily during the preceding week, moved forward at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes, remaining stationary 200 yards beyond each objective. Whilst stationary on these “protectors” some batteries fired smoke shells to form a screen another 200 yards further on. In the 91st Brigade 2nd Lieut. G. C. Glossop, C/91 Battery, and Lieut. H. P. W. Humphreys, D/91, acted as F.O.O.’s, accompanied by twelve N.C.O.’s and men. A buried cable had been dug in up to the front line trenches. As the infantry advanced, a telephone line was run out from the cable head, one officer being responsible for the line and the other for obtaining information. Excellent reports were sent back, and 2nd Lieut. Glossop and Lieut. Humphreys were awarded the M.C. and four men the M.M. for their conspicuous success in maintaining communication to the foremost infantry positions for two days under heavy shell-fire. Lieut. A. Currie of the same brigade won the M.C. for carrying out under heavy shelling a most useful reconnaissance. In the 92nd Brigade Lieut. Pickard, D/92, and 2nd Lieut. Harrison, A/92, acted as F.O.O.’s, and advanced with the infantry. 2nd Lieut. Harrison and many of his party were killed during the action.

As the advance progressed the guns were moved forward. At 10 A.M., when the infantry had taken a line between Pilckem and the Steenbeek, the 92nd Brigade moved forward to positions already chosen just west of the canal. As soon as this brigade was reported in action, about 1.45 P.M., the 91st was ordered to the western slope of Pilckem Ridge. At this time it began to rain. The tracks forward were not yet completed; one road was passable, but only as far as the old German front line. As a result of our bombardment the ground was a mass of shell-holes, with pill-boxes blown upside down and débris scattered everywhere, difficult enough for infantry to move over and almost impossible for guns. As the planked track could not be finished till nearly dark, only one battery, C/91, was able to get to the forward position that day, with eight horses per gun team and all ammunition by pack. The remaining batteries got to the position by dawn the next day. The ground, however, was so swampy that the guns could not open fire until platforms had been made. During the 1st of August, in the efforts to get the guns into some sort of line, one or two were completely bogged and could not be got out for some days. There was great difficulty in getting up ammunition; all had to come by pack along a plank road, at the end of which it was dumped and then brought up some distance to the gun positions by hand. It was hard work for the men, who had no cover of any kind, and who, when there was time to rest, simply slept in the mud.

The rain continued for the next three days, making any movement most difficult. On the 4th the weather cleared and aeroplanes could go up, an opportunity of which the Germans took full advantage, for they shelled the wagon lines heavily that night, causing many casualties among the men and horses.

The C.R.A. took over command of the Right Artillery on the 5th, and the Left Group (91st, 92nd and 93rd Brigades) came under Lieut.-Colonel Ricardo. The next day the 20th Division relieved the 38th, with headquarters at Dragon Camp, about three miles east of Elverdinghe, the 61st Brigade taking over the outpost line.

On the 7th of August Major-General Matheson went to hospital, suffering from gas poisoning. Two days later Major-General Douglas Smith returned to the Division and took command. At the same time Brig.-General Browell, the C.R.A., was invalided home. He was succeeded on the 10th by Brig.-General H. W. A. Christie, C.M.G.

The 61st Brigade was relieved that night by the 59th.

The task before the Division was to capture Langemarck. The line held, on taking over the right sector of the XIVth Corps front, extended for 1000 yards along the west bank of the Steenbeek, with the left flank resting on the Ypres-Staden railway. As a preliminary operation it was necessary to gain command of the Steenbeek valley in order to obtain ground on the far side of the stream, where the leading waves might form up for the attack.

It was originally intended to do this by peaceful penetration. This was a very difficult matter, not only because the stream and the marshy ground on each side of it formed a serious obstacle, but also because the enemy, profiting by a week of bad weather which had prevented any advance on our part, had thoroughly organised his defences on the east bank.

Major J. W. Massie, 83rd Field Company R.E., made a remarkably fine reconnaissance of the Steenbeek along the whole Divisional front—work which was particularly valuable, as previous reports had been misleading.

The 29th Division on the left and the 11th Division on the right had already established a line of posts on the far side. On the front of the 20th Division there was a very strong work at Au Bon Gite, 300 yards beyond the east bank on the Langemarck road. This was an extremely well fortified place, containing many concrete shelters. There were many other concrete blockhouses at intervals on both sides of the stream, commanding all approaches, but Au Bon Gite was the key to the enemy’s defences in this sector.

On the 8th, the 11th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Cotton), who held the whole of the front line, were ordered to send over three patrols to establish themselves by peaceful penetration. As one of these patrols went forward to the stream the road was blown up; a bridge was blown up in front of another patrol; the third got across and established a post on the right flank in prolongation of the line of posts thrown out by the 11th Division. This patrol remained in its position until the night of the 10th/11th, when the 11th R.B. were relieved by the 10th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Lee), and the post was withdrawn.

During this week the Divisional Signal Company made great improvements in the signal communication with the front. The buried cable head was still in the original front line just east of the canal. It was impossible with the labour available to continue the bury to the two infantry brigade battle headquarters, so arrangements were made to establish a route from the cable head to each brigade and to bury each of these lines for a short distance over the worst shelled area on the Pilckem Ridge. This exceedingly unpleasant task was accomplished before the coming operation, thanks to the untiring energies of the infantry working parties and signal personnel. Forward of brigade headquarters one main route on each brigade front was laid. These were supplemented by visual wireless and amplifiers, so arranged as to form alternate routes as necessity arose. Breakdown parties were placed at intervals along all routes.

On the 11th of August the 59th Brigade was ordered to force the Steenbeek with artillery support. Two companies of the 10th K.R.R.C. were detailed to make the assault. Unfortunately a patrol of the enemy crossed the stream shortly before operations began, and fired on the troops as soon as they advanced. This disorganised the attack. The two companies, however, got across, but were overwhelmed by the enemy on the east bank.

Another attempt was made on the 14th, this time with six companies, two of the 11th R.B. on the right of the Langemarck road and the whole of the 10th R.B. on the left of it, all under Lieut.-Colonel L. H. W. Troughton, commanding the 10th R.B. The objective was a line about 300 yards east of the Steenbeek and included Au Bon Gite.

The joint headquarters of these two battalions was at this time at Stray Farm, an old farmhouse reinforced with concrete and in full view of the enemy. Here, under the filthiest and most unsanitary conditions, the staffs of both battalions and the signallers were crowded together. The Germans had the range exactly, and hit the place repeatedly.

Although they came under a good deal of shelling the assaulting companies were assembled by 3 A.M. on the 14th, under cover of detachments thrown forward to guard the line of the stream. At 4 A.M., under an artillery barrage which was described by Lieut.-Colonel Troughton as the best he had ever seen, the troops crossed, some by wading through the stream and others by light bridges which they themselves carried down. The 10th R.B. suffered heavily from machine-gun and rifle fire from Au Bon Gite and other pill-boxes, but after severe hand-to-hand fighting round the pill-boxes they established themselves 250 yards beyond the stream and consolidated the position. Lieut. Martin and Sgt.-Major Salter, D.C.M., were killed gallantly capturing a pill-box which was holding up the advance. Immediately afterwards, while attacking another pill-box Capt. Edwards and Capt. Irvine were killed. When information was urgently needed as to the situation, Lieut. E. Chapman, intelligence officer to this battalion, went forward with Rfm. Moore to the front line in full view of the enemy under a hail of bullets and made a most valuable reconnaissance of the position. Lieut. Chapman was killed but Rfm. Moore succeeded in bringing back the information which Lieut. Chapman had written.

The left company of the 11th R.B., after crossing with some difficulty the Steenbeek and the swampy ground on each side of it, had a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy on the east bank, and then carried straight on under heavy machine-gun fire to Au Bon Gite. The mill at this place and several smaller dug-outs were taken, but the main work, a solid structure scarcely damaged by the bombardment of our heavy guns, held out. Men were all round it and even on top of it, but the Germans inside had closed a strong iron door and could not be captured. At this point a counter attack developed, and the company of the 11th R.B., now short of ammunition and without bombs, had to fall back to a position some 200 yards west of Au Bon Gite and partially surrounding it. The company commander, Capt. H. A. Slade, greatly distinguished himself and was awarded the D.S.O.

The right company gained its objective, but then became involved in the counter attack on Au Bon Gite and had to withdraw, forming a defensive flank with one post practically in the objective.

In the early morning of the 15th a party of the enemy tried to work round the flank of the left company of the 11th R.B., but under the steady fire of this company the attack melted away. The two remaining companies were then sent up to reinforce the front line. They suffered heavily on the way, but succeeded in reaching the forward troops.

The casualties, especially in officers, were very heavy. By 6 A.M. on the 14th the only two officers remaining in the 10th R.B. were Capt. S. J. Pegler and Lieut. Bidwell; they were awarded the D.S.O. and the M.C. respectively for their gallant actions on this day. The battalion lost altogether 11 officers killed, 4 officers wounded, and over 200 men.

Preparations were made for a company of the 10th K.R.R.C. and a company of the 11th K.R.R.C. to capture Au Bon Gite at 2 A.M. on the 15th, with the assistance of trench mortars, machine-gun fire from the 217th Machine Gun Company, and six R.E. detachments from the 83rd Field Company to blow in the doors. The artillery put down a barrage according to orders, but owing to the darkness of the night, the difficulties of communication, and the continuous shell and machine-gun fire, the troops could not reach their jumping-off ground in time. The attack was therefore cancelled by the senior officer on the spot.

Although the strong point at Au Bon Gite had not been reduced, the Steenbeek had been crossed and sufficient ground gained to enable the assaulting waves for the main attack to be formed up on the far side.

The way was now clear for the larger operation, which included the capture of Langemarck. This was fixed for the 16th of August, and was part of an attack carried out by the Allied armies on the east and north of Ypres.

The attack on the 20th Division front was made by the 60th Brigade on the right and the 61st on the left. These two brigades on the night of the 14th/15th relieved the 59th, which went back into reserve on the canal bank, leaving, however, the 10th and the 11th R.B. as covering troops on the east side of the Steenbeek. After the losses incurred in the operations of the last week this brigade was very weak, and two battalions of the 38th Division were attached to the 20th as Divisional reserve.

The first objective followed the road bounding the west edge of Langemarck; the second was clear of the village on the east side of it; the third and final objective ran east of Schreiboom, and was part of the German Gheluvelt-Langemarck line.

The direction of the attack was north-east, with the left resting on the Ypres-Staden railway. The extent of the front increased from 1000 yards on the Steenbeek to 1400 on the final objective. The boundary between brigades as far as the first objective was the Langemarck road; it then skirted the south of Langemarck and of Schreiboom. It will be seen that this gave a wider front to the 61st Brigade than to the 60th until the final objective was reached. The reasons for this were as follows:

The 60th Brigade was to attack the first and second objectives on a one battalion front with the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I.; the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 12th K.R.R.C. were then to advance to the final objective. If all went well this would leave one battalion (the 12th R.B.) still in reserve.

The 61st Brigade was to advance throughout on a two battalion front, two half battalions of the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and the 7th Somerset L.I. being allotted to each of the first and second objectives; the 12th King’s and the 7th D.C.L.I. being detailed to attack the third.

Special arrangements were made to deal with Au Bon Gite. The company of the 11th R.B. which had made the original assault on the 14th, and a party of the 83rd Field Company R.E., were to advance with the first wave of the Oxfords and reduce this place while the main attack pressed forward on either side.

The 11th Division was on the right of the 20th and the 29th Division on the left, and at certain fixed points during the advance touch was to be gained with these divisions.

The Right Artillery of the XIVth Corps (the 20th and 38th Divisional Artilleries) covered the attack with standing and creeping barrages, pausing on the first objective for twenty minutes and on the second for an hour, so that under cover of smoke shells the infantry might have time to re-form or to come up to the objective should the attack have been delayed. The Corps heavy guns co-operated in the barrage on areas further behind the enemy’s lines. A machine-gun barrage was provided by the four machine gun companies with the exception of half of the 60th and half of the 61st, which accompanied their brigades.

The attacking troops formed up during the night of the 15th/16th. It was, of course, of the utmost importance that they should take up their position east of the Steenbeek without the knowledge of the enemy. As the enemy’s posts opposite the 60th Brigade were at an average distance of 150 yards from the stream and only 80 yards opposite Au Bon Gite on the front of the 61st Brigade, this was an extremely difficult manœuvre. During the night the 83rd and 84th Field Companies R.E. placed bridges, covered with canvas, across the Steenbeek, Lieut. E. C. Delamain of the 84th Field Company being awarded the M.C. for his work during the night. Further, Major P. G. Norman, commanding 84th Field Company, carried out the very hazardous task of laying tapes under severe fire to mark the forming-up places on the cast bank of the stream. It reflects great credit on all who directed the operation and on the troops who earned it out that in spite of the enemy’s shelling, which was at times severe, and of machine-gun fire from Au Bon Gite, the leading battalions formed up in their positions apparently without the enemy being aware of their presence.

The disposition of the troops, when the assembly was completed, was as follows:

On the right was the 60th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General Butler), with headquarters at Stray Farm. The 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. were formed up with the first wave east of the Steenbeek, and the second wave west of it. The 6th K.S.L.I. on the right and the 12th K.R.R.C. on the left were a short distance in rear of the Oxfords. The 12th R.B. were 800 yards south-east of Pilckem.

On the left was the 61st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General Banbury), with headquarters on the railway north of Pilckem. The 7th Somerset L.I. on the right and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. on the left were east of the Steenbeek; behind these battalions the 12th King’s on the right had crossed the stream, and the 7th D.C.L.I. were crossing it at the time when the attack began.

The 60th and 61st Trench Mortar Batteries and half of the 60th and 61st Machine Gun Companies were close to the infantry of their brigades.

The guns of the 91st Field Artillery Brigade were in action on the west slope of Pilckem Ridge, those of the 92nd Brigade on the canal bank.

At 4.45 A.M. the artillery barrage, accurate and beautifully timed, fell like a curtain, and close behind it the leading waves of the infantry moved forward to the attack. It was then just light enough to see the country for about 300 yards ahead. Bombers of the 11th R.B. had crawled up during the night to within a few yards of Au Bon Gite, where they lay concealed in shell-holes. At zero these men threw smoke bombs on to the enemy, making a screen under cover of which the rest of “B” Company attacked. After a short fight the position was captured with its garrison of an officer and 50 men.

The first wave of the Oxfords had meanwhile passed Au Bon Gite, and the second wave had crossed the Steenbeek. This battalion met a certain amount of opposition from parties of the enemy in blockhouses, but by 5.20 A.M. had reached the first objective with trifling loss.

All movement, however, was very difficult. On the whole Divisional front the ground was nothing but a swampy crater field as far as the final objective. Up to the first objective it was particularly bad, and in many places the only possible formation for the troops was a series of small columns which wound their way in single file between the pools of mud and water.

The 61st Brigade came under enfilade fire from Au Bon Gite until that place was taken, but otherwise, although under fairly heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, met no serious opposition until the K.O.Y.L.I. on the left were held up by concrete blockhouses west of Langemarck and later at Langemarck station. At these two places great dash and initiative were shown by individual men, who, when practically all their officers had been lost, carried on, and with Lewis guns and bombs fought splendidly together. Here Pte. W. Edwards of the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. won the Victoria Cross. The following is the official account of his valiant action:

“For most conspicuous bravery when under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from a strong concrete fort. Having lost all his company officers, without hesitation he dashed forward at great personal risk, bombed through the loopholes, surmounted the fort, and waved to his company to advance. By his splendid example he saved a most critical situation at a time when the whole battalion was held up and a leader urgently needed. Three officers and thirty other ranks were taken prisoner by him in the fort. Later Pte. Edwards did most valuable work as a runner, and he eventually guided most of the battalion out through very difficult ground. Throughout he set a splendid personal example to all, and was utterly regardless of danger.”

Lance-Cpl. Powel fired a Lewis gun through the enemy’s loophole and so cleared a point which had held up the line. Altogether at this stage the battalion captured 5 officers, 70 other ranks and 12 machine guns, in addition to 3 guns, with a quantity of ammunition.

By 5.40 A.M. the whole of the first objective was in our hands.

At 5.45 A.M. the advance was continued. The original second wave of the Oxfords attacked and reached the second objective with little loss. In the meantime the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. had crossed the Steenbeek. The former reached the line of the first objective without incident, but the latter came under machine-gun fire from a blockhouse near Langemarck and lost a good many men, including the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Prioleau, who was wounded.

The situation was retrieved by Sgt. E. Cooper of the 12th K.R.R.C. The gallant action, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross, is given as follows in the London Gazette:

“For most conspicuous bravery and initiative in attack. Enemy machine guns from a concrete blockhouse, 250 yards away, were holding up the advance of the battalion on his left, and were also causing heavy casualties to his own battalion. Sgt. Cooper, with four men, immediately rushed towards the blockhouse although heavily fired on. About a hundred yards distant he ordered his men to lie down and fire at the blockhouse. Finding this did not silence the machine guns, he immediately rushed forward straight at them and fired his revolver into an opening in the blockhouse. The machine guns ceased firing and the garrison surrendered. Seven machine guns and forty-six prisoners were captured in the blockhouse. By this magnificent act of courage he undoubtedly saved what might have been a serious check to the whole advance, at the same time saving a great number of lives.”

After this the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 12th K.R.R.C. continued to advance; they mopped up all shelters and dug-outs which they passed, and in this way killed many of the enemy and took a further 46 prisoners. They then formed up east of the second objective, ready to move forward to the attack.

On the left, once the station and the railway trucks had been cleared, comparatively little opposition was met. The losses, however, in the first stages of the battle had been heavy. Second-Lieut. Robinson was the only company officer of the K.O.Y.L.I. left after reaching the first objective; he had a very trying time and set a splendid example throughout. Sgt. S. Goodman and Sgt. G. H. Jackson deserve great credit for the way in which they took their companies to the second objective when all their officers had been hit.

The right of the 61st Brigade had some trouble with machine guns and snipers in the outskirts of Langemarck, but the mopping-up parties did their work thoroughly and accounted for any of the enemy who were left behind the leading wave. On this front, too, there had been heavy losses. One company of the Somersets had no officers left and lost touch with the rest of the battalion. Second-Lieut. J. R. Hill, M.C., of “D” Company, got these men together and then took his own company on to the objective. Although wounded in the face and leg, he remained in command until he was satisfied that the position was assured. He was awarded a bar to his M.C. The mopping-up parties for the village were twice the strength of the assaulting troops; they worked from shell-hole to shell-hole under cover of Lewis gun fire and then bombed the enemy out of each concrete dug-out in turn. In one blockhouse the Somersets took 1 officer and 30 men; in another 40 men and 4 machine guns.

The 12th King’s and the 7th D.C.L.I., who had sustained a good many casualties in following close behind the leading battalions, formed up on the second objective.

Up to this time the enemy’s barrage, which came down on the Steenbeek four minutes after zero, had been ineffective, and though he now began to shell the south-west of Langemarck, little damage was done.

At 7.20 A.M. the whole line advanced to the final objective, the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. on the right, the 12th King’s and the 7th D.C.L.I. on the left. The battalions of the 60th Brigade met with strong opposition from parties of the enemy concealed in hedges, ditches, concrete dug-outs and fortified houses, and came under intense machine-gun fire from the right flank. Many of the enemy were killed and 135 prisoners taken. By 7.45 A.M. the 60th Brigade held the final objective. The 61st Brigade had little difficulty except on the extreme left. Here it was possible to advance only in single file along the railway line. The left company of the D.C.L.I. had a certain number of casualties, chiefly from machine-gun fire from the left front, but cleared the line and took 60 prisoners. This brigade had gained the final objective by 8 A.M.

No sooner had this line been occupied than enemy aeroplanes appeared flying low, about 50 feet above the ground, firing machine guns on the infantry and apparently taking photographs.

The divisions on the flanks had meanwhile advanced. On the left the 61st Brigade was throughout in touch with the 29th Division. The co-operation of the 29th Division on the left of the 61st Brigade could not have been better. On the right of the 20th Division the situation was not so good. The divisions further south had not made much progress; the 11th Division therefore had to form a defensive flank. Its left was in touch with the 60th Brigade on the third objective, but Rat House, south-east of Langemarck, remained in the possession of the enemy.

About 400 prisoners had been taken by the Division, including the officer commanding the battalion which had held Langemarck. A section of 4·2 howitzers, one 77 mm. field gun, and 20 or 30 machine guns had also fallen into our hands.

The artillery F.O.O.’s were excellent; their reports were generally the first to be received and were accurate. The liaison, too, between the artillery and the infantry was all that could be desired. In this battle 2nd Lieut. Potter and Lieut. Green, of B/92 Battery, won the M.C.

The R.E. field companies did most valuable work, both in preparing for the crossing of the Steenbeek and in making strong points during the advance.

The bearers of the Division worked under the 61st Field Ambulance, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. S. Harvey, who also devised a most successful scheme for the organisation of the medical officers of battalions.

Walking wounded collecting posts had been established by the 60th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Osburn) at Cheapside, and by the 62nd Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel E. F. L’Estrange) at Mouton Farm near Elverdinghe.

Although the Decauville railway line was broken early in the day, the evacuation of wounded by hand, by wheeled stretcher, and by hand trolley went on smoothly and without congestion, but the long carry from the R.A.P.’s in the front line to the forward A.D.S. at Gallwitz Farm threw very heavy work on the bearers.

Gallwitz Farm was heavily shelled and had to be abandoned. Here Capt. G. Adam, 62nd Field Ambulance, won the M.C.—one of many honours awarded to the R.A.M.C. for this battle. Capt. Adam attended the wounded in the open under heavy shell fire until the dressing station was destroyed. He then got his cases safely away and went on with his work at another point until he was utterly exhausted.

Two hundred stretcher bearers, detailed by the Division for clearing the battlefield, were given a short training and organised as the Divisional Stretcher Company. They were an unqualified success and did valuable work on the afternoon of the 16th and that night.

After the capture of the second objective the rest of the morning was spent in consolidating the position, involving on the part of the 60th Brigade preparations to deal with a counter attack on the dangerous right flank. The line was held from right to left by the 6th K.S.L.I., the 12th K.R.R.C., the 12th King’s, and the 7th D.C.L.I. The Oxfords were on the first and second objectives, and the 12th R.B., who had been employed during most of the fighting in carrying bombs and ammunition to the front line, occupied a position east of the Steenbeek. The Somersets and the K.O.Y.L.I. were on the second objective.

From mid-day onwards various reports were received stating that the enemy appeared to be crawling up along hedges in front of the position. At 4 P.M. he attacked the junction of the two brigades about Schreiboom and drove back the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th King’s for a distance of 200 yards. The left company of the 12th K.R.R.C. was practically wiped out, and a company of the Oxfords was sent up as reinforcements. Nearly all the ammunition had been spent in fighting this attack, and a further supply was sent up by parties of the 12th R.B., two companies of which battalion moved forward to ensure the safety of the second objective.

At 7 P.M. the two battalions of the 38th Division were placed at the disposal of brigade commanders, the 10th Welch coming under the 60th Brigade and the 15th Welch under the 61st. They did invaluable work in bringing up water, rations, and ammunition, besides helping in the work of consolidation.

On the 17th an attempt was made to regain that part of the line which had been lost. In the 60th Brigade the attack was made by two and a half companies of the 12th R.B.; in the 61st by the 12th King’s, supported by the remaining three companies of the Somersets and one company of the D.C.L.I. On the left the objective was occupied without much trouble, but the right of the 61st Brigade and the 12th R.B. were enfiladed by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from Rat House, and suffered severely. It was therefore decided to dig in on the original line.

That night, on relief by the 38th Division, infantry units began to move back to Proven, where Divisional Headquarters was opened on the morning of the 19th. During the following three weeks the field companies and some of the battalions were at intervals employed in the forward area, but the time was devoted principally to rest and training.

The headquarters of the Divisional Artillery went back to rest, but the 91st and 92nd Field Artillery Brigades remained in action under the C.R.A. of the 38th Division, the 92nd Brigade moving up on the 26th to the west slope of Pilckem Ridge.

During the following three weeks the general situation was little changed. The weather until the end of August was wet and windy, and time was needed to prepare for the next advance. Minor operations were carried out against Eagle Trench, a part of the enemy’s line east of Schreiboom, but without much result. The French had not lately been heavily engaged, and in consequence the Germans turned most of their guns in this area on to the British lines. The battery positions of the 91st Brigade were heavily shelled on the 2nd of September, and again on the 4th, when two howitzers of D/91 were hit.

At this time the enemy, finding that his strongest defences were unable to hold out against our attacks, adopted a new system of defence by which he held his front line only lightly, relying on large reserves kept close at hand to regain any ground that might be lost.[8] He devoted his time in this part of the battlefield principally to organising shell-holes as posts and strong points. In order that our guns might bring all these posts under fire, the front was divided into a number of areas, some of which were shelled each day; barrages were frequently carried out, not creeping regularly, but lifting backwards and forwards at odd intervals, so as to harass the enemy. These continual bombardments entailed very heavy work not only on the batteries, but also on the Divisional Ammunition Column. In September the weather improved, and, except for occasional heavy bombardments, the German artillery became less active; aeroplanes, however, flew frequently over our lines, particularly between the 11th and the 16th, when they bombed the camps and wagon lines and killed a large number of horses.

The 93rd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade pulled out of action at this time and moved to another area.

On the 5th the headquarters of the Divisional Artillery returned to the line, and on the 11th the 20th Division again relieved the 38th, and prepared to launch an attack on the 20th of the month, when the British offensive was being resumed on a front of eight miles, from the Ypres-Staden railway to the south. By the day of the attack the front line, which ran from a point on the road 1000 yards east of Langemarck in a north-westerly direction to the railway, was held by the 60th Brigade on the right and the 59th on the left; the 61st was in reserve. Divisional Headquarters was near Elverdinghe. All units had been very weak since the fighting at Langemarck, and even after they had had three weeks out of the line to refit, the average fighting strength of the battalions was only 350. The 51st Division of the XVIIIth Corps was on the right of the 20th, and the Guards on the left.

The signal communications taken over from the 38th Division included a new buried cable in the much-shelled area between Langemarck and Au Bon Gite, but there was no buried line back to Stray Farm. The task of completing this bury across a mile of sodden and difficult ground was at once undertaken by the Signal Company, and successfully accomplished in time. The value of this work was proved in the course of the day’s fighting, when not only was signal communication maintained, but in addition to continual telephone calls, one thousand and ten telegrams were dealt with at the Divisional Signal Office.

The objective in the forthcoming attack included ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm and the enemy trenches south-east of it; from the farm it ran west to the railway, involving on this flank only a short advance. On the right the attack was to be made in two bounds, but on the left there was an intricate network of trenches, which it was considered better to capture without any pause.

The attack was preceded by a twenty-four hours’ hurricane bombardment, which started about 4 A.M. on the 19th, and during the action the usual creeping, standing, and smoke barrages were carried out, covering altogether a depth of 2500 yards. Half of the machine gun companies of the 60th and 59th Brigades were under their brigade commanders, the remaining two half companies being kept back as a reserve until the objective had been taken. The 61st and 217th Machine Gun Companies worked under the orders of the Divisional Machine Gun Officer.

The night before the attack a direct hit on the headquarters of the 10th K.R.R.C. killed Lieut-Colonel Rixon, Capt. Wallington, and several others. Major Cockbum took over the command of the battalion.

The operations began at 5.40 A.M. on the 20th of September.

East of Schreiboom the enemy held a defensive position known as Eagle Trench. It was a curiously constructed work, in which the actual trench ran between two solid embankments about 8 feet high. These details were not known at the time of the attack, as owing to the formation of the ground it was an extremely difficult place to see. As, however, it was known to be strongly held, 290 oil drums were fired on to it at zero; they seem to have fallen beyond the trench, and to have done little more than light up the surroundings and show the enemy our advancing lines.

On the left flank all went well; the enemy’s trench system was carried and the line pushed forward to ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm, but in the centre the right of the 59th Brigade and the left of the 60th, owing to the enemy’s excellent field of fire, could make no headway against Eagle Trench. The right gained some ground, but, coming under machine-gun fire from houses and strong points on its right, was unable to advance very far. This was the situation at 8 A.M. Owing to this delay the infantry ceased to gain any immediate advantage from the pre-arranged artillery barrage, which, after a short pause on the first objective, continued to sweep forward. During the next hour the left flank reached the objective and the right moved forward some distance, but the centre remained held up. The 51st Division on the right had advanced successfully, and was in touch with the 60th Brigade.

Orders were then issued for the attack to be continued at 6.30 P.M., when the situation had been cleared up. The artillery barrage, which was reported from all sides to be perfect, was in the main a repetition of that of the morning, but smoke shells were fired at Eagle Trench to mask the machine guns there while the infantry moved into position. This proved to be a wise precaution, in view of the high command which this trench was afterwards found to possess. On the front of the 11th R.B. the smoke screen was ineffective. The companies of this battalion, having been widely separated to support other battalions in the morning, had to form up in daylight in view of the enemy. This daylight assembly was the signal for a tremendous barrage on Langemarck, while machine guns in Eagle Trench simply raked the plain.

The 60th Brigade advanced on the right, and by 9.15 P.M. had taken between 60 and 70 prisoners, but the north part of Eagle Trench, immediately east of Schreiboom, resisted all efforts to take it. The 59th Brigade, while holding the objective on the left, had its right thrown back to pass a little east of the Schreiboom cross-roads. The 11th R.B. in gaining a footing in Eagle Trench, just north of the cross-roads, had lost 66 per cent. casualties and 11 out of 16 officers. The result of the day’s fighting left the enemy holding a salient in the centre of the Divisional line. On the general front the advance had been successful, and had gained ground to an average depth of 500 yards.

The remaining part of Eagle Trench had still to be captured. With this object an attack, in which two tanks were to precede a party of infantry, was ordered to be carried out on the 22nd. The tanks stuck in Langemarck, so the operation was postponed till the morning of the 23rd. At the same time an alternative plan was prepared to be carried out in the event of the tanks remaining derelict. As the tanks were unable to move forward in time to take part in the attack at 5.30 A.M., the alternative plan was put into operation at the last moment, and zero put forward to 7 A.M. These orders provided for a three-minute bombardment by Stokes guns and a smoke barrage, followed by a bombing attack up the trenches from the south and north covered by a barrage of rifle grenades, and an assault above ground from the west. Detachments of the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. were to carry out this operation.

The Stokes bombardment was timed to begin at 7 A.M. At 6.25 the enemy attacked the 60th Brigade, but was driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire, leaving 23 prisoners behind. This in no way disorganised the preparations for the attack, which started punctually at 7 o’clock. After a very effective bombardment by the Stokes mortars, the bombing parties worked their way inwards from the flanks, the 12th K.R.R.C. from the south, the 10th R.B. from the north, covered by a rifle grenade barrage. While the enemy was engaged with these parties, one company of the 10th R.B. assaulted Eagle Trench from the west, and after a short and sharp fight, carried it. The attack took place practically in broad daylight, and came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who had just “stood down.” The bombers did their work well, and the frontal attack was splendidly carried out by Capt. T. G. L. Ashwell, who won the M.C. Our casualties were not heavy, but the enemy left 94 prisoners and 10 machine guns in our hands.

In the fighting for Eagle Trench 2nd Lieut. Allan, A/91 Battery, gained a bar to his M.C., and 2nd Lieut. Robinson, C/91, won the M.C. The latter was very badly wounded, and completely lost his sight.

The stretcher bearers, working under the 60th Field Ambulance, had more casualties in this action than in the battle of Langemarck. Again, their task was a severe one, as the Decauville line was broken too often to be of much use, but by their untiring efforts all the wounded were cleared without a hitch. As an example of what was done, 24 bearers at Gallwitz Farm carried back 142 stretcher cases in 24 hours.

Prisoners stated that a concerted attack against the Divisional front had been arranged, and it is evident that our success here completely upset the enemy’s plans. By the evening the total number of prisoners had risen to 1 officer and 102 other ranks. The successful issue of this fighting is all the more creditable since between the 18th and the 23rd the troops had little or no cover and during the whole time were exposed to heavy shelling day and night. From prisoners’ statements it appears that since the 11th of September the regiments opposed to the 20th Division had lost over 60 per cent. of their strength, largely from artillery fire, and that their morale had been much shaken.

By the evening of the 23rd the 60th and 59th Brigades were well established east of Eagle Trench. They were relieved that night by the 61st Brigade, which during the next few days straightened the line to give a good jumping-off place for the relieving division in the subsequent operations. The total number of prisoners was brought up to 2 officers and 156 other ranks.

So gallant had been the fighting and so important had been the result of the capture of Eagle Trench that the following message was sent by the Army Commander, General Sir Hubert Gough:

“The tenacity, gallantry and skill which your Division showed over the operations round Eagle Trench are very fine. Please accept my congratulations and expressions of admiration to you and all ranks of your gallant Division.”

Throughout the period spent in this sector the 11th D.L.I. (Major G. Hayes) were constantly at work; they carried up material, dug and wired new lines of trenches, repaired tramways and constructed a duckboard track from Langemarck to the front line. On the 20th of September the Lewis gunners of the battalion were employed on anti-aircraft work and assisted the attack on Eagle Trench. That night two companies working with the R.E. constructed strong points in the captured area. For his work at this time Capt. W. G. L. Sear was awarded the M.C. The continual shelling, particularly on the line of the Steenbeek, made the journey to and from work always difficult.

In the last days of September the 20th Division was relieved by the 14th, and on the 1st of October entrained for Bapaume.

Before leaving, another congratulatory message was received from General Sir Hubert Gough:

“The Army Commander wishes to thank all ranks 20th Division for the part they have played in the third battle of Ypres. The Division may well be proud of the capture of Langemarck on August 16th and the taking of Eagle Trench on September the 23rd. While holding the line of the Steenbeek during a prolonged spell of bad weather the Division showed a good soldierly spirit under difficult conditions. The Army Commander is sorry to lose such a good fighting Division.”

Once more the Divisional Artillery was left in action, although all ranks were well-nigh exhausted after two and a half months’ continuous fighting in the battle.

The C.R.A. and headquarters moved out of the line on the 28th, when the artillery brigades came under the 4th Division, commanded by Major-General T. G. Matheson. The gunners of both brigades were immediately employed in preparing gun positions on the Steenbeek. The line of the Steenbeek was continually being shelled, especially at night, when all ammunition had to be carried down to the positions; and as the usual artillery programme had to be carried out in addition to this work, the strain was very great.

Since the capture of Langemarck the German possession of Poelcapelle had prevented the advance on this part of the battle front from being pushed to any great depth. A successful advance further to the south gained Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke on the 26th of September, thus establishing a footing on the main ridge at these places, and the line was advanced to within striking distance of the high ground as far north as a point east of St Julien.[9] In the XIVth Corps area there was no infantry action, though both the 91st and 92nd Field Artillery Brigades took part in an artillery bombardment. On the 4th of October an attack between the Menin road and the Ypres-Staden railway included Poelcapelle as an objective of the 11th Division, which was at this time on the right of the 4th. The 4th Division advanced at 6 A.M. parallel to the railway, with its left flank some 600 yards south-east of it, and by 10 o’clock, when the protective barrage was reported to be most effective, had gained the final objective, the right of which touched the northern outskirts of Poelcapelle. The town itself was entered by the 11th Division.

The fighting on the general battle front since the 20th of September had been remarkable for the many heavy counter attacks launched against our troops when the objectives had been taken. These attacks were repulsed with great loss to the enemy, and Sir Douglas Haig states in his despatch[10] that documents captured on the 4th of October showed that the Germans, recognising the failure of these methods, were endeavouring to return to their old practice of holding their forward position in strength.

After this attack the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade moved to positions on the eastern slope of Pilckem Ridge completely open to the enemy’s view. The 91st Brigade was transferred to the sector north of the railway, to cover the Guards Division, and was ordered to take up a position on the Steenbeek (Hannebeek) during the night of the 6/7th. Batteries worked all through the 6th, trying to make a track round the shell-holes towards the positions, which were in a swamp on both banks of the stream. They began to move forward at 7 P.M. along the road which follows the crest of the ridge as far as the cross-roads at Pilckem, then down the Langemarck road for a mile, after which they branched off to the north.

This was the only available road in the neighbourhood for all traffic. It was constantly shelled, and on the evening of the 6th it was crowded with infantry units, ration parties and troops of all kinds when the German guns opened fire. In the confusion that ensued the batteries were a good deal delayed, but in spite of the awful state of the ground they reached a road close to the position during the night and actually got four guns and two howitzers into action. All the next day they struggled to get ammunition down to the position by pack, skirting the northern edge of the Pilckem Ridge. It rained heavily, and the mud was so deep that it was found to be impossible to get the remaining guns into action that night.

On the 8th, at dawn, Lieut.-Colonel Erskine, commanding the brigade, borrowed a hundred men under Lieut. Hoare from the 4th Battalion of the Grenadier Guards to assist in moving the remaining guns. This battalion was at the time in reserve, and the men showed extraordinary goodwill and keenness to do all they could, and worked with the greatest determination. Each man carried down with him two rounds of ammunition besides his own rifle and equipment. Then, with fifty men on each gun besides the men of the batteries and one team of horses, the whole brigade was got into action by mid-day, with the exception of one gun which was badly stuck upside down in a shell-hole. It was a fine piece of work, which earned the congratulations of the XIVth Corps and of Brig.-General F. A. Wilson, the C.R.A., Guards Division. Major Balfour, commanding C/91, a first-rate battery commander, was killed while actually man-handling one of the guns.

The last two actions in this battle in which the Divisional Artillery took part were fought on the 9th and 12th October, when attacks were launched on the British front from Zonnebeke to the left flank, and on part of the French front further north. The Guards on the extreme left of the British line attacked at 5.20 A.M. on the 9th. They made a brilliant advance in cold, wet weather and over sodden ground to a line close to the south-east end of Houthulst Forest. Further south the eastern outskirts of Poelcapelle were cleared and progress was made up the main ridge towards Passchendaele.[11] On the 12th, attacking again in rain and a high wind, the Guards reached the edge of the forest.

Forward positions for one brigade of the 20th Divisional Artillery were reconnoitered on the 14th, but the continued bad weather made the movement of guns impossible. Four days later the batteries were at last relieved.

For three whole months the 20th Divisional Artillery had been in the battle without any relief. Throughout this time, over ground sodden with rain, the men had fought continuously, practically without protection of any sort and under a continuous bombardment of gas and high-explosive shell. Casualties had been exceptionally heavy and the strain abnormal. It was the hardest time in the line that the Divisional Artillery ever spent, and the men were absolutely played out when on the 18th of October they moved out of action to entrain two days later for Peronne.