(Vide Map I.)

After the battle of Cambrai the Division went back into Corps reserve for a few days, and then moved north again into the area of the Fourth Army (General Sir H. S. Rawlinson). By the 12th of December units were concentrated some twenty to twenty-five miles south-west of Ypres, with Divisional Headquarters at Blaringhem. The Divisional Artillery, after a most trying march over roads coated with ice, arrived in this area on the 24th, when the Divisional Artillery Headquarters was opened at Robecq and the batteries went into billets in the neighbourhood of Haverskerque. On the 7th of January 1918 the 20th Division, less the artillery, relieved the 30th Division in the left sector of the IXth Corps front (Lieut.-General Sir A. Hamilton Gordon).

The front line, 2700 yards in length, ran north-east and south-west for about an equal distance on either side of the Menin road, which it crossed north-west of Gheluvelt. The position lay on the forward slopes of the long ridge which overlooks Ypres from the south and east. From the high ground about Clapham Junction several marshy streams flow south and east, cutting the slopes of the ridge into a succession of spurs, on one of which the village of Gheluvelt stands.

The defensive system included a series of lines which at this time were still in course of construction. Behind an outpost line lightly held ran the main defensive position in which the reserves of battalions were generally posted. Behind this again ran an Intermediate Line just below the crest of the ridge, a Corps Line, and an Army Line which extended from the ramparts of Ypres to the south.

The ground along which the front trenches ran had been won as a result of the hard fighting in September and October 1917, since when British troops had twice attacked in the northern part of the sector with a view to improving their position. In the second attempt, on the 3rd of December, some progress was made in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, but only a temporary advantage was gained, as the Germans, attacking on the 14th under cover of a trench mortar barrage, recovered the greater part of their original line. In so doing they curtailed our observation and to a certain extent improved their own.

It was this problem of observation that made it essential for us to yield no further ground, for should the enemy capture the front line here his view of our position would be improved very greatly. An official memorandum issued by the Fourth Army at this time states: “The area of the Army Battle Zone about the Menin road is probably the most important on the whole Army front, and it rests with the IXth Corps to make it as nearly impregnable as possible.” This, then, was one of the tasks which the Division had to undertake.

A boundary line running east and west cut the front trenches about three hundred yards south of the Menin road, dividing the front into two sub-sectors, the right held by one battalion in the front line, the left by two battalions. On the night of the 6th/7th of January the 61st Brigade took over the right sub-sector and the 60th Brigade took over the left. The 59th Brigade was in reserve in the area between Dickebusch and La Clytte, three to five miles south-west of Ypres. Divisional Headquarters was nearly seven miles south-west of Ypres at Westoutre. The 37th Division was on the right of the 20th, and the New Zealand Division on the left.

The front was covered by three brigades of artillery formed into two groups, one to support each of the infantry brigades in the line. The Southern Group consisted of the 242nd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade; the Northern Group, when the 20th Division first took over this sector, consisted of the 37th Divisional Artillery. The whole was under the command of the C.R.A. 20th Division.

In spite of the advantages which the Germans would have obtained by penetrating the front line in the Menin road sector, the six weeks which the Division spent there were extremely quiet. The great trouble was the weather. The first half of January was cold, with hard frosts and heavy falls of snow; occasionally there were warmer days when it poured with rain. About the middle of the month the thaw began with torrents of rain and a gale of wind. The trenches soon became feet deep in mud and water. Part of the front line was so deeply flooded that certain trenches had to be evacuated. Posts were established behind them, and the line was constantly patrolled at night to prevent the enemy from occupying these positions.

Being on the forward slope of the ridge, a great deal of the position was in full view of the enemy. The whole of the ground was a mass of shell-holes, and the only approaches to the front line lay along a few duckboard tracks, which the Germans regularly shelled. The journey to the front line and back along these slippery tracks was a very unpleasant and dangerous business, and as a brigade relief took place every six days and battalions remained in the front trenches only forty-eight hours, and sometimes only twenty-four, it had to be made very often.

Along the top of the ridge were several “tunnels,” which gave cover to a large number of troops. Just south of Sanctuary Wood, Tor Top Tunnels, a huge underground cavern lit by electric light, held the whole of the battalion in reserve to the left brigade. As there were only four exits from this place, so that very few men might have escaped if a fire had broken out, great precautions were taken, and nobody was allowed even to strike a match. These orders were the outcome of a disastrous fire which had occurred in Hedge Street Tunnels the night before the 61st Brigade went into the line, when several officers and men were burnt to death, including some of the advanced party of the 61st Brigade.

The swampy ground along the banks of the various streams which crossed the line was generally impassable, so that it was sufficient to organise the spurs for defence, and to wire the gaps in the line where the streams flowed through. For the first half of January, however, the hard frost made it possible to move across these marshes, and constant patrolling was necessary to ensure the safety of the line.

Almost the only events which involved any fighting occurred on the night of the 9th/10th of January. In order to assist some operations of the 37th Division, the 20th carried out a demonstration in which artillery, Stokes mortars, machine guns, Lewis guns and rifle grenades all played a part. The 37th Division raided the enemy’s trenches twice during the night, and on both occasions the enemy put down a heavy barrage for an hour on the front and support lines of the 20th Division.

At 4.45 A.M. on 10th of January a party of the enemy, estimated at 30 to 50 strong, attempted to raid the left company of the 6th K.S.L.I. in the left sub-sector. The forward posts were temporarily driven in, but the positions were quickly retaken, and though the Germans failed to capture any of the K.S.L.I., they left two of their own party prisoners in our hands. About this time the 37th Division on the right was relieved by the 4th Australian Division.

On the 22nd of January the artillery of the 37th Division was relieved by that of the 20th, which from that date formed the Northern Group, under Major H. Price Williams, M.C. The battery positions extended between Zillebeke and Hooge. It was laid down that the policy of the artillery in this sector should be defensive and not aggressive, as it was not desired to stir the enemy into activity without good cause. Accordingly, while no favourable opportunity of inflicting loss on the enemy was missed, no harassing fire or fire without a definite object was carried out.

Throughout this period our patrols were active, as it was considered important that we should keep command of “No Man’s Land.” This was successfully done. A number of patrols went out from each brigade every night, and although they kept the enemy’s trenches and posts constantly under observation, as a rule no parties of the enemy were met. One patrol of the 7th D.C.L.I. had an unpleasant experience and was forced to spend a considerably longer time in front of the line than was expected. A liaison patrol of one N.C.O. and one man of this battalion had been sent out on the night of the 24th/25th to the battalion on the left. The patrol had encountered an enemy machine gun and the N.C.O. had been killed. An officer and one man of the D.C.L.I. went out at 4 A.M. on the 25th to investigate. They also found the machine gun, which opened fire on them at fifteen yards’ range. Fortunately they escaped, and they crawled away eastwards. At daybreak they found themselves between the enemy’s posts, and there they had to remain concealed in a shell-hole all day. As soon as it became dark they moved towards their own trenches, coming across a post of the enemy on the way, and then being driven back by Lewis gun fire from our line. Having thus had to spend another night out, they eventually rejoined their battalion at daybreak on the 26th.

Good work was done also by the machine gun companies. Between the 23rd and the 29th the 59th Machine Gun Company fired 36,000 rounds in indirect fire, and in conjunction with trench mortars silenced all the enemy’s forward machine guns near the Menin road, making the reliefs much easier to carry out.

On the 31st the Division was transferred from the IXth to the XXIInd Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, but as the XXIInd Corps took over the Menin road sector, this involved no change in the dispositions. On the night of the 7th/8th February the Divisional line was extended to the left as far as a point 600 yards east of the south-east corner of Polygon Wood. A readjustment of the inter-brigade boundary then became necessary, so that after this time each brigade had two battalions in the front line.

Meanwhile, the organisation of the Division had been changed. It had been decided to reduce all infantry brigades to three battalions each. On the 3rd of February three battalions—the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Boyle), the 10th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Sheepshanks), and the 10th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Morgan-Owen)—were told that they were to be broken up at once. The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Janson) were to leave the Division. The preparation of rolls and the many details which had to be settled in a short time involved a great deal of work, but it was quickly carried out. A certain number of the 10th K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. joined the 11th K.R.R.C. and the 11th R.B. and so remained in the Division, and in all units officers were given, as far as possible, their choice of various battalions to which they might go. In general, complete companies were posted to other battalions of their own regiments.

The order came as a great shock to battalions all of which had a fine record and in which esprit de corps stood high, and both officers and men felt the disbandment keenly.

By the 8th of February only a few headquarter details were left. Lieut.-Colonel Morgan Owen, commanding the 10th R.B., returned on the 12th from a conference to find that his battalion no longer existed. About the middle of the month the last few details went to the Divisional Wing of the Corps Reinforcement Camp.

The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. remained with the Division until the 15th, when they came under the O.C. Reinforcements XXIInd Corps; on the 20th they became the 14th Entrenching Battalion.

The 2nd Scottish Rifles, a very fine battalion over 1000 strong, under Lieut.-Col. H. C. H. Smith, D.S.O., came from the 8th Division to the 20th on the 3rd of February, and from that time formed part of the 59th Brigade.

In the Trench Mortar Batteries the personnel of V/20 Battery was transferred to the XXIInd Corps (H) T.M.B.; X, Y, and Z/20 were then reorganised to form the new X and Y/20 Batteries. At the same time, twelve mortars were handed over in exchange for ten six-inch Newtons.

After this the 20th Division was relieved by the 37th. All units were out of the line by the 19th, and on the following day began to entrain for the area of the Fifth Army south of the Somme.