We left the 20th Division on the evening of the 25th of March holding the line Cressy—Billancourt—Réthonvillers, with the 60th Brigade on the right, the 59th on the left, and Divisional Headquarters at Roye.

By that time all local reserves on this part of the battle-front had been thrown into the fighting, but French forces were coming up in increasing numbers to reinforce the British line. On the 25th the French took over the whole of the front south of the Somme,[1] the 20th Division coming under the orders of the G.O.C. 133rd French Division. “The situation still remained critical, however, as every mile of the German advance added to the length of the front to be held, and while the exhaustion” of the British divisions “was hourly growing more acute, some days had yet to pass before the French could bring up troops in sufficient strength to arrest the enemy’s progress.”[14][**2nd anchor “1”]

The Division was under orders from XVIIIth Corps to conform with the retirement of the French towards Roye, should such retirement become necessary. On arrival at Roye the Division was to move north-west to Le Quesnel, covered by the 61st Brigade as a left flank guard. The 133rd French Division, which was to have relieved the 20th, had orders to retire during the night, and French and British troops were so mixed that a relief in the ordinary sense of the word would have been impossible. At an interview between Lieut.-Colonel Haskard, G.S.O.I. of the 20th Division, and the G.O.C. 133rd French Division, it was decided that the 20th should withdraw at midnight, at the same time as the French. The French Divisional Commander, however, said that he could give no orders as to the withdrawal of the 20th Division, as his line of retreat was towards the south. He had no objection to the 20th moving on Le Quesnel, although as the enemy was already in Liancourt he doubted if this could be done.

It was obviously a difficult task, for it meant a flank march in the face of an advancing enemy who at the beginning was not more than four miles away, and who before the march was completed penetrated to within half a mile of the road on which the troops were moving. It is due to the exceptionally gallant action of the 61st Brigade that this operation was brought to a successful close.

On arrival at Gruny late in the evening of the 25th, the 61st Brigade moved into its allotted position. The battalion headquarters company was on the eastern outskirts of Gruny, the Somerset L.I. company on the eastern outskirts of Cremery, and the D.C.L.I. and King’s companies at Liancourt. The headquarters and Somerset L.I. companies took up their positions without incident. The D.C.L.I. and King’s, on the other hand, had some difficulty at Liancourt, as although a line was established in touch with the French on the east side of the village, German machine guns and patrols were in occupation of the south-west outskirts. No touch was obtained with the 24th Division on the left, and during the night the position in the village itself was not quite clear, as British, French and German patrols were continually challenging each other in different languages.

The 60th and 59th Brigades withdrew to Roye at midnight, and before dawn this difficult manœuvre was successfully accomplished and outposts were thrown out east, north and west of the town.

The march from Roye to Le Quesnel was timed to begin at 7 A.M. on the 26th. By that time the 61st Brigade had slowly fallen back to the line Fresnoy—La Chavette, During the day, in order to cover the flank of the Division, detachments of the 61st Brigade occupied in turn the villages of Parvillers, Damery and Le Quesnoy, establishing posts on all roads leading to the enemy and pushing out patrols to the north with the object of keeping touch, which had then been gained with the 24th Division.

The chief action of the day was fought in defence of Le Quesnoy, where the garrison, one officer and 100 men of the 7th D.C.L.I., with two Lewis guns, was commanded by Captain E. C. Combe, M.C., the brigade major of the 61st Brigade. During the morning Capt. Combe was ordered to hold the village until relieved by troops of the 30th Division, some of whom had already taken over the defence of Bouchoir. At noon the enemy moved out from Parvillers towards Le Quesnoy. The Lewis gunners seized their chance and fired four drums into the advancing lines at 500 yards range with great effect. Both guns were put out of action, however, at 1.30 P.M., when the enemy opened heavy machine-gun and trench mortar fire. By two o’clock, after hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans gained the east edge of the village and had machine guns trained on the exits. At this point Capt. Combe was ordered to withdraw to Beaufort, but considering it impossible to do this in daylight and in close contact with the enemy, he decided to hold on till it was sufficiently dark to give his troops a chance of getting back in safety. At 3 P.M. the enemy again attacked and reached the centre of the village, but the few men of the garrison who remained held on to the west edge until 6.40 P.M., when the enemy closed in on both flanks. Then the only survivors—two officers and nine men—withdrew, still firing with good effect on the Germans as they over-ran the position. Sir Douglas Haig refers in his despatch[15] to this “very gallant feat of arms.”

The Division only just completed the march in time, for the troops did not reach Le Quesnel till noon, and at 11.15 A.M. patrols of the enemy had crossed the road south-west of Damery, thus severing all communication with the French in the neighbourhood of Roye.

The fact that the French troops were being forced south-west, while the British retired west, left a gap between the two armies of which the enemy took full advantage. To fill this gap the 36th and 30th Divisions, which had been withdrawn to rest the previous day, were put back into the line, and offering a gallant resistance, played no small part in preventing the enemy from breaking through.[16]

On arrival at Le Quesnel the Division came again under the command of the XVIIIth Corps and was ordered to consolidate a line just east of the village with the 59th and 60th Brigades, while the 61st concentrated at Beaufort. This placed the 20th Division in support of the 30th, which at this time held the line Bouchoir—Rouvroy-En-Santerre. Touch was gained with the 24th Division at Warvillers. The enemy was reported soon after mid-day to be advancing in large numbers along the Roye—Amiens road. Four motor machine-guns, in action near the cross-roads north-west of Rouvroy, did most useful work, delaying the enemy’s advance and causing great loss to his troops.

At 6.30 P.M. XVIIIth Corps ordered the 61st Division to take over the defence of Le Quesnel and the 20th to hold a line in immediate support of the 30th. The 60th Brigade accordingly moved to Arvillers and the 59th to Folies; the 61st was at Beaufort, and the Divisional Reinforcement Battalion in reserve at Le Quesnel. To assist in carrying out reconnaissance duties twelve Corps cyclists, under Lieut. Quartermain, were attached to the Division; they were most ably handled, and proved of the greatest value in the operations of the following day.

Most of the fighting on this line fell to the lot of the 60th Brigade on the south-eastern and eastern outskirts of Arvillers. The front was held from right to left by the 11th D.L.I., the 12th K.R.R.C., and the 6th K.S.L.I. The 12th R.B., to whom the 60th T.M.B. had been permanently attached as riflemen, were in support in the village.

On the morning of the 27th Arvillers was heavily shelled, and the German attack developed towards Erches and Rouvroy about 10 o’clock. Major-General Douglas Smith then ordered the 25th Entrenching Battalion to be transferred from the 59th Brigade to the 61st—a valuable addition to the strength of the left flank, as this battalion numbered 38 officers and 640 men. The 59th Brigade being then very weak, asked urgently for reinforcements in the afternoon, and was given two companies of the Divisional Reinforcement Battalion.

At 10.40 A.M. Erches was captured and at 12.30 troops of the 30th Division were driven out of Bouchoir. Brig.-General Duncan therefore ordered the 12th R.B. to send one company to prolong the line of the 11th D.L.I. to the right. Before mid-day large numbers of troops were streaming back from the direction of Erches towards Le Quesnel. Lieut.-Colonel Welch, commanding the 6th K.S.L.I., rallied many of these men and placed them on his left flank, and other troops retiring along the Erches—Arvillers road were stopped by the 12th K.R.R.C. Beyond elements of other divisions on the right of the D.L.I. there were no troops on the right of the 60th Brigade for 1200 yards. Some of the 30th Division were in Hangest. During the day four German cyclists dressed in British uniform, evidently having lost their way, rode into the lines of the 60th Brigade; three of these were shot by the 12th K.R.R.C. before they could get through, and the fourth was made a prisoner.

On the front of the 59th Brigade the 11th R.B. repulsed by a counter attack a German advance from the direction of Bouchoir.

The following was the situation at 6.30 P.M. The 60th Brigade held a line round the south and east of Arvillers. North-east of the village, on the main Roye—Amiens road, were elements of the 30th Division which had been driven out of Bouchoir. From this road to the left the 24th Division held a line which ran north-west and north of Bouchoir and then followed the road to Warvillers. The 59th Brigade was at Folies and the 61st at Beaufort. Hangest was held by the 61st Division and elements of the 30th, Le Quesnel by the 61st Division and the French.

At midnight the enemy made a local attack on Folies, but this was very effectively repulsed by the 11th K.R.R.C., who inflicted a number of casualties and captured a machine gun.

Before dawn on the 28th the 59th and 61st Brigades had been relieved by the 401st Regiment of the 133rd French Division. They marched along the main Roye—Amiens road to a wood south-east of Demuin, which they reached by mid-day. The relief of the 60th Brigade presented a good deal of difficulty, chiefly because the relieving troops belonged to two separate French formations. Before it could be completed, about 8.30 A.M. the enemy put down a heavy barrage, which he followed by an attack on the whole brigade front. After severe fighting, in which the enemy lost heavily, an advanced platoon of the 11th D.L.I. was driven in and the right flank of the battalion became exposed. A counter attack failed to restore the situation. The enemy then advanced on the front of the 6th K.S.L.I., and also worked round to the right of Arvillers. As it was evident that a serious attack was developing, Brig.-General Duncan ordered the brigade to withdraw. At this time the mixed troops on the right, who had occupied a ridge of great importance, and whose task was to hold on until the 60th Brigade began to leave the village, were seen to have fallen back. The position was then precarious. The enemy was only a few hundred yards away from the ridge, from which he could cut off the retreat of all troops from Arvillers. The situation was saved by the soldierly instincts and most gallant leading of Capt. Tait, the adjutant of the 12th R.B., who seeing what had happened, swung round a company of his battalion to the right, opened fire on the Germans at short range, and drove them off. At 11 A.M., under unusually heavy shell and machine-gun fire, the brigade withdrew in very good order, and at 3 P.M. rejoined the rest of the Division.

An A.D.S. of the 60th Field Ambulance under the commanding officer, Major R. V. C. Ash, had remained near Réthonvillers on the 25th until the enemy came within 500 yards. Having withdrawn from this position, Major Ash moved the whole field ambulance south to a village about a mile north-east of Roiglise. As the enemy was reported that evening to be advancing on both flanks, it was decided, after consultation with Divisional Headquarters, to retire through Roye to a point about two miles south-west of it on the Montdidier road. By the time this position was reached, about 3.20 A.M. on the 26th, information was received from the French that the enemy was on the point of entering Roye and that French troops were about to form a defensive line through the village in which the 60th Field Ambulance was established. No further information could be obtained. Major Ash continued to withdraw along the road towards Montdidier, stopping on the way to help the 53rd C.C.S. to evacuate its wounded, and collecting a large number of cases along the road. At Faverolles communication with the Division was obtained and the field ambulance marched north to rejoin, eventually arriving at Domart on the 28th.

It was then decided that the Divisional transport and two out of the three field ambulances should be sent back out of the way to Abbeville. The 60th and 62nd Field Ambulances accordingly moved back that day.

From this time until the 1st of April the only remaining field ambulance—the 61st—did great work. Except for a small detachment from the cavalry field ambulances there seemed to be no other medical units near. Wounded and sick from the whole Corps, from Army troops and cavalry, and from the French had to be dealt with. Every man was fed and dressed, had his case diagnosed, and was properly ticketed before being sent back.

The 92nd Field Artillery Brigade was last mentioned moving back to Roiglise on the 25th, under the orders of the 30th Division. A further retirement to Beauvraignes became necessary on the morning of the 26th; and that afternoon, covered by a section of D/148 Battery and one of

At 10 A.M. on the morning of the 27th the brigade came under heavy shell-fire from the direction of Erches. Shortly afterwards the French were forced out of Laboissière and the brigade was compelled to fall back to positions south-west of Favorelles, covered by the fire of B/92. At this time orders were received for the brigade to rejoin the 20th Divisional Artillery, but as the French were being hard pressed it was decided to stop and fight with the French until all ammunition was expended.

The whole afternoon the enemy pressed his attack between Piennes and Favorelles, keeping up a barrage on the main road through Montdidier, which increased in intensity as more guns came up. One enemy motor machine gun which tried to get into Favorelles was knocked out at close range by C/92. A good many casualties were caused by enemy machine-gun fire.

At 5 P.M. nearly all ammunition had been expended, and the batteries retired under mutual covering fire to the bridge at Le Monchel, about a mile and a half south of Montdidier. The last battery crossed at 6.30 P.M., when all ammunition had been fired. The brigade marched back to Serevillers, and on the 28th moved north to join the 20th Division, arriving at Rouvrel on the 29th.

On arrival in the Dormat area on the 28th the 20th Division came under the XIXth Corps (Lieut.-General Sir H. E. Watts). This Corps had been very heavily pressed all day, and its right was reported to be in a critical position. Accordingly, the Division was ordered to occupy a defensive line between Mézières and Demuin, exclusive of both villages. The 59th Brigade, with a strength of 770, held the right as far as the Roye—Amiens road, the 61st held the left, and the 60th was in reserve west of the road from Demuin to Moreuil.

The orders stated that the Corps line would be held on the 29th by the 20th Division between Mézières and Demuin, and by Carey’s Force from Demuin to the Somme. The 24th Division was to concentrate just west of Mézières and the 8th Division in Cavalry Wood to protect the right flank. The 50th Division was to assemble south of Demuin as reserve to the 20th.

At 8.35 A.M. on the 29th the 59th Brigade gained touch with the French, who held Mézières and a line from there back towards Moreuil, but no trace of the 8th and 24th Divisions could be found.

About mid-day, as the French were reported to be heavily engaged, the 50th Division was asked to send a battalion forward to the north of Villers, and the 60th Brigade was ordered to form a defensive flank on the right of the 59th.

The French withdrew from Mézières about 1 P.M. The 59th Brigade held out with its flank turned until 1.30; then, having exhausted all available reserves, the brigade was forced to fall back on Villers. At this point the 60th Brigade came up and formed a defensive flank with the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th R.B., keeping the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 11th D.L.I. just north of Villers in reserve. Here there was a good deal of shelling, and Lieut.-Colonel Welch, commanding the 6th K.S.L.I., was killed.

Just before 3 P.M. Brig.-General Duncan received orders from the Division to recapture Mézières in conjunction with the 59th Brigade. The 12th K.R.R.C. on the right and the 12th R.B. were ordered to attack the village from the south-west, while on the left the 11th D.L.I., with the 11th R.B. of the 59th Brigade on their right, worked through a wood on the north-west. About a company of the 2nd Scottish Rifles operated on the right of the 11th R.B. The artillery covering the Division was on the move, so that there were no guns to support this attack. Brig.-General Duncan and Brig.-General Hyslop asked such batteries as could be found in the neighbourhood to give their help, but very little artillery support was possible.

Zero was fixed at 4 P.M. As the 12th R.B. received the orders at 3.45 P.M. and the 12th K.R.R.C. only at 3.55, these two battalions did fine work in carrying out their instructions and taking their place in the attack. They got right through the village, where they killed a large number of the enemy and took fifty prisoners. The 11th D.L.I., 10 officers and 130 men strong, came under a trench mortar barrage and enfilade machine-gun fire about 300 yards west of Mézières and lost heavily. Nevertheless the survivors worked their way forward. Lieut. King on the left got into the village and retired only when all his men had been hit. Capt. Pemberton with a small party succeeded in pushing right through, but as he had then only two men left, he also had to fall back. Another party entered the square and destroyed three German trench mortars which were found in position there.

The 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th R.B., however, were unable to hold the village, as they were caught in the rear by concealed parties of the enemy, who was also massing on their right front, and all battalions were forced to retire again. It appears that the Germans were attacking Villers at the same time as we attacked Mézières. Some of the prisoners captured stated that in their attack they had lost very heavily, and that three of their companies had been completely wiped out.

The line was then established along the Demuin-Moreuil road. The 60th Brigade on the right had its right flank about the north-east corner of Cavalry Wood, where it was in touch with the French; the remnants of the 50th Division were placed under the 59th Brigade, which held the centre, with its left on the main road from Roye to Amiens; the 61st Brigade gradually fell back from positions south of Demuin during the night, and by the morning of the 30th continued the line from the left of the 59th Brigade along the road to the river Luce at Demuin. The 92nd Field Artillery Brigade came into action south of Hailles.

About 11 A.M., as the troops north of the Luce retired towards Hangard, the 61st Brigade had to draw back its left flank to the west of Demuin.

The Germans repeatedly attacked the position of the 20th Division in the early morning without success, but at 4 P.M. they penetrated the line of the 60th Brigade.

In order to clear up the situation on this flank the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th R.B., now very much depleted and exhausted, were ordered to counter attack in conjunction with the 59th Brigade and some French troops and elements of the 50th Division. At this time the 2nd Cavalry Division was in action in Cavalry Wood, with the 8th Division coming up in support.

For the first time since the retirement began, the infantry was given really good artillery support. After a very effective bombardment for twenty minutes the attack was launched with complete success. Fifty-three prisoners and nine machine guns were captured and the original line was restored. In appreciation of this very fine action by troops tired out by incessant fighting, the G.O.C. XIXth Corps wired to the Division: “Well done the 20th. Such a counter attack after all your hard work is splendid. Please congratulate your troops.”

The situation on the left was relieved in the evening by an attack of the 9th Australian Brigade north of the Luce; the 61st Brigade was then able to gain touch with the 18th Division across the river.

The line held on the morning of the 31st was substantially the same as that taken up during the night of the 29/30th. Demuin, however, was in the hands of the enemy, and the 61st Brigade was just west of the town, with a bridge-head established between Demuin and Hangard. On the right the 60th Brigade was in touch with the 8th Division. French troops were in Moreuil.

All was quiet until mid-day, when the enemy advanced against the French at Moreuil and the 8th Division in Cavalry Wood. A heavy barrage fell on the line of the 20th Division, and the attack gradually spread northwards along the whole Divisional front. The 8th Division was driven back, leaving the right flank of the 60th Brigade in the air. The 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th R.B. were then attacked from the right and rear, “D” Company of the 12th K.R.R.C. being almost annihilated. The 6th K.S.L.I. were ordered up from a position south-east of Domart to protect the right flank, and succeeded in stopping the enemy’s advance for a time and in causing him severe loss.

The flank was again turned, however, and the 59th and 60th Brigades were forced to swing round to a line south of the Roye—Amiens road, facing south. Here they held on until 4 P.M., when the enemy had again worked round to their right. The Division then fell back—for the last time—to a line just south of the river Luce.

Brig.-General Duncan then asked the cavalry for assistance. Realising that the real danger lay on his right flank, as soon as he saw the cavalry advancing from the direction of Domart, he ordered what was left of the 6th K.S.L.I. (about 120 men) and the remnants of the D.L.I. to support the attack. Details of various units were collected and placed south-east of Domart. The action of the cavalry succeeded in securing the right flank, and at 8 P.M. Brig.-General Duncan offered the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 11th D.L.I. to the cavalry commander, Brig.-General Bell-Smythe, under whose orders these two battalions served until the Division was relieved. These operations were seen from Divisional Headquarters, established on the high ground just north-west of Domart, and the artillery support was forthcoming before infantry brigades had time to ask for it. The 92nd Field Artillery Brigade inflicted great loss on the Germans as they advanced in the open just north of Cavalry Wood.

“By the supreme efforts of all concerned, and as the result of counter attacks by elements of the 20th, 8th, and Cavalry Divisions,”[17] the following line was gained and held by 7.30 P.M. The cavalry occupied a position running from the north-west corner of Cavalry Wood north for about half a mile. From this point the 60th Brigade held a line facing south and south-east about half-way between Cavalry Wood and the Luce. The 61st Brigade, covering the Luce almost as far as Demuin, occupied a pronounced salient, as the troops on the north of the river were some way further back. The 59th Brigade withdrew to the bridge-head at Domart. That evening the following wire was received from the G.O.C. XIXth Corps: “Please accept and convey to all ranks my thanks for the splendid work which you have done since joining the XIXth Corps. The fighting spirit and power of endurance displayed by all ranks under very trying conditions have been wonderful.”

On the morning of the 1st of April the 2nd Cavalry Division delivered a successful counter attack, supported by 100 men of the 59th Brigade, and occupied positions south-west of Demuin. The 92nd Field Artillery Brigade did valuable work in covering this attack. No further action developed on this front, and at night the 20th Division, less the artillery, was at last withdrawn to rest.

The headquarters of the Divisional Artillery and the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade remained in the line and were attached to the French 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Division, which held the front from Moreuil to the north-east corner of Cavalry Wood. The 92nd Brigade covered the northern half of the east edge of the wood.

On the 3rd the enemy took Moreuil and pushed forward some distance to the west. In a further attack delivered on the following morning after a heavy bombardment he reached a line just east of Rouvrel, and by the evening was only a mile south of Hailles. This forced the 92nd Brigade to withdraw about mid-day to the neighbourhood of Fouencamps, 12 miles north-west of Hailles. The French counter attacked on the evening of the 4th, and again on the 5th, and drove back the enemy from part of the ground he had gained. Then, on the 6th, the 20th Divisional Artillery Headquarters and the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade withdrew to Poix, 15 miles south-wrest of Amiens, to rest and refit.

The 91st Field Artillery Brigade, when last mentioned, had successfully withdrawn from Guiscard on the night of the 24th/25th of March. Under the orders of the 9th French Division the brigade moved that night to Crisolles, and from there to Lagny, where positions were taken up south of the village in the early morning of the 25th, to cover the crossings over the canal near Bussy. At 4 P.M. the French retired across the canal, and the batteries took up forward positions about a mile and a half south-east of Lagny, to cover the withdrawal of the French artillery, which was still in position on the canal bank. By dusk the French batteries had been successfully withdrawn, and those of the 91st Brigade, after an exciting fight for half an hour with the Germans who were crossing the canal, returned to their former positions. The brigade then marched back through Cuy and Thiescourt, along roads blocked with troops of every kind. The last battery reached Chevincourt, two miles south-south-east of Elincourt, at 8 A.M., on the 26th. No billets were available, and no rations; no one had had any sleep for days, and men and horses were dead beat.

On the 27th the batteries took up positions on the Thiescourt Massif, which gave a wonderful view over miles of the country below, in order to cover the line from Thiescourt to the south-east. Although dust columns could be seen at Cuy, no action developed opposite the 9th French Division, although there was considerable activity on the left flank about Lassigny, in which D/91 Battery was taking part. Since the 21st of March D/91 had been attached to the 153rd Field Artillery Brigade under the C.R.A. 36th Division. It had fought its way back in a succession of rearguard actions through Tugny, Ham, Buverchy, Flavy-Le-Meldeux (1½ miles north-west of Berlancourt), Freniches, and Beaulieu (one mile north of Ecuvilly), to Gury (three miles south-west of Lassigny), where it came into action on 26th of March, and covered the 177th French Division. Before the battery rejoined the 91st Field Artillery Brigade, a week later, it had taken part in a heavy attack by the Germans on the 30th of March, when the French were forced back through the guns but retrieved the situation by a brilliant counter attack, taking 700 prisoners.

On the 29th, having received orders to rejoin the British Army, the 91st Field Artillery Brigade started on a five days’ march to the neighbourhood of Poix. Here on the 3rd and 4th of April D/91 Battery and No. 1 Section of the Divisional Ammunition Column rejoined the brigade and D/173 Battery returned to its own formation. Large reinforcements of N.C.O.’s and men were available, but no horses.

At a conference held on the 4th, the C.R.A. 14th Division, who commanded all the artillery units concentrated in this area, urged brigade commanders to report at the earliest possible moment when their commands were fit to take the field again. The 91st Brigade, although tired out by continuous fighting, volunteered to carry on at once. The next day accordingly found the brigade once more on the move, and by the 7th the batteries were in position north-west of Villers Bretonneux.

The 91st Field Artillery Brigade was now in the IIIrd Corps (Lieut.-General Sir R. H. K. Butler) and under the 58th Divisional Artillery, and from the 9th covered part of the front of the 58th Division, from the main road east of the village to the south. Lieut.-Colonel Erskine took over the Left Artillery Section of the Right Division, IIIrd Corps, and had at first two and later three artillery brigades under his command.

By the 17th of April the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade was in the line north and north-west of Villers Bretonneux, under the 5th Australian Division, covering the front from the main road east of the village to the north. The 5th Australian Division side-stepped to the left to join its own Corps on the 22nd, when the 8th Division took its place. From that time the Southern Group, under Lieut.-Colonel Erskine (91st, 291st and 179th Brigades), and the Northern Group, under Lieut.-Colonel Balston (92nd Brigade), came under the C.R.A. 20th Division, who had moved up into the line two days earlier to take command of the 8th Divisional Artillery Group, covering the front of the 8th Division.

Between the 5th and the 24th of April the only important action on this part of the front was a German attack on Hangard on the 11th. The enemy succeeded in taking the village and a wood to the north of it, but was driven back to his original position the same day. On the 17th, however, the German guns poured so many gas shells into Villers Bretonneux as to make it uninhabitable. The whole detachment of an 18-pdr. gun, which had been placed in the eastern outskirts of Villers Bretonneux as an anti-tank gun, was gassed. Attempts were made to keep this gun in action, but every man sent up to replace the casualties met the same fate, so the gun had to be withdrawn. Up to this time the artillery had had observation posts in the village—an unpleasant place even then, as it was shelled frequently with gas. After the bombardment on the 17th, it was fairly obvious that the Germans intended to make a supreme effort to capture Villers Bretonneux, from where they would have observation over all the country to the west as far as Amiens. Accordingly intense harassing and counter-preparations were carried out nightly, and all gun teams were moved up close to the battery positions. Batteries which had been discovered by the enemy moved to new positions.

About 6.30 A.M. on the 24th, after a heavy bombardment lasting three hours, the Germans launched an attack on both sides of the village with four divisions. Taking advantage of the undulating ground, German tanks—now used for the first time—broke through south-west of Villers Bretonneux and opened a way for the infantry.

The battery positions of the artillery were north of the Bois l’Abbé. Those of the 91st Brigade were on the Cachy—Fouilloy road and with the exception of D/91 were just north of the railway; D/91 was just south of the railway, which at that point ran on a high embankment. The 92nd Brigade was on the left of the 91st, with the exception of C/92, which was just north of the railway, three-quarters of a mile west of the Cachy—Fouilloy road.

By 9 A.M. the enemy had worked round the south of Villers Bretonneux and was in the village, and began dribbling troops down the railway line towards the Bois l’Abbé. The batteries had suffered very severely from the bombardment; Major Poer of A/91 had been killed, and D/91 had lost all officers at the battery positions, including the commanding officer, Major E. G. Earle, D.S.O., severely wounded. As the advance of the Germans on the south side of the railway rendered the position of D/91 a very precarious one, Capt. Gwyn, M.C., was sent up from the wagon lines with orders to move the guns at all costs to the north side of the embankment. The teams came up from the wood under a hail of bursting shells and succeeded in getting the guns through a bridge under the embankment to the north side, where the battery came into action again. Shortly after this the German infantry advanced down the main road from Villers Bretonneux and occupied the east edge of the Bois l’Abbé. Gunners from some of the nearest batteries manned the embankment with rifles and prevented the enemy from breaking through to the north. At about the same time Lieut.-Colonel Balston ordered C/92 (Major A. Currie), to move to a position close to his other battery on the left of the 91st Brigade. Before moving, the battery had lost fifty per cent. of its personnel and had two guns put out of action by enemy shell fire.

The position at this time was curious, for the enemy had advanced south of the railway to the Bois l’Abbé, but north of the railway his line was no further forward than Villers Bretonneux, and British troops were still holding out along the road to Fouilloy.

At 11 A.M., when this situation became definitely known, orders were received to withdraw the artillery from the threatened flank. The 91st Brigade and the other brigades of the group moved back into the valleys east of Blangy Tronville. The 92nd Brigade sent A/92 to a position south-east of Aubigny. B/92 and D/92 remained in their original positions throughout the day, exposed to a galling fire from all natures of artillery, and when the enemy attempted to advance through Villers Bretonneux north of the main road, drove them back by direct fire over open sights.

In the afternoon orders were received that a counter attack would be launched at 10 P.M., by a brigade of the 18th Division and the 13th and 15th Brigades of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. The plan was to pinch out Villers Bretonneux by driving the enemy back across the ground he had gained south of the village, and by pressing forward at the same time on the north. To cover the attack those batteries which had been withdrawn were ordered to move forward again after dark.

Although the attack was delivered at such short notice it was brilliantly carried out and met with complete success. At dawn on the 25th, Villers Bretonneux was practically surrounded, and during the morning two brigades of the 8th Division overcame the resistance of such parties of the enemy as still held out in the village. By the night of the 25th, Villers Bretonneux was again completely in our hands. A thousand prisoners were taken, and a German tank was left derelict in our lines.[18]

The salient feature of the battle was the part taken by the artillery on both sides. By 5 P.M. on the 24th, one 18-pdr. battery alone had fired over 4000 rounds. Throughout that day the gunners had to fight in gas masks, and the various changes of position added greatly to the fatigue.

The supply of ammunition threw extremely heavy work upon the battery drivers and the Divisional Ammunition Column. They had to make innumerable and incessant journeys between the dumps and the batteries, whole teams being sometimes completely wiped out.

The many rewards for gallant action given to the 20th Divisional Artillery on this day included the D.S.O. to Major Price-Williams, M.C., commanding C/91 Battery, and the M.M. to Fitter Robson of B/92. The latter, though wounded in the head, refused to go to the dressing station until he had put into action again two guns which had been knocked out by shell-fire. Having had his wounds dressed, he returned to the battery with a splinter still in his head, and rendered invaluable service for four days until the battery came out of action.

On the evening of the 25th, the 91st Field Artillery Brigade was relieved. The 92nd, which remained in action for a few days longer, helped to repulse several attacks, the two most important of which took place on the 27th, when the brigade inflicted extremely heavy losses on the enemy, who dispersed and fled before reaching the front line.

With the relief of the Headquarters 20th Divisional Artillery and the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade on the 28th of April, the last troops of the Division moved out of action, having fought continuously throughout the retreat and having taken their part in the battle that marked the last effort of the Germans to break through on the Somme.