The case of Great Britain and Portugal is the only instance in history of an alliance extending over seven centuries. With two peoples so fundamentally different such an alliance could not prevent misunderstandings, but it has nevertheless been a real bond. It is characteristic of Portugal’s whole history that England, separated from her by a great expanse of sea, should have been a nearer neighbour than Spain, and although it has sometimes become the custom in Portugal for writers and speakers to belittle England on every possible occasion, there has never been any real or at least immediate thought of giving up the ancient alliance.

The modern Portuguese are full of suspicions with regard to foreign politics, and are unwise enough to give these suspicions expression in words. Recently the well-known Madrid newspaper, La Epoca, officially denied that these suspicacias portuguesas had any foundation in fact: “For some time past there has been talk in Portugal of the so-called ‘Spanish danger,’ and the Press of that country of various political shades frequently declares that intervention in Portugal meets with widespread favour in Spain.... In Spain no thought has ever been given to the political form of the Portuguese Government further than the wish for order and tranquillity in the neighbouring nation, since these constitute the sure basis of prosperity. This we sincerely desire, as it is desired by all the powers that have relations of real friendship with Portugal.... Whatever the form of Government in Portugal we repeat that the Press and public opinion in Spain unfortunately give but slight and disconnected attention to the affairs of that country, and that there is no reason whatever for these suspicions, since we only occupy ourselves with Portugal in order to wish her every kind of happiness.” A démenti somewhat crushing in its kindness, invoked by the mania of the Portuguese to ascribe motives that do not exist. The expression of such suspicions can be of no possible advantage to Portugal. The weakness of Portugal’s army and of her defences, and the practical non-existence of her navy are perfectly well known, and Spain could easily conquer Portugal were she so minded. The difficulty would be to retain her conquest. All the Portuguese in their hatred of the Spaniard and their love of independence would unite to throw off the yoke of Spain, even though they have not the sense to unite to build up Portugal’s prosperity and to make a second imposition of the Spanish yoke impossible. Spain would thus be confronted with that which defeated Napoleon—the resistance of a people, and might come out of the conflict shorn of Catalonia as well as of their new Lusitanian province. The country that would benefit would be Portugal, since the Portuguese would at last pull themselves together and pull together. But indeed the idea of Spain permanently conquering Portugal is as far removed from practical politics as the idea cherished by not a few Portuguese—of Portugal conquering Spain. Iberian unity may be a pleasant dream, but when a country has won for itself so definite and distinguished a position as Portugal in history, literature and language, it is too late for it to coalesce with another nation, unless as one of a federation of free States, the Basque Provinces and Asturias, Portugal and Galicia, Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, Andalucía, Castille. Nor can one think of Lisbon as a provincial capital. Portugal, modern and progressive, considers Spain very backward and narrow, and rarely seeks to pierce the rough shell to the very excellent kernel beneath it. The Portuguese Press, which gives to foreign news infinitely greater and more enlightened attention than does the Press of Spain, scarcely extends its interest to Spain. And unfortunately what La Epoca said is true: Spain gives Portugal but a passing thought. Both countries would be the gainers by closer relations and a better understanding. Portugal is far more nearly allied in thought with France than with Spain, and the Portuguese who takes the Sud-Express from Lisbon to Paris journeys through an unknown country till he reaches the French frontier.

Formal ally Portugal possesses but one in Europe: Great Britain. The Portuguese, especially the Portuguese Republicans, have attacked this alliance vigorously; indeed, the Republican party increased and prospered largely as a protest against Lord Salisbury’s ultimatum. Even as late as 1910 a book appeared,[70] which accused the English of being in their relations to Portugal hypocritical, voracious and untrustworthy. Snr. João Chagas in one of his pamphlets had charged the Kings of the Braganza dynasty with being “vassals of England,” and this book was the “arraignment of the Monarchy in Portugal.” The British Alliance, it said, was essentially an alliance between dynasties, and to this character owed its unbroken continuity “in spite of all the incidents that have arisen between the two countries and of the unequivocal feeling of repulsion which separates the two peoples.” England has “exploited and insulted us.” But, asks the writer, “does the protection of England at least shelter us from other countries?” and his answer is “Only if it suits her interests. The decadence and degradation of Portugal are due to the august trinity of the Braganças, the Jesuits and the English.” British policy towards Portugal has “always been inspired by a spirit of rapine.” The British alliance has been constantly characterised by its want of sincerity and “a spirit absolutely foreign to the general interests of the Portuguese nation.” And after heaping abuse and insult the author concludes that, much as Portugal may dislike the British alliance, “it is that which suits Portugal more than any other,” since Great Britain is the only power which can effectively support Portugal against the encroachment of Germany and the Congo Free State. They cannot have their cake and eat their cake, and if they wished the British alliance to continue why express their hatred and abhorrence of it? This book was the true expression of the attitude of the Portuguese Republicans towards England, although Dr. Bernardino Machado, first Republican Minister for Foreign Affairs and fifth Republican Premier, who supplied it with an introduction and with a prefatory letter, dated 20th May, 1910, held no official position when he expressed cordial approval of its contents.

The Republicans after the Revolution were obliged to modify their attitude, but it would have been wiser had they frankly accepted the British Alliance, frankly without arrière-pensée, instead of exerting themselves to stand well with Great Britain officially while at the same time indulging in petty slights and insinuations, and doing their utmost to encourage German at the expense of British trade in Portugal. German exports to Portugal before the War, although they had not yet equalled the British, were gaining ground very rapidly (avance à pas de géants, said M. Marvaud). Intellectually France held the field, materially it might soon be Germany. The British Chamber of Commerce in Portugal, founded in 1911, does good service in the interests of British trade. The threatened increase of the already exorbitant Customs duties has had at least the good effect of bringing about several commercial treaties: between Portugal and Germany (1908), Portugal and Great Britain (1914), and others, e.g., with Spain, are in contemplation. It was certainly significant and, partly, the natural outcome of the commercial treaty of 1908, that the Lisbon shopkeepers, the most devoted of the Republic’s supporters, filled their shops as never before with German wares. Germany methodically set herself to undermine the British Alliance by peaceful penetration. She offered Portuguese tradesmen cheaper (if less lasting) goods than did Great Britain, and made great reductions for large orders, and generally studied and consulted the needs and the character of her Portuguese customers. Her advances were so well received as to give a misleading impression. A German observer, Dr. Gustav Diercks, for instance, writing in 1911, guilelessly remarked that Germans were perhaps of all foreigners, the most agreeable to the Portuguese at the present time, “because they have nothing to fear from them, and have learnt to know them merely as pleasant business men, whose aim is not the systematic exploitation of Portugal.” For the great majority of Portuguese, of course, tradition counts for less than nothing; and the old Portuguese families, with which tradition counts for much, often have old ties of family or religion connecting them with Germany or Austria.

The chief evil in Portugal has been the imagination of evil, the fear of disease doing much to encourage or aggravate the disease. The suspicions of conspiracy were more serious than the actual conspiracies, the continual charges of political corruption are a powerful incentive to political corruption. The nagging accusations against Spain at the time of the Royalist incursions might have tempted that country to help the Royalists in earnest. The ridicule and abuse heaped in an underhand way on Great Britain might have induced a Power without scruples and without a sense of honour to make serious use of its brute force. It would, of course, be quite as easy for Great Britain to pocket the entire colonial empire of Portugal as it was for Germany to invade Belgium. But even the most suspicious and cantankerous Portuguese trusts Great Britain’s honour and moderation; and if the Republicans have sometimes affected to regard Great Britain as a gorged beast of prey, they trust and love Germany much as one may love and trust a tiger ready to spring.

For those to whom history and tradition have any meaning, the ancient alliance between Great Britain and Portugal and the fact that under many diverse conditions Englishmen and Portuguese have fought side by side, will always establish at least a basis of friendliness between the two countries. Before Portugal was Portugal, Portuguese and English fought in a common undertaking, the conquest of Lisbon from the Moors in 1147. In this difficult enterprise English crusaders played a very important part, and an account of it was written, in Latin, by an Englishman. A treaty between Portugal and England, or at least between Portuguese and English merchants, followed not long afterwards, for in 1308 when the treaty was formally renewed by the Kings of England and Portugal, King Edward wrote to King Diniz of “the treaty of love and union that has hitherto existed between your merchants (mercatores) and ours.”

It was, however, in the fourteenth century that the old treaty between the countries became a definite and strong alliance. Portugal was in need of a foreign ally against her neighbour Castille, and when old John of Gaunt, time-honoured Lancaster, laid claim to the throne of Castille, a further tightening of the relations between England and Portugal indicated itself as the obvious policy. A treaty between John of Gaunt and King Ferdinand of Portugal was drawn up at Braga in 1372. It is true that eight months later Ferdinand signed a treaty of peace with King Henry II of Castille against the Duke of Lancaster and the King of England, but England continued to have many friends and partisans at the Portuguese Court, and eight years later, when Portugal was again at war with Spain, an English fleet with three thousand soldiers commanded by the Earl of Cambridge (Cambris and Cãbrix in the old Portuguese chronicles) appeared in the Tagus to the assistance of Portugal. Unhappily the English soldiers incurred the hatred of the inhabitants by their pillaging and lawless behaviour, as if they were in a hostile country. They remained in Portugal till 1383 when a fresh treaty between the Kings of Castille and Portugal turned the tables on them, and the King of Castille blandly provided ships to convey them back to England. However that might be, King Ferdinand’s successor, the Infante João, Master of Aviz, when he laid claim to the crown of Portugal, was glad enough to be able to count on the support of England, and the prosperity of his reign certainly owed something to English influence. English soldiers fought side by side with the Portuguese in the victory of Aljubarrota in 1385, and the great Nun’ Alvares evidently learnt from English soldiers the best way of making his infantry effective against cavalry. At Aljubarrota, as at Crécy and Agincourt, the infantry stood firm in close formation against vastly superior numbers, and all the efforts of the cavalry were as powerless to break them as were the French charges at Waterloo. The influence of the Earl of Cambridge and the other English commanders was great in Portugal, and when João I married an English princess in 1387, English ascendancy became supreme at the Portuguese Court. There are many indications to show how wide that influence extended. The dignity of Constable and Marshal were introduced directly from England; Nun’ Alvares, the first Constable, was deliberately a second Galahad; the chivalry of the Round Table became the incentive and fashion of the Portuguese courtiers and nobles; the royal princes were given an English education by their English mother.

To her Portugal owes a great debt. The Portuguese chronicles admit that her children received a more careful education than was habitual at the Courts of the Peninsula, and one of these children was Prince Henry the Navigator, real founder of Portugal’s glory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The treaty of 1308 between Portugal and England had been constantly renewed: in 1353, 1372, and 1380. After King João I’s accession it was confirmed in 1386 and 1404. The fishermen and traders of Portugal, as indeed of the whole coast as far as Bayonne, had much in common both in character and interests with the English, and even if close relations had not existed between the Courts of Portugal and England it is probable that some such treaty would have been formed as existed between Basque fishermen and King Edward II of England.

In 1470 these friendly relations were disturbed. Portuguese ships were plundered by English pirates. But actual war was avoided, and the treaty signed in 1472 lasted unbroken between Portugal and England for the next hundred years. In 1580, when Portugal came under Spanish sway, her alliance with England naturally fell to the ground, and it was actually in the harbour of the Tagus that was equipped the greater part of the Invincible Armada of 1588. Portugal, which had sometimes found England’s friendship unpleasant, when English soldiers were quartered for long periods in Portugal, and, as says an old chronicle, would kill an ox in order to eat its tongue, now experienced the very much more unpleasant consequences of the cessation of that friendship. All her coasts and all her colonies were at the mercy of her former ally’s attacks. As soon as the yoke of Spain was thrown off the Duke of Bragança as João IV sent ambassadors to England to conclude peace. A treaty was signed in January, 1643, by which many mutual privileges, both of trade and individuals, were recognised. Among other privileges of British subjects in Portugal, it was agreed that British Consuls need not belong to the Roman Catholic religion. Generally the treaty increased in a high degree the facilities of trade and commerce between the two countries. But when Cromwell came to the throne the relations between England and Portugal were not easy, in spite of the fact that they had the same enemies. In 1650, Prince Rupert and his brother Maurice took refuge in Portugal, and King João IV refused to accede to Cromwell’s demand that they should be surrendered. Two years later, however, when both Portugal and England were at war with the Dutch, the old friendship was resumed. The Conde de Penaguião was sent on a special mission to England, and in July, 1654, the treaty of 1642 was revised and renewed. Among other articles it stipulated that the English should have certain rights of trading with the Portuguese possessions in the East, and that in Portugal no British subject might be arrested without a special warrant.

The Restoration in England and the marriage of Charles II with Catharina, daughter of King João IV, drew the bond between Portugal and England still closer. In 1662 an English force was sent to Portugal to assist her in her war against Spain, and in the following year took part in the victory over Don John of Austria at Ameixial. The Spanish losses in dead, wounded, and prisoners are said to have numbered 10,000 out of a total army of 16,000. The Portuguese losses are given as 1,500 dead and wounded, and those of their allies, the French and the English, as 300 and 50 respectively. Once more, as at Aljubarrota and so many other fights, the English had contributed in some measure to secure Portugal’s independence. Charles II also helped to bring about the peace between Spain and Portugal, which was signed after many negotiations and difficulties in 1668. The English ambassadors both at Madrid and Lisbon worked persistently for peace, and the two neighbouring countries, which should never have been at war, were finally induced to accept it.

A new treaty between England and Portugal had been signed seven years earlier in 1661, by which all the older treaties were confirmed. Portugal ceded Tangiers to Great Britain, as well as Bombay, and two million cruzados as dowry of the Princess Catharine. Great Britain promised to protect Portugal by land and sea, with cavalry, infantry, and ten of her best warships whenever Portugal might be attacked. Great Britain, moreover, undertook never to form a treaty with Spain which might be in any way prejudicial to Portuguese interests, never to give back Dunkirk or Jamaica to Spain, and to support the Portuguese in India against the Dutch unless the latter made peace with Portugal. At first sight the actual advantages of this treaty are all on the side of Great Britain, those of Portugal being chiefly hypothetical, but Portugal had received in the past proofs of support from England so solid that the promise of British support in the future was considered as anything but nugatory. After the Revolution in England William of Orange informed the King of Portugal of his intention to abide by the existing treaties, and accordingly King Pedro II gave no help to the exiled Stuarts, however much they might have his sympathy.

In the war of the Spanish Succession Portugal at first maintained neutrality in spite of the offer of ships and men made to her by the Allies if she declared war against Spain, and the promise that whatever territory she won from Spain should be guaranteed to her after the war ended. Although Portugal’s duty and interests alike seemed to require that she should join the alliance against Spain without hesitation, it was not till May, 1703, that she finally threw in her lot with them. The alliance between Great Britain and Portugal has more than once shown a strange capacity to simmer down into neutrality at the very moment when it might have been expected to be most active. Yet war between Great Britain and another Power was not so remote a contingency that Portugal’s attitude and obligations might not have been clearly defined beforehand. Of the force of 28,000 men which Portugal now engaged to bring into the field, nearly a half, 13,000, were to be maintained by the Allies.

The Methuen commercial treaty between Great Britain and Portugal was signed in the same year (27th December, 1703). On the strength of this treaty. Great Britain has been accused, and is still sometimes accused, of deliberately planning Portugal’s ruin, as if Great Britain were to blame because her woollen goods were superior to those of Portuguese manufacture, or because the Portuguese, in a short-sighted desire for immediate profits, planted more than a due proportion of their land with vines, till wine became commoner than water, while agriculture and pasture lands were neglected. But it is certain that the neglect and lack of enterprise of the Portuguese allowed a great part of Portuguese trade to fall into the hands of the English.

The Marquez de Pombal, who lived in England as Portuguese Ambassador for six years, was able to compare England’s active business methods with the lazy laisser-aller of the Portuguese. England, he said, has become master of the whole of Portugal’s trade. But however much he might deplore and seek to remedy this fact, he recognised that the British alliance must be the basis of all Portugal’s foreign policy. England and Portugal, he said, were like man and wife: they might quarrel, but, if a third party interfered, they would unite against the common foe.

In 1805 the threats of Napoleon induced Portugal to declare war formally against England and to close her harbours to British ships. Three hundred English families, settled in business in Portugal, left the country. Great Britain was willing to accept these measures as the results of a necessity that knew no law, and although war was formally declared, the British Ambassador, Lord Strangford, remained at Lisbon. But when Portugal went still further, and at the bidding of France confiscated the property of those English families that had remained, Lord Strangford demanded his passports, and an English fleet blockaded the mouth of the Tagus. Before the British Ambassador could leave the country Junot had approached rapidly nearer to Lisbon. When Strangford received the Moniteur in which it was announced that “the House of Braganza has ceased to reign,” he was able to induce the Prince Regent to sail for Brazil. Portugal’s lot was now once more closely united with that of Great Britain. The Peninsular War, in which Portuguese and English troops fought side by side on many a field, could not fail to strengthen the old alliance, however much individual differences of character might come to the surface.

Yet, after seven centuries of constant intercourse between English and Portuguese, it is indeed astonishing that in intellectual and social relations they should have remained almost strangers. The blame for this disappointing fact may be equally apportioned between them. Certainly England cannot be acquitted of a certain narrowness and angularity—whether it be the result of stupidity or pride—which has driven Portugal, intellectually, into the hands of France or Germany. It is to be regretted, in this respect, that the Commercial Treaty between Portugal and Great Britain negotiated by Sir Arthur Hardinge and Mr. Lancelot Carnegie, and signed in 1914, should not have included a clause by which English books might share the favourable treatment as regards Customs duties which is given to French books. A knowledge of English literature would do much to increase the regard or diminish the dislike of the Portuguese towards England. Latin nations give more importance to literature than is perhaps attributed to it in England, and the fact that Portuguese literature and Portuguese history meet with little sympathy or study in England undoubtedly has its effect in Portugal when it is compared with the attitude of Germany. The difference leaps to the eyes of all educated persons in Portugal, and it must not be forgotten that in Portugal the uneducated people—apart from the trained demagogues’ bands in the cities—has no part or parcel in the affairs of the nation.

If you ask what is the best history of Portugal, the answer is that of Heinrich Schaefer, a German; there is not even an English translation of it, although a considerable portion of it is English history. English readers must read this in German or in the French translation. If you inquire for the best history of Portuguese literature, if you wish to consult important works on the Portuguese language, if you wish to read all the works of Portugal’s chief poet in a translation, the language necessary for your purpose is still not English, but German. It is not a creditable fact, for England, and it may be that one result of the World War will be to broaden England’s outlook: if so, it is to be hoped that she will, especially, bestow more attention on the life and character, literature, and history of the oldest of her allies.