During the course of the contest with Austria, the war in the Iberian peninsula went on in a prolonged series of obstinate campaigns between Napoleon’s marshals and an allied force composed of English, Portuguese, and Spanish contingents. Even after the victory of Wagram the Spaniards held on in the face of several disasters; and helped by the English fleet they managed to retain a foothold in Cadiz. The temper of the population was judged to be so hostile that the French army of occupation was raised to the enormous number of 270,000 and the whole country was placed under martial law. The King, Napoleon’s brother Joseph, was only the nominal executive; he aptly called himself the porter of the Madrid hospitals. As the country was harassed with guerrilla warfare, and as the Cortes refused to recognize Joseph as their sovereign, Napoleon threatened to annex the whole kingdom to France.

In Portugal, a French army under Masséna failed to win a decisive victory. It was met by an Anglo-Portuguese force under Wellington, who so strongly intrenched himself at Torres Vedras that Masséna finally withdrew, followed by the English. In his retreat the French general was unable to change his fortune, and the effort to occupy Portugal failed. Masséna was then superseded in his command. Later on the French cause was much injured by the mutual jealousies of the commanders of the various army corps, who, if they had zealously coöperated, might, with the superior forces at their command, have driven Wellington back to the sea coast. By the year 1812, the French armies were stale, and although there were 230,000 French soldiers in the peninsula, Wellington was allowed to invade Spain with an army of only 60,000 men.

Napoleon was indignant at the mismanagement of his subordinates, and sent Jourdon to take charge of the military operations. The new commander not only found the various generals under him unwilling to act together, but also had to deal with a situation in which the troops were demoralized by habits of pillage. Their pay was in arrears, field artillery was scarce, the large siege guns had fallen into the hands of the English, there were no wagon trains and no supply service. Napoleon himself could not from a distance undertake any intelligent supervision of the Spanish situation, since he was obliged to depend on indirect information, and when he interfered his commands were rarely carried out with common sense or good will. His own hands were not free when the Spanish affairs became most critical, for the alliance with Russia, on which so much hope was placed, proved only temporary. On both sides there were grievances; Napoleon was indignant at the apathetic attitude of his ally during the Wagram campaign, and he felt irritated also at the hesitation and delay of the Czar in arranging a marriage for him with a Russian archduchess, after the divorce from Josephine. A distinct Austrian trend was given to French policy when Napoleon found the Austrian Emperor willing to sacrifice his daughter, for the purpose of perpetuating the Napoleonic dynasty. Intimation was given in plain terms that in the questions relating to the Balkan peninsula, Russia’s scheme of aggression would be no more encouraged nor supported.

In Alexander’s domains the continental blockade against England was unpopular and disastrous. With English vessels barred from Russian ports there was no more an outlet for the raw materials of the country. Many of the landlords were in a bankrupt condition; reprisals were made by increasing the tariff on French goods. In a military sense the only benefit accruing to Russia from the French alliance was the conquest of Finland. No good came from French help either in the war with Persia or in that with Turkey. On the other side, the constant extension of French territory and influence placed a sinister but natural interpretation on Napoleon’s promises to share with the Russians the dominion of all European and Asiatic lands as far East as India.

The last step in annexation illustrated the character of Napoleon’s present temper. Hamburg and Lübeck were incorporated with the French Empire and along with them the duchy of Oldenburg, whose duke was closely allied to the Russian royal house. The Czar protested formally, but without moving the Emperor of the French either to recede or to give adequate compensation for annexing these German territories.

But the severest blow to Russia came from the favors shown the Poles, to reward their valorous coöperation in the Wagram campaign. The Czar, who feared the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, attempted to secure from Napoleon the promise that that kingdom should never be reëstablished. Napoleon’s reply was that he would only pledge himself not to give any assistance to any revolt tending to restore the kingdom of Poland. The Czar’s anxiety was misplaced, for the provinces of his empire that he feared might be taken, were in no sense Polish socially, though they had formed a part of the ancient kingdom of Poland. There was no likelihood of a popular movement in favor of the Poles, nor would the population have endured a pro-Polish rearrangement of their territory against the Russians, with whom they, as members of the Orthodox Church, were closely in sympathy. There was also a pro-Russian party among the Poles which Alexander encouraged, by proposing a scheme to establish an enlarged autonomous Poland with a constitution under Russian protection. In 1811, Russian troops were massed together, to invade the grand duchy of Warsaw, and so to encourage the Russian partisans to carry through Alexander’s scheme.

In the spring of 1811, Napoleon, who had at first made light of the intimations of the hostile purposes of the Czar, that kept coming to him from Polish sources, realized that there was a substance behind these reports and began to collect forces from all parts of his empire to protect the grand duchy. Napoleon told the Russian representatives of his gigantic preparations, and at the same time declared that he wished for peace; he asked also whether Alexander thought he was ready to sacrifice 200,000 Frenchmen to re-establish Poland.

But the final rupture arose over Napoleon’s economic policy. Alexander refused to give up the right of trading with neutrals. “I am ready,” he said, “to withdraw to Siberia rather than accept for Russia the situation now occupied by Austria and Prussia.” When the Russian ultimatum was handed in, its conditions were the settlement of Alexander’s grievances with Sweden, the evacuation of Prussia, and the right of commerce with neutrals as preliminary to the question of tariffs and indemnity for the seizure of Oldenburg. Napoleon’s unwilling allies, Prussia and Austria, smarting as they were from past defeats at his hands, were not to be depended upon. On the other hand, Russia’s hands were made free by subsidies from England, by a treaty of peace with Turkey, and by the valuable aid of Sweden, whose crown prince was now Bernadotte, a kinsman of Napoleon and one of his ablest marshals.

In May, 1812, the French Emperor appeared in Dresden, ready to undertake the invasion of Russia; he was the personal ruler of 130 French departments, and under him, in the relation of vassals, were seven kingdoms and thirty princes. In Poland, he was greeted with great enthusiasm, but the actual contingents supplied to his army from Polish sources did not amount to more than 70,000 men. Much of the Grand Army with which Russia was now invaded, 678,000 in all (among the items being 480,000 foot, 100,000 horse, and 80,000 artillerymen), were composed, to the proportion of nearly half, of foreign contingents. Besides the force taken with him to Russia, he had at his command, under arms, 150,000 soldiers in France, 50,000 in Italy, 300,000 in Spain. The plan of campaign was to penetrate into the interior of the Russian Empire, leaving ample forces to guard communications and protect the flanks, as the French advanced. On the Russian side the forces were much less numerous, and there actually faced the 400,000 French who crossed the Niemen the last of June, only 147,000 Russians.

Napoleon’s plan depended for success on quick action. He hoped to attack and overcome the two chief Russian armies, before they had effected a junction. But the country was not like the plains of central Europe; it was marshy and broken by forests. His commanders, especially his brother Jerome, whose position at the head of an army corps was an absurd concession to the clan spirit of the Bonaparte family, showed dilatoriness in executing important strategical movements. The troops also suffered in their discipline from the constant marauding expeditions. Desertions were numerous, many lagged behind, and there were epidemics in the invading army owing to the extreme heat. From these various causes the divisions lost a large percentage of their effective strength, so that by the middle of July the invaders were faced by a reduction in the original number of their army of 150,000 men. Napoleon won no decisive victory, for after every engagement the enemy contrived to get away, drawing the invading forces farther into the interior of the country.

At Smolensk and Borodino there were battles that recalled the Eylau campaign, the losses were heavy on both sides without producing any change in the position of the opposing armies. On September 7, a murderous battle took place at Borodino near Moscow; the victory for the French might have been complete, if Napoleon had not at a critical time refused to let his guard charge, saying that he did not want to destroy it, 800 leagues away from France. The loss on both sides was frightful; of the French 30,000 were “hors de combat,” while the Russians counted their losses at 60,000. Among the killed on the French side were three generals of division, nine brigadier generals, and ten colonels. The Russians lost their heroic commander Bagration.

The road was now opened to Moscow, but there was no rejoicing among the victors, for on the field of battle lay 30,000 dead and 60,000 wounded. On the 14th, Napoleon entered the city, the ancient capital of Russia. Most of the inhabitants had fled, leaving only the lower classes and the occupants of the prisons, whom the governor of the city had released, when he heard of the victory of the French. While the army was halted in expectation that Alexander would sue for peace, a fire, started by Russian incendiaries, soon consumed most of the city, the houses of which were constructed entirely of wood. Fifteen thousand of the Russian wounded, who had been brought on in ambulances, were burnt to death. After the fire had spent its course Napoleon took up his abode in the Kremlin, which was only saved by the efforts of the Imperial Guard. He still hoped that terms of peace might be arranged, but Alexander continued inflexible.

Napoleon for a time contemplated spending the winter in Russia, since he recognized the practical difficulties of the retreat and the loss of prestige due to his withdrawal. Finally he decided to return by the southern provinces. The start west began on the 19th of November, 1812, with a force of 100,000 men; the way south was made impracticable by the obstinate resistance of the Russian general Kutusoff, with his army of only 50,000 men. Therefore the route over which they had come had to be taken for the return. The rearguard was constantly harassed by the enemy, and early in November there was a battle at Viazma, in which the French lost from 15,000 to 18,000 men. Snow began to fall, food was scarce, the troops were badly prepared to endure the wintry weather; out of 100,000 men there were soon only 40,000 left able to bear arms, and at Smolensk on the 12th of November only 34,000 were left.

No French army corps actually surrendered, but they suffered terrible losses, some of them losing half their effective strength. The Russians who followed the retreat were also reduced from 60,000 to 30,000. At the Berezina, where three Russian armies were joined to dispute the passage, the French with unheard-of bravery rescued themselves from capture by forces three times as numerous, and inflicted on the Russians a loss of 14,000 men. When the remnants of the army reached Lithuania, Napoleon left them there in order to make a rapid return to Paris and to counteract by his presence in his capital the bad effect of the news of the defeat in Russia. New armies had to be raised, for it was practically certain that a large part of Germany would soon be in revolt. Though temporarily strengthened by the various contingents left to protect the communications eastward, the final stage of the retreat from Russia, which was conducted by Murat, bore witness to the frightful straits and demoralization of the French. The sick and wounded were abandoned; there were no provisions for carrying the artillery or the pontoons; even the army treasure and the secret archives had to be left behind. Before the end of the journey west Ney, who commanded the rearguard, had with him no more than 500 or 600 men, and when the Old Guard entered Königsberg, it was reduced to 1500 men, of whom only 500 were fit to bear arms.

The extent of the Russian disaster may be measured by a few statistics; 533,000 soldiers crossed the actual frontier into Russia in the summer of 1812; 18,000 of the main army returned in the December following; about 130,000 men had been made prisoners in Russia, 55,000 had deserted at the opening of the campaign, and there were 55,000 survivors of the various corps that had been stationed as reserves along the line outside of the Russian territory. Altogether 250,000 must be reckoned as having perished during the course of the march to Moscow and the retreat from that city. The disaster meant that Napoleon’s schemes of European domination were checked and his military resources much diminished. It was no longer a question of new conquests, but of turning to face the nations who had suffered so long from French despotic rule.