The year 1916 opened and still no general action had been fought in the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet continued to dominate, paying its price—though not so heavy as might have been expected—for the influence it exerted on all the operations—naval, military and economic—to which the country had by that time been committed in face of the active operations pursued by enemy submarines and mine-laving craft.
On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth to cruise in the northern part of the North Sea, and returned during the night of the 8th–9th.
The facility with which enemy mines could be laid in the vicinity of naval bases during the long winter nights, when there was little or no moon (as shown, inter alia, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland Bight, which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant in 1917), led me to extend still further the patrols from the bases at such times; from January 2nd to January 10th inclusive, the patrol vessels (two light cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about 140 miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the Pentland Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 P.M. each day. Similar patrols were ordered to be instituted from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however, instead of mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the purpose, possibly because of the considerable mercantile traffic using this route. The patrols in this direction did not extend so far from the base, the sea being very frequently too heavy in the winter months; the practice was to search the route periodically for mines.
The weather early in January had been very bad, and both sweeping and patrol work were impracticable. In these circumstances the enemy raider Moewe, disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably passed up the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field between Cape Wrath and a position about north from Strathie Point, on the Scottish coast, on the night of January 1st or 2nd. The work of the Moewe was facilitated by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and Sule Skerry Island were necessarily exhibited at night for the sake of the large mercantile traffic using the Pentland Firth and the Minches.
On January 6th, at 7 A.M., the pre-Dreadnought battleship King Edward VII., of the 3rd Battle Squadron, left Scapa for Belfast to refit, and at 10.47 A.M., when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent explosion occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain Maclachlan first reported that the ship had been torpedoed, but later came to the conclusion that she had been mined, as was eventually found to be, undoubtedly, the case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both engine-rooms filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing at the time with a rising sea.
As soon as the report was received at Scapa the flotilla leader Kempenfelt and 12 destroyers were sent out to assist and to keep the submarine under, if one were present. Tugs were also despatched. Meanwhile the collier Melita, which had arrived on the scene, proceeded to take the King Edward VII. in tow, assisted by the Kempenfelt; but the ship was very low in the water and unmanageable, and the tow parted. At 4 P.M., the battleship having by this time a heavy list, Captain Maclachlan decided to abandon her for the night, and the destroyers Musketeer, Marne, Fortune and Nessus were taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they embarked all hands without loss of life, although the destroyer Musketeer received considerable injury from projections on the side of the battleship. The destroyer Nessus and a tug stood by the King Edward VII. until 8.10 P.M. when she turned over and sank. The Africa, also of the 3rd Battle Squadron, en route from Belfast to Scapa, passed safely through the mined area a few hours before the King Edward VII. was mined—a very fortunate escape!
Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing between Cape Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large force of mine-sweepers was detached to ascertain the limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear a passage along the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape Wrath, and some on Scapa, but continuous bad weather interfered with the sweeping operations to such an extent that, between January 7th and January 21st, no sweeping was possible except close in shore in sheltered water. On January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet Bay, near Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the loss of the King Edward VII. was thereby removed.
On January 7th the battleship Albemarle left Scapa for Archangel, and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth to operate in the Skagerrak; she returned on the 16th, having met with no success.
On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was experienced at Scapa. The oiler Prudentia drifted across the bows of the Iron Duke during the night and sank, and one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier, a tug and three trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The Iron Duke was undamaged.
Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol suffered considerable damage from the heavy seas. The month of January, as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over the whole North Sea. Great injury was done to all the anti-submarine obstructions at Scapa, many of them being entirely destroyed. In order to make the base temporarily as secure as possible from submarine attack, the Fleet was directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions.
On January 24 the destroyer Talisman reported that a torpedo had been fired at her off Blyth. The Botha and 10 destroyers were sent out from Rosyth to locate and destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing of her.
On January 25th the Ebro, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, picked up a dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and towed her to Lerwick, arriving on the 28th.
On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers, and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with five destroyers, left Rosyth for operations in the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, during daylight on the 27th, swept through the Skagerrak to the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron being in support. The ships then moved to the northward; at daylight on the 28th, the whole force, joined by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and again swept into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then returned to their respective bases. During the operations the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was at short notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted outside territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of small vessels passing along the Norwegian coast inside territorial waters.
On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers reported that he had swept a clear channel along the north coast of Scotland from Cape Wrath to Scapa, between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field laid by the Moewe. This channel was instituted for warships only for use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed to steer to the northward from Cape Wrath, thence to make Noup Head, on the north-west coast of the Orkneys, passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa; all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair Island Channel to their destination.
During the month of January gunnery practices were carried out, both in the Moray Firth and in the Pentland Firth.
The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were much restricted by the bad weather experienced, the weekly average showing:
Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8; number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 10; number on special service, 2.
Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood on January 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 30th. The weather during the month both at Scapa and in the whole northern area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements of all small craft.
Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by night from the various bases were continued in January, as was the change of base of the Rosyth squadrons to Scapa and Cromarty for practices.
At 6 A.M. on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers left Scapa, steering towards the little Fisher Bank, whence the destroyers returned to Scapa, and the squadron proceeded to sweep up the Norwegian coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered probable that enemy raiders, attempting to pass out of the North Sea, would hug the coast on passage.
On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins returning from raiding our east coast. The fishing trawler King Stephen on this day sighted Zeppelin L 19 in a sinking condition in the North Sea.
On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate off the Norwegian coast. She returned on the 13th.
On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded to a position about 150 miles to the south-eastward from Scapa for patrol during the night and returned on the 8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out a similar patrol, returning on the 9th.
On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, operating from the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral of the East Coast, was attacked by enemy torpedo craft in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, and the Arabis was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending further information as to the strength of enemy forces at sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night of the 10th–11th, and proceeded to the southward; the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Harwich; and the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and move to the southward. The situation became clear during the 11th, when it was evident that the enemy’s force, which had consisted only of destroyers, had returned to its base.
At 10.30 P.M. (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 0.20 E.) orders were given for the Grand Fleet to return to its bases, and the squadrons arrived on the 12th.
From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the armed boarding-steamers Dundee and Duke of Clarence, from Scapa, swept from that base to the Utvoer Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long. 40.31 E.), thence down the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed boarding-steamers returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted were two enemy submarines off the coast of Norway.
On February 18th the new battleship Malaya, the gift of the Federated Malay States, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were sent to the Skagerrak to examine and board merchant-vessels with a view to stopping the iron ore trade from Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part of their cruise, to operate against two enemy submarines reported off the Norwegian coast. They returned on February 28th, not having met, outside territorial waters, the submarines or with any vessels which were engaged in the iron ore trade.
On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were sent without result to operate against a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel.
On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas, left Scapa before daylight for a watching and exercise cruise in the northern part of the North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight, in conjunction with the Harwich force, had been intended, but was abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore Tyrwhitt that the weather and other conditions were unsuitable for his operations. Battle exercises took place during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which left Rosyth at 1.30 P.M. on the 26th, joined the Battle Fleet at 8 A.M. next day. During that day further battle exercises were carried out, including deployments of the whole Grand Fleet from its cruising order, so that the battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers might become accustomed to taking up the stations assigned to them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 28th.
During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping sloops patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys to prevent mine-laying in the approaches to the base.
On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept any enemy vessel that might be attempting to pass out into the North Sea. Information from neutral sources had led to a belief in the possibility of such an attempt being made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the information was received after the event, that is, it was reported that the vessel in question had already left German waters. The dispositions were made, therefore, on this assumption, and in making them it was necessary to place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be expected to pass through in daylight.
The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship, whether her mission were mine-laying near our bases, or an attempt to pass out into the Atlantic. The Patia and Columbella, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were directed to patrol a line running north-east from Lat. 61.45 N., Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the C Patrol line were directed to extend this line to the north-eastward. The Alcantara and Andes, of the same squadron, already on a special patrol line, were ordered to remain in their position till further orders. Two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers left Rosyth at 8 P.M. on the 28th to patrol the area covering the Farn Island—Skaw and the May Island—Skaw trade routes, working to the eastward. Early on the 29th the Comus and the Calliope, of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the 28th with two destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. 58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E., and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E. respectively, were directed to patrol lines 40 miles long, running 50° to 230° respectively from a position in Lat. 61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The Blanche, which had also sailed, was ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The Minotaur and a destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair Island passage during daylight on the 29th. Steps were also taken to cover the approaches to the Pentland Firth against mine-laying.
At 8.55 A.M. on the 29th the Andes, Captain G. B. Young, R.N., reported by wireless that an enemy vessel was in sight in Lat. 61.58 N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave her course, speed and description; her enemy character was assumed owing to her movements. The Alcantara, Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight of the Andes, but sighted her at 9.10 A.M. chasing a strange vessel, joined in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 A.M., being then about 6,000 yards from her, ordered her to stop. She complied and informed the Alcantara that she was the Norwegian s.s. Rena from Rio to Trondjhem. She was flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted on her sides. At 9.40 A.M. the Alcantara, then about 2,500 yards on the quarter of the stranger, began to hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. At this moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her hitherto concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian ensign and staff overboard and hoisting a German ensign at the main. But she still showed the Norwegian flag on her sides, where it was displayed throughout the action. At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced immediately, and as the first hits on the Alcantara cut all her communications, Captain Wardle experienced great difficulty in passing orders to the guns. But the enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with effect, in spite of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went ahead and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of which hit the Alcantara between the boiler-rooms at about 10 A.M., causing them gradually to fill.
By 10.15 A.M. the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. A few minutes later, at 10.22 P.M., boats were observed to be leaving her and the Alcantara ceased firing. The latter ship was by this time listing heavily and was abandoned shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 A.M. The Andes, which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range than the Alcantara, rendered assistance to the boats of the two ships.
On receipt of the first signal from the Andes, the Calliope, Comus and Blanche had been ordered to the scene at full speed. The Comus, Captain Alan G. Hotham, R.N., the nearest vessel, with the destroyer Munster, arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E., as the Alcantara was sinking. The Munster picked up the crew of the Alcantara, and as the enemy raider still had colours flying the Comus proceeded to sink her by gunfire and to pick up the survivors in her boats. The Calliope and Magic arrived at 1 P.M., but, not being required, returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned out to be the disguised raider Grief, armed with four 5.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement of 306, of whom 209, including many wounded, were rescued by the Comus and Andes.
The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying out blockade work under modern conditions when dealing with an unscrupulous enemy. A raider disguised as a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most difficult customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had perforce to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of this nature. It is not possible to examine a vessel without boarding her, and, except in very fine weather, it is necessary for the boarding ship to be close to the suspected ship before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously cannot pull long distances. The experience of the Alcantara showed the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An attempt to solve the problem was made by informing all neutrals that, when any of our vessels displayed a certain signal, the ship to be boarded should steam towards the boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away. But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously dependent to a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, which was not always in evidence.
Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties which did not exist in the days of our forefathers, not the least being the advent of the torpedo and the submarine. The German method of solving such difficulties was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did not, and never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of any seaman belonging to the Allied nations.
During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, combined with more favourable weather, gave the 10th Cruiser Squadron better opportunities for the blockade, and the average weekly results were: Number of ships intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on patrol, 12; number absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 9; number detached on special service, 1.
Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on February 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual exchange of bases for practices and the independent squadron exercises at sea from the bases were carried out during the month.
On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen visited the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in the evening. The party included M. Danchenko, Count Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M. Bashmakoff, M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky.
On March 2nd the new battleship Valiant, a vessel of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the Kattegat to intercept trade and to ascertain the situation there on the chance of any enemy vessels being found. She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and exercise cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea. On the 6th the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded into the North Sea for a southerly sweep, concentration being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on the meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became very unfavourable for destroyers, and speed had eventually to be reduced to such an extent that the sweep was abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its bases on the 7th.
On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was instituted in an area north of the Shetlands. It was designed to cover the track of vessels en route between the north of Iceland and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was considered probable that this route might be taken by enemy raiders as well as by vessels attempting to evade the blockade. The patrol was continued throughout the year, although occasionally modified in details and frequently doubled in strength. It was eventually successful in intercepting and sinking the German raider Wolf, in the spring of 1917, the Achilles (Captain F. M. Leake, R.N.) and the armed boarding-steamer Dundee (Commander Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the vessels engaged in this operation. This patrol was also of use for blockade work.
On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a division of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth at 7.30 A.M. for operations off the Norwegian coast, the objective being the capture of any enemy merchant-ships found outside territorial waters between Ekersund and the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian ports, and especially Narvik, occasionally ventured outside territorial waters in this locality. It was the only locality, besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, in which they did so venture, and in which, therefore, there was a chance of capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward of the Naze for supporting purposes. It was also intended that the remainder of the Grand Fleet should be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly gale sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying the Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme was cancelled; Sir David Beatty was informed that, if the weather conditions farther south prevented his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the latter should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron be left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The conditions being unfavourable for destroyers, this course was adopted. The weather eventually became too bad for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain their speed, and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed.
Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on March 14th to intercept contraband trade and for reconnoitring purposes. She did not sight any enemy vessels, but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying contraband.
The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at sea on March 14th and 15th, and the Roxburgh and two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th for another sweep on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the Naze. This was again unproductive.
The cruiser Theseus left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk in the White Sea. On the same date the cruiser Crescent, en route from Scapa to the south, was fired at and missed by a submarine south of the Hebrides.
On the 19th the light cruiser Calliope, with two destroyers, left the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with orders to proceed to the Naze and sweep up the Norwegian coast to Udsire; and the Comus and two destroyers left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep down the Norwegian coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial waters in this locality. The Calliope was forced to put in to Rosyth owing to a serious fire occurring in her after boiler-room. The Comus completed her sweep in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels.
On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out aerial operations off the Danish coast, involving an attack on the enemy’s zeppelin shed at Tondern, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet left early that day to cover the operation. In the course of the operations the destroyers of the Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the southward of the Horn Reef for this purpose. Some German outpost trawlers were encountered here by the destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during the engagement the destroyer Medusa was rammed by the destroyer Laverock, being very seriously damaged. The Medusa was taken in tow, but, the weather becoming very bad, the towing hawser parted, and all attempts to get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels were in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident that the enemy would be aware of the incident by means of his directional wireless system, since a good deal of wireless signalling on the part of our ships had been necessary. It was expected, therefore, that he would send out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in view of the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt rightly judged it expedient to abandon and sink the Medusa, and gave orders to this effect. The ship’s company of the Medusa was taken off in a most seamanlike manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the Lassoo.
Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was difficult for Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact conditions, but during the night of the 25th, having sent his destroyers ahead, he steered with his light cruisers in order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s North Sea mine-field. At about 10 P.M. two enemy destroyers were sighted on the port bow of the Cleopatra (flying Commodore Tyrwhitt’s broad pennant) at a distance of about 800 yards. Their presence was betrayed by the flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the enemy. The Cleopatra at once opened fire and headed for the destroyers, and when it was seen that they were crossing from port to starboard, Captain Loder Symonds of the Cleopatra ported his helm and rammed the second destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically in half. There was a tremendous crash, followed by what seemed to be two explosions, one possibly a boiler explosion, and the second due to either a mine or depth-charge, causing considerable damage to the stem piece of the Cleopatra. The injury was subsequently found to be far too great to have been caused by the impact alone. The sudden alterations of course by the Cleopatra, combined with the gunfire and explosions, had thrown the squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the Cleopatra, in separating from the sinking destroyer, found herself across the Undaunted’s stem; the latter was somewhat seriously damaged, and reported subsequently that she could only steam at slow speed. The Commodore, therefore, remained near the Undaunted for the night.
Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left Rosyth on the 24th to cover the operations, was in the vicinity of the Harwich force, and, on the morning of the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the Undaunted, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force swept back towards her position, not sighting any enemy vessels. Three of the light cruisers covered the Undaunted during her passage to the Tyne, where she was sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced in locating the Undaunted, owing to a difference in “dead reckoning” between the various ships. In order to be prepared for eventualities the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of the 25th–26th, heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility was also very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang up when the snow ceased. During the early afternoon of the 26th the wireless reports from the Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and the Undaunted cleared up the situation, the latter ship reporting herself as hove to until the weather moderated.
By 4.30 P.M., when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,” the sea had become so heavy and steep that destroyers with the Battle Fleet could not safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern waters, and the Undaunted was approaching a safe area, the 5th Battle Squadron was detached at high speed, without destroyers, to assist in covering her passage back to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet and cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and Cromarty. The Iron Duke convoyed the destroyer flotillas in order that they could be given their position, as the coast was approached. The weather moderated during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the 27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before daylight on the 27th, one, the Michael, being somewhat seriously damaged.
By 8 A.M. on the 27th the Undaunted was in Lat. 56.35 N., Long. 2 E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser Fleet arriving at Rosyth on the 27th.
The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas again proceeded to sea on March 29th, for a watching and exercise cruise in the northern part of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, the destroyers having to return independently as they were unable to maintain Fleet speed through bad weather conditions.
During March the system of carrying out target practice in the Pentland Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of in the Moray Firth was regularly instituted, and no further practices took place in the Moray Firth during the year 1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that of towing the target in the strong tides of the Pentland Firth.
On March 19th the battleship Hercules, which had been laid up at Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly six weeks, completed her repairs. These were carried out with the assistance of artisans from the engine contractors.
The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth for the purpose of practices continued.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for March showed: Number of ships intercepted, 43; number sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number absent at bases, or en route to or from patrol, 9; number on special service, 1.
A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced during the month, and the weather generally in northern waters was bad, gales occurring on the 6th, 11th, 12th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th.
On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth and attacked Leith and Edinburgh, but did not make any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting some of them during their return passage, but saw nothing of them.
On April 3rd the Devonshire and two destroyers left Rosyth and proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Udsire lighthouse, and swept thence to the Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or neutrals with contraband which might be found outside territorial waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic in territorial waters was reported.
On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate against enemy submarines on the route which it was thought was taken by them between the Shetlands and Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about 30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, however, sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine operations of this nature by the submarines attached to the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent intervals during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft were available for this purpose; the plan of operations was constantly varied. The general scheme was to place our craft in positions through which hostile submarines were expected to pass, or along the routes which they usually took.
On April 6th the Roxburgh left Rosyth with two destroyers, to repeat once again the operation of sweeping down the Norwegian coast from Udsire to the Naze. The search was again unproductive.
On April 12th the armed liner Campania returned from a lengthy refit at Liverpool, during which the ship had, at my request, been provided with a “flying-off” deck for her sea-planes, as experience throughout the War had shown conclusively that it was of little use to depend on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the most advantageous conditions, and that the only system which would give reasonable certainty of the machines being able to get into the air when required was to fly them from the ship. At the same time I formed the conclusion, after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of the Campania, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, that the sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown from ships, since the weight of the floats of sea-planes greatly limited their climbing powers, their radius of action and their speed. This alteration to the Campania was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced, of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships with scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from the ship under practically all conditions. I make no apology for referring again to this subject in view of its importance.
The Campania had also been fitted to carry a kite balloon aft, for use for spotting the fall of shot and for reconnaissance purposes. This fitting was the beginning of the arrangement, gradually introduced during 1916, of carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success in large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being also provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small craft, an arrangement which proved to be of great use for anti-submarine and convoy work.
On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up a line running from Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 11.30 W. to Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles apart and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed to the northward of Iceland.
On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive sweep into the Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept and examine all mercantile traffic, (2) to operate against enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any enemy vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements in the Kattegat of the light forces, which it was intended should be sighted from neutral shores in the expectation that they might be reported to the enemy by his agents.
The force included three submarines, which were ordered to positions commanding the northern entrance to the Sound, and the Great and Little Belts, so that enemy forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was decided to move south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef with the whole Grand Fleet, the object being to induce the enemy to keep the ships of the High Sea Fleet in North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic, where they might cause interference with the relaying the Russian mine-fields, an operation which became necessary at this season of the year after the ice had broken up. It was thought that the appearance of the Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would probably effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat. Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the 21st, with orders for the battle and cruiser squadrons to concentrate on the morning of the 22nd in a given position to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” whilst the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were ordered to an area from which they could concentrate later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if required.
At 2.30 P.M. of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was detached, with three destroyers, to proceed to the Skagerrak, with directions to arrive in the vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered to push ahead, and at 6 P.M. of the 22nd was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26 E., cruising in an area north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight, when it was intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather, which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle Fleet, with cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered to the eastward from Scapa until shortly before dark, and then altered course to South 18 East for the Horn Reef, to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the 23rd.
The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 P.M., and at 6 P.M. Sir David Beatty reported that the Australia and New Zealand had collided in a fog and had received damage necessitating both ships returning to their base. By 10 P.M. the Battle Fleet and cruisers were also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. It was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such conditions with so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers and destroyers, when to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank, were accordingly turned to the northward, the order of turning being rear squadrons first and thence to the van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals had been introduced to provide for such circumstances, and were of great use on this occasion.
In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty was experienced in carrying out the turn in the dense fog that prevailed, especially amongst the destroyers, and three of them, namely, the Garland, Ardent and Ambuscade, were in collision; the Ardent was so seriously damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her back to a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a neutral steamer, in passing through the Fleet in the fog, collided with the battleship Neptune, doing considerable injury to that ship.
The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, and the Fleet cruised to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank until it was certain that the damaged destroyers were safely on their way to their bases. The operations were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, and the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the Fleet remaining out for a further twenty-four hours, so as to repeat the sweep to the Horn Reef on the following day.
The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, fuelled, and again proceeded to sea for another movement south during the evening of that day, the 5th Battle Squadron being sent on in advance of the remainder of the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and strengthen the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of the Australia and New Zealand, damaged in collision.
At 4.6 A.M. on the 25th, however, whilst steering to the southward, a report was received from Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, that he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light cruisers in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet increased to full speed, and shaped a course to pass down the searched channel to the westward of the German mine-field to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during their expected return passage to their ports. At 4.20 A.M. the Admiralty informed me that the enemy was bombarding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 A.M. the Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle cruisers in sight steaming to the eastward.
At 11 A.M. the Iron Duke, with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, was in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were about 35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70 miles to the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as appeared later, having evidently only just barely missed cutting the enemy off from his base. The Battle Fleet stood on to the south-eastward until the afternoon, when it became evident that the Germans had escaped to their bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 26th.
On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty as to the steps which could be taken to minimise the danger of a recurrence of such raids on unfortified towns on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. Although they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly a great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, and might result in much loss of life. I suggested that the placing of the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Humber or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, and in any case would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting injury by submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, if, by good fortune, we happened to be cruising sufficiently far to the southward at the time. The presence of the squadron in southern waters would be useful, also, in the unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of movement, due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines in southern waters, were considerable. I pointed out that since the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron and the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was no longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships of the “Revenge” class were also approaching completion. The proposal was adopted, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed for the Humber on the 29th, en route to the Medway. On that port the 3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being gradually withdrawn for service in foreign waters. The Admiralty also stationed some of the monitors in the more important undefended ports.
During the month of April a policy, suggested by me, of placing the Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead of in light cruisers, was adopted. This was made possible by the completion of several vessels of the class. The object was to add the light cruisers thus released to our all too slender light cruiser force.
The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during April were:
Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; number of ships on patrol, 12; number absent at ports or en route to or from patrol, 9; number on special service, 1.
A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced during the month, and gales on the 8th, 16th and 24th.
On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the vicinity of the Horn Reef. The operation was covered by the Grand Fleet. One of its objects was, as before, to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval forces to the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually drawn out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand Fleet in southern waters would soon become known to the enemy from neutral sources, with the result that vessels of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations in the Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North Sea ports. From information obtained subsequently from reliable sources, it appeared that the operation produced the intended result. Between the afternoon of May 2nd and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers convoying the sea-plane-carriers Vindex and Engadine, proceeded to a position just north of the Horn Reef, arriving at dawn on May 4th; the objective of the sea-planes was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer Abdiel proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track of enemy vessels en route to the North Sea via the Horn Reef. The mine-layer Princess Margaret was directed to lay mines on the same night across the expected route taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were completed without any interference on the part of the enemy.
Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn Reef, three to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three to positions off Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of the 3rd.E