Peter Ceely, one of the Justices of the Peace of this County, to the Keeper of His Highness’s jail at Launceston, or his lawful Deputy in that behalf, Greeting:—

“I send you herewithal by the bearers hereof, the bodies of Edward Pyot of Bristol, and George Fox of Drayton-in-the-Clay, in Leicestershire, and William Salt of London, which they pretend to be the places of their habitations, who go under the notion of Quakers and acknowledge themselves to be such; who have spread several papers tending to the disturbance of the public peace, and cannot render any lawful cause of coming into these parts, being persons altogether unknown, and having no pass for their travelling up and down the country, and refusing to give sureties of their good behaviour, according to the law in that behalf provided; and refuse to take the oath of abjuration, &c. These are therefore, in the name of his Highness the lord Protector, to will and command you, that when the bodies of said Edward Pyot, George Fox, and William Salt, shall be unto you brought, you them receive, and in his highness’s prison aforesaid you safely keep them, until by due course of law they shall be delivered. Hereof fail you not, as you will answer the contrary at your perils. Given under my hand and seal, at St. Ives, the eighteenth day of January, 1665.”

“Friend,

“We are free men of England, free born; our rights and liberties are according to law, and ought to be defended by it: and therefore with thee, by whose hand we have so long suffered, and still suffer, let us reason a little plainly concerning thy proceedings against us, whether they have been according to law, and agreeable to thy duty and office, as chief minister of the law, or justice of England. And in meekness and lowliness abide, that the witness of God in thy conscience may be heard to speak and judge in this matter, for thou and we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that everyone may receive according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad. Therefore, friend, in moderation and soberness, weigh what is herein laid before thee.

“In the afternoon, before we were brought before thee at the assize at Launceston, thou didst cause many scores of our books to be violently taken from us by armed men without due process of law; which being perused to see if anything in them could be found to be laid to our charge, who were innocent men, and then upon our legal issue, thou hast detained from us to this very day. Now our books are our goods, and our goods are our property; and our liberty is to have and enjoy our property; and of our liberty and property the law is the defence, which saith, ‘No free man shall be disseized of his freehold, liberties, or free customs, &c., nor any way otherwise destroyed: and we shall not pass upon him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.’land.’ Magna Charta, cap. 29. Now friend, consider, is not the taking away of a man’s goods violently, by force of arms, as aforesaid, contrary to the law of the land? Is not the keeping of them so taken away, a disseizing him of his property, and a destroying of it and his liberty, yea, his very being, so far as the invading of the guard the law sets about him, is in order thereunto? Calls not the law this, a destroying of a man? Is there any more than one common guard or defence to property, liberty, and life, viz. the law? And can this guard be broken on the former (viz. property and liberty), and the latter (viz. life,) be sure? Doth not he that makes an invasion upon a man’s property and liberty (which he doth, who, contrary to law, which is the guard, acts against either,) make an invasion upon a man’s life; since that which is the guard of the one, is also of the other? If a penny, or a penny’s-worth, be taken from a man contrary to law, may not by the same rule all that a man hath be taken away? If the bond of the law be broken upon a man’s property, may it not on the same ground be broken upon his person? And by the same reason, as it is broken on one man, may it not be broken upon all, since the liberty, and property, and beings of all men under a government are relative, a communion of wealth, as the members in the body, but one guard and defence to all, the law? One man cannot be injured therein, but it redounds to all. Are not such things in order to the subversion and dissolution of government? Where there is no law, what is become of government? And of what value is the law made, when the ministers thereof break it at pleasure upon men’s properties, liberties, and persons? Canst thou clear thyself of these things, as to us? To that of God in thy conscience, which is just, do I speak. Hast thou acted like a minister, the chief minister, of the law, who hast taken our goods, and yet detainest them, without so much as going by lawful warrant, grounded upon due information, which in this our case thou couldst not have; for none had perused them, whereby to give thee information? Shouldst thou exercise violence and force of arms on prisoners’ goods, in their prison-chamber, instead of proceeding orderly and legally, which thy place calls upon thee, above any man, to tender, defend, and maintain against wrong, and to preserve entire the guard of every man’s being, liberty, life, and livelihood? Shouldst thou, whose duty it is to punish the wrong-doer, do wrong thyself? who ought to see that the law is kept and observed, break the law, and turn aside the due administration thereof? Surely from thee, considering thou art chief justice of England, other things were expected, both by us and by the people of this nation.

“And when we were brought before thee, and stood upon our legal issue, and no accuser or accusation came in against us, as to what we had been wrongfully imprisoned, and in prison detained for nine weeks, shouldst not thou have caused us to be acquitted by proclamation? Saith not the law so? Oughtest thou not to have examined the cause of our commitment? And there not appearing a lawful cause, oughtest thou not to have discharged us? Is it not the substance of thy office and duty, to do justice according to the law and custom of England? Is not this the end of the administration of the law? of the general assizes? of the jail delivery? of the judges going the circuits? Hast not thou by doing otherwise, acted contrary to all these, and to Magna Charta? which, cap. 29, saith, ‘We shall sell to no man, we shall deny or defer to no man, either justice or right.’ Hast thou not both deferred and denied to us, who had been so long oppressed, this justice and right? And when of thee justice we demanded, saidst thou not, ‘If we would be uncovered, thou wouldst hear us, and do us justice?’—‘We shall sell to no man, we shall deny or defer to no man, either justice or right,’ saith Magna Charta, as aforesaid. Again, ‘We have commanded all our justices, that they shall henceforth do even law, and execution of right to all our subjects, rich and poor, without having regard to any man’s person; and without letting to do right for any letters or commandments, which may come to them from us, or from any other, or by any other cause, &c., upon pain to be at our will, body, lands, and goods, to do therewith as shall please us, in case they do contrary,’ saith Stat. 20. Edw. III. cap. 1. Again, ‘Ye shall swear that ye shall do even law and execution of right to all, rich and poor, without having regard to any person; and that ye deny to no man common right by the king’s letters, or other man’s, nor for any other cause. And in case any letter come to you contrary to the law, that ye do nothing by such letter, but certify the king thereof, and go forth to do the law notwithstanding those letters. And in case ye be from henceforth found in default in any of the points aforesaid, ye shall be at the king’s will of body, lands, and goods, thereof to be done, as shall please him,’ saith the oath, appointed by the statute to be taken by all the judges, Stat. 18. Edw. III. But none of these nor any other law hath such an expression or condition in it as this, viz., ‘provided he will put off his hat to you, or be uncovered:’ nor doth the law of God so say, or that your persons be respected; but the contrary. From whence then comes this new law, ‘If ye will be uncovered I will hear you, and do you justice?’ This hearing complaint of wrong, this doing of justice, upon condition, wherein lies the equity and reasonableness of that? When were these fundamental laws repealed, which were the issue of much blood and war; to uphold which cost the miseries and blood of the late wars, that we shall now be heard, as to right, and have justice done us but upon condition, and that too such a trifling one as putting off the hat? Doth thy saying so, who art commanded, as aforesaid, repeal them, and make them of none effect, and all the miseries undergone, and the blood shed for them of old, and of late years? Whether it be so or not indeed, and to the nation, thou hast made it so to us, to whom thou hast denied the justice of our liberty (when we were before thee, and no accuser, nor accusation came in against us,) and the hearing of the wrong done to us, who are innocent, and the doing us right. And bonds hast thou cast, and continued upon us until this day, under an unreasonable and cruel jailer, for not performing that thy condition, for conscience-sake. But thinkest thou that this thine own conditional justice maketh void the law? or can it do so? or absolve thee before God or man? or acquit the penalty mentioned in the laws aforesaid? unto which hast thou not consented and sworn? viz., ‘And in case ye be from henceforth found in default, in any of the points aforesaid, ye shall be at the king’s will, of body, lands, and goods, thereof to be done as shall please him.’ And is not thy saying, ‘If ye will be uncovered (or put off your hats), I will hear you, and do you justice;’ and because we could not put them off for conscience-sake, thy denying us justice, and refusing to hear us, as to wrong, who had so unjustly suffered, a default in thee against the very essence of those laws, yea, and overthrow thereof, for which thing’s sake (being of the highest importance to the well-being of men), so just, so equal, so necessary, those laws were made, and all the provisions therein? To make a default in any one point of which provisions, exposeth to the said penalty. Dost not thou by this time see where thou art? Art thou sure thou shalt never be made to understand and feel the justice thereof? Is thy seat so high, and thy fence so great, and art thou so certain of thy time and station, above all that have gone before thee, whom justice hath cut down, and given them their due, that thou shalt never be called to an account, nor with its long and sure stroke be reached? Deceive not thyself, God is come nearer to judgment than the workers of iniquity in this age imagine; who persecute and evil-entreat those that witness the just and Holy One, for their witnessing of him who is come to reign for ever and ever. Saith he not, he will be a swift witness against the false swearers? God is not mocked.

“Surely, friend, that must needs be a very great offence which deprives a man of justice, of being heard as to wrong, of the benefit of the law, and of those laws afore-rehearsed; to defend the justice and equity of which a man hath adventured his blood and all that is dear to him. But to stand covered (or with the hat on), in conscience to the command of the Lord, is made by thee such an offence (which is none in law), and rendered upon us (who are innocent, serving the living God), effectual to deny us justice, though the laws of God, and of man, and the oath, equity and reason, say the contrary, and on it pronounce such a penalty. ‘If ye will be uncovered (uncovered, saidst thou), I will hear you, and do you justice;’ but justice we had not, nor were we heard, because Jesus Christ, who is the higher power, the lawgiver of his people, in our consciences commanded us not to respect persons, whom we choose to obey rather than man. And for our obedience unto him hast thou cast us into prison, and continued us there till this very day, having showed us neither law for it, nor Scripture, nor instances of either, nor example of heathens nor others.

“Friend, come down to that of God, that is just in thee, and consider, was ever such a thing as this heard of in this nation? what is become of seriousness, of true judgment, and of righteousness? An unrighteous man, standing before thee with his hat off, shall be heard; but an innocent man, appearing with his hat on in conscience to the Lord, shall neither be heard nor have justice. Is not this regarding of persons contrary to the laws aforesaid, and the oath and the law of God? Understand and judge: Did we not own authority and government oftentimes before the court? Didst not thou say in the court, thou wast glad to hear so much from us of our owning magistracy? Pleaded we not to the indictment, though it was such a new-found one as England never heard of before? Came we not when thou sent for us? Went we not when thou bade us go? And are we not still prisoners at thy command and at thy will? If the hat had been such an offence to thee, couldst not thou have caused it to be taken off, when thou heard us so often declare, we could not do it in conscience to the commands of the Lord, and that for that cause we forbore it, not in contempt of thee or of authority, nor in disrespect to thine, or any man’s person (for we said, we honoured all men in the Lord, and owned authority, which was a terror to evildoers, and a praise to them that do well; and our souls were subject to the higher powers for conscience-sake): as thou caused them to be taken off, and to be kept so, when thou called the jury to find us transgressors without a law?

“What ado hast thou made to take away the righteousness of the righteous from him, and to cause us to suffer further, whom thou knew to have been so long wrongfully in prison contrary to law? Is not liberty of conscience a natural right? Had there been a law in this case, and we bound up in our consciences that we could not have obeyed it, was not liberty of conscience there to take place? For where the law saith not against, there needs no plea of liberty of conscience; but the law have we not offended, yet in thy will hast thou caused, and dost thou yet cause us to suffer for our consciences, where the law requires no such thing; and yet for liberty of conscience hath all the blood been spilt, and the miseries of the late wars undergone, and (as the Protector saith,) this government undertakes to preserve it; and a natural right, he saith, it is; and he that would have it, he saith, ought to give it. And if it be a natural right, as is undeniable, then to attempt to force it, or to punish a man for not doing contrary to it, is to act against nature; which, as it is unreasonable, so it is the same as to offer violence to a man’s life. And what an offence that is in the law thou knowest; and how, by the common law of England, all acts, agreements, and laws, that are against nature, are mere nullities; and all the judges cannot make one case to be law that is against nature. But put the case, had our standing with our hats on been an offence in law, and we wilfully, and in contempt, and not out of conscience had stood so (which we deny as aforesaid), yet that is not a ground wherefore we should be denied justice, or be heard as to the wrong done to us. ‘If ye will not offend in one case, I will do you justice in another;’ this is not the language of the law, or of justice, which distributes to everyone right; justice to whom justice is due, punishment to whom punishment is due. A man who does wrong may also have wrong done to him; shall he not have right wherein he is wronged, unless he right him whom he hath wronged? The law saith not so; but the wrong-doer is to suffer, and the sufferer of wrong to be righted. Is not to do otherwise a denying, letting, or stopping of even law and execution of justice, and a bringing under the penalties aforesaid? Mind and consider.

“And shouldst thou have accused, when no witness appeared against us, as in the particulars of striking Peter Ceely, and dispersing books (as thou saidst) against magistracy and ministry, with which thou didst falsely accuse one of us? Saith not the law, ‘the judge ought not to be the accuser?’ much less a false accuser? And wast not thou such a one, in affirming, that he dispersed books against magistracy and ministry, when as the books were violently taken out of our chamber (as hath been said,) undispersed by him, or any of us? Nor didst thou make it appear in one particular, wherein those books thou didst so violently cause to be taken away, were against magistracy or ministry? or gave one instance, or reply, when he denied what thou charged therein, and spoke to thee to bring forth those books and make thy charge appear. Is not the sword of the magistrate of God to pass upon such evil-doing? And according to the administration of the law, ought not accusations to be by way of indictment, wherein the offence is to be charged, and the law expressed against which it is? Can there be an issue without an indictment? Or can an indictment be found before proof be made of the offence charged therein? And hast thou not herein acted contrary to the law and the administration thereof, and thy duty as a judge? What just cause of offence gave George Fox to thee, when, upon thy producing a paper concerning swearing, sent by him (as thou said) to the grand jury, and requiring him to say, whether it was his handwriting? he answered, ‘read it up before the country, and when he heard it read, if it were his, he would own it?’ Is it not equal, and according to law, that what a man is charged with before the country, should be read in the hearing of him and of the country? When a paper is delivered out of a man’s hand, alterations may be made in it to his prejudice, which, on a sudden looking over it, may not presently be discerned, but by hearing it read up, may be better understood, whether any such alterations have been made therein? Couldst thou in justice have expected or required him to do otherwise? Considering also, that he was not insensible how much he had suffered already, being innocent, and what endeavours were used to cause him further to suffer? Was not what he said, as aforesaid, a plain and single answer, and sufficient in the law? Though (as hath been demonstrated) thou didst act contrary to law, and to thy office, in being his accuser therein, and producing the paper against him. And his liberty it was, whether he would have made thee any answer at all, to what thou didst exhibit, or demand, out of the due course of law; for to the law answer is to be made, not to thy will. Wherefore then wast thou so filled with rage and fury at his reply? Calmly, and in the fear of the Lord, consider, wherefore didst thou revile him, particularly with the reproachful names of juggler and prevaricator? Wherein did he juggle? wherein did he prevaricate? Wherefore didst thou use such threatening language, and such menacings to him and us, saying, thou wouldst ferk us, with such like? Doth not the law forbid reviling, and rage, and fury, threatening, and menacing of prisoners? Soberly mind, is this to act like a judge or a man? Is not this transgression? Is not the sword of the magistrate of God to pass on this as evil-doing, which the righteous law condemns, and the higher power is against, which judgeth for God?

“Take heed what ye do, for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord, who is with you in the judgment. ‘Wherefore now, let the fear of the Lord be upon you; take heed, and do it: for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts,’ said Jehoshaphat to the judges of Judah. Pride and fury, passion and rage, reviling and threatening, are not the Lord’s; these, and the principle out of which they spring, are for judgment, and must come under the sword of the magistrate of God; and it is of an ill savour, especially such an expression, as to threaten to ferk us. Is not such a saying more becoming a schoolmaster with his rod and ferula in his hand, than thee, who art the chief justice of the nation, who sittest in the highest seat of judgment, who ought to give a good example, and so to judge that others may hear and fear? Weigh it soberly and consider, doth not threatening language demonstrate an inequality, and partiality in him, who sits as judge? Is it not a deterring of a prisoner from standing to, and pleading the innocency of his cause? Provides not the law against it? Saith it not, that irons and all other bonds shall be taken from the prisoner, that he may plead without fear, and with such freedom of spirit, as if he were not a prisoner? But when he, who is to judge according to the law, shall beforehand threaten and menace the prisoner contrary to the law, how can the mind of the prisoner be free to plead his innocency before him? or expect equal judgment from him who, before he hears him, threatens what he will do unto him? Is not this the case between thee and us? Is not this the measure we have received at thy hands? Hast thou herein dealt according to law? or to thy duty? or as thou wouldst be done unto? Let that of God in thy conscience judge.

“And didst thou not say, there was a law for putting off the hat, and that thou wouldst show a law? and didst not thou often so express thyself? But didst thou produce any law, or show where that law might be found? or any judicial precedent, or in what king’s reign, when we so often desired it of thee, having never heard of, nor known any such law, by which thou didst judge us? Was not what we demanded of thee reasonable and just? Was that a savoury answer, and according to law, which thou gave us, viz., ‘I am not to carry the law-books at my back, up and down the country; I am not to instruct you?’ Was ever such an expression heard before these days to come out of a judge’s mouth? Is he not to be of counsel in the law for the prisoner, and to instruct him therein? Is it not for this cause that the prisoner, in many cases, is not allowed counsel by the law? In all courts of justice in this nation, has it not been known so to have been? And to the prisoner has not this been often declared when he demanded counsel, alleging his ignorance in the law, by reason of which his cause might miscarry, though it were righteous, viz., ‘the court is of counsel for you’? Ought not he that judgeth in the law, to be expert in the law? Couldst thou not tell by what act of parliament it was made, or by what judicial precedent, or in what king’s reign, or when it was adjudged so by the common law (which are all the grounds the law of England has), had there been such a law, though the words of the law thou couldst not remember? Surely, to inform the prisoner when he desired it, especially as to a law which was never heard of, by which he proceeds to judge him, that he may know what law it is by which he is to be judged, becomes him who judgeth for God; for so the law was read to the Jews by which they were to be judged, yea, every Sabbath-day; this was the commandment of the Lord. But instead thereof to say, ‘I am not to carry the law-books at my back up and down the country; I am not to instruct you:’ to say, ‘there is a law,’ and to say, ‘thou wilt show it,’ and yet not to show it, nor to tell where it is to be found; consider whether it be consistent with truth or justice?

“Have not thy whole proceedings against us made it evidently appear, that thy desire was to cause us to suffer, not to deliver us, who, being innocent, suffered; to have us aspersed and reproached before the country, not to have our innocency cleared and vindicated? Doth not thy taking away our books as aforesaid, and perusing them in such haste before our trial, and accusing us with something, which thou said was contained in them, make it to appear, that matter was sought out of them, wherewithal to charge us, when the Et Cetera warrant would not stand in law, by which we stood committed, and were then upon our delivery, according to due course of law? Doth it not further appear, by thy refusing to take from our hands a copy of the strange Et Cetera warrant, by which we were committed, and of the paper for which we were apprehended, to read it or cause it to be read, that so our long sufferings by reason of both might be looked into, and weighed in the law, whether just or righteous, and the country might as well see our innocency and sufferings without a cause, and the manner of dealing with us as to hear such reports as went of us, as great offenders, when we called upon thee often so to do, and which thou ought to have done, and said, thou would do, but did it not; or so much as take notice before the country that we had been falsely imprisoned, and had wrongfully suffered? But what might asperse and charge us, thou brought in thyself, contrary to law, and called to have us charged therewith. Is not this further manifest, in that thou didst cause us on a sudden to be withdrawn, and the petty jury to be called in with their verdict, whereupon Peter Ceely’s falsely accusing George Fox with telling him privately of a design, and persuading him to join therein, it was by G. Fox made so clear to be a manifest falsehood, and so plainly to be perceived, that the cause of our sufferings was not any evil we had done, or law that we had transgressed, but malice and wickedness?

“And is it not abundantly clear from thy not permitting us to answer, and clear ourselves of the many foul slanders charged upon us in the new-found indictment, of which no proof was made; but when we were answering thereunto, and clearing ourselves thereof, thou didst stop us, saying, ‘thou minded not those things, but only the putting off the hat’ when as, before the country, the new-found indictment, charged us with those things, and the petty jury brought in their verdict, ‘guilty of the trespasses and contempts mentioned therein;’therein;’ of which (except as to the hat) not one witness or evidence was produced; and as to the hat, not any law, or judicial precedent, upon the transgression of which all legal indictments are only to be grounded? Now the law seeks not for causes whereby to make the innocent suffer, but helps him to right who suffers wrong, relieves the oppressed, and searches out the matter, whether that, of which a man stands accused, be so or not, seeking judgment, and hastening righteousness; and it saith, ‘the innocent and the righteous slay thou not.’ But whether thou hast done so to us, or the contrary, let the witness of God in thee search and judge, as these thy fruits do also make manifest.

“And, friend, consider how abominably wicked, and how highly to be abhorred, denied, and witnessed against, and how contrary to the laws such a proceeding is, to charge a man with many offences in an indictment, which they who draw the indictment, they who prosecute, and they who find the bill, know to be false, and to be inserted purposely to reproach and wound his good name, whom with some small matter which they can prove, they charge and indict; as is the common practice at this day. Prove but one particular charge in the indictment, and it must stand (say they) for a true bill, though there be ever so many falsehoods therein, purposely to wrong him, who is maliciously prosecuted: this is known to the judges, and almost every man who has to do with, and attends, their courts. How contrary is this to the end and righteousness of the law, which clears the innocent, and condemns the guilty, and condemns not the righteous with the wicked! Much it is cried out against; but what reformation is there thereof? How else shall clerks of assize, and other clerks of courts, fill up their bags (out of which perhaps their master must have a secret consideration), and be heightened in pride and impudence; that even in open court they take upon them to check and revile men; men without reproof, when a few lines might serve instead of a hundred? How else shall the spirit that is in men, that lusteth unto envy, malice, strife, and contention, be cherished and nourished to feed the lawyers, and dependents on courts, with the bread of men’s children, and the ruin of their families, to maintain their long suits and malicious contentions! For a judge to say, ‘I mind not these things; I will not hear you clear yourselves of what you are falsely accused: one thing I mind in your charge, the rest are but matter of form, set there to render you such wicked men before the country, as the thing that is to be proved against you is not sufficient to make out.’

“O!“O! abominable wickedness, and perverting of the righteous end of the law, which is so careful and tender of every man’s peace and innocency. How is the law in the administration thereof adulterated by lawyers, as the Scriptures are mangled by priests! And that which was made to preserve the righteous, and to punish the wicked, perverted to the punishing of the righteous, and the preserving of the wicked! An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth; life for life; burning for burning; wound for wound; a stripe for a stripe; he that accuseth a man falsely to suffer the same as he should have suffered, who was falsely accused, if he had been guilty; this saith the righteous law of God, which is agreeable to that of God, in every man’s conscience. Are not such forms of iniquity to be denied, which are so contrary to the law of God, and man? which serve for gendering strife, and kindling contention? and of this nature was not that, with which thou didst cause us to be indicted? and this form didst thou not uphold, in not permitting us to answer to the many foul slanders therein; saying, ‘Those things thou mindest not.’ Will not the wrath of God be revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; who are so far from the power of godliness, that they have not the form, but the form of iniquity, which is set and held up, instead of, and as a law, to overthrow and destroy the righteousness of the righteous, and so to shut him up, as by the law he can never get out? Is not the cry, thinkest thou, gone up? ‘It is time for thee to set to thine hand, O Lord, for thine enemies have made void thy law!’ Draws not the hour nigh? Fills not up the measure of iniquity apace? Surely the day is coming, and hasteneth. Ye have been warned from the presence, and by the mouth of the Lord; and clear will he be when he cometh to judgment, and upright when he giveth sentence. That of God in every one of your consciences shall so to him bear witness and confess, and your mouths shall be stopped, and before your Judge shall ye be silent, when he shall divide you your portion, and render unto you according to your deeds. Therefore, whilst thou hast time, prize it, and repent: for verily ‘Our God shall come, and shall not keep silence; a fire shall devour before him, and it shall be very tempestuous round about him. He shall call to the heavens from above, and to the earth that he may judge his people; and the heavens shall declare his righteousness: for God is judge himself. Consider this, ye that forget God, lest he tear you in pieces, and there be none to deliver.’

“And, friend, shouldst thou have given judgment against us (wherein thou didst fine us twenty marks a-piece, and imprisonment till payment), without causing us, being prisoners, to be brought before thee, to hear the judgment, and to move what we had to say in arrest of judgment? Is not this contrary to the law, as is manifest to those who understand the proceedings thereof? Is not the prisoner to be called before judgment be given? and is not the indictment to be read? and the verdict thereupon? And is not liberty to be given him to move in arrest of judgment? And if it be a just exception in the law, ought not there to be an arrest of judgment? For the indictment may not be drawn up according to law, and may be wrong placed, and the offence charged therein may not be a crime in law; or the jury may have been corrupted, or menaced, or set on by some of the justices; with other particulars, which are known to be legal and just exceptions. And the judgment ought to be in the prisoner’s hearing, not behind his back, as if the judge were so conscious of the error thereof, that he dare not give it to the face of the prisoner. But these privileges of the law, this justice, we (who had so long and so greatly suffered contrary to law), received not, nor could have at thy hands; no, not so much as a copy or sight of that long and new-found indictment (which in England was never heard of before, nor that the matter contained therein was an offence in law, nor ever was there any law, or judicial precedent, that made it so); though two friends of ours in our names and our behalf, that night, next day, and day following, often desired it of the clerk of the assize, his assistants, and servants; but they could not have it, nor so much liberty as to see it. And it is likely not unknown or unperceived by thee, that, had we been called, as we ought to have been, or known when it was to be given, three or four words might have been a sufficient, legal arrest, of the judgment given on that new-found indictment, and the verdict thereupon.

“Therefore, as our liberties, who are innocent, have not (in thy account) been worth the minding, and esteemed fit for nothing but to be trampled under foot, and destroyed, so, if we find fault with what thou hast done, thou hast taken care that no door be left open to us in the law, but a writ of error; the consideration whereof, and the judgment to be given thereon, is to be had only where thyself art chief; of whom such complaint is to be made, and the error assigned for the reverse of thy judgment. And what the fruit of that may be well expected to be, by what we have already mentioned, as having received at thy hands, thou hast given us to understand. And here thou mayest think thou hast made thyself secure, and sufficiently barred up our way of relief, against whom (though thou knew we had done nothing contrary to the law, or worthy of bonds, much less of the bonds and sufferings we had sustained): thou hast proceeded as has been rehearsed: notwithstanding that thou art (as are all the judges of the nation) entrusted, not with a legislative power, but to administer justice, and to do even law and execution of right to all, high and low, rich and poor, without having regard to any man’s person; and art sworn so to do, as has been said: and wherein thou dost contrary art liable to punishment, as ceasing from being a judge, and becoming a wrong-doer, and an oppressor; which what it is to be, many of thy predecessors have understood, some by death, others by fine and imprisonment. And of this thou mayest not be ignorant, that to deny a prisoner any of the privileges the law allows him, is to deny him justice, to try him in an arbitrary way, to rob him of that liberty which the law gives him, which is his inheritance as a free man; to do which is in effect to subvert the fundamental laws and government of England, and to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law; which is treason by the common law; and treasons by the common law are not taken away by the statutes of 25 Edw. III. 1 Henry IV. 1, 2, m. See O. St. Johns, now chief justice of the common pleas, his argument against Strafford, fol. 65, in the case.

“These things we have laid before thee in all plainness, that (with the light of Jesus Christ, who lighteth every one that cometh into the world, a measure of which thou hast, which showeth the evil, and reproveth thee for sin, for which thou must be accountable,) thou mayest consider and see what thou hast done against the innocent; that shame may overtake thee, and thou mayest turn unto the Lord, who now calleth thee to repentance by his servants, whom, for witnessing his living truth in them, thou hast cast into, and yet continues under, cruel bonds and sufferings.”