The Neptune was one of the cheapest ships ever built for the British Navy, her cost working out at a little under £87 per ton.

The other ship of the same programme was the Indefatigable, an improved Invincible. She represents an increase of nearly 2,000 tons over the type ship, with an increase in length of 18ft. and a foot more beam. Save for the addition of four more anti-torpedo guns the armament remains the same, but an extra inch is added to the belt. The principal improvement achieved in her is that the two amidship turrets are much less crowded up than in the type ship, thus securing a considerably better range of fire.

Although the horse power is proportionately less than that of the Invincibles, the better lines of the ship have made her even more speedy. She easily exceeded her designed speed on trial, and has reached as high as 29.13 knots.

The cost of construction was £1,547,426, which works out at about £82 10s. per ton, as against the average £120 per ton that the Invincibles cost to build. She was the cheapest ship ever built for the British Navy,33 to her date.

Details of the Indefatigable are:—

• Displacement—19,200 tons.
• Length—578ft.
• Beam—79½ft.
• Draught—27¾ft.
• Guns—Eight 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch.
• Armour Belt—8-in. amidships, diminished to 4-in. at the ends.
• Machinery—Parsons Turbine.
• Horse-power—43,000 = 25 knots.
• Boilers—Babcock.
• Coal—(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,500 tons; oil fuel also.
• Built at Devonport Dockyard.
• Engined by J. Brown & Co., of Clydebank.

Two other battle-cruisers almost identical to the Indefatigable, the Australia at Clydebank, for the Australian Navy, and the New Zealand at Fairfield, a gift from New Zealand to the British Navy, were launched in 1911.

The programme for 1908–09, consisting as it did of only two armoured ships, and the fact that the corresponding German programme was increased by one capital ship, bringing the total to four, brought the naval agitation to a head. Meetings demanding eight “Dreadnoughts” were held all over the country, with the result that the British programme for 1909–10 rose to four armoured ships with four other “conditional” ships. The ships of the former programme were the Colossus, Hercules, Orion, and Lion, and the first two of these were laid down some months before the usual date, the Colossus being commenced in July instead of at the end of the year.

The “conditional” ships were all eventually laid down in April of the following year. They were the Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer, and Princess Royal.

Under this programme there were no less than three distinct types of ships. The first two, the Colossus and Hercules, are practically sisters of the Neptune, but of 400 tons greater displacement. They differ in appearance in having but one tripod mast instead of two. This, like the Dreadnought’s, is placed abaft the foremost funnel. The Colossus was built and engined by the Scott Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., commenced in July, 1909, and completed two years later. The Hercules, built by Palmer’s, followed a month later in both cases. The first is fitted with Babcock, and the second with Yarrow boilers. A point of minor interest about these two ships is that whereas the anti-torpedo armament of the Neptune is in three groups, that of the Colossus and Hercules is in two groups only, the mounting of small guns between the échelon turrets being done away with.

The other two types of the 1909–10 Estimates are the ships generally known as “super-Dreadnoughts.”

SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS.

The most obvious feature of the so-called “super-Dreadnoughts” is the introduction of the 13.5-inch gun, particulars of which will be found at the end of this chapter. This gun was experimented with with a certain amount of secrecy, and was for a long time officially designated as the 12-inch “A,” although practically everybody knew that it was really a 13.5. It was only rendered possible by recent improvements in gun-mountings and gun-construction. It is not very appreciably heavier than the latest type of 12-inch, as mounted in the Colossus, and its adoption was not so much a matter of obtaining an increased range and penetration, as of securing the tremendously increased smashing power of the heavier projectile.

Somewhat less obvious to the general public, but really of a great deal more far-reaching importance, is the “Americanising” of British naval design exhibited in all the “super-Dreadnoughts.” Though differing in detail, the arrangement of the armament in all the “super-Dreadnoughts” followed the American centre-line system, an interesting indication of the progress of the United States Navy from the days, not so very long ago, when American warship design was more or less a pour faire rire! It is none the less interesting from the fact that in the earliest designs, in all ships carrying more than two turrets, the centre line was the only arrangement ever built or even considered. Yet when an increased number of turrets came into being, the American Navy was the only one which followed the original practice. In all other Navies ideas of the period 1870–1880, when strong end-on fire was considered an all-important essential, influenced design. America alone appreciated the prophecy long ago made by Admiral Colomb to the effect that whatever else might temporarily obtain, broadside to broadside would always be reverted to for battle, on the grounds that thus, and thus only, could the maximum number of guns be utilised.

It is proper here to remark that though the Americans adopted the centre line from the outset for practical reasons, this disposition became more or less a necessity when 13.5’s came in, owing to the infinitely greater strain on the structure. This has been occasionally used as an argument against American influence having made itself felt, but the balance of evidence shows that even had the 13.5-inch not appeared, the centre line system would have figured in the Navy. The original centre-line idea disappeared because the échelon system looked so superior. The échelon system of the 1875–85 era, however, died out in its turn on account of certain practical disadvantages. It was resurrected when these had been forgotten in the lapse of years; but the disadvantages entailed in firing across a deck soon made themselves felt again once the system was reverted to.

One of the earliest advocates, if not the first of modern advocates, of the centre-line in England was Admiral Hopkins. Discussing the original Cuniberti ideal, Admiral Hopkins pointed out that although for an absolute right-ahead or astern fire wing-turrets gave an advantage, a very slight yaw entirely altered the proportion, and that circumstance in which the enemy was dead right-ahead necessitating such a yaw were likely to occur very rarely indeed in war. He leaned, therefore, to the opinion that a fewer number of guns all in the centre line would be equally as efficacious, practically, as a larger number disposed partly in wing turrets.

The échelon system, of course, renders practically no assistance here, the arc of the guns firing across the deck being necessarily restricted, even with the best échelon arrangement. While, therefore, the échelon system is good for absolute end-on, or for more or less absolute broadside firing, any intermediate and more probable position renders it less efficient than a centre-line arrangement.

Another defect of the échelon system is that with it, except exactly end-on, one side of the ship is necessarily more efficient than the other, and that this is reversed according to whether the enemy is ahead or astern, twenty-five per cent. of the big-gun armament being affected thereby in a four turreted ship.

Though attention never seems to have been drawn to the matter, it is a fact worthy of some attention that the Von der Tann, which is to be regarded as Germany’s “answer” to the Invincibles, has (like all German34 ships on the same system) her échelonned turrets exactly in reverse order to British ones. All British ships have the port turret foremost; all German ones the starboard. The net result of this is that (as the diagram indicates) there are two worst and two best positions for either design. An Invincible getting and keeping a Von der Tann upon her starboard bow or port quarter would have a twenty-five per cent. superiority over her, while, supposing the German type to maintain a position on her starboard quarter or port bow she would be to the same extent over-matched, and to a certain extent “in chancery.”

With the centre line system, the imposition of fighting one side rather than the other is not imposed, and overhauling or being overhauled causes no disadvantage. Nothing is lost, save in the almost hypothetical case of two ships engaging exactly end-on—a condition which in no case would endure for more than a very short space of time, to say nothing of the fact that practically all gunnery errors being of “elevation” and not of “direction,” a ship adopting the end-on position offers the equivalent of a vertical target of some 60ft. to 70ft. instead of the equivalent of 30ft. or so that she would present broadside on.

The centre-line system may, therefore, be expected to endure against all other dispositions pending the appearance of some fresh condition of affairs which would cause the old end-on idea to be reverted to.35

The Orion was the only one of her class which belonged to the normal Estimates, 1909–10, the other three—Conqueror, Thunderer, Monarch—being “contingent ships.” Details of the class are as follows:—

• Displacement—23,500 tons.
• Length—(between perpendiculars) 554½ft; (over all) 584ft.
• Beam—88½ft.
• Draught—(mean) 27¾ft.
• Armament—Ten 13.5-inch, forty-five calibre; sixteen 4-inch; three 21-inch torpedo tubes.
• Armour Belt—12—4-inch. Turrets, 12-inch.
• Machinery—Parsons turbine.
• Horse-power—27,000 = 21 knots.
• Boilers—Babcock.
• Coal—(nominal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil, 1,000 tons.

The Orion was laid down in November, 1909, the others in April, 1910.

The Orion was the first of these ships to be commissioned, and her gunnery trials were watched with great interest. Few details of them transpired, save that part of the secondary battery was injured by blast. After commissioning, the Orion was sent for a voyage across the Bay of Biscay, and attracted much attention by rolling very heavily, this being attributed to the fact that her bilge keels were not large enough—not to any general structural defect.

An interesting feature of the Orion type is that in it provision first appears for the protection of boats in action.

Belonging to the same programme (1909–10), the first belonging to the normal Estimates and the second to the “contingent,” are the battle cruisers Lion and Princess Royal. A great deal of secrecy was observed about these ships, but their main details are approximately as follows:—

• Displacement—25,000 tons. Full load, 26,350 tons.
• Length—(water-line), 675ft.; (over all) 690ft.
• Beam—86½ft.
• Draught—(maximum) 30ft.
• Armament—Eight 13.5 inch 45 calibre, twenty 4-inch, three 21-inch torpedo tubes.
• Armour—Belt, 9—4-inch.
• Machinery—Parsons Turbine.
• Horse-power—(as designed) = 28 knots.
• Boilers—Yarrow.
• Coal—(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,500 tons; oil also.
• Lion—Built at Devonport; engined by Vickers.
• Princess Royal—Built at Vickers; engined by Vickers.

The Lion was laid down in November, 1909, and launched in the following year. The Princess Royal was laid down in April, 1910, and launched a year later. Both were arranged to be completed during 1912.

The Lion was somewhat delayed owing to slight repairs being required to her turbines. In addition, the authorities very wisely did not “hurry” her—hurrying ships to fit an exact official date having done more mischief than anything else in the past.

The Lion did her trials early in 1912, and reached a maximum of 31.7 knots by patent log, with a mean of 29 knots at full power and 24.5 or so at three-quarter power. For her trials the Lion burned coal only, and this at the seemingly enormous rate of 950 tons a day, which worked out at approximately about a ton and a quarter per mile. This consumption, heavy though it seems, really pans out at about the usual “ton a mile,” as the ship developed horse-power far in excess of the contract. At the same time it necessarily draws attention to the enormous increase in coal stores required for supplying modern warships. It is unfortunately by no means clear that the question of the very great increase in coal required for modern warships has been thoroughly realised by the authorities. The amount provided may be said to be what ships needed in the pre-Dreadnought era. It is now an open secret that at the time of the “war scare” with Germany in 1911, the British Home Fleet was unable to proceed to sea owing to a shortage of coal supply, many ships being a thousand tons short and no proper arrangements for rapid remedy existing. This state of affairs, at one time alleged to be merely a newspaper canard, is not likely to occur again; but it is an indication of how difficult it is adequately to realise the problem of coal supply to ships of ever-increasing horse-power.

During the Lion’s trials it was found that the heat from the fore funnel was so great that the fire-control station (then carried on a tripod mast placed immediately over the forward funnel) was so intense as to render that position practically impossible. On the navigating bridge also, instruments were badly affected by the heat. The ship was consequently further delayed in order to effect essential modifications. These included the abolition of the tripod mast, shifting the fore funnel back a long way, and enormously increasing the height of all funnels.

The principal item of the Estimates of 1910–11 was five armoured ships. Of these, four, the King George V class, are slightly improved replicas of the Orion, while the remaining vessel, the Queen Mary, is a battle-cruiser of the Lion type.

Ships of the George V class are as follows:—

The over-all length is increased to 596ft., and the horse-power to 31,000. All were laid down during 1911, with a view to launching during 1912 and completion in 1913. The displacement of these ships is 23,000 tons odd.

The Queen Mary, laid down at Palmers’ early in 1911, and engined by Clydebank, is virtually a sister to the Lion, differing from her merely in a slight variation of the lines, and some increase in length. Save for these items, and a small difference in the arrangement of the anti-torpedo armament, the ship belongs to the same class and type.

The 1911–12 Estimates provided for five further large armoured ships, which represent an increase in dimensions over their predecessors. Of these the first four are battleships varying from their predecessors in the inevitable increase in size to allow of somewhat superior protection and an improved secondary battery—twelve 6-inch being substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the King George class.

The selection of the 6-inch gun as the anti-torpedo craft weapon was due partly to the way in which Germany had persisted in her rigid adherence to that calibre for her minor armament, and partly to the rapidly increasing size of destroyers. It was held as questionable, even by the most ardent believers in the ability of the big ship to defend herself against destroyer attack, whether the 4-inch was sufficient to disable large destroyers. Hence the adoption of the 6-inch—the largest gun that can be man-handled.

The nominal displacement of these battleships, the Iron Duke class, rises to 25,000 tons as against 23,000 of the previous class. The length is increased to 620ft. and the beam to 89½ (instead of 89ft.). Owing to improved lines, the horse-power is reduced to 30,000 without any very material loss of speed. In all these super-Dreadnoughts, as in the Dreadnoughts themselves, 21 knots has always been the selected speed, though in units there have been slight variations.

Ships of the Iron Duke class are as follows:—

The Emperor of India was originally named Delhi. The first two were given Babcock, and the second two Yarrow boilers. All were completed in 1914, but only the Iron Duke was available for service on the eve of the outbreak of the war with Germany and Austria. The other three were, however, rapidly completed and put into commission.

The fifth ship of the 1911–12 Estimates was the battle cruiser Tiger, nominally belonging to the Lion group, but actually differing very considerably in various important details.

She was laid down at Clydebank in June, 1912, a great deal of official reticence being maintained concerning her. She was not complete on the outbreak of war; but as she was available for service not long afterwards she is included in this survey.

The marked and most characteristic difference between her and the Lions is that the third turret instead of being cramped amidships as in the Lion design, is moved further aft, thus giving a greatly improved arc of fire. Twelve 6-inch were substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the Lions for reasons already given.

The Tiger is approximately 720ft. long, with a nominal horse-power of 75,000. Babcock type boilers are fitted. Her nominal speed is 27 knots, but this has more than once been very considerably exceeded.

For 1912–13 the Estimates provided for four capital ships, the usual twenty destroyers, and a new type of warship designated as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

This programme is of abounding interest, not only on account of the fact that—so far as the larger types of ships are concerned—it probably embodies the last new construction available for the British Fleet in the war (unless the war endure beyond all anticipations) but also because of its more or less revolutionary nature.

The big ships of the programme were as follows:—

The fifth ship in this list, the Malaya, is an extra vessel paid for and presented to the British Navy by the Federated Malay States.

In general appearance these ships of the Queen Elizabeth class do not greatly differ from their predecessors; but there all resemblance ends. In every other way they embody a “new idea”—an attempt so to blend the battleship proper with the battle-cruiser so as to secure the best points of both.

Roughly, the battleship proper sacrifices speed for extra gun power and protection; while the battle-cruiser sacrifices these two latter for speed. The speed of the Queen Elizabeths was fixed at 25 knots—something rather less than that of battle-cruisers, but still sufficiently high to take them out of the ordinary battleship category as hitherto understood. Certainly they differ from the normal quite as much as the original Dreadnought differed from her immediate predecessors.

It was only possible to secure this high speed, plus other qualities, by the bold adoption of oil fuel only—in itself of the nature of a gigantic experiment, which, however, results have more than justified. The designed horse-power to secure 25 knots is 58,000.

If, however, the motive power embodied novelty, still more so did the armament. For the ten 13.5’s of preceding ships, eight 15-inch guns were substituted. So far as power is concerned the 13.5 is ample for all contingencies, but the 15-inch embodies a marked superiority in range and the additional accuracy which a heavier projectile naturally affords. Furthermore—a very important point—the “life” of the 15-inch gun is much longer, owing to there being no necessity to utilise the full power of which it is capable.

The general arrangement of turrets is that of all the super-Dreadnoughts, with the middle turret (always the most restricted in arc of fire) omitted.

Nothing has ever been officially stated as to the armour protection; but it is known to be equal or superior to that of any preceding battleships.

When war broke out, the first two of these ships were nearing completion—the first being completed about the end of 1914 and the second at the end of March, 1915.

The 1913–14 Estimates provided for five more or less normal battleships designed for coal fuel,36 the usual 21 knots speed, but 15-inch instead of 13.5-inch guns.

Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000 horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were estimated to be completed by the end of 1915—the others in 1916.

The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of submarines.

In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the Royal Sovereign class—to be named Renown, Repulse, and Resistance—were provided for, also a sixth ship of the Queen Elizabeth class, which was provisionally named Agincourt. The participation of any of these in the war is very improbable.

The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines.

When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards—two for Turkey and one for Chili—were taken over by the British Admiralty. Details of these are as follows:—

There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats—renamed Humber, Severn, and Mersey—of 1,200 tons each, carrying two 6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about 11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast shortly after the outbreak of war.

In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at Cowes were taken over and renamed Broke and Faulknor.

A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty—to say nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats.

The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one.

Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter.

At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have reached its apotheosis.

For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to “super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as any that the “fifties” saw.

As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and “not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being screened with very numerous smaller craft.

When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly danger.

On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?

There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.

PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA.

The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid down in 1901.

The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers of the Bristol class were provided for. These were the Bristol (Clydebank), Glasgow (Fairfield), Gloucester (Beardmore), Liverpool (Vickers), Newcastle (Elswick). The designed displacement was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also turbines of the Parsons type, except in the Bristol, in which Curtiss type turbines were installed.

For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided—the Weymouth class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight 6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the Bristol class. These four “Town” cruisers were the Weymouth (Elswick), Yarmouth (London and Glasgow Co.), Dartmouth (Vickers), and Falmouth (Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except the Weymouth, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines.

The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the Chatham, Dublin, and Southampton, of the same type, but with a displacement increased by 200 tons. Three more, the Birmingham, Nottingham, and Lowestoft, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12.

In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, those constructed to date being the Boadicea, Bellona, Blanche, Blonde, Active, Amphion, and Fearless, all of which are unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on equal terms. Of these the Amphion was lost early in the war by a mine.

Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, of which two were built in this country and the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin armour belt amidships—a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German Navy.

The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also a reversion to the original Bristol with modifications born of experience.

In essence, these ships of the Arethusa class—Arethusa, Aurora, Galatea, Inconstant, Royalist, Penelope, Phaeton and Undaunted, compared with the prototype as follows:—

Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the Arethusa, a radius equal to that of the Bristols was secured with a considerable saving in weight.

Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility of yesterday. When the Bristols were designed they were the “best possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely novel vista.

In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the Calliope, Caroline, Carysfort, Champion, Cleopatra, Comus, Conquest, Cordelia, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the Arethusa, but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft—a wise arrangement, as a heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness.

The Arethusas and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:—

which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons.

In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no details whatever have been published concerning them.

DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA.

The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of sea-going and coast-defence ironclads.

Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; the most important being the experimental boat Swift, which was given a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about £280,500.

It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found vent in a Swift (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the 40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years before anything else of the same size was built.

The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five 12-pounders.

The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about 260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel instead of coal.

In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat fragile. The new boats, the Beagle class, averaged 900 tons instead of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to.

The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the Acorn class. These are slightly smaller than the Beagles, armed with two 4-inch and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only.

On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were completed in June, 1911.

Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the Acheron class, an Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was obtained with all.

For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of them—the Thornycroft type—is the appearance of the Diesel engine for partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow firm in the Archer and Attack, their special destroyers, evolved a system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.

In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.

Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There is also the still older idea of our original Swift.

The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.

It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it should be an immense asset if properly handled.

GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA.

The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:—

It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original Dreadnought) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and the better capacity of its shell.

Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts era.

From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.

Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,37 and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to judge are extremely careful about prophecying.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.

TORPEDO PROGRESS.

The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type Hardcastle torpedo—so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander Hardcastle—is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, despite all the protests against “mastodons.”

With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the solid bulkheads of the original Dreadnought, was, after a time, partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship Henri IV, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in the Russian Tsarevitch in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the torpedo, startling things are toward.38

The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, Russian and Japanese Navies—most other navies making no use of net defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy—the British theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.

NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA.

Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in order to set off a corresponding German increase.

The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while little or nothing was said about the military estimates.

For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400.

For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood at £51,550,000.

On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that “Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages.

Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum spent in any other way whatever.

The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to regard future increases with apprehension.

Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests.