They were built as follows:—

They were laid down in 1885 and 1886. The Orlando was completed in 1888, all the others in 1889. They were launched in 1886 and 1887, and some of them, fitted with wooden guns (“Quakers”), served to swell the Fleet at the great Jubilee Review of 1887. All made over their designed speeds on trial, but they did their trials “light.” In service all proved fairly useful, and the Undaunted, with Lord Charles Beresford as her captain in the Mediterranean, “made history” to the extent of first creating an Anglo-American entente, beginning with the U.S.S. Chicago, captained then by the now universally known naval author, Admiral Mahan. Beresford first achieved fame in the Condor at Alexandra, in 1882; but it was in the Undaunted that he first “made history” by ending the previously existing hostility between the British and U.S. Navies; and establishing the naval brotherhood of those who speak the same language.

The Orlandos were the last of the essentially Barnaby ships. Barnaby was associated with the Navy thereafter; but the Nile and Trafalgar, though produced under his régime, were not “Barnaby ships,” and differences of opinion with the Admiralty about them eventuated in his resignation.

The tide of naval opinion was then setting back in the old Dreadnought direction. More complete protection was being demanded. The quick-firer was just coming in and its potentialities seemed enormous. The secondary battery had to be protected. Destruction of communications on board began to take on a fresh and more serious aspect. In a word, the Admiralty reverted to Reed ideas, and in reverting exaggerated them. In such circumstances the general idea of the Trafalgars was born.

Sir N. Barnaby totally dissented from the Admiralty line of thought. In his view the size of a ship could not legitimately be increased unless her offensive powers increased in proportion; in the Trafalgar idea both speed and armament were reduced as compared to the Admiral class, and over a thousand odd tons added entirely to carry extra defensive armour. Over which dispute he resigned his position.

Details of the Nile and Trafalgar as built are:—

• Displacement—11,940 tons.
• Length (between perpendiculars)—345ft.
• Beam—73ft.
• Draught (mean)—27½ft.
• Armament—Four 13.5-inch, six 4.7 Q.F., also smaller guns, and four 14-inch torpedo tubes, of which two were submerged.
• Armour (compound)—Belt, 230ft. long (i.e., 80ft. longer than in the Admirals and Victorias), 20—16in., with 16—14 inch bulkheads, protective deck at ends and over main belt.
• Over this a redoubt 141ft. long, 18in. thick. Above the redoubt a battery, 4in. thick. Turrets, 18in.
• Horse-power—12,000 = 17 knots.
• Coal—(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 1,200 tons = 6,500 miles at 10 knots.

The Nile was built at Pembroke and engined by Maudslay. She was laid down in April, 1886, launched in March, 1888, and completed some two years later. The Trafalgar was laid down at Portsmouth in January, 1886, and launched in September, 1887. Her machinery was supplied by Humphrys. The armour of these ships weighed no less than 4,230 tons, i.e., some 35 per cent. of the displacement instead of the more usual 25 per cent. or so. The then first Lord of the Admiralty took the occasion of the launch to remark that the days of such armoured ships were over, and that probably these were the last ironclads that would ever be built—the future would lie with fast deck-protected vessels! As, for three years, no more armoured ships were laid down, he at least enunciated a definite policy when these heavily armoured successors of the Admiral class were put afloat. They differed from the Admirals in that turrets were reverted to instead of barbettes, and, as already mentioned, they were really nothing but modernised versions of the old low freeboard Dreadnought.

At a later date 6-inch Q.F. were substituted for the 4.7’s; but no other schemes of modernising the ships ever came to a head.

PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE BARNABY ERA.

Four ships of the Amphion Class—Amphion, Arethusa, Leander, and Phæton, of which the first (Arethusa) was laid down in 1880—represented the first Barnaby idea of the protected cruiser. They were of 4,300 tons displacement, and 16.5 knots nominal speed. They carried ten 6-inch guns, and a 1½-inch deck amidships. According to the ideas of those days they were heavily over-gunned. They always steamed well; but it is doubtful whether Barnaby, left to himself, would ever have produced them. Incidentally, they were always bad sea-boats.

In 1883, completed about the same time as the Victoria, the Mersey class—Mersey, Thames, Severn, and Forth—of 4,050 tons displacement, and carrying two 8-inch and ten 6-inch, were commenced: practically early essays at the Orlando class idea which followed. The Orlandos, on only a thousand or so tons more displacement, carried 9.2’s instead of 8-inch, had armour-belts as well as protective decks, and were a good knot faster. Both the Amphions and Merseys may be described as representing strictly naval Admiralty ideas—the Orlando, Barnaby ones. Each type was quickly rendered obsolete by the coming of the quick-firer; but the Barnaby type of cruiser, for 20 per cent. extra displacement, certainly offered better chances than any rival proposition, if only we consider matters in the light of what existed in those days and what promised best at that time.

So ends the Barnaby era. Barnaby’s constructional ideas were blown to mincemeat by the advent of the quick-firer. Even to-day his ideas seem somewhat obsolete. Yet a few years hence (if big ships survive) they stand every chance of being reverted to, because to-day the big gun has more or less come back to where it was in 1875–1885. Barnaby, though he worked into its era, never realised the preponderance or possible preponderance of the “secondary gun.” In his era it fired too slowly to count for very much; in our own, range neutralises whatever it may have accomplished in the rapidity of fire direction.

Likely enough, the reversion to Barnaby ideals, which is reasonably probable for the immediate future, will be merely a phase; and casual historians will ever put him down as the naval constructor who was least able to anticipate the years ahead of his creations. But a hundred years hence Barnaby may come into his own in a way little suspected to-day. A hundred years hence, when all the most modern ideas are ancient history, Barnaby may stand with Phineas Pett, and the Navy which he created stand for something infinitely more than the scrap heap to which a later age swiftly relegated it. Only the historian of the distant future can estimate him at his real value. His own generation never placed much faith in his ships; the generation that followed generally regarded them with scorn. It was probably wrong, but only the future can prove it to have been so.

GUNS IN THE ERA.

The guns which especially belong to the Barnaby era were as follows:—

In the early part of the period, guns of the Reed era, down to the 10-inch 18-ton M.L., were also made use of; but generally speaking, the Barnaby designs coincide with early breechloading types. It is interesting to note that the 81-ton gun figured in one ship only (the Inflexible), and that after this the 38-ton 12.5 M.L. was reverted to, to be replaced in later designs by the 45-ton 12-inch B.L.

The M.L. guns available for early Barnaby designs were considerably superior to earlier examples of their type; as after the fiasco of the Glatton trials,7 copper gas checks were introduced. These were affixed to the base of the projectile and expanded on firing. They led to a certain increased power and accuracy; but, even so, only of a relative nature compared with the better results obtained from breechloaders. The Thunderer gun disaster, which after many experiments was found to have been caused by doubly loading the gun, added another argument to the anti-muzzle-loader cause.

The 12-inch, which was the first large B.L. to be introduced, compared as follows with the 12-inch M.L.:—

The enormous difference in efficiency was of course traceable to other causes than the adoption of the breechloader instead of the old M.L.; but this was, equally naturally, overlooked; which, perhaps, was just as well—otherwise the muzzle-loader might have persisted to quite recent times. Though the Thunderer disaster showed that a M.L. could be loaded twice over by accident, this was an obviously unlikely thing to occur again. The impression was made by the fact that the 12-inch B.L. was far more powerful than the old 16-inch M.L. It was possibly this which directly led to the “monster-gun craze” of the Barnaby era, the way to which had already been shewn by the 16-inch M.L. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present monster gun era is the third in which, after a period of adhesion to a 12-inch gun, greatly increased calibres have suddenly and more or less generally been resorted to.

THE COMING OF THE TORPEDO.

Reference has been made in the past chapter to Sir E. J. Reed’s recognition of the possibilities of the torpedo; and floating mines were, of course, well known. It was not, however, till 1874 that either mine or torpedo came to be regarded at all seriously.

The earliest Whitehead “fish torpedo” was produced in 1868; though it was then little more than a curiosity. It was a crude weapon, although it embodied, with two notable exceptions, most of the features that it possesses to-day. Its motive power was compressed air; it carried an explosive head with a sensitive pistol.

The secret was bought by the British Government at an early stage. It was made strictly confidential; indeed, to the present day, the internal mechanism of a torpedo is more or less sacred. Most other nations purchased the secret also, and guarded it with like care!

It is but fair to add that this ridiculous situation was brought about by the inventor, who particularly specified that the balance chamber must not be revealed even to admirals commanding fleets, but only to specially selected officers.

A main difficulty with the torpedo was how to discharge it. For some while only two methods existed: the first, a mechanism of catapult type which hurled the torpedo into the water; the other, by a crude application of dropping gear, suitable, of course, for launches only. In either case, especially the former, there was a strong element of uncertainty as to the direction the torpedo would take; for one to describe a circle and return to the firer was not unknown.8

The charge was inconsiderable, and range and speed were both very small.

An instrument called the Harvey torpedo was more or less contemporaneous with the Whitehead. It was a very primitive idea, consisting as it did merely in attempting to tow explosives across the course of an enemy. It was too obviously cumbersome to cause disquietude, and with the invention of torpedo tubes passed into oblivion.

The advantages of the torpedo tube were quickly recognised; and though the range was still little over a hundred yards or so—at any rate, so far as any probability of hitting was concerned—the torpedo quickly became a part of the armament of all important ships. So much was this the case that the submerged tube was developed with sufficient celerity to be adopted into the equipment of the Inflexible, of 1874 design.

None the less, however, the possible results of torpedo attack remained uninvestigated till 1874, and even then only came to be inquired into after the Oberon experiments, which were primarily if not entirely brought about by the advent of the observation mine as a practical thing.

The mine’s arrival counted for little; the automobile torpedo being at the moment much in the public eye, the point that the Oberon experiments were primarily designed to test the effect of mines got somewhat lost sight of. The essential fact is that by 1874 the fact of other enemies to the ship than the gun was established. For a long time it affected ship design no further than the gradual introduction of an anti-torpedo-boat armament; but this was mainly due to Sir E. J. Reed having in the Bellerophon design endeavoured to anticipate torpedo effect. In 1874, and onward therefrom for some time, the double bottom, combined with water-tight bulkheads, was considered a suitable “reply” to the “new arm,” and it was not for many years that torpedo nets were in any degree appreciated.

In the later eighties some torpedo experiments were conducted against the old ironclad Resistance, in which the Bullivant net defence system proved altogether superior to the cumbersome old wooden booms which were in use: but, despite this, nothing was done for many a year, and the old pattern was adhered to.

ESTIMATES IN THE ERA.