The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887 mostly centred around the Polyphemus, and her charging a boom at Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report upon them, especially with regard to the following points:—

As Supplementary Instructions there were:—

A summary of the findings9 is as follows:—

Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders, though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the torpedo-gunboats of the Rattlesnake class were highly commended.

Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the Warspite was specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every available deck hand would have been required above had the operations been real war.

A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to this particular report, and the following extracts are especially interesting:—

Admiral class.

This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented as follows:—

The Conqueror and Hero were reported to roll a great deal. Being short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as “half-boots.”

Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised, as he had done with the Admirals, that however fast these short ships might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway.

The Mersey class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.10 The captain of the Severn, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of the other cruisers.

The Arethusa type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine guns in the tops would be useless.”

The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these should be reduced.

For the Archer class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which, however, was never carried into effect.

Particular interest attaches to the Rattlesnake11 class of torpedo-gunboats—these vessels being really prototypes of the destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be removed. This, however, was never done.

With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported as deserving immediate consideration:—

In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted, and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the River class.

The report concluded:—

An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the Pall Mall Gazette,12 finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats, to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000.

The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big turret ships, the Nile and Trafalgar, and two armoured cruisers, Immortalité and Aurora of the Orlando class. In 1887 nothing larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers, Blake and Blenheim. There was, therefore, ample material for panic.

Details of the Blake class:—

• Length (p.p.)—375 ft.
• Beam—65 ft.
• Guns—Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr.
• H.P.—20,000.
• Designed speed—22.0 kts.
• Coal—1500 tons.
• Builder of Ship—Blake, Chatham; Blenheim, Thames Ironworks.
• Builder of machinery—Blake, Maudsley; Blenheim, Thames Ironworks.
• Launched—Blake, 1889; Blenheim, 1890.

Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament of the Orlando class with greatly increased speed secured by the development of deck armour in place of the belts of the Orlando class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the development of some predecessor, the Blake and Blenheim may be described as enlarged Merseys. They were, however, unique on account of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made its first appearance. It was employed in the Blake and Blenheim for four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields.

The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the Orlando class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system of the Blake and Blenheim secured this much larger distribution, rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the Orlando class at least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell.

Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used before in the Italian monster ships Italia and Lepanto, but it was first introduced in the British Navy in the Blakes.13

The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her expected twenty-two knots on trial.

Trial results:—

The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the Blake and Blenheim, so far as the disposition of their armament was concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place of the low freeboard of the Admiral class, seven of the Royal Sovereigns were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the Hood, was modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an improved Trafalgar, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet above the water, in turrets instead of en barbette, with guns exposed as in the rest of the class.

In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared.

The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the bow in place of the ram. The Polyphemus was the first ship in which an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still has, in Germany.

The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear.

Sir William White never claimed for himself that he had anticipated the future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the Royal Sovereigns are still looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction.

In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the Trafalgars. The following points were also mentioned by him:—

The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date with the Majestic class (see a few pages further on), he effected modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the Royal Sovereigns.

In connection with the later career of the Royal Sovereign class these items may be added. On completion they were found to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12, they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of being steady gun platforms.

The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much less than they did in the past. The defects of the Sovereigns, as realised not very long after completion, were:—

In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships except the Hood,14 which on survey was found unsuitable for such reconstruction.

The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely.

In addition to the Sovereigns two “second-class battleships” were built, the Centurion and Barfleur, of which details are:—

• Displacement—10,500 tons. Complement, 620.
• Length—(Waterline) 360ft.
• Beam—70ft.
• Draught—(Maximum) 27ft.
• Armament—Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve 3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes (18-inch)—two submerged and one above water in the stern.

The Barfleur was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in August, 1892, and completed two years later. The Centurion, laid down at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed before her sister.

The ships were armoured generally on the Royal Sovereign plan, with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt (nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big guns—probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns of the Sovereigns. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every other.

Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots, which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal endurance—they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for a nominal 9750 mile radius—makes them something more than the “second-class battleships” which they nominally were.

Compared to the Sovereigns they were:—

From which the existence of an elementary conception of the “battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for increased speed” obtains.

The Barfleur and Centurion proved excellent steamers and good sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their 4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference. The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order.

For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples of the Blenheim were decided on. These vessels were the Edgar, Endymion, Grafton, Hawke, St. George, Gibraltar, Crescent, and Royal Arthur (formerly designated as the Centaur). They were launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed) and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four mentioned). Except the two last, all had the Blenheim armament of two 9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2.

No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the Blenheims—19.5 knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the Edgar class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch of the Blenheims.

In the course of their service careers, the St. George (or rather her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The Crescent was served in by King George V, and the Hawke achieved notoriety by ramming the Olympic in the Solent in 1911.

The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of these twenty belonged to the Apollo class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed) and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were Apollo, Andromache, Latona, Melampus, Naiad, Sappho, Scylla, Terpsichore, Thetis, Tribune (unsheathed), and Aeolus, Brilliant, Indefatigable (named Melpomene in 1911), Intrepid, Iphigenia, Pique, Rainbow, Retribution, Sirius, and Spartan (sheathed).

In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and, above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones.

When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however, remained as fast as when they were built—the Terpsichore, in 1908, averaging 20.1 knots, and the Aeolus, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots.

During their service, the Melampus was commanded by King George as Prince George, while the Scylla, under Captain Percy Scott, gave birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In 1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service—the Latona, Thetis, Apollo, Andromache, Iphigenia, Intrepid, and Thetis—were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine layers.

The remaining eight cruisers of the Act—Astræa, Bonaventure, Cambrian, Charybdis, Flora, Forte, Fox, and Hermione—were increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra 4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong. Four Astræas cost as much as five Apollos. They were rather more seaworthy, but no faster—if as fast. The total broadsides obtained were only one 4.7 more and two 6-inch less.15 A considerably greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply (400 tons) was the same for both.

In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained. It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907, displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about 8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots.

Here, however, there was a definite aim—increased speed, with only trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what the original design might have been if plotted a year or two later than it actually was. There is no question—or very little—but that Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war.

Minor cruisers must be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them must have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very little. The Astræas, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may even be a real deficit from another point of view.

The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance of everything.

The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class cruisers—Pallas, Pearl, Philomel, and Phœbe—for the ordinary service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally named Pandora, Pelorus, Persian, Phœnix, and Psyche. These were later altered to Australian names, Katoomba, Mildura, Wallaroo, Tauranga, and Ringarooma. They were of 2,575 tons, with 2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots.

Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved Rattlesnakes, were laid down under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme, of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were Alarm, Antelope, Circe, Gleaner, Gossamer, Hebe, Renard, Speedy—all laid down in 1889, as also were the Whiting (afterwards Boomerang) and Wizard (renamed Karahatta) for Australia. Those laid down normally in the previous year were the Salamander, Seagull, Sheldrake, Skipjack, Spanker, Speedwell, for the British Navy. Two others, Assaye and Plassy, were built for the Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as “catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date, reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary purposes—many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest used as tenders for various services.

They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament—two 4-inch instead of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten knots faster—an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in the course of twenty years!

More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what—except in the matter of modern speed possibilities—is to-day the recognised ideal for destroyers.

In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher” stage—they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern war conditions—the Chilian Blanco Encalada and the Brazilian Aquidaban—were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats.

So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the “secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success, perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought of as an offensive arm against big ships—destruction of the torpedo boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era.

Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small cruiser” Hela; in 1898 the Gazelle of 2,645 tons was set afloat. For years Germany added to the Gazelle class, at a time when all the rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless. Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had seen the matter of the Lynch and the Sampaio16 better than any other Power.

Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes.

Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities, no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes against a battleship at night.

So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked.

In February, 1893, there was laid down the Renown, the only armoured ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved Centurion, with thinner belt armour. Harvey armour—three inches of which had the resisting value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron—was adopted in this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however, at work, for in the Renown sacrifices were made at the water-line in order to secure better protection to the lower deck side.

Details of the Renown:—

• Displacement—12,350 tons.
• Length (between perpendiculars)—380ft.
• Beam—72⅓ft.
• Draught—(maximum) 27ft.
• Armament—Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders, four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern.
• Armour—8—6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above. Bulkheads 10—6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones 6in., upper deck ones, 4in.
• Horse-power—12,000 = 18 knots.
• Coal—(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles at ten knots.

Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895, and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼ years to build. Cost, £746,247.

She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease.

The special feature of this ship was that in her instead of the ordinary flat deck on top of the belt, a sloping deck behind the belt was first introduced. This system—rigidly adhered to in the British Navy ever since, and copied eventually into every other Navy—was based upon the idea of reinforcing the deck-protected cruiser with side armour. The principle involved was that at whatever angle the belt might be hit and penetrated, the incoming projectile would then meet a further obstruction at a 45° angle, calculated to present a maximum of deflecting resistance. Professor Hovgaard and others have since indicated that, weight for weight, three inches of inclined deck armour, having to be spread more, represent as much or more tons as six inches of vertical armour (the nominal equivalent), and protective decks behind armour are to-day much thinner than of yore and little better than “splinter decks.” The principle, however, remains, as originated by Sir William White, and is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature of his era: seeing how universally the idea was copied.

The French were the last to adopt it. Instead, they used the flat deck below the belt in addition to the one on top of it. This was made use of so late as the République and Liberté class. While ideally better for resisting projectiles which might penetrate the belt, it was impossible of really practical application amidships on account of the difficulty of keeping the engines entirely below it.

The Renown was the first ship to carry all her secondary guns in casemates. She was fitted as a flagship, and first served on the North American Station. When Admiral Fisher went from there to the Mediterranean he took the Renown with him as flagship, presumably with the idea that speed was better than power in a flagship. The Renown’s fighting power was small even then, but she was well fitted for the social side of flagship work—so nicely, indeed, that the flash-plates of the big guns had been taken up so as not to interfere with ladies’ shoes in dances!

After leaving the Mediterranean the Renown was still further converted into a “battleship yacht,” the six-inch guns being removed. She was painted white, and used to convey the then Prince of Wales to India. Thereafter she practically disappeared from the effective list and eventually became a training ship for stokers.

The Renown was followed by the ships of the Spencer programme, nine battleships of the Majestic class, which were spread over the 1893–94 Estimates, and those of the next year. The Majestics were in substance amplified Renowns, their special and particular feature being that in place of the two amidships belt of varying thickness a single belt of 16ft. wide of a uniform 9in. thickness was substituted.

In the Majestics, the 13.5, which had been for so long the standard gun for first-class battleships, disappeared in favour of a new type of 12-inch, a Mark VIII. of 35 calibres. The two types compare as follows:—

The new gun was, therefore, superior in everything except weight of projectile, and that was not considered much in those days. To-day, of course, it has quite a special meaning.

In the Majestics, except in the first two, all-round loading positions for the big guns were introduced in place of the cumbersome old system whereby, after firing, the guns had to return to an end-on position, tilt up, and at a fixed angle take their charges at what was little but an adaption for breechloaders of the loading system evolved twenty years before for the old Inflexible.

Details of these ships:—

• Displacement—14,900 tons.
• Length—(between perpendiculars) 390ft., (over-all) 413ft.
• Beam—75ft.
• Draught—(mean), 27½ ft., (maximum) about 30ft.
• Armament—Four 12-inch 35 cal., twelve 6-inch 40 cal., sixteen 12-pounders, twelve 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes (18-inch), four submerged and one above water in stern.
• Armour (Harvey)—Belt, (220ft. by 16ft.) 9in. Bulkheads, 14in. Barbettes, 14in. with 10in. turrets. Casemates, 6in.
• Horse-power—12,000 = 17.5 knots.
• Coal—(normal) 1,200 tons; (maximum) 2,200 tons = nominal radius of 7,600 miles at 10 knots and 4,000 at 15 knots.

The ships were built, etc., as follows:—

Mostly they were completed inside two years, the only ones which took appreciably longer being the Hannibal and the Illustrious. In these and the Cæsar an innovation introduced in the others—the placing of the chart house round the base of the foremast with the conning tower well clear ahead—was done away with, and the old system of the bridge over the conning tower reverted to. In the Cæsar and Illustrious, laid down later than the others, an improvement was effected by the introduction of circular instead of pear-shaped barbettes. The Majestic, Magnificent, and Cæsar were built in dry dock instead of on slips—the first instance of this since the days of early coast-defence monitors.

The total cost was approximately a million per ship.

On trials most of them exceeded the designed speed, but all were light on trials. They proved very handy ships, with circles of 450 yards at fifteen knots. Coal consumption was always high.

Compared to the Sovereigns, the following figures are of interest:—

The total dead weight carried in armament, armour, and coal thus works out at practically the same figure, despite the rise of 800 tons in displacement. On these grounds certain attacks were made upon the ships, mainly by those who argued against the unarmoured ends. The criticisms were, however, mainly of the captious order—the ships were certainly the finest specimens of naval architecture of their day.

At a later date electric hoists were fitted to the 6-inch guns, and 400 tons of oil fuel were added to the fuel capacity (the maximum coal capacity being reduced by 200 tons). The first ship to be so fitted was the Mars. Another innovation was shifting the torpedo nets, first in the Mars, then in all the others, from the upper deck to the main deck level; the idea being to keep the nets clear of the 6-inch guns.

The Majestic and Magnificent served for a long time as flagships in the Channel Fleet. Admiral Sir F. Stephenson and Sir A. K. Wilson flew their flags in the Majestic, of which ship Prince Louis of Battenberg was at one time captain.

It was during the early service of the Majestics in the Channel Fleet that “invisible” colours for warships first came into consideration, all ships up to that date being painted with black hulls, white upper works, and yellow masts and funnels. For these experiments the Magnificent was painted black all over, the Majestic and Hannibal were given grey and light green upper works respectively. The latter was really the more “invisible” of the two, but both ships were left with black hulls. Ultimately a grey, a little darker than that which the Germans had long used, was adopted as the regulation, though for some time it varied greatly between ship and ship, following the old system under which a good deal of latitude in painting was allowed.17

To this era, 1894–95, belong two groups of protected cruisers, the Powerfuls and the Talbots. The latter, nine in all, were merely enlarged (5,600 tons) editions of the later cruisers of the Naval Defence Act, and call for no comment. The former group were the Powerful and Terrible, “replies” to the Russian Rurik and Rossiya. They displaced nearly as much as the battleships—14,200 tons—and ran to the then unheard of length of 500ft. between perpendiculars. They carried no belt armour whatever, but were given stout protective decks, no less than 6in. on the slopes amidships. The two big guns (40 calibre, 9.2) were given 6in. Harvey barbettes, the twelve other guns18 (6-inch) being in 6-inch casemates. Sixteen 12-pounders were disposed about the upper works. Designed horse-power 25,000 = 22 knots. Total bunker capacity of 3,000 tons, equal to a nominal 7,000 miles at fourteen knots. Both ships were laid down in 1894, the Powerful by Vickers and the Terrible at Clydebank. They were launched in the following year.

In service the Powerfuls proved capable of keeping up a speed of twenty knots almost indefinitely. For the rest, they were unhandy ships with large turning circles. At the time of the South African War, both of them were at the Cape, and did service with landed naval brigades. Of these, one from the Powerful, with some 4.7’s on special Percy Scott gun-carriages, materially assisted in the defence of Ladysmith.

During the year 1911 the decision was come to that it was not worth while preserving either ship, on account of the large crews required and their comparatively small fighting value under modern conditions.

Two considerable novelties were embodied in these ships. The first of these was the adoption of electrical gear for the big guns. The other and more far-reaching was the adoption of Belleville boilers.

THE BATTLE OF THE BOILERS.

Owing to favourable reports of their use in the French Navy, Belleville boilers were in 1895 experimentally fitted to the Sharpshooter, torpedo gunboat; but the decision to adopt them in large ships was taken from French rather than any British experience. Trouble and failure were freely predicted. With the result frequently attending lugubrious predictions, very little trouble has ever been experienced with any type and then only in the very early stage when the water-tube boiler was an almost unknown curiosity to the engine-room staff.

The chief advantages claimed for Belleville boilers were the higher working pressures, economy in maintenance and fuel consumption, saving of weight, rapid steam raising, and great facility for repairs.