The communist underground is designed to carry forward phases of the Party’s program which cannot be conducted openly and lawfully. In addition, it contains weapons of attack which must always remain hidden (the permanent part of the underground), such as aid to Soviet espionage, attempts to place members in strategic positions in industry for potential sabotage, techniques to discredit law enforcement, and endeavors to infiltrate the armed forces.

Lenin taught that the enemy must be weakened in advance. To wait for something to happen is not the way to achieve revolution. The way must be prepared. The enemy must be softened up: weaken his will to resist, nullify his capacity for counteraction, impair his morale. Then, as in November, 1917, in Russia, when the crisis comes, communists can march to power through the ranks of a demoralized enemy.

The Party’s relation to Soviet espionage is one of the most potent weapons in the communist underground arsenal. As past events have proven—for instance the Harry Gold-Klaus Fuchs combination and the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed in 1953 on espionage charges—Moscow-directed spying represents a vital danger to the integrity and safety of free government. Espionage is utilized not only to secure information but also to weaken the “enemy” from within.

The Soviets very early instituted espionage operations against the United States with the full cooperation of the Communist Party. In 1919 the Comintern was established and, as we have seen in Chapter 4, Comintern “reps” became common figures in Party circles. In January, 1919, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, a member of the Russian Communist Party, was appointed as the first Soviet representative to the United States. Although never recognized by the American government, he set up an office in New York City. Arthur Adams, later identified as a Soviet atom spy, was a member of Martens’ staff.

In the light of today’s well-organized, efficiently operated spy apparatus, the Soviets in the early days were crude and clumsy. Many of the Russians were not proficient in English. They lacked knowledge of our customs and possessed no special espionage training. Many were propaganda as well as espionage agents and could be identified by their rabid preaching of communism. Often the security of their communications was not of the best.

In late July, 1920, a seaman on the SS Stockholm walked up Pier 95 in New York City. Noticing customs officials searching two other seamen, he turned and ran down the pier. Later, after the seaman’s apprehension, a package was found concealed in his trousers. Inside was a series of envelopes, one inside the other with the smallest containing over 200 uncut diamonds valued at 50,000 dollars. The smuggling of diamonds was one of the early Bolshevik techniques of financing operations in the United States. For whom was the package destined? Inside was a typewritten letter starting, “Comrade Martens.”

Unfamiliarity with America made dependence on the Communist Party, USA, more important than ever. Without the ready base of the Communist Party, USA, with its fanatical allegiance to Moscow, Soviet espionage would have had tremendous problems in getting started. As it was, there were Party members available, able and willing to carry out Soviet instructions. Often it was difficult to distinguish between a member’s work for the Party and for Moscow. Comrades traveled back and forth to Russia, were given assignments by the Kremlin, and felt it their highest duty to gather information for the Bolsheviks.

Party officials made assistance to Moscow priority Number One. We have seen in Chapter 4 how the communist leadership, for example, promised to help Comrade Loaf (a Comintern agent) collect information on the American labor movement. In another instance the Party Secretariat actually approved the release of a Party member for Soviet intelligence duties.

What were some of the ways through which the Communist Party, USA, rendered aid to Soviet espionage?

Most important, of course, was recruitment. The Party was able, time after time, to supply recruits, both members and sympathizers, for espionage use. Suppose the Soviets needed a photographer? a source of information in a Pennsylvania steel plant? a trusted short-wave radio expert? The Party would be expected to, and did, “fill the bill.”

This funneling of talent to the Soviets was often accomplished through a special Party contact who was called a “steerer.” A trusted old-time member, he was able to spot recruits for espionage among the Party’s ranks and to fulfill requests made by the Soviets. As espionage operations became more complex, the “steerer’s” role became ever more vital. The Party was a vast recruiting ground for spy talent.

The Party provided many essential “services” to Soviet espionage. Suppose a Russian espionage agent secretly entered the United States, to operate here or while en route to another country. Most likely, as so often happened, he would need a “new identity,” or, in espionage language, a “change of feathers.” This probably meant a faked birth certificate, a false passport, and other identification papers. Maybe he would be placed in “deep freeze” for several months. If so, he had to be “serviced”—that is, fed and clothed. After being “re-feathered,” he would be on his way.

Then there were “business covers.” A Party member, perhaps with Soviet funds, would set up a business, allegedly for legitimate purposes but actually for espionage. In 1927, World Tourists was incorporated in New York, ostensibly for tourist business. Actually, this “business,” under the operation of Jacob Golos, a communist “steerer,” became an active espionage “cover.”

The Party, in addition, helped arrange the transfer of funds, established mail drops (where espionage communications come to a third person, later to be given to the espionage network), and operated couriers. In one instance a Party member even served as an interpreter for a Soviet agent.

Even from these early days, however, evidence existed that the Soviets were aware of the dangers of too close an affiliation with the United States Party. An espionage operation might be jeopardized by a known Party member’s participation. Similarly, in the event of a “blow-up,” the Party, in the public’s eyes, would be linked directly with a foreign power, Soviet Russia. This was one thing both the Soviets and Party officials wanted to avoid. Hence, by the early 1940’s there was a definite lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the U.S. Party for espionage assistance.

The Soviet spy system, moreover, was now better able to stand on its own feet. In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation (a Soviet government commercial agency) was established. This gave the Soviets their first “legal” base for espionage operations. In this way persons or institutions in a country openly as representatives or agents of a foreign power have an ideal cover to fulfill their assignments of clandestine espionage. In 1933 diplomatic recognition was afforded the Soviet Union. Now trained espionage agents, operating under diplomatic immunity, could direct operations. After World War II Russians assigned to the United Nations in this country gave additional striking power to Soviet espionage. Moreover, assistance was possible through the espionage networks of Soviet satellite countries operating in the United States.

This lessening of direct Soviet dependence on the Party was a gradual development. Whereas in the early 1920’s Party and espionage work were often indistinguishable, the Soviets now instructed members tapped for service to drop all connections with the Party. One old-time Party member, turned spy, told the FBI that the Soviets had instructed agents to conceal their Party affiliations. This soon became a standard technique. If engaged in espionage, cut off all connections with the Party, even contacts with former Party friends. Ethel Rosenberg, for example, indicated that she no longer bought the Daily Worker at her usual newsstand. Another agent, while in the company of a Soviet superior, stopped to purchase a communist publication. He was severely reprimanded. The communist label might betray the espionage ring.

The Soviets, however, still depended on communists or sympathizers for assistance. In one major apparatus detected by the FBI, for example, twelve of seventeen participants had been Party members. Both Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, executed as Soviet spies, had communist backgrounds.

Elizabeth Bentley, moreover, has given testimony as to how she collected dues from secret members of the Party when she came to Washington as a courier of the Soviet espionage system. Among those from whom she has stated she collected dues were officials of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Department of Commerce, the Air Corps, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Treasury Department, and others. In some instances one person would collect dues for a group and hand them over to Miss Bentley. One such individual was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, who, according to Miss Bentley, headed a group. (Silvermaster denied the disclosures initially and later invoked the Fifth Amendment.) On occasions a member of a group when coming to New York would deliver the Party dues collected to Miss Bentley there. The Party also benefited, as disclosed by testimony, because, as in some instances, information collected for the Soviets was made available to the leadership of the Party for review.

In 1945 the defection of Igor Gouzenko, cipher clerk assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Canada, revealed close tie-ups between Soviet espionage and Canadian communists. Then the appearance of FBI informants at Smith Act trials shocked the Soviet Union as to the amazing extent to which the FBI had penetrated the Communist Party, USA. These, among other revelations, encouraged even more the Soviet tendency to lessen its direct dependence on the Party. Today, with some exceptions, the Soviets are attempting to operate their espionage networks independent of the Party, staying away, as much as possible, from Party assistance. This does not mean, however, that the Party is today not playing an important role in Soviet espionage. As we shall see, the Party is doing much to prepare the way for Soviet espionage and, when the need arises, will unhesitatingly supply vital assistance. The present “drawing away” from direct Party assistance is strictly a Soviet tactical maneuver, subject to instant change.

Soviet espionage is no longer a clumsy, crude affair, as it was in the days of the rollicking “reps,” but a deadly efficient profession, skillfully directed from Moscow, with well-trained agents supplied with money, modern technical equipment, and experience. To the Soviets, espionage is a part of over-all state policy.

On an April night in 1951, just two minutes before seven o’clock, a tall man wearing a tweed sport coat walked through the darkness toward the Washington Monument in our nation’s capital. Brilliant lights played on the famous shrine. The usually bustling place was deserted. Everything was quiet.

Suddenly the tall man stepped from the circle of darkness into the light. He stopped a moment, peered up at the 555-foot top, looked at his watch, then started to walk around the base. On his left hand he wore a glove. A band of adhesive tape circled the middle finger of his right hand, and he carried a red-covered book under his left arm. This man was an employee of our Defense Department. As part of his work he had access to highly confidential information, just what the Russians wanted.

Exactly at seven o’clock, another man clad in a dark business suit stepped from the shadows. An espionage contact set up months previously in Austria was being consummated to the minute. The second man was Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Novikov was well known to the FBI, since his activities in the United States had gone far beyond those of a diplomatic official. He was audacious almost beyond description. His brazenness reached a climax when he sat with defense counsel during the espionage trial of the onetime Justice Department employee, Judith Coplon. During this trial he would write out questions and hand them to defense counsel to direct to FBI agents on the witness stand. He was particularly interested in having questions asked pertaining to our internal administration and procedures.)

When Novikov met the government employee he said, “I’m Mr. Williams,” the code words of recognition, along with the glove, tape, and red book. The two shook hands, then Novikov took the military specialist by the elbow, directing him from the light. A few words, arranging another meeting, and they parted.

From that night, for an entire year, the Soviets made secretive contacts with the government employee, never realizing that he was a “double agent” of the FBI. Seldom were meetings held in the same place. Some were on lonely lanes or in dead-end streets; one on a narrow rock bridge on a deserted Maryland road after dark. One time Novikov stood in a movie line; the double agent was to pass by and, seeing him there, would know that a meeting was scheduled one hour later at a nearby school. Then there were chalk marks on trash cans and a pencil mark on page 100 of the Manhattan (New York) telephone directory in Washington’s Union Station, elaborate code signals between Novikov and the man from the defense establishment.

I hasten to add that the government employee was a loyal American, and in meeting Novikov he was merely carrying out a duty imposed upon him when he was assigned in Austria with the air force. His services were solicited by Otto Verber, who came to the United States as a refugee, as did Kurt L. Ponger, who had married Verber’s sister. Both Verber and Ponger were in the armed services, both had acquired American citizenship, and, after the war, both had served in Europe. Upon returning to private life, both settled in Vienna, where they took advantage of the GI bill and benefits and enrolled in the University of Vienna. In 1949 Ponger was recruited by the Soviet intelligence service, and he in turn recruited Verber. It was later learned that Ponger had been a member of a Communist Party cell in England before he came to the United States as a refugee. He also had indoctrinated Verber.

The air force representative promptly reported Verber’s approach to his superiors and from that time on acted under instructions. Prior to his return to the United States, Verber and Ponger arranged for the meeting at the Washington Monument. The Treasury of the United States, of course, received the thousands of dollars of Soviet funds paid to the loyal American.

In June, 1953, after pleading guilty to an espionage indictment, Ponger was sentenced to a prison term of from five to fifteen years, while Verber received a sentence of from three years, four months, to ten years. Novikov, who was named in the indictment as a co-conspirator, was declared persona non grata and returned to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet spy system is a disciplined structure, composed of many networks. There are the “legal” networks; that is, espionage controlled by legal representatives of the Russian government, such as diplomats. This was the case of Novikov. Then there are illegal networks, meaning spy rings operated by Moscow independent of the legal establishments. More and more the Soviets are concentrating on building illegal networks and planting “sleeper” agents. Such was the case of Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, of Soviet intelligence, who was arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in June, 1957, at the request of the FBI, after we had identified him as a concealed agent. After his indictment in August, 1957, on espionage charges, information was made public concerning him which the FBI could not previously disclose. In November, 1957, after being convicted in Federal Court, Eastern District of New York, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined 3000 dollars. Subsequently, a notice of appeal was filed.

Ordinarily a network includes a principal (the boss), always a Russian national in a “legal” network. Then there are, depending on the size of the network, group leaders, couriers, sources of information. Non-Russians, such as Harry Gold, may reach as high as a group leader or may be even a principal, but at all times they are under the firm control of Soviet superiors. In espionage, as in all features of communism, native comrades exist only to serve the Russian master.

Strange as it may sound, it is difficult to become a Russian espionage agent. The Soviets are highly selective. They will not accept just anybody. Does the prospect have access to confidential data? Will he accept discipline? What is his background? The Russians want to know everything about him. Sometimes elaborate verification checks, from Soviet contacts around the world, are run. Moreover, the breaking-in period of a prospect may be very slow. At first he may be given minor assignments to test his flair for intelligence work and discernment of details, all without risk to any established espionage operation. If he “comes through,” he’ll be given more responsible work.

Why does an individual engage in espionage? Why do native Americans betray their country for a foreign tyranny?

The motives are many, and often intertwined: money, the temporary thrill of secretive work, personal weaknesses, blackmail, feelings of spite against America because of an imagined wrong, a hope to assist relatives in communist countries. Very important, however, is ideological motivation, an attraction to the theory of communism and/or misguided admiration for Soviet rule in Russia.

Let’s examine more closely this ideological motivation since it is playing such a major role today. We can distinguish two major categories:

1. Non-Party ideological motivation: that is, a feeling for or acceptance of the alleged principles of communism. In prior years many thousands were hoodwinked into believing, because of propaganda, that Russia represented a new “era” in humanity, that anti-Semitism was being abolished, that injustices were being rectified, that the problems of hunger, poverty, and racial discrimination were being solved. Among the reasons Harry Gold, who was never a Party member, gave for entering Russian espionage were:

2. Party ideological motivation: the conditioning of thousands of members and sympathizers in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, schooling them in loyalty to Moscow. Every Party member, through his training, is a potential communist espionage or sabotage agent. Julius Rosenberg, a fanatical Party member, actually volunteered his services. David Greenglass, Rosenberg’s brother-in-law, was also an ardent communist. Walking along Highway 66 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 1944, his wife, Ruth, who had just come from New York City, told David that Julius wanted him to furnish information about his work at Los Alamos, where the atom bomb was being prepared. (David was assigned there as an army technician.) At first David said no—but his ideological motivation as a communist reversed his decision, and he agreed. He was to do great damage to America by furnishing the Russians, through Rosenberg, with valuable information about our greatest weapon.

Then there are other methods of motivating agents:

1. Threat of exposure and blackmail. Agents are given money (sometimes even against their will). Usually the amount is small, but a receipt is obtained, thus compromising their independence. Or they are made to sign papers, reports, or documents. If the initial ideological enthusiasm wears off, as it probably will, the agent is trapped. Even if he so desires, he cannot break away.

2. Use of hostages. Once they have control over relatives and loved ones the Soviets do not hesitate to let it be known that unless their victim does their bidding a whole family will be liquidated.

Today the Party, with its thousands of members, represents a vast reservoir of potential espionage agents. Moreover, its vast propaganda and ideological program is daily saturating their hearts, minds, and souls with a sympathetic acceptance of communism. To be a Party member does not automatically mean being an espionage agent, but it makes the member potential spy material, if the request for aid to Russia ever comes. This is a tremendous and present danger to our security.

The United States is strategic spy target Number One for the Soviets. Every effort is being made to penetrate our defenses. The Soviets are interested in literally everything. Any person who believes that espionage means securing only military information is unacquainted with the nature of twentieth-century spying. An army manual, security regulations of a government building, the “political” views of a clerk in an industrial firm, incidents in the life of a prominent person which might be used for blackmail—these and many more are prize espionage targets. Soviet espionage is both mass (seeking information at random) and specific (trying to obtain a certain blueprint or military operational plan); open (gathering public source items, such as newspapers, magazines, maps, navigational charts, patents, aerial photographs, technical journals) and undercover (use of illegal means to steal information).

Here are some major “areas of interest” of Soviet espionage in the United States:

1. Scientific research and development, with particular attention to atomic energy, missiles, radar defense, electronics, and aeronautics.

2. The strength, deployment, training methods, strategy, and tactics of the armed forces of the United States, together with ordnance, weapons, and military equipment.

3. The intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the United States, possibilities for penetration.

4. International relations of the United States.

5. Weaknesses in American public and private life that can be exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes.

6. Anti-Soviet political opposition groups, refugees from the Soviet Union and satellite countries, and nationality groups in the United States.

The world of Soviet espionage, like the communist underground, is bleak and dreary. An individual may work for years and know his superior only as “Bill” or “Henry.” His rewards: a smile, a promise, or a token award. Harry Gold, who gave a lifetime to the Soviets, was awarded the Order of the Red Star, which, among other things, gave him the privilege of free trolley rides in Moscow. To those hoping to get money, the promise is always big, but results are meager. Here are Gold’s own words:

Life is disciplined to the final detail. The individual is a cog in a vast, inhuman, demanding machine. Klaus Fuchs, for example, while committing espionage in New York, asked permission from the Soviets for his sister in Massachusetts to stay with him. A petty detail but, disciplined agent that he was, he got the necessary approval.

The pressure is terrific, with the Soviet principals always wanting more and more. “If you were in Russia,” one Soviet superior barked at a sub-agent who had done something wrong, “you would suffer the same fate as the traitors in the Moscow trials,” referring to the purges of the 1930’s. Everything is geared to promote Russian interests. If the agent fails, there are threats of dire consequences.

Espionage’s twin partner is sabotage. In 1917 and after, sabotage played an important part in the Bolshevik rise to power. Revolution for the communists is a “science,” of which sabotage is an important element. Not to use it, according to communist tactics, is to hinder victory.

The Communist Party, USA, has not reached the point where preparations for sabotage are vital to its future plans. Its small numbers, fear of FBI penetration of its inner discussions, and the existence of federal laws against sabotage and insurrection militate against such plans. So far the communists have carefully refrained from any show of terrorism. Any such act, even random sorties, the communists realize, would cause more harm to the Party by counter prosecutive action than any damage achieved by violence. Moreover, basic communist revolutionary tactics dictate against any such sabotage attempts until the eve of hostilities, which we pray and hope will never come. According to communist teaching, the comrades should not “tip their hands” until the “time is ripe.” At a time when the Party was more open and truthful in proclaiming its objectives and tactics, Party organizers were instructed, “To raise the slogan of an armed demonstration without any anticipation of a speedy transformation into an armed revolt, and before the preconditions for a successful revolt exist, is to be guilty of playing with revolution.”

Never must we forget, however, that even though acts of sabotage are not now part of the Party’s program, they may become so in the future. In fact, the communist underground provides a cover to commit sabotage when it will serve the communist cause.

As part of the Party’s underground the communists are pursuing a program called colonization, designed to place concealed members in strategic positions in basic industries and defense facilities. Colonization is part of the Party’s industrial concentration program, which aims at increasing communist influence in industry and labor. This always has a high Party priority. Basic industry is a commonly used Party term, which one communist manual has defined as those industries “upon which the whole economic system depends.” Hence to have a Party member in a steel plant would be more advantageous to the communists than one in a corncob-pipe factory. This technique is also often called “A Party Rooted Among the Workers.”

In event of an emergency these colonizers, because of their key positions and concealed capacities, would be able to commit sabotage. A trained communist, by a flip of a switch, the pull of a lever, or the release of death-generating germs, could disrupt the work of thousands. One publication described the Party’s objective:

Moreover, the location of communist members in key industrial facilities places the Party in a position, if it desires, to promote strikes and slowdowns, which can be used as forms of sabotage. These tactics are vital, in communist thinking, to create “revolutionary situations” preparatory to the seizure of power.

Colonizers do not participate in open Party activities. Often they come from other areas of the country, even giving up their chosen professions. Sometimes a man and wife (a colonizer couple) will be sent into this phase of underground operations. The emphasis is on young people—those in their twenties and thirties. Operating under aliases, they attempt to work their way into more strategic industrial positions. These colonizers represent a deadly communist underground weapon. They are “sleepers” who, upon Party instructions, may one day rise up against our nation.

Another potential danger arises from previous sabotage training of Party members. Some, as we have seen, attended Moscow’s Lenin School. There they learned, among other things, the techniques of guerrilla warfare, how to make sabotage devices and organize civilian resistance. Others served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. According to William Z. Foster, 15,000 Party members saw duty with American military forces during World War II. The Party realizes that the enrollment of members in the armed forces provides military experience which, in a time of revolutionary crisis, could be utilized to communist advantage—at “capitalist” expense.

All the time, while the Party is attacking free government, both above-ground and underground, it seeks complete license to pursue its schemes. Any opposition by the government is labeled “persecution,” “Red baiting,” or “thought control.”

For this reason communists grasp every opportunity to discredit, weaken, and vilify the institutions enforcing law and order. As long as the American judicial system is strong and realistically recognizes the threat of subversion to our constitutional republic, their efforts will be hampered. They know that.

Listen to these teachings. Are they calculated to instill respect for our democratic heritage?

At all times communists are told to try to make “bourgeois” courts look weak and silly. If members are brought to trial, turn the courtroom into a sounding board for communism. “... the aim should be to turn the trial into an open tribunal for the spreading and propagating of Communist ideas and aims.” “The class struggle goes on in the courtroom as well as it does on the picket line, in the shops, and in the mines.”

That’s why every possible tactic is used inside the courtroom to obstruct the orderly operation of justice. Outside, another attack is coordinated: letter-writing campaigns, fund-raising drives, propaganda leaflets, literature, all alleging that the communists on trial are being “persecuted” and that American courts are “unfair,” “partial,” and “undemocratic.”

Another weapon in the Party’s underground arsenal is the attempted infiltration of our armed forces. “Illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy and police,” Lenin proclaimed. Another communist writer adds, “The capitalist class has the army, navy and police at its disposal precisely for the purpose of keeping the working class from seizing power.”

Yet, in the final analysis, as the communists well know, force and violence will be needed to bring about the revolution.

In fact this is exactly what Khrushchev had in mind when he told the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

Over 100 years ago Marx and Engels made this point perfectly clear in the Communist Manifesto. “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” Lenin was more pointed:

Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev reveals his own hypocrisy when, in the same breath, he boasts that the communist world has no aggressive intentions and then declares as he did in August, 1957, “We are Leninists and are for peaceful cooperation.” Through the use of Aesopian language he is seeking to induce the Western world to relax its guard until the time when the communist world is ready to launch its offensive and hopes to chant the “funeral dirge” over the free world.

How can loyal Americans resist this attack? I turn to this subject in the concluding chapters.