The Ottoman Ruling Institution has now been considered in all but the last of its aspects. The recruiting of its members from Christian subjects and enemies, their conversion to Mohammedanism, and their training for the duties of war and government were first explained; then the military duties and organization of the sultan’s kullar, their privileged and noble status, and their organization and activity as a household and court were described. Of the seven aspects in which the Ruling Institution may be considered only one remains, that of government in the narrow sense.
With certain exceptions, the Ruling Institution constituted the government of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Sacred Law, the rendering of justice belonged to the Moslem Institution, and many internal matters were left to be regulated by the subject nationalities, which were organized as churches, and by the foreign colonies, which remained under their own laws; but even over these bodies the Ruling Institution held the sword, and in the case of the Moslem Institution it held the purse-strings also. Aside from such exceptions, it attended to all the functions of government that were performed within the empire. These, however, as will appear, were by no means so numerous and extensive as are the activities of a progressive twentieth-century state.
Some of the functions of government cared for by the Ruling Institution have already been described in the previous chapters. The guidance of the educational system, the management of the army of the empire, the conduct of local government, the oversight of the household, the care of the sultan’s gardens, pastures, and forests, the regulation of ceremonies at his court, may be all be regarded as tasks of government. To some of them it will be necessary to refer again briefly; but the fact that they have been described already simplifies the problem of setting forth the plan of the government in its narrower sense.
All governments must in some fashion maintain themselves in place and in operation; they must obtain means to meet expenses, and they must keep some kind of record of their receipts and expenditures and of their acts. They must alter and expand the unwritten and the written rules under which they operate, at least enough to keep their system workable. They must protect their subjects sufficiently to enable them to earn a living and the means to meet taxation. They must meet the efforts of other governments of both a diplomatic and a military character. All these things the Ottoman government did in its own way. In addition, it remained in the sixteenth century strongly under the ancient impulse to increase its bounds and the number of its subjects, particularly at the expense of Christians and Shiites and in the interest of Sunnite Islam.
The Ottoman government did not include among its functions the building and maintenance of systems of roads, bridges, and ferries, the conduct of a public postal service, the promotion of agriculture, industry, and commerce, the organization of a system of public and universal education, the adjustment of taxation and customs duties in the interest of the welfare of its subjects, or an extension of the activities and liberties of its subjects. Benevolence toward the common people had hardly emerged into the consciousness of any sixteenth-century state. Self-maintenance in power by the most available means, which were usually military force; increase of power, authority, and territory, by similar means; and, incidentally, an assurance of the well-being of all the privileged persons who were connected with the government, in proportion to their importance: these were the chief objects aimed at by the governments of that day, whether in the West or in the East.
Accordingly, the chief energies of the Ottoman Ruling Institution in its capacity as government were directed toward the smooth running of the machine. For this object the best and most devoted men were obtained and trained. They, with as many other members of the Ottoman nationality as possible, were organized into a magnificent army, which first of all defended and maintained the government against enemies at home and abroad, and then increased its dominions and greatness by victorious campaigns in the “land of war.” The religious motive entered strongly here, since the power and conquests of the Ottoman nation were felt to be the power and conquests of Islam. The welfare and contentment of the members of the government, beginning with the sovereign, were assured by exclusive privileges, elaborate organization of personal service, and ceremonies in which they could be flattered by opportunities for display and by gradations of honor.
There remained as the special functions of government, first, the careful elaboration and watchful improvement of the regulations under which the Ruling Institution and the state were organized; second, the keeping of every part of the administrative machinery in the best possible order and condition; third, the acquisition of enough money and means to carry out the purposes of the government, and the supplying of this money and means in suitable quantity at the time and place needed and to the proper persons; and, fourth, the preparing and recording of all written acts necessary to the transaction of the business of the government. A fifth function was the adjustment of disputes between subjects of the empire who were not connected with the government; this was attended to largely by another institution, though supported and executed by the members of the government itself. The first of these functions, that of legislation, was cared for chiefly by the sultan himself; the second, of administration, was controlled by his viziers; the third, of finance, was managed by the Defterdars through twenty-five departments; the fourth, of chancery, was under the power of the Nishanjis; the fifth, of justice between the subjects, was, in matters controlled by the Sacred Law, administered by the Ulema, the learned men of the Moslem Institution, under the headship of the Kaziaskers. These five functions were by no means so clearly separated as were the groups of officials concerned with them. A logical classification of duties would have necessitated much readjustment.
The striking way in which the Ottoman Ruling Institution, when regarded as a government, limited its operations almost exclusively to its own affairs seems to have resulted from its character as a single slave-family. Although its essential character is somewhat obscured by the facts that it was by far the largest slave-family in the empire, that it had ruling authority, and that some of its members exercised general governmental functions, it is nevertheless true that the legislation of the sultans and of Suleiman himself was largely directed to the regulation of the institution itself, most laws of wider and deeper import being included in the almost unchangeable Sacred Law. The business of the viziers was also largely that of the institution, aside from the fact that the grand vizier, as representative of the sultan, headed also the justice of the empire. The imperial treasury, again, was concerned, in the first place, with obtaining the revenues due to the sultan, such of them as did not come from his personal rights as the owner of domain lands being farmed out, so that the government did not even here touch the people directly. In the second place, the revenues were paid out to the members of the institution as soldiers, servants, officials, and members of the royal family. All who followed the sultan to war without belonging to his great household provided their own support. Even the officers of local government, though appointed from his kullar, were supported by the assignment of lands which they administered themselves by means of the Ruling Institution. The sultan’s chancery was similarly confined in its operations to the preparation and registration of acts, decrees, commissions, and the like, most of which were concerned with the adjustment and operation of the Ruling Institution. Finally, the officers of the army and the government rendered and administered justice to all the kullar, besides deciding many law cases under imperial laws. To a very great extent, then, the sultan’s government was that of a large slave-family, which secured its own interests and managed to the best advantage its own affairs, which cared little for the welfare of the great majority of the people of the empire, and which had dealings with them and attended to their affairs only when obliged to do so by the pursuit of its own aims.
Suleiman’s authority rested actually and immediately upon the military might which he controlled. Psychologically, it was strongly supported by the ancient Turkish tradition of absolute obedience to the ruler who led and fed his people, and by the undying allegiance of the population of wide areas to the Caesar of New Rome, to whose seat and splendor Suleiman had succeeded. Theoretically, and, if a modern expression may be used, constitutionally, Suleiman’s power was that of the ancient caliphs of Islam. It is true that he suffered under one apparently complete disqualification. A tradition of high order asserted that the Imâms must be of the Prophet’s tribe, the Koreish;[505] but by an extension of the principle of agreement (ijma) by which the consensus of the Islamic doctors of the law of any period may establish an interpretation of some passage of the Sacred Law, Suleiman’s father, after the acquisition of the Holy Cities and the resignation of the last Abbassid caliph at Cairo, had come into full rights as caliph. The title itself seems to have been known by none of the Western writers of the sixteenth century, nor was it commonly used by Suleiman in public documents.
In his capacity as caliph, Suleiman was head of the Islamic state, defender, executor, and interpreter of the Sacred Law, and defender of the faith. He was under obligation to punish heretics and unsubmissive infidels, to protect true believers, and to extend the area of his divinely-appointed rule. To him, after Allah and the Prophet, was due the absolute obedience of all good Moslems within his dominions. As for his Christian subjects, they also regarded him as their lawful sovereign, given by God as a punishment for their sins. The Sacred Law recognized no power of legislation in the head of the state, since God through Mohammed had legislated once for all; but it entrusted to him the functions of administration and justice, to be exercised to the fullest possible extent, subject always to the prescriptions of the Law. The sultan being thus supreme, all the great institutions of the Ottoman Empire are to be thought of, not as built upward from a basis in the popular will, but as extended downward from the divinely-appointed sovereign at the top. To what extent the Ruling Institution held this relationship has been indicated already. Central and local government, household and court, standing, feudal, and irregular army, all depended upon the sultan. The Moslem Institution recognized him as its head, and the highest officials of the judiciary, chosen out of its membership, were appointed by him and removable at his will.[506] So also the Mufti, the chief of the jurists, was appointed by the sultan.[507] Even the ecclesiastical organizations of the subject Christians and Jews were likewise extended downward from his authority, since at the capture of Constantinople the Conqueror had at once assumed that temporal headship of the Christian churches which had been held by the Byzantine emperors.[508] The Greek Patriarch received from the sultan appointment and investiture, including a command to bishops, clergy, and people of his faith to render obedience to him in matters within his province; the other Christian groups and the Jews were likewise dependent. Finally, the privileges enjoyed by the foreign settlements all depended upon grants from the sultan or upon treaties made with him in his sovereign capacity.[509] As for the officials of the Ruling Institution, they were all either directly or indirectly the sultan’s appointees. Grand vizier, viziers, treasurers, chancellor, generals of the inside service, generals of the outside service and the army, Beylerbeys and Sanjak Beys, all took their places at a word from him, and at a second word all left them without a murmur.
So far as legislation was possible under the Ottoman system, the sole power to issue it rested in the sultan. The law which demanded obedience within the Ottoman Empire was fourfold: the Sheri, or Sacred Law of Islam; the Kanuns, or written decrees of the sultans; the Adet, or established custom; and the Urf, or sovereign will of the reigning sultan.[510] The Sheri was above the sultan and unchangeable by him; the Kanuns and the Adet were subordinate to the Urf; the Urf, when expressed and written, became Kanun and annulled all contradictory Kanuns and Adet.
The Sheri was the whole body of Islamic law as accepted by the Ottoman nation. Its long history cannot be detailed here. Based originally on the Koran, supplemented by traditions of Mohammed’s legal decisions and sayings, and by the decisions of the early caliphs and the interpretations of early judges,[511] it was first formulated by Abu Hanifa, who was the earliest of the four great orthodox Moslem doctors, and who became the accepted teacher of all Turkish peoples.[512] His code was worked over again and again in the course of six centuries, as new decisions of judges and interpretations of jurists accumulated. Mohammed II found it necessary to have a new code prepared, a task for which he chose Khosrew Pasha, who, singularly enough, was a Christian renegade, seemingly almost the only one who rose high in the Moslem Institution.[513] This work, finished in 1470,[514] was not sufficient in the days of Suleiman. At the time of its preparation the Ottoman Empire had been still wholly within territory that had remained Christian during all the early brilliant period of Islam; but since then the sultans had conquered three seats of the later caliphate, Damascus, Bagdad, and Cairo, and had come to hold the protectorate of the Holy Cities, where Mohammed and the early caliphs had ruled. A new code of law, therefore, better adapted to the more widely Moslem character which the empire had assumed, was demanded. Suleiman charged Sheik Ibrahim Halebi (of Aleppo) with the task of preparing such a code; and the result, prepared before 1549, was the Multeka ol-ebhar, the “Confluence of the Seas,” which remained the foundation of Ottoman law until the reforms of the nineteenth century.[515] The Multeka did not, however, entirely replace the previous codes and collections of fetvas, or authoritative juristic opinions, which continued to be used as law books of less weight.
Early in the process of formulation, the Sacred Law was separated logically into two great divisions,—matters of faith and morals, and practical regulations, groups corresponding more or less closely to the Western conceptions of theology and law. The Moslems never made an actual separation of these two divisions of the Sacred Law; both in education and in practice they regarded them as parts of one great unity of advice, precept, and command, divinely sanctioned and binding upon all true believers. The practical regulations, or the Law proper, went by the Arabic name of fikh; it included both jurisprudence and positive law.[516]
A group of Dutch and German thinkers, led by Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, has been so strongly impressed by the jurisprudential side of the Sheri as almost to deny that it has or has ever had an important practical side;[517] but a careful consideration of the early history of the Ottoman Empire suggests that their view in its entirety is not supported by the facts. Dr. Goldziher says: “In later days, historical consideration has proved that only a small part of this system, connected with religious and family life, has a practical effect as of old, while in many parts of merely juristical character this theological law is entirely put aside in actual jurisdiction.... Snouck Hurgronje was really the first who set forth with great acuteness and sure judgment the historical truth, namely, that what we call Muhammedan law is nothing but an ideal law, a theoretical system; in a word, a learned school-law, which reflects the thoughts of pious theologians about the arrangement of Islamic society, whose sphere of influence was willingly extended by pious rulers—as far as possible—but which as a whole could hardly ever have been the real practical standard of public life. He finds there rather a doctrine of duties (Pflichtenlehre) of quite an ideal and theological character, traced out by generations of religious scholars, who wished to rule life by the scale of an age which in their idea was the golden period, and whose traditions they wished to maintain, propagate, and develop. Even the penalties for offenses against religious laws are often nothing else but ideal claims of the pious, dead letters conceived in studies and fostered in the hearts of God-fearing scholars, but neglected and suppressed in life where other rules become prevailing. We find even in the oldest literature of Islam many complaints about the negligence of the religious law by Ulema in their struggle against the practical judges, that is to say against the executors of actual law.”[518]
The last sentence quoted contains by implication a genuine distinction between the “religious law,” which may be called jurisprudence, and the “actual law.” It is true that at the present time “actual law” in all Mohammedan lands consists only in a comparatively small proportion of precepts drawn from the Sheri; yet a body of precepts which today requires an elaborate system of courts for its enforcement, and which offers a career to many thousands of living men as teachers, advisers, and judges, can hardly be adjudged a mere “doctrine of duties.”[519] Undoubtedly the Sheri has suffered a gradual shifting of emphasis from its practical to its jurisprudential side; undoubtedly it has suffered progressive encroachment upon the area of its practical application, beginning in very early times and leading up to an invasion in force in the nineteenth century by the principles, practice, and procedure of Western Europe. But in the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century the Sheri had no such inferior place. Even then, to be sure, it occupied by no means the whole field of practical law; but an examination of the quotations from the Venetian reports which were presented in an earlier chapter is of itself sufficient to show that at that time the Sheri held the place of overwhelming preëminence in legal matters, in point of usefulness as well as of honor; that its practical precepts to the full extent of their formulated scope were the private law of the land; that its judges were of equal or greater authority and repute than were the high officers of government; that the latter were in most cases obliged to execute decisions of the former, their independent jurisdiction being confined to a limited class of persons, and to the decision of administrative cases according to Kanuns outside the field of the Sacred Law.[520]
The Sacred Law reached out far beyond the conception of law in the West. It was originally supposed to be sufficient for the entire government of the Islamic state (of which there was believed to be but one upon the earth),[521] as well as for the minute regulation of the social, ethical, and religious life of all its members.[522] From two circumstances, however, it rapidly became inadequate as a political constitution: first, from the expansion of the original simple Islamic society into a great world-power, with interests and relationships far more complex than had been dreamed of by the founders; and, second, from the fact that the Law, believed to be of divine origin,[523] was proclaimed unchangeable by its own provisions, and hence could not, except with extreme difficulty, be adapted to new responsibilities and times. Judges and jurists labored manfully to provide elasticity by interpretation, but the task was too great to be completely successful. It became necessary, therefore, for princes to supplement the Sacred Law by decrees of their own, a course in which they could not transgress the positive commands of the Sacred Law. But even within the Law itself the jurists had allowed them considerable latitude, by classifying its provisions under different heads as of various degrees of obligation: some acts were forbidden, some were advised against, some were considered indifferent, some were recommended, and some were rigidly prescribed.[524] Princes were compelled to keep hands off all matters that were forbidden or prescribed; but in the wide intervening field there was much that they might do, and an even larger field was left open in matters that were not touched at all by the Sacred Law because they had lain outside the experience of the fathers of Islam or had developed since their time. In case of undoubted transgression of the Sacred Law, the Moslem society, led by the Ulema, was considered absolved from allegiance to the sovereign and justified in exercising the right of revolution.[525] The Sheri was thus a written constitution for the Ottoman Empire, not subject to amendment, but capable of some slight modification by judicial and juristic decision and interpretation.[526] The sultan had no power over it except as guardian, interpreter, and executor. The popular consent which allowed him to remain in authority did not recognize in him any right to amend or abolish any part of the Sacred Law.
The Ottoman sovereigns at first issued their new legislation as firmans, or ordinances,[527] but in the course of time they adopted from the Greek word κανών, or rule, the word kanun, which they applied to every general law. This Greek word as applied to law thus came to be used in contrary senses in the East and the West. To the canon law of the West corresponded the Sheri, and to the civil or rather the national law of the West, the Kanuns. It is to be noted, however, that the Sheri had wider sway in Turkey in the sixteenth century than the canon law ever had in the West. Not only did it deal with a far larger field, but its judges seem sometimes to have administered the Kanuns also; they had, further, the support of the national government, whereas the rival courts of the great officials had ordinarily a very limited jurisdiction. The position of the ecclesiastical courts of the Christian subjects was much more like that of similar courts in the West.[528]
The Kanuns were issued in accordance with a general formula of the Sacred Law. “The Imâm,” quotes Von Hammer, “has the right to make all civil and political regulations which are demanded by prudence, the circumstances, and the public welfare of the administration and the highest executive power.”[529] The Kanuns of previous sultans were not binding upon a reigning sultan, except so far as he chose to put them in force;[530] but the necessity of preserving a continuous administration led ordinarily to the carrying over to a new reign of all Kanuns that were actually in use. Reforms or readjustments were often accomplished by the revival, with modifications, of old Kanuns, rather than by wholly new legislation.[531]
The Kanuns dealt with matters of military, financial, feudal, criminal, and police law, and with the law of ceremonies.[532] All these were also covered in a measure by the Sacred Law, with two exceptions,—the feudal law and the law of ceremonies, which had to do with matters non-existent in the early Islamic state.[533] Within these two fields the sultans had a free hand; in all others their Kanuns were strictly supplementary and administrative.[534]
The Kanuns were issued separately to meet special circumstances. A number of them, when collected according to subject-matter or under the name of the sultan who issued them, constituted a Kanun-nameh, or book of laws. Each department of the government had its own Kanun-nameh, and the laws of taxation for each sanjak were collected into a separate group.[535] It is incorrect to think of a Kanun-nameh of Mohammed II or of Suleiman as bearing any resemblance to the codes of Theodosius or Justinian. Not in magnitude, scope, character of contents, authorized unification, or prevailing authority can any comparison be made. The Kanun-nameh of Mohammed II seems from its opening words to have had his sanction as a collected body: “This is the Kanun of my fathers and ancestors, according to which my successors shall act from generation to generation.”[536] These words themselves show, however, that the contents were not a unified body, but a collection of Kanuns issued at different times by former sultans as well as by the one who was reigning; and an examination of the contents bears out the statement. Nor does the collection possess completeness in any sense. The first of the three parts deals mainly with the relative rank of officials, the second with a miscellaneous lot of usages, chiefly ceremonial, the third with fines for some serious offenses and with the salaries of some great officials. The whole code is brief and shows great economy of legislation.
Suleiman’s laws are not contained in a single Kanun-nameh. He is rightly named the Legislator by comparison with preceding Ottoman sultans, who were men of the sword and not of the pen; who, saying little, but doing much, had built up a great empire. With the empire, institutions which started from small beginnings had also grown great; but, resting as they did on few written laws or ordinances, they had tended to reach a confused and complicated condition. The Ruling Institution itself, gathered closely about the sultans and constantly amended by them, was kept in excellent order; it needed no Kanun-nameh, and as a whole never had one, though many Kanuns of rank, ceremony, salary, and inheritance had reference to it. More remote matters, however, could not have so much attention. By the time of Suleiman’s accession, for example, the feudal system, and the bearing of the various forms of taxation and land tenure on the subject population, had come into great disorder; criminal law also needed further development, and the market and gild regulations of the cities of the empire demanded attention. Egyptian affairs were likewise in wild confusion. Already disordered under the last Mameluke sultans,[537] they were now, by reason of the many deaths and confiscations in the war of conquest and the setting-up of a new governing authority, imperatively demanding settlement. In accordance with the needs of the time, therefore, Suleiman issued a large number of Kanuns, dealing especially with timars or fiefs, rayahs or subjects, ceremonies, and criminal and market regulations, and comprising a constitution for Egypt, the Kanun-nameh Misr.[538] The latter appears to be the only body of Kanuns which the Legislator published as a whole, and which formed a complete system; issued in 1532,[539] it was probably inspired by Ibrahim, following up his visit to Egypt in 1524.[540] The collection of the great Mufti Ebu su’ud, which is called the Kanun-nameh of Suleiman, contains chiefly his ordinances in regard to the land tenure and taxes of the subject Christians, together with a number of laws designed to regulate the feudal system, and a few relating to judges and legal processes.[541] Suleiman was great as a legislator only by comparison with his predecessors. He set nothing in final order; and the ground had to be gone over again within fifty years after his death, in the reign of Achmet I.[542] His legislation was doubly hindered: first, by the conservatism of his people and his religion, which alike believed that the old ways were the best, and which made radical departures practically impossible; and, second, by the weakness inherent in despotic legislation, in which the distance of the law-giver from the subjects affected makes true adaptation to circumstances and complete enforcement impossible of attainment. Because of the first hindrance, most of Suleiman’s laws professed an attempt to restore a former better state of affairs. As a matter of fact, they probably did not contain much more than a statement in black and white, with necessary simplifications, of a confused body of practice that had grown up gradually, formulated in parts by the ordinances of his predecessors. Because of the second hindrance to his legislation, Suleiman was not able to put into satisfactory and enduring order matters of such vital interest to the people as the feudal and financial systems. Conferring only with a few religious men and a limited number of high officials, aside from the shut-in members of his inner service, he could not possibly know how his regulations would bear upon the holders of small fiefs and the Christian tenants and tax-payers in remote parts of the empire. The officials who formulated the Kanuns for him were only a little better able than he to judge of such matters; and the persons chiefly affected by the laws were not consulted at all. Moreover, after issuing his laws the sultan could not follow them up to see to their execution. In later times, orders to readjust land titles were sometimes given, but with little further result than to enrich officials by the bribes which they accepted for declaring titles good, or by their confiscations of property on which the owners could not pay enough.[543] Although official corruption was undoubtedly not so bad under Suleiman as it became later, the suspiciously great wealth of high officials like Ibrahim and Rustem and the fact that fiefs and finances were in worse disorder than ever, after no great time had elapsed, gives evidence that his laws were not faithfully enforced.[544]
Not much need be said about Adet and Urf. Adet, or custom, corresponds primarily to the body of unwritten regulations under which the Turks of the steppe lands lived. As in most semi-civilized societies, it was at once far wider in scope, more rigid, and more binding, as enforced by popular opinion, than written laws in more advanced societies usually are. Something of these primitive characteristics were carried over into the Ottoman nation, with all its acquisition of new membership and incorporation of useful ideas. The conservative character of Islam strengthened the tendency to perpetuate established custom. It has been remarked of the caliphate that in no other state have little causes near the beginning produced such great effects, because of the tendency to follow precedent minutely.[545] A very similar observation has been made in regard to the Ottoman state: “The changeless perpetuity of a primitive institution appears at every step in Ottoman history.”[546] What has been shall be, was a precept observed by the Ottomans in matters small and great. The principles of the Sacred Law, the accepted Kanuns, and the local Adet of towns, districts, and manors had almost equally binding force. In fact, to the unlettered citizen they probably formed one indistinguishable whole, which seemed almost a feature of the ordering of nature. Although such sentiments tended strongly toward stability, they were a great hindrance to improvement. The early Ottomans had adopted new ideas and institutions with great readiness; but, since they held to them with equal tenacity, in the course of time they had no room left for the admission of more novelties. As fusion and combination were processes little understood, the tendency was thus toward stagnation, interrupted violently and for short periods when evils became too great to be endured. But, while the disposition to adhere to the established order was exceedingly strong among the Ottomans, Urf, the will of the sovereign was recognized to be superior to Adet, much as the Creator was held to be superior to the ordinary operations of nature. The sultan’s will, however, penetrated but seldom so far as to the masses of the people.
Adet supplemented the Sacred Law and the Kanuns in matters which they did not cover.[547] It differed from district to district, as it does in the West. Urf was the sovereign will of the reigning sultan; it was the seat and organ of sovereignty, being absolute to the full extent in which, according to the Sacred Law, God has delegated the right of legislation and rule to human beings.[548] The will of a past sultan could prevail only if it had been expressed in a Kanun and was enforced by the reigning sovereign. It was by the expression of Urf that Kanuns were issued or annulled and that Adet was replaced by Kanun. So long as the Sacred Law was untouched, Urf might be exercised oppressively, cruelly, or unworthily, without giving any one the right to resist.[549] Against the Sheri, however, it had no force; any attempt to exercise it thus was an invitation to disaster.[550]
Suleiman was never in danger from transgression of the Sacred Law. A devout Moslem, whose piety increased in old age, he took seriously his duty of enforcing its provisions, not even hesitating at such as were unpopular, like the prohibition of wine-drinking,[551] or at such as demanded self-sacrifice on his part, like the disapproval of musical instruments and silver plate.[552] If he did not enact measures directly to increase the welfare of the common people, his attempts to regulate the tax and tenancy systems tended to lighten their condition. Moreover, he used severe measures to put down extortion; and he strove by his market and police regulations to maintain justice, fairness, and order.[553]
Ottoman writers represented their government under the figure of a tent supported by four lofty pillars,[554]—the Viziers, the Kaziaskers, the Defterdars, and the Nishanjis. It is not safe to press comparisons too far, however; for, as a matter of fact, the pillars did not bear equal weight. All four groups of officials were necessary, but they were not of like importance: the Nishanjis were far less esteemed than the others; the grand vizier, on the other hand, carried, from the time of Suleiman, so much greater a burden than any one else that he might be compared to a central pillar which supported the entire tent.
The viziers were the chief councillors of the sultan for peace and war, administration and justice; and they deliberated all important questions in the meetings of the Divan, which will be described later. The word vizier means burden-bearer, the idea being that an official so designated lifted from the shoulders of the sovereign the burden of state, and bore it upon his own shoulders. The number of viziers was not rigidly fixed, but in the reign of Suleiman, there were ordinarily four, that being a sacred number with both Turks and Moslems.[555] All bore the title pasha, which was sparingly used in the sixteenth century. Ordinary viziers had no regular responsibilities besides their function as councillors; they had great incomes from both regular and irregular sources, and kept large establishments modeled on that of their master.[556]
In the time of Suleiman, the office of grand vizier reached the climax of a noteworthy development. Whereas formerly this official had been the senior member of the sultan’s board of advisers, primus inter pares, he now became a personage far above his fellow-viziers. His position came to differ from theirs not merely in degree, but in kind, a difference typified by the fact that, in reporting to Suleiman after the meetings of the Divan, none spoke but the grand vizier.[557] This development of the office seems to have resulted from Suleiman’s willingness to entrust much power to a chosen instrument, who would thus relieve him of many of the immense cares of empire. Ibrahim first held his master’s confidence for many years. Later Rustem came to full power, supported by the wife and the favorite daughter of the monarch. In Suleiman’s last years he left well-nigh everything to Ali and to Mohammed Sokolli.[558]
The grand vizier thus came practically to wield the sovereign power of the Ottoman state: the sultan might almost discharge his mind of public care. That is why it became easy for Selim II and his successors to withdraw into the harem, and devote most of their energies to carousing and debauchery. Had the position of the grand vizier been more secure, this change might have been for the good of the Ottoman state, as affording a means of supplementing the scanty abilities of weak sultans by those of the ablest men of the empire. In the case of Mohammed Sokolli, and of the Kiuprilis three generations later, such was to be the fact. More often, however, the place of grand vizier was to be so thoroughly at the mercy of harem intrigue that only a master of this art could retain his precarious position by immense efforts, such as would leave a mere remnant of his energies free for the service of the state. The increase under Suleiman of the relative power of the grand vizier was thus a dangerous and eventually a disastrous development.
It is clear that the grand vizier fully deserved the name of burden-bearer. Whereas even so earnest a sovereign as Suleiman appears to have had a sufficiently leisurely life in time of peace, in spite of his great responsibilities as head of a despotic government,[559] his grand viziers must have been kept fully occupied. He that has been called the greatest of all viziers, the Nizam al-mulk, spoke out of his experience when he said: “It is necessary that the sovereign consider with his vizier affairs of state and all that concerns the army, the finances and general prosperity. He must needs give attention to the measures which should be taken against the enemies of the empire and everything that relates to the subject. All these matters give rise to a great many annoyances and preoccupations and put the spirit to torture, for they do not leave a single instant of repose.”[560]
The grand vizier represented the sultan as head of the civil and military administration and as supreme judge.[561] He appointed the highest officials in these departments. He presided over long sessions of the Divan four days in the week. Some of his other duties, cares, and obligatory ceremonies appear in the catalogue of his ten special prerogatives:[562]—
1. He had the care of the imperial seal, with which, on the days of the Divan, the doors of the treasury and chancery were sealed. The delivery of the seal was the symbol of investiture with the office of grand vizier.
2. He might hold a Divan of his own at his palace in the afternoon. This was an important session of court at which many cases, both great and small, were decided.[563]
3. He had the right to be escorted by the Chaush-bashi and all the Chaushes from his palace to and from the sultan’s palace.
4. He received visits of state from the Kaziaskers and Defterdars every Wednesday.
5. He was honored by the appearance of the officers of the imperial stirrup every Monday in the Divan.
6. He went in solemn procession on Friday to the mosque, escorted by the Chaushes, the Muteferrika, and others of the outside service in turbans of ceremony.
7. He received a weekly visit from the Agha of the Janissaries, and a monthly visit from the other viziers.
8. He inspected the city of Constantinople and its markets, escorted by the judge of Constantinople, the Agha of the Janissaries, the provost of the markets, and the prefect of the city.
9. He received a weekly visit of state from various magistrates and Sanjak Beys.
10. He was honored at the two Bairams with official felicitations from the other viziers, the Defterdars, the Beys, the magistrates, and the generals of the army.
Customary ceremonies alone were evidently enough to absorb a very large part of the grand vizier’s time; but they were a mere incident to the vast amount of administrative and judicial business that demanded his attention. It is not to be wondered at that the period of service in this office was short, on the average. The post was a dangerous one; for the possessor, with all his greatness, was the sultan’s kul, and liable to summary execution if he failed to give satisfaction. Of some two hundred men who served as grand viziers in the course of five hundred years, about twenty were executed at the time of their deposition.[564]
Suleiman’s grand viziers held office for comparatively long periods.[565] Seven, taken together, served him forty years; Mohammed Piri Pasha, whom he found in office at his accession, served in all six years, and Mohammed Sokolli, whom he left in office at his death, served fifteen years. Thus in sixty-two years there were only nine in all. Three of them deserve to be called great,—Ibrahim for his splendor, his breadth of mind, and his continuance in favor, Rustem for his financial shrewdness, and Mohammed Sokolli for his statesmanship. These three also served the longest,—Ibrahim thirteen years, Rustem fifteen years in two periods, and Mohammed Sokolli fifteen years without a break. Four of the nine ended their service at death, two were deposed and executed, three were simply deposed. All except Mohammed Piri Pasha were Christian renegades, who had risen as slaves to the highest honor of the empire.
The Kaziaskers were, under the sultan and the grand vizier, the heads of the judiciary of the empire. They sat in the Divan, where they ranked next to the grand vizier. Since they belonged to the Moslem Institution, discussion of their duties will be postponed to the next chapter.
The great labor of accounting for the receipts and expenditures of the Ruling Institution in practically all its capacities was under the care of the two principal Defterdars, or treasurers, one for Rumelia and one for Anatolia, aided by two of lower rank, one for Aleppo and the southwest and one for the Danubian countries.[567] The principal Defterdars were men of great position, with large incomes and households, and possessing the right of audience with the sultan in regard to matters of revenue.[568] Under them were twenty-five departments or bureaus, as instituted by the Conqueror, each with a chief, or Khojagan, who directed a number of clerks of different grades. Between these and the Defterdars were several intermediate officials, of whom the most important were the two Rusnamehjis, or book-keepers. The total personnel of the treasury department numbered more than eight hundred.[569]
A list of the twenty-five bureaus, or kalems, with a statement of the provinces of each, will give an excellent idea of the complicated financial arrangements of the Ottoman government.[570] Taken as a whole, they show in outline the economic substructure of the Ruling Institution, as well as that of the Moslem Institution, with exception of the sultan’s private treasury, out of which most of the inner service of the court was paid, and of the provisions for the officers and judges of local government:—
1. The Buyuk Rusnameh Kalemi, or greater book-keeping bureau, was the central office to which all the accounts were brought from the other bureaus. Once or twice a year it drew up a statement of the finances of the government. The income of this bureau seems to have been the greatest of all.[571]
2. The Bash Muhasebeh Kalemi, or head bureau of accounts, was the largest of all in numerical strength, and the second in income. It kept account of tithes and taxes from the sanjaks, of munitions of war of all kinds, of the pay of the garrisons of Rumelia and Anatolia, of the receipts and expenses of the intendants of buildings, the admiralty, the kitchen, forage,[572] the mint, the three powder factories at Constantinople, Salonika, and Gallipoli, and of the inspector of artillery. This bureau received copies of all contracts made in the public service, and it registered and countersigned the entire vast number of orders on the treasury.
3. The Anatoli Muhasebesi Kalemi, or bureau of accounts for Anatolia (though it was by no means confined to Anatolia in its scope), kept accounts for certain domanial lands, for the garrisons in the Aegean Islands, and for the pensions of veteran soldiers.
4. The Suvari Mukabelesi Kalemi, or bureau of control for the cavalry, kept account of the salaries of officials of the inner service, of the Kapujis, of the imperial stables, and of all the Spahis of the Porte.
5. The Sipahi Kalemi, or bureau of the Spahis, issued orders for the pay of the Spahis proper, which required to be countersigned by the head of the fourth bureau.
6. The Silihdar Kalemi, or bureau of Silihdars, was similar to the fifth bureau, except that it was concerned with the Silihdars.
7. The Haremein Muhasebeh Kalemi, or bureau of accounts of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, kept the books of the religious endowments or vakfs of the imperial mosques, of the salaries of all persons connected with these mosques, of all other religious endowments in Constantinople and elsewhere in Rumelia, and of all Rumelian property dedicated to the Holy Cities. All certificates of nomination to service in connection with mosques in Rumelia were prepared here, to be presented to the tenth bureau for the issuance of diplomas.
8. The Jizyeh Muhasebesi Kalemi, or bureau of accounts for the capitation tax, issued orders yearly for the payment of this tax according to the estimated number of adult male subject Christians. A specified number of these orders was sent to each district, which was held responsible for a corresponding revenue.[573] The income of this bureau was only a little less than that of the second bureau.
9. The Mevkufat Kalemi, or bureau of tributes, kept account of taxes paid in kind, of the quantity of grain in the public storehouses of Constantinople and the border fortresses, and of the grants of supplies from these stores to the several army corps and to the households of military and civil kullar who were required to follow the army.
10. The Maliyeh Kalemi, or chancery bureau of the treasury department, issued diplomas to all employees of mosques who brought certificates of nomination from the seventh and twentieth bureaus, and to all administrators of religious endowments and pensioners upon such funds; and it drew up for the approval of the sultan and the countersignature of the Defterdars all firmans, or administrative orders, that concerned the treasury department.
11. The Kuchuk Rusnameh Kalemi, or lesser book-keeping bureau, kept the accounts of the head Kapujis, the stewards, and the marine.
12. The Piadeh Mukabelesi Kalemi, or bureau of control for the infantry, kept the books of the Janissaries and the auxiliary corps of the standing army.
13. The Kuchuk Evkaf Muhasebesi Kalemi, or lesser bureau of accounts of religious endowments, kept the accounts of all pensioners and attendants of the endowed public hospitals, soup-kitchens, insane asylums, and the like.
14. The Buyuk Kalaa Kalemi, or greater bureau of fortresses, kept record of the garrisons and of the militia who were liable for the service of the fortresses of the Danube regions.
15. The Kuchuk Kalaa Kalemi, or lesser bureau of fortresses, kept like records for fortresses in Albania and the Morea.
16. The Maaden Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of mine leases, kept account of the tribute required from gipsies, of the receipts from gold and silver mines in Europe and Asia, of the tributes from Moldavia and Wallachia, and of the customs duties of Constantinople, Adrianople, Smyrna, Gallipoli, Chios, and other places.[574]
17. The Saliyaneh Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of salaries, arranged the yearly pay of the captains of the fleet, and of the Khan of the Crimea and some of his officials.
18. The Khaslar Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of domanial leases, kept the books of the domain lands whose revenues were assigned to the chief ladies of the harem, including the Sultana Valideh and the sultan’s daughters, and to the high officials of the government.[575]
19. The Bash Mukataasi Kalemi, or head bureau of leases, cared for the revenues from the domains in some lower Danubian lands, from the rice fields of Eastern Rumelia, from various salt works, from the fisheries of the Aegean and Black seas, and from the forests.
20. The Haremein Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of leases of the Holy Cities, was charged with regard to Anatolia, as was the seventh bureau with regard to Rumelia.
21. The Istambol Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of leases for Constantinople, kept account of the domanial leases of Salonika, Tirhala, and Brusa, the market dues of Constantinople and Adrianople, the revenues from silk and from the manufacture of articles in gold and silver.
22. The Brusa Mukataasi Kalemi, or bureau of the leases of Brusa, kept account of the domanial leases in the neighborhood of that city.
23. The Avlonia Mukataasi Kalemi, kept similar accounts for the island of Euboea, or Negropont.
24. The Kaffa Mukataasi Kalemi kept similar accounts for Kaffa and certain domain lands of Anatolia.
25. The Tarishji Kalemi, or bureau of dates, dated all public documents that came from the other bureaus, and, at least in later times, prepared assignments on the public revenues on behalf of creditors of the government.
Supplementary bureaus, attached to some of the others, were the bureau of confiscations and escheats to the crown, the bureau of the tax on animals, and the bureau of the Christian churches and monasteries. An additional office of great importance, called the Oda of the treasury department, attended to the correspondence of the Defterdars, to their reports to the grand vizier and the sultan, and to the forwarding of leases for sections of the crown lands. Attached to the treasury department was a special court under a judge appointed by the Kaziasker of Rumelia, which was designed to adjust disputes between the department and private citizens.
A Defter-emini, or book-keeper intendant, kept the records of the fief-holders and administered their estates during vacancies. He was well paid, and had a staff of clerks.[576] He appears to have been independent of the Defterdars. Two household treasurers were in charge of the sultan’s personal funds: the eunuch Khazinehdar-bashi, already mentioned as chief of the treasury chamber of pages, guarded the treasure stored there, and paid the members of the inner service; a second official, under the authority of the former and apparently called by the same name, attended to the business of the sultan’s private purse outside the palace.[577] The sultan had in the castle of the Seven Towers, or Yedi-kuleh, another deposit of treasure which was supposed to be very large.[578]
The characteristics of the treasury scheme give evidence that it developed by a gradual growth without systematic revision at any time. As new occasions for expenditure arose, they were put in charge of various bureaus; as new provinces or other sources of fresh income appeared, they were either assigned to existing bureaus or given to new ones created for the purpose. The bureaus of Istambol, Avlona, and Kaffa evidently date from the time of the Conqueror; most of the others must have been older. That the conquests of Selim and Suleiman were not administered from Constantinople is evident from a study of the bureaus, and from the separate listing of the revenues from Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt in contemporary estimates. Since the authorities give no source of revenue for the first bureau, which nevertheless seems to have had the greatest income of all, it is probable that the tribute from the later conquests was paid into that department, and by it apportioned to bureaus of expenditure, such as the fourth, the eleventh, and the twelfth. It is worthy of notice to what an extent the sources of revenue were ear-marked for expenditure. The second bureau received the tithes and taxes of the sanjaks, and paid them out for munitions of war, the maintenance of garrisons, and the expenses of the intendants of the outside service of the court. The third bureau received the revenue from certain domanial lands, and supported the garrisons of the Aegean Islands and soldiers who had been pensioned. The eighteenth bureau administered domanial lands for the support of the harem and high officials. The ninth bureau received and delivered to the army taxes paid in kind. The seventh, thirteenth, and twentieth bureaus took revenues from lands assigned by religious endowment for the support of the Moslem Institution and certain beneficiaries, and paid them out as stipulated by the givers.
Instead of one treasury, into which all revenues should come and out of which all disbursements should be made, there were fifteen or more bureaus which received, and as many which spent; and some of those which both received and spent were, except for the oversight of the first bureau, practically independent institutions. A distinct tendency toward decentralization of management is manifest. Whatever could be set off by itself was made as nearly independent as possible, subject only to inspection and supervision. This policy undoubtedly resulted from the despotic character of the government. Since one man, the founder of a despotic state, can attend to only a limited number of duties, he is forced, as his power develops, to assign more and more responsibilities to subordinates. The method which most relieves the central management is to entrust definite duties to definite groups of men, to support these with sufficient revenues, and then to leave them to themselves. If things go wrong in any department, the central authority intervenes, punishes severely those who were responsible, sets things to rights forcibly, and again leaves the department to itself. The system is very dangerous unless the central management can be kept constantly strong and able to assume full control promptly and effectively. This was the case in the Ottoman Empire until after the time of Suleiman.
A yet stronger tendency toward decentralization appeared in connection with local government. Each Beylerbey had his own mufti, reis effendi, and defterdar, with a considerable body of clerks, who advised him, recorded his decisions, attended to the revenues from the estates assigned for the support of his household, and kept account of the fief-holders in his dominion.[579] Each Sanjak Bey again had his group of assistants, with similar duties on a lesser scale.[580] Some generations later the extension of this decentralization was to become a great evil.
The duties of the bureaus of the treasury department reveal clearly the limited purposes and activities of the Ottoman government. The support of the Ruling Institution as standing army, court, and government was provided for; the revenues assigned by former sultans and by private individuals to the support of the Moslem Institution in its religious and charitable aspects were supervised; the navy was provided for; and the Khan of the Crimea was pensioned. But nothing was done for the great mass of the population. They were expected to furnish the means for these activities; and the duty of the most conscientious sovereign was fully performed if he provided that they should labor unmolested, and should not be burdened with taxation beyond their ability to pay. Under a strong ruling hand the Ottoman system easily maintained order through the standing and feudal armies, but it did not so easily regulate the burden of taxation. This subject deserves special consideration.
A distinction was drawn between taxes authorized by the Sacred Law, which were called legal, and all others, which were called arbitrary as depending on the will of the sovereign. The early Islamic system of taxation, taken over, it would seem, from the Sassanian Persian Empire,[582] was extremely simple. No taxes were laid except on land and on persons. The lands of Arabia and Bosra were charged with a tithe, or ’ushr, of their produce. Other conquered lands were more heavily burdened, being assessed with a kharâj, or tax payable in money, and with a share of the produce, which might be from the tenth to the half according to the fertility of the land. The tax on persons, the jizyeh, was limited to a poll or capitation tax on adult male subjects who were not Moslems. The ’ushr, the kharâj, and the jizyeh were the only taxes recognized by the Sacred Law.
Other methods of taxation were utilized almost from the beginning. When, with the conquest of Syria and Egypt, the Byzantine Empire was entered, it did not seem best to sweep away the customs, tolls, and other impositions which drew revenue from trade. As such taxes did not rest on a constitutional foundation, they were discouraged by some legists; but they became more and more necessary as a worldly government developed, and as the revenues from a large part of the land were set aside for religious foundations.
The early Islamic state also had a vast source of revenue in booty. Four-fifths of this went to the generals and soldiers actually concerned in conquest; the remaining fifth was sent to Medina. After the capital had been removed from Arabia, the “Prophet’s fifth” was still claimed for the support of legists and judges.
The Islamic system, with its distinction of legal and arbitrary taxes, its rules regulating the distribution of booty, and its custom of devoting revenues to religious foundations, was taken up by the Ottoman state. At the same time the feudal system, based upon both Seljuk and Byzantine example, was applied to a large part of the lands conquered from Christians, an arrangement which yielded considerable revenue for the support of individuals; and a host of Seljuk and Byzantine imposts lengthened the list of arbitrary taxes. Much land was retained as imperial domain, perhaps in many cases land that was already domain of the Byzantine emperors and other rulers whom the Ottomans dispossessed. The conquests in Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt were left under the old regulations, with some clearing away of arbitrary taxes, and preparing of cadasters in the Turkish language.[583] Hungary was carefully cadastered, to be administered thus during a century and a half.[584] Special arrangements and exemptions were made for the foreign colonists, of a character similar to old Byzantine and Saracen treaties and agreements.
As a result of all this, the system of taxation in the Ottoman Empire was very complex. It contained a great variety of taxes,—on persons, land, trade, animals, produce, mines, markets, and the like,—differing from sanjak to sanjak and from town to town; and it collected its income by various methods and through various agencies. The details of the system cannot be considered here, but a few general observations may be made.
Until the time of Mohammed II the revenues were administered directly by the treasury department, but this method led to so many malversations at the cost of the government that he changed the system to one of tax-farming. By this means the government became sure of its money. The malversations did not stop, however, but went on now at the cost of the tax-payers.[585] The taxes of regions of large size were sold by the treasury, usually to high officers among the kullar, who did not intend to collect the taxes themselves, but sold them again by sections. This process might be repeated several times, till in the end it would probably be, not Ottomans, but Christians and Jews who applied the screws to the unfortunate subjects.[586] The amount wrung from them might easily be double what the government received.
The strongly conservative tendency of the Ottoman people showed markedly in regard to taxation. The taxes that had been agreed upon of old were paid, but a general revision of the system in the direction of uniformity was never thought of. The revenues of the empire were thus extremely inelastic.[587] A special war contribution might be laid, as was done by Suleiman before Mohacs,[588] and requisitions might be made upon the inhabitants of a region through which the army passed; but a permanent increase of revenue was practically impossible. The tendency was in the other direction. As the value of money declined, not without assistance from the sultans,[589] all revenues payable in agreed sums declined likewise. Payments in kind from agricultural products may have increased for a time under local peace and security, but in the end they were to diminish also. Treaties with Western nations were so favorable to the latter commercially as to prevent the receipt of extensive revenues from foreign customs duties; and such trade must have increased with the growth of the empire and the increasing luxury of the court. But on the whole the sultan’s receipts from taxation, aside from the effect of new conquests, and allowing for the fluctuations in tithes due to good and bad harvests, were probably not far from stationary.