The Ottoman Turkish state of the sixteenth century was a despotism, limited and supported by the Mohammedan Sacred Law; it governed a vast territory, which had been gathered by the progressive conquest of many separate lands, and which was consequently held in many diverse relationships; it ruled a multitude of peoples, some of which were favored as holding to the state religion, and others of which, though in an inferior position, had yet the right by sacred compacts to practise other religions and obey other laws.
This description reveals at once the complex and parti-colored character of the Ottoman Empire at the period when its power and prestige were greatest, when its armies were feared from the shore of the German Ocean to the borders of India and its fleets from Gibraltar to Bombay, and when its favor and goodwill were sought by powers great and small in Asia, Africa, and Europe. For the state as for the individual, the penalty of greatness is increase of responsibility and care. In any conquering nation the growth of governmental institutions must keep pace with increase of territory and population, or advance will be stifled by confusion. The growth may, however, be too rapid to be intelligently directed. Most great institutions, in fact, tend to develop a separate life of their own which may become too vast and powerful for human comprehension and control; for political, religious, economic, and social forces proceed out of and act upon them in numerous and unexpected ways. In the case of the Ottoman Empire the situation was rendered more difficult by the presence in its territory of stable and vigorous institutions centuries older than its own. These were profoundly hostile to its inner spirit, far too powerful and individual to be destroyed or absorbed by it, and therefore an eternal obstacle to unity. In addition, the Ottoman institutions themselves grew more and more apart into two unified groups, which were in striking contrast in many ways; dwelling together, they acted upon each other continually; and unfortunately they were so constituted that their reciprocal influence was to the injury of both. A fuller explanation will make the complicated situation clearer.
It may seem a contradiction in terms to speak of a despotism as limited; yet a little reflection will show that there never has existed and never can exist a despotism that is not limited. In what land has the will of one man been obeyed instantly, everywhere, and by all? In what land have there not been stubborn traditions, ineradicable prejudices, and powerful organizations, which have blocked the way of the despot as effectively as lofty mountains and stormy channels? The great limitation upon the power of the Ottoman sultan was the Sheri, or Sacred Law of Islam, which claimed to be wholly above him and beyond his alteration.[31] He might by act of violence transgress its provisions, but he had even then done it no damage; it was still what it had always been. And he knew well that his transgressions must not be too many, and must not at all touch certain matters, else he would be declared to have forfeited the throne.[32] The Sacred Law divided with him the allegiance of his Mohammedan subjects; it demanded to be consulted before he removed the head of a criminal,[33] or went to war with an enemy;[34] it took for itself the revenues of a large share of his lands, and so controlled the imposition of general taxation as seriously to embarrass his finances; it even protected his Christian subjects from all efforts of his to bring them forcibly under its sway;[35] it entered into his very spirit and persuaded him to relinquish harmless pleasures,[36] while it supported him in the execution of able and worthy brothers and sons.[37] The Sheri was a form of rigid constitution which by its own provisions was incapable of amendment. It purported to regulate for all time the matters included in its scope. Open to a small measure of modification by juristic interpretation, it was probably on the whole as changeless a system as has ever prevailed among men. The sovereign had no right to modify it in the least respect.
Nor was the Sacred Law the only real limitation upon the sultan’s power. Although he was not bound to observe the legislation of his ancestors or maintain their institutions,[38] yet he could not lightly destroy what he must at once replace. Some of their laws he might cease to observe, some institutions he might neglect, improve, or reform; but the main substance of their work was too useful and too well-established to be undone. Suleiman bears the name of Legislator (El Kanuni); but in his case it was even more true than in similar instances in other lands that he did not so much ordain and create anew as rearrange and put in order, reorganize and regulate.
Again, few other peoples in the world, perhaps, have been so much under the power of custom as was the Ottoman nation.[39] That which had been once done in a certain way must always be done in the same way, or in what was believed to be the same way, unless a change had been accomplished by the distinct intervention of fully recognized authority. The inertia of the people was so marked that the sovereign power seldom found it worth while, and then only when driven by necessity, to put forth the great exertion required to make a change in the established order.
Restricted thus by an unchangeable constitution, by the presence of deep-rooted laws and institutions, and by the settled customs of a highly conservative people, the power of the Ottoman sultan could be exerted freely in certain directions only. What these were will appear as the scheme of the government is unfolded.
A fundamental characteristic of the modern state is considered to lie in the fact that its power is territorial, that it exerts equal authority over every part of a certain territory, and over every human being and every material object upon, above, or under the surface of that territory. Although an authority so evenly applied may be possible theoretically, it is never in actual existence in any particular state; for special laws and arrangements always modify the situation. For example, lands and property devoted to religious or educational uses, or owned by a foreign nation for its ambassador, are regularly exempted from taxation. Or, again, the government of the United States of America stands in different relations toward the soil of the District of Columbia, the state of Massachusetts, the territory of Alaska, the Philippine Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.
By the laws of Islam the soil of a conquered land is granted by God as the absolute possession of the Imâm, or divinely commissioned prince, who commands the conquering army.[40] Apart from the question as to where the sovereignty rests, this theory of ownership is substantially that of the modern state. The fact that the soil of the Ottoman Empire came into highly complex relationships with the government, therefore, arose not so much from a different fundamental theory as from a greater number of special arrangements based on circumstances and on the personality of religion and law.
The Ottoman Empire consisted, first, of a great body of lands which were directly administered according to a system that was exceedingly intricate but approximately uniform; second, of a number of regions less directly administered under special regulations; third, of numerous tributary provinces; and fourth, of certain protected or vassal states. Outside the whole, except where the frontiers were natural, lay a belt of neutral or disputed territory, which tended to be depopulated by continual raids from both sides, only less frequent and terrible in time of peace than in time of war.[41] The great significance of this belt to the Ottoman people and government was that it furnished a continuous supply of captives for the enormous slave-trade of the empire. Outside of the raided belt, again, lay the Dar-ul harb, or land of war, inhabited either by peoples whose religions were regarded as inferior, or by heretics, whom it was a duty to conquer, at least when practical.[42] The order in which these several regions are mentioned, an order based on progressive diminution of control, corresponds in general to an increasing distance from Constantinople. While the Ottoman Empire was growing, each sort of territory tended to absorb the next, proceeding from the center outward.
These lands may be considered rapidly in the reverse order. The territory in which raiding was frequent consisted of a strip extending across Austria-Hungary from the head of the Adriatic in a northeasterly direction, and another band stretching eastwardly across Southern Poland and Russia in the edge of the forest region. The latter was separated from Crimean Tartary by the steppe land, which the Tartars kept uninhabited in order to afford a free passage to their light horse. The Persian frontier also lay waste; but the country was too much broken for easy raiding, and Mohammedans, even though heretical, could not lawfully be enslaved.[43] Similar conditions existed on the Moroccan frontier, except that the majority of the inhabitants of Morocco were orthodox Moslems. Another section that may properly be regarded as one of the raided regions from which slaves and booty were drawn was the Christian shipping on the Mediterranean Sea, and the islands and shores of that sea so far as they were held by Christians. Crimean Tartary, Georgia, Mingrelia, and parts of Arabia were vassal territories, more or less lightly attached and paying no regular tribute.[44] Venice’s island of Cyprus, the Emperor Ferdinand’s possessions in Hungary, the territories of Ragusa, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, all paid regular tribute with occasional presents, for the privilege of maintaining their own administrations. Egypt was under a special government, adapted with slight changes from that of the Mamelukes, headed by a pasha sent out from Constantinople for a term of three years, and delivering a large part of its annual revenue to the imperial treasury. The Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, far from paying tribute, received a large annual subsidy at the cost of Egypt.[45] North Africa, conquered by the Corsairs, was brought into the empire by Khaireddin Barbarossa principally for the sake of prestige and support; but, though in its organization it imitated the parent government, it was seldom in close obedience.
The regions directly administered were divided into districts, or sanjaks, each of which had a separate law or kanun-nameh, of taxation, which rested upon terms made at the time of conquest.[46] Parts of the mountain lands of Albania and Kurdistan, and the desert of Arabia, though nominally under direct administration, were in very slight obedience; they retained their ancient tribal organizations, under hereditary chieftains who were invested with Ottoman titles in return for military service, and whose followers might or might not submit to taxation.[47] The remaining sanjaks, more closely under control, were yet organized in no simple way.
Parcels of land in the great central portion of the Ottoman Empire were in three classes,—the tithe lands (ersi ’ushriyeh), the tribute lands (ersi kharâjiyeh), and the state lands (ersi memleket).[48] The tithe lands had been granted to Mohammedans in fee-simple (mulk) at the time of conquest, on condition of paying a relatively small portion (not more than one-tenth) of the produce to the state. The tribute lands had been granted or left to Christians in fee-simple at the time of conquest, on payment of one of two taxes—either a fixed sum for the land itself or a share of the produce—the latter ranging in amount from one-tenth to one-half.[49] The state lands were such as had never been granted in fee-simple, and hence their title remained in the sultan. He received the revenue, however, from only a part of them; for a very large portion had been given to mosques as endowment (vakf) for their maintenance and the support of their attendants, or for the benefit of the schools, hospitals, and other buildings attached to them; and another large portion had been granted in fief to Mohammedans, who in return rendered military service on horseback.[50] The comparatively small remainder of the state lands was held as crown domain, administered in a special way by the sultan as owner. The tenants of state lands held title only by lease, or tapu, and paid both money and crop rent to the church, the fief-holder, or the crown.[51] All the lands in Europe were regarded as state land,[52] for the Ottomans gave out in fee-simple few lands that were conquered from Christians. Asia Minor was also largely state land; but Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt were held under older arrangements, and were mainly tribute lands. Arabia and Bosra were almost wholly tithe lands, as being the oldest Arabian possessions.[53] The fundamental quality of all tribute land was unchangeable;[54] but original tithe lands which had come into the hands of Christians were temporarily regarded as tribute lands,[55] and lands in fee-simple (tithe and tribute lands) might be devoted by their owners as religious endowments (vakf).[56] Original small fiefs might be made into one large one; or a number of persons might come to hold a fief without division of it, provided they jointly furnished the required military service.[57] Many endowments (vakf) were made by private individuals for various public purposes; in time, through the attachment of pension provisions and by other devices, a system was built up which had many of the features of the employment of uses under English law.[58]
No small amount of land of every sort went out of cultivation, and after a certain time had elapsed, if the owner was unknown, became state land. If this or any other unoccupied land was brought again under the plow, it might be granted to the new cultivator.[59]
This rapid survey is sufficient to reveal the tangled nature of the Ottoman land system in both its farther and its nearer aspects, and to show why the administration had to become markedly and increasingly bureaucratic. Such a multiplication of relations acted powerfully toward decentralization, since the regulation of countless details could be attended to better from points near at hand; and the immense amount of adjustment to which officials and clerks must devote their time afforded infinite opportunities for corruption and extortion. Suleiman, in his legislation, made a series of efforts to simplify and systematize the situation, and with some success; but he could not remove the causes of the complications, or arrange matters so that they would not eventually become worse than before.
The wide Ottoman territory held a great number of peoples, marked off by differences of race, language, religion, and customs. The raided belt was inhabited chiefly by Southern Slavs, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and Russians; and the Christian shores and islands of the Mediterranean chiefly by Greeks, Italians, French, and Spaniards. Accordingly, slaves from all these peoples were constantly forwarded to the center and distributed widely—in the service of the sultan, in the households of the great, and on the estates of country gentlemen. They were treated without prejudice in accordance with their abilities, and in the end the great majority were brought into the Moslem fold, many of them rising to the highest positions. The inhabitants of the tributary states were left in possession of most of their own institutions, but whether to their advantage in the long run is a question open to debate.[60] They were plundered directly by their own princes and indirectly by the Turks, and they had almost no part in the work and life of the empire. The Mingrelians and Georgians captured and even raised children for the slave-trade of the empire proper and of Egypt.[61] The Egyptian fellahs toiled, as they have done through all ages, to produce wealth for their masters, who were now in two bodies—the Mamelukes, recruited as always from slaves of many races, and the group of officials and Janissaries who aided and sustained the Ottoman pasha. The Berbers of North Africa furnished a sufficient task of government to their rulers, who consisted of a body of officials and Janissaries recruited from captives and from the Turks and other inhabitants of southwestern Asia Minor,[62] but connected only at the top with the central government of the empire.
In the region which was under more or less direct administration, Albanians, Servians, Croatians, Bulgarians, and Greeks—in general, the Christian subjects in the Balkan Peninsula—furnished most of the tribute children; but some were taken from the Christians of western and northeastern Asia Minor and the Caucasus region.[63] Kurds and Arabs, being Moslems, could not be enslaved, but they fought for the empire on the eastern frontiers. Armenians and Jews were, by ancient privilege, exempt from both blood tribute and military service.[64]
The principle of the personality of law and religion came most visibly into play in the heart of the empire. Prevalent in the Orient from the time of Assyria’s greatness to the present day, it is not easily to be understood in a land that has wholly separated religion and law. Where these two ideas are united, two men who hold different faiths must perforce live under different laws.[65] Islam inherited the idea of the personality of law through the Sassanian Persians, and endeavored to apply it with simplicity by drawing a single line between Moslem citizens (Muslim) and non-Moslem subjects (Zimmi).[66] The Ottomans adopted the idea unreservedly and worked it out into a complicated system: each considerable body of their non-Moslem subjects, Greek Orthodox, United Greek, Armenian, and Jewish, they left, in time, not merely to its own religion, but to its own law and the administration of its law in all matters that did not concern Moslems.[67] Proceeding yet farther with the same principle, they granted even greater privileges to foreigners who wished to reside within the empire. Except for a tax upon the land which they might occupy, for the necessity of paying customs duties, and for responsibility to Ottoman courts of justice in civil cases in which Ottoman subjects were concerned, such foreigners were almost wholly free from Ottoman control, freer far to do as they pleased than they could be in their native lands.
Regions existed where nearly all the inhabitants obeyed one law. In Bulgaria and Greece few were not Greek Orthodox. In the interior of Asia Minor few were not, at least legally, Mohammedan. But in the great cities of the empire, and especially in the capital, there was an immense variety of obedience. Not only did the various colonies of foreigners and the various subject nationalities have their separate rights under different systems, but individuals among them, such as ambassadors and clergymen, had special privileges and immunities. Even among the Mohammedans there were various distinctions. Several large classes were privileged, and in different ways, including all the people of court and church, of the army and the law, of government and education. The social and legal structure was thus scarcely less complicated than that of medieval Western Europe, with its interlocking of feudal and official and royal privilege, of clergy and nobility, of free and chartered cities.
In the midst of so much territorial complexity and among so many peoples which enjoyed different rights, what unifying institutions did the Ottoman Empire possess? In the largest sense, the government included every organization that could lay claim to any public character, and all of these must be brought into view if there is to be a complete understanding of the conditions. In the first place, however, it is necessary to discover and comprehend the genuinely great and powerful institutions. These were two, and not, as is essential to the modern conception of the state, a single one. Each was, it is true, composed of several parts, which may be regarded as distinct institutions in themselves; and yet each had an inherent unity that must be firmly grasped and held if the situation is to be understood.
If names must be assigned to these two great composite institutions, the nearest approximation would perhaps be to call them State and Church. But these words give no adequate idea of them, since each embraced a little less and at the same time far more than is included in the conception of the corresponding Western institutions. They will therefore be described and discussed as the “Ottoman Ruling Institution,” and the “Moslem Institution of the Ottoman Empire.” The character of each and the distinction between them will become clear as they are explained in detail. For the present, a brief statement of the composition of each and of its function in the government of the empire will suffice.
The Ottoman Ruling Institution included the sultan and his family, the officers of his household, the executive officers of the government, the standing army composed of cavalry and infantry, and a large body of young men who were being educated for service in the standing army, the court, and the government. These men wielded the sword, the pen, and the scepter. They conducted the whole of the government except the mere rendering of justice in matters that were controlled by the Sacred Law, and those limited functions that were left in the hands of subject and foreign groups of non-Moslems. The most vital and characteristic features of this institution were, first, that its personnel consisted, with few exceptions, of men born of Christian parents or of the sons of such; and, second, that almost every member of the Institution came into it as the sultan’s slave, and remained the sultan’s slave throughout life no matter to what height of wealth, power, and greatness he might attain.
The Moslem Institution of the Ottoman Empire included the educators, priests, jurisconsults, and judges of the empire, and all who were in training for such duties, besides certain allied groups, such as dervishes or monks, and emirs or descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. These men embodied and maintained the whole substance and structure of Mohammedan learning, religion, and law in the empire. They took part in the government by applying the Sacred Law as judges assisted by jurisconsults, and in these capacities they paralleled the entire structure of administration to the remotest corner of the empire.[68] In fact, their system extended to regions where direct administration was not exercised. In the Crimea, for example, the rendering of justice was in their hands, while the other functions of government were performed by a vassal state in light obedience. The situation in Arabia and in North Africa was somewhat similar, though complicated by the presence of rival systems of jurisprudence. In direct contrast to the Ruling Institution, the personnel of the Moslem Institution consisted, with hardly an exception, of men born of Moslem parents, and born and brought up free.
Both these institutions, while uniquely powerful and independent within the empire, were paralleled by lesser institutions, but in different ways. The Ruling Institution was followed closely by the governments of Egypt and North Africa, and less closely by those of the tributary and vassal states; but all these were strictly subordinate, and exercised what authority they possessed only within definite territorial limits. The Moslem Institution was followed closely by the Greek and Armenian and Jewish national institutions, and to some extent by the organization of the foreign colonies. Each of these various institutions rested on a religious organization or theory, cared for the learning, religion, and law of its people, and rendered justice in matters not covered by the Ottoman administration; but all were wholly independent of the Moslem Institution, and, since they were based on personality instead of territory, they exercised jurisdictions which were territorially co-extensive with its jurisdiction and often with the jurisdictions of each other.
The two great institutions and the lesser parallel ones included practically all the government of the empire when regarded in its widest aspect. In the time of Suleiman the Ruling Institution was perhaps of greater power and influence than the Moslem Institution, but the tendency of the latter was to gain upon the former. Notable progress in that direction was made during his reign, and indeed through his personality. The policy of both toward the parallel lesser institutions was to prevent them from gaining in power, and, so far as possible, to weaken them. In the former aim this policy succeeded with all but two classes,—the governments of North Africa, which were separated by a sea under their own control, and the organizations of the foreign settlements, which were supported by active and increasing powers outside of the empire. But the two great institutions were restrained by circumstances and their own inherent structure from extirpating the parallel institutions, and in time they were to cease to weaken them. The greatest dangers to the whole Ottoman system lay, however, in the rivalry of the two great institutions and in a tendency of the Ruling Institution toward decentralization and division into its component parts.
Few writers on the history and government of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century have grasped the individual unity, the parallelism, and the contrast of its two leading institutions. D’Ohsson and Von Hammer understood the Moslem Institution, but missed the conception of the Ruling Institution, the unity of which had disappeared long before their time. Ranke obtained from a few of the Italian writers a very vivid conception of the Ruling Institution, particularly as a slave-family and an army; but he did not see the Moslem Institution in its due proportion and importance. Zinkeisen, making wider use of the Italians, came nearer than any other to a clear understanding of the whole scheme; yet his exposition does not leave a distinct impression. Bury, in his lucid chapter in the Cambridge Modern History, describes well the Spahis and the Janissaries, and notes that many tribute children rose to high positions; but he does not grasp the unity of the Ruling Institution, and he seems hardly at all to see the Moslem Institution. Jorga, the latest to write a general history of Turkey, makes it his avowed purpose to exhibit cultural and institutional growth; he comes near, but does not attain, a distinct conception of the Ruling Institution; while giving especial attention to the renegades who reached high position in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, he seems not to recognize how definite, and how intelligently constructed and directed, were the policy and organization which raised them to power.[69]
In order to show how clearly some of the Italian writers of the sixteenth century understood the two institutions, though not under any particular names, translations of certain quotations are subjoined. Since they will serve also to justify the present writer’s point of view, no apology need be made for their length.
Andrea Gritti, Venetian orator extraordinary to Bayezid II, in his report to the Venetian senate on December 2, 1503, mentions the highest Turkish officials as follows:—“For affairs of state and every other matter of importance His Majesty is wont to take counsel with the pashas.... These are ordinarily four in number, who reside in Constantinople; they are born of Christian parents, seized from the provinces while small, and educated in different places by men delegated for that purpose; raised then to certain positions either through the affection which the Grand Signor bears for them, or by some enterprises valorously carried through, they quickly become very rich, selling, among matters of importance, justice and favors; but when they find themselves at the summit of felicity they live in great danger.”[70]
Antonio Barbarigo, Venetian Bailo at Constantinople from 1555 to 1560, speaks further of the high officials: “Nor does there exist in this so great empire either superiority or illustriousness of blood, so that any one can glory in his descent, but all are in an equal condition, and they themselves wish to be named and called slaves of the Grand Signor, and their greatest pride is when they say that they are slaves of the Signor; and all his chief men and governors are slaves, and Christian renegades, and sons of Christians brought up from an early age in the seraglio, and then in time, according to their worth, exalted and rewarded and made great by His Majesty.”[71]
Marcantonio Barbaro, Bailo of Venice at Constantinople from 1568 to 1573, seems to have been the first to discern clearly the contrast of the two institutions.
“It is a fact truly worthy of much consideration, that the riches, the forces, the government, and in short the whole state of the Ottoman Empire is founded upon and placed in the hands of persons all born in the faith of Christ; who by different methods are made slaves and transferred into the Mohammedan sect. Then whoever will carefully direct his attention to this principal consideration, will come more easily to an understanding of the government and nature of the Turks....
“Other sorts of persons are not ordinarily admitted to the honors and the pay of the Grand Signor, except the above-mentioned, all Christian-born....
“The emperor of the Turks has ordinarily no other ordinances and no other laws which regulate justice, the state, and religion, than the Koran; so that, as the arms and the forces are wholly reposed in the hands of persons all born Christians, so, as I have already said, the administration of the laws is all solely in the hands of those who are born Turks, who bring up their sons in the service of the mosques, where they learn the Koran, until being come of age they are made kazis of the land, who are like our podestas, and administer justice, although the execution remains in the hands of those who wield arms....
“I have taken much space to demonstrate to your most excellent Signory how the government of this empire is wholly reposed in the hands of slaves born Christians, this appearing to me a matter for much consideration....”[72]
Gianfrancesco Morosini, Venetian Bailo at Constantinople from 1582 to 1585, later made a cardinal of the Roman church, yields to none in the fulness and depth of his observation of the Turks. He too distinguishes clearly the great institutions:—
“There are two sorts of Turks: one of these is composed of natives born of Turkish fathers, and the other of renegades, who are sons of Christian fathers, taken violently in the depredations which his fleets and sailors are accustomed to make on Christian territories, or levied in his own territory by force of hand from the subjects and non-Moslem tax-payers (carzeri) of the Signor, who while boys are by allurement or by force circumcised and made Turks.... Not only does the greater part of the soldiery of the Turks consist of these renegades, but in yet greater proportion all the principal offices of the Porte are wont to be given to them, from the grand vizier to the lowest chief of this soldiery, it being established by ancient custom that the sons of Turks cannot have these positions....
“To the native Turks are reserved then the governing of the mosques, the judging of civil and criminal cases, and the office of the chancery: from these are taken the kazis and the kaziaskers, the teachers (hojas), and their Mufti, who is the head of their false religion; and the kazis are like podestas, and render justice to every one, and the kaziaskers are like judges of appeal from these kazis....”
“The renegades are all slaves and take great pride in being able to say, ‘I am a slave of the Grand Signor’; since they know that this is a lordship or a republic of slaves, where it is theirs to command.”[73]
Lorenzo Bernardo was Bailo of Venice in Constantinople from 1584 to 1587. After a second period of service in 1591 and 1592 he presented the longest extant report to the Venetian senate on the Ottoman Empire. After describing the principal officers of the Ottoman government at the time he says in his involved style:—
“These are they, in whom is reposed not only the whole government of the state, but also the command of all the arms of this so great an empire; and yet these are neither dukes, nor marquises, nor counts, but all by origin are shepherds, and persons base and vile; wherefore it would be well if this most serene republic, imitating in this direction the Grand Signor, he who from this sort of persons, his slaves, creates and makes the best captains, sanjaks and beylerbeys, giving them in this way credit and reputation....
“Just as the whole government of the affairs of the state and the command of its arms is reposed in the hands or the control of slaves by origin Christian, and then made Turks by various accidents; so the government of the affairs which look toward justice, and all the charge of affairs of religion are located in the hands of native Turks, sons of Turks, who having been educated in the universities instituted by the Grand Signor and the present ministers, and made learned in their laws, which consist, both civil and criminal, in no other teaching than that of the sole book, the Koran, become imâms, or priests, who govern mosques; kazis, or podestas; hojas, or preceptors of great men; and finally kaziaskers, or judges of supreme appeal, of whom there are only two, the one in Asia and the other in Europe; and the head of all these and supreme in their religion is the mufti, like the pope among us, who is chosen by the Grand Signor.”[74]
Lastly, Matteo Zane shall speak, Venetian Bailo in Constantinople from 1591 to 1597. In the imperfect record of his vigorous report, the illustrious diplomatist says: “The Turks are partly natives and partly renegades; the natives, who live for the most part in Asia, are in comparison with the renegades less depraved and less tyrannous, because they still have in them some religion, which the others have not,—the most arrogant and scoundrelly men that can be imagined, having seemingly with the true faith lost all humanity. This alienation from religion is fitting in desperate characters, who are induced to it by licentious freedom of life, and by seeing placed in their hands the arms, the government, the riches, and in short the whole empire, excluding the native Turks, who are admitted only to the careers of justice, as that of kazi and the like, and to those of religion, such as mufti, hoja, and imâm, as is very well known.”[75]
The impending break-down of the system near the close of the sixteenth century is also set forth clearly by Zane: “The government of the Turkish Empire is suffering within itself so many and such great alterations, that one may very reasonably hope, divine aid mediating, for some notable revolution within a short time, because the native Turks continue to sustain the greatest dissatisfaction, from seeing all the confidence of the government reposed in the renegades, who, at a tender age for the most part, are taken into the seraglio of the king or of private citizens, and made Turks. To the renegades is committed not merely the care of arms, but the entire command and the execution of the acts of justice of the kazis (although they do not allow appeals), and the superintendence of religion; whence one may say that they rule everything and that the native Turks are their subjects as are servants to their masters; which was not true in other times to such excess as at present.”[76]
To these testimonies from Italian writers may be added a paragraph written about 1603 by the great English historian of Turkey, Richard Knolles. Knolles shows no acquaintance with the Moslem Institution, but his recognition of the Ruling Institution is good:—
“The Othoman Government in this his so great an Empire, is altogether like the Government of the Master over his Slave, and indeed meer tyrannical; for the Great Sultan is so absolute a Lord of all things within the compass of his Empire, that all his Subjects and People, be they never so great, do call themselves his Slaves and not his Subjects; neither hath any man power over himself, much less is he Lord of the House wherein he dwelleth, or of the Land which he tilleth, except some few Families in Constantinople, to whom some few such things were by way of reward, and upon especial favour given by Mahomet the Second, at such time as he won the same. Neither is any man in that Empire so great, or yet so far in favour with the Great Sultan, as that he can assure himself of his Life, much less of his present Fortune or State, longer than it pleaseth the Sultan. In which so absolute a Sovereignty (by any free born People not to be endured) the Tyrant preserveth himself by two most especial means; first, by taking off all Arms from his natural Subjects; and then by putting the same and all things else concerning the State and Government thereof into the Hands of the Apostata, or Renegade Christians, whom for the most part every third, fourth, or fifth Year (or oftner, if his need so require) he taketh in their Child-hood, from their miserable Parents, as his Tenths or Tribute Children; whereby he gaineth two great Commodities: First, For that in so doing he spoileth the Provinces he most feareth, of the flower, sinews, and strength of the People, choice being still made of the strongest Youths, and fittest for War; then, for that with these, as with his own Creatures, he armeth himself, and by them assureth his State; for they, in their Child-hood, taken from their Parents Laps, and delivered in Charge to one or other appointed for that purpose, quickly, and before they are aware, become Mahometans; and so no more acknowledging Father or Mother, depend wholly on the Great Sultan; who, to make use of them, both feeds them and fosters them, at whose hands onely they look for all things, and whom alone they thank for all. Of which Fry, so taken from their Christian Parents (the only Seminary of his Wars) some become Horse-men, some Foot-men, and so in time the greatest Commanders of his State and Empire, next unto himself; the natural Turks, in the mean time, giving themselves wholly unto the Trade of Merchandise, and other their Mechanical Occupations; or else to the feeding of Cattel, their most ancient and natural Vocation, not intermedling at all with matters of Government or State.”[77]