The trial of Admiral Byng, and, in a less flagrant degree, that of Lord George Sackville, had revealed the existence of a mode of prosecution fraught with danger in the hands of a weak or malignant administration. The means thus invented, were to throw upon the commander of an expedition which, from some cause over which he had no control, and possibly from the fault of Government itself, did not succeed, all the blame and penalty of the failure. Unlike the noble and friendly reception which Rome, in the days of its great and glorious contest with Carthage, gave to the defeated consul Terentius Varro, because he had not despaired of the Commonwealth;—a British general or admiral, however distinguished on other occasions, was to be met, on his return from any mischance, with opprobrium, criminal prosecution, and probably death. Fortunately for the constitutional character of England, and the dignity and independence of its military and naval service, this plan, when attempted for the third time, utterly and signally failed. Admiral Keppel was, indeed, not the man for such an attack, nor was the time of it suitable either. His own credit as a commander and a man of sterling worth, and his popularity, stood on the very firmest basis; and he belonged to the influential Whig party, which was then rising fast into power over a ministry as rapidly sinking under the disasters of the American War. Poor Byng had but his merit to protect him, and he perished; a better chance let Lord George Sackville off with his bare life; but Keppel had the public around him, and had not only the people in his favour, but also a giant band of personal friends. With such protectors as Rockingham, Burke, Fox and Sheridan, persecution might do its worst: he was invulnerable. The only thing to wonder at now is, the madness of a Government which could participate in such a prosecution against him. His trial is really a somewhat dull affair, as much from the certainty of his acquittal as from the prolixity of the details; yet it must be ever read with the deepest interest by all who advocate the free action and the fair latitude that should be allowed to every man who has to command the army or the navy of the British empire.
Before entering into the trial itself, it may be as well to give a short biographical sketch of the previous career of Admiral Keppel.
The Rt. Hon. Augustus Keppel, Viscount Keppel, of Elvedon, in the county of Suffolk, P.C., an admiral of Great Britain, and for some time First Lord of the Admiralty, one of the pre-eminent seamen of our naval history, was, like the unfortunate Admiral Byng, of aristocratic birth and descent: he was the second son of Sir William Anne[14] Keppel, K.G., second Earl of Albemarle, by his wife Anne, daughter of Sir Charles Lennox, K.G., first Duke of Richmond; and was the grandson of the famous friend and companion-in-arms of William III., Arnold-Joost Van Keppel, Lord of Voorst, whose aid to William in his acquisition of the throne at the Revolution was rewarded with the earldom of Albemarle, and other minor titles in the peerage of Great Britain. Augustus Keppel, the future admiral, was born on the 2nd of April, 1725, and entered the royal navy when thirteen years of age. He was a midshipman on board Commodore Anson’s ship, the Centurion, in his voyage round the world, in 1740. Of the dangers, distresses, and advantages of that celebrated expedition, he therefore had his share: in particular, at the taking of Paila, by Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral Sir Peircy) Brett. In 1741 he had a very narrow escape; for, having on a jockey cap, one side of the peak was shaved off close to his temple by a ball, which, however, did him no other injury. Having been appointed, while still in his teens, in the course of that voyage, a lieutenant, he, soon after his return, in February, 1745, took post rank as captain of the Maidstone, 40, and was very successful in capturing several French privateers; but on July 7, 1747, as he was giving chase to one, running too near shore on the coast of France, near Nantes, his ship was unfortunately lost: himself and crew were saved. Keppel’s picture, admirably painted by his friend, Sir Joshua Reynolds, represents him as just escaped from that shipwreck. Being soon exchanged, and returning to England in 1747, he was one of the court-martial on the trial of Captain Fox, of the Kent, who, for misbehaviour in the action under Admiral Hawke, was dismissed the service. After the peace in August, 1749, Captain Keppel sailed with a squadron, as commodore, to Algiers, to demand satisfaction or restitution for the treasure piratically taken out of the Prince Frederick packet boat; and the matter was brought to a satisfactory and amicable conclusion. But another act of piracy, in the succeeding year, led him again to Algiers: he had a second audience of the Dey, and exhorted him to consider, that a great king, like His Britannic Majesty, was not accustomed to demand satisfaction in vain; to which the Dey made a defiant and spirited reply; but eventually concluded the business in friendly terms. In 1752, Commodore Keppel ably effected treaties with the States of Tripoli and Tunis, and returned with credit from the Mediterranean.
In 1755, he sailed as commodore in the Centurion, for Virginia, having on board General Braddock, and under his convoy a fleet of transports, with 2,000 troops, to drive the French from their encroachments on the Ohio. The event of that expedition, as is well known, was unfortunate, and would have been more so, but for the co-operation of Keppel. During his absence he was elected to Parliament for the city of Chichester, in the room of his brother, who had succeeded to the earldom of Albemarle at his father’s death. In January, 1757, Keppel was the junior member of the memorable court-martial, at Portsmouth, which tried Admiral Byng; and (for the law gave him no alternative) he was obliged to concur in the sentence which adjudged the admiral to be shot to death. He, however, strenuously endeavoured to save him; and in his place in the Commons, applied to the House on behalf of himself, and several other members of the court-martial, praying the aid of Parliament to be released from the oath of secrecy imposed on courts-martial, in order to disclose the grounds on which that sentence was passed. The obvious intent of this leave to disclose, was to allow the members of the court-martial to openly comment on and protest against the monstrosity of a law which compelled them to an award of death for an error in judgment; and thus might they avert its effects. The Commons listened to the prayer; the sentence was for the moment respited, and a bill passed the House to release the members of the court-martial from the obligation of the oath of secrecy. But the upper House was less merciful; after examining the several members of the court-martial, the Lords unanimously rejected the bill. To the third question, among those, which the Lords put to the members of the court-martial on that occasion, viz., the question,—“Whether you are desirous the present bill should pass?”—Keppel, with Rear Admiral Norris, and Captain (afterwards Sir John) Moore, answered in the affirmative; and to the fourth question,—“Whether you are of opinion that you have any particulars to reveal relative to the case of, and the sentence passed upon, Admiral Byng, which you judge necessary for His Majesty’s information, and which you think likely to incline His Majesty to mercy,”—Keppel replied, “I think that I cannot answer that question without particularising the reasons for my vote and opinion.” The House, by not passing the bill, would not allow him to do so, and the shameful sentence was, despite of his humane endeavour, carried into execution. Commodore Keppel, in 1758, sailed from Spithead with a squadron and land forces, on an expedition against the French settlements at Goree, on the coast of Africa, which he reduced by a vigorous attack. In Hawke’s memorable naval victory over the French armament under Conflans, Captain Keppel, in the Torhay, had a brilliant share; he sunk the enemy’s ship, Thésée, of equal force to his own vessel, at the second broadside. Again, while in command of the Valiant, he victoriously served under Sir Edward Hawke in Quiberon Bay. In October following, just before King George II.’s death, he was appointed to command the fleet on an intended expedition, in which General Kingsley was to command the troops; and His Majesty saw a battalion of the foot guards march by Kensington Palace for that purpose two days only before his death. The royal demise occasioned a suspension of the expedition. In 1761, Commodore Keppel commanded the British fleet at the celebrated reduction of Belleisle; and in 1762, he contributed greatly to the reduction of the Havannah, being second in command under Sir George Pocock, who said, “that Keppel executed the service under his direction with the greatest spirit, activity, and diligence.” In 1763, he was a Lord of the Admiralty; in 1765, he was appointed rear, and in 1770 vice, admiral of the blue. Keppel had thus risen to the very highest repute, and deservedly so. He was a man of cultivated mind and generous soul, and was a thorough British sailor,—brave, prudent, energetic, and indefatigable. His frankness, affability and good humour, won him the unbounded love of the seamen, who gave him the affectionate and familiar title of “Jack’s protector.” It was in the very midst of this credit and popularity that the Government of the day—the disastrous administration of Lord North—sought to re-enact against Keppel the tragedy of Admiral Byng. The occasion was this:—
The court of France having, in February, 1778, acknowledged the independence of America, proceeded to make an open avowal of the hostile sentiments they had long entertained against England, by detaining all British ships to be found in the French ports. Orders were, in consequence, given by the British ministry to fit out a fleet of twenty sail of the line with the utmost expedition; the command of which was offered to Admiral Keppel. As the ministry had, in a great measure, lost the confidence of the country, the eyes of the whole nation were turned on Keppel, in whose appointment every one seemed to feel his own security included. On this occasion, therefore, he had a great deal to risk. His well-earned fame was now to be staked on the doubtful issue of a single battle. The part he had taken in politics, and the close friendship in which he lived with the leading members of the opposition, augmented these difficulties, and even rendered the command that was offered him extremely hazardous; for the ministers were his political enemies, and political hostility at this time was carried to a very great height. Any failure, therefore, whether proceeding from unavoidable accident, or those misfortunes which the wisest and bravest cannot repel, might attach censure on him, and be attended with disagreeable, if not with dangerous, consequences. A due consideration of all these incidental difficulties made him hesitate in accepting an appointment so pregnant with danger from the hands of ministers; but in consequence of a royal message delivered to him through the first lord of the admiralty, he attended in the closet to receive the commands of his sovereign; and in that and the subsequent royal audiences, he delivered himself with that plainness, candour, and sincerity, which so strongly marked his character. He particularly took the liberty of observing, that he served in obedience to His Majesty’s commands, that he was unacquainted with his ministers as ministers, and that he took the command as it was, without making any difficulty, and without asking a single favour, trusting only to His Majesty’s good intentions, and to his generous support and protection. Keppel sailed from St. Helen’s on the 13th of June, 1778, with a naval force and with unlimited discretionary powers. But this force was of no more than twenty sail of the line, many of which were in a bad state of equipment, and was extremely inadequate for the important service which was entrusted to him. On the one hand, it was well known that France had a large fleet at Brest ready for sea; and, on the other, the great commercial fleets of England were on their passage home from the East and West Indies. Besides, the defence of these fleets, he had to protect the extensive coast of Great Britain, together with those invaluable reservoirs of her naval power, in which were equally included her present strength and her future hope.
After much mature consideration, Keppel finally resolved to yield everything to what he conceived to be a faithful discharge of the great trust reposed in him. He wisely thought that the only fleet which was then prepared to protect the commerce and the coast of his country, ought not to be hazarded against vast odds, either upon personal or professional punctilio. His conquest over the feelings of pride, was so extremely difficult, that he afterwards declared, “he never in his life felt so deep a melancholy, as on finding himself even for the moment obliged to turn his back on France; and that his courage was never put to such a trial as in that retreat; but that it was his firm persuasion his country was saved by it.” The fleet returned to Portsmouth on the 27th of June, and being joined by such ships as were ready, the admiral sailed again on the 9th of July, with twenty-four sail of the line, and two days afterwards was joined by six more. In all, therefore, he had now thirty sail of the line, four frigates, and two fire-ships. The day before Keppel’s departure from Portsmouth, the great French fleet, amounting to thirty-two sail of the line, and a vast number of frigates, sailed from Brest, under the command of the Count d’Orvilliers.
The actual encounter with the French cannot be better described than in the narrative of it given by Mr. C. D. Yonge, in his “History of the British Navy:” he writes thus:—
“On the 9th of July, 1778, Keppel again put to sea with a splendid fleet of thirty sail of the line and four frigates. With him were the Vice-Admirals Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart. (a Lord of the Admiralty at the time), and Sir Robert Harland, Bart.; and, among his captains were, John Jervis, of the Foudroyant, 80 (afterwards Earl St. Vincent), and in the Robust, 74, Captain Alexander Hood, afterwards Viscount Bridport. The French fleet had quitted Brest the day before; the commander-in-chief was the Comte d’Orvilliers; and among the subordinate admirals was a prince of the royal blood, the Duc de Chartres, subsequently known as that Duc d’Orleans who voted for the murder of his relation and king, the hapless Louis XVI. The Duc de Chartres was one of the vilest of cowards;[15] and being also given, as such people sometimes are, to boasting of the exploits he intended to perform, he had lately announced to Admiral Sir George Rodney, at Paris, his appointment to a command in the fleet which was to combat Keppel. Rodney predicted that the result of the meeting would be that His Royal Highness would be conducted to England to learn English; but he and his commander did their best to defeat the prophecy by avoiding the battle for which he had professed so much eagerness.
Before he regained his old station off Brest, Keppel learnt that the French were at sea; and accordingly he kept off the land to search for them. The weather was so hazy that the two fleets nearly passed one another unconsciously; but on the afternoon of the 23rd the fog suddenly cleared off, and, to the surprise of both, they found themselves within a few miles of each other, some leagues to the west of Ushant. D’Orvilliers had probably been ignorant of Keppel’s return to England for reinforcements. At all events, he believed him to be far weaker than he really was, and at first showed every inclination to fight; but when, on approaching nearer, he ascertained the real strength of the British fleet, he showed that he had no idea of engaging on equal terms. He resolved to decline the battle; and his possession of the weather-gauge enabled him to do so. His conduct was a practical acknowledgment of the inferiority of French to British sailors; for more equal fleets could not be found. The French line-of-battle ships exceeded the English in number by two; but the English ships were rather the larger; and the English had two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight guns, to two thousand two hundred and seventy-six, that composed the armament of the French. In frigates, D’Orvilliers had a decided advantage; but however useful they might be before or after the battle, in the actual conflict they were not likely to have much weight. A fairer opportunity of testing the naval merits of the two nations could not be imagined. D’Orvilliers, however, kept away, and the next day was seen moving off in full retreat. Keppel, signalling to his fleet to form in fine of battle, and to chase, pursued with every sail his ships could carry; and, as two of the Frenchmen had fallen to leeward, he endeavoured to cut them off, in the hope of thus forcing his antagonist to a battle in order to save them. D’Orvilliers thought more of saving himself, and left the stragglers to their fate: their speed enabled them to escape, but they were unable to rejoin their comrades. The 24th, the 25th, the 26th, passed without any variation of the circumstances or relative positions of the two fleets. The French continued their retreat; we continued our pursuit. In the afternoon of the 26th, Keppel, thinking he was losing time by keeping his fleet in line of battle, hauled down that signal which had been constantly flying from the time he first saw the enemy, but still he kept up the signal to continue the chase.
“The French ships, however, as has been mentioned before, were generally superior to ours in sailing qualities, so that the chase would in all probability have been entirely fruitless, had not the wind suddenly shifted on the morning of the 27th from south-west to west-south-west; and, though this does not appear a very great change, it was sufficient to prevent the French admiral from any longer having the entire option of engaging in or avoiding a battle. It put in Keppel’s power to force on at least a partial action, and he instantly availed himself of the chance thus unexpectedly afforded him; but he found himself in some difficulty. The eagerness with which he had hitherto pressed on the chase had somewhat scattered his fleet. Harland was four miles off, on the Victory’s weather quarter; Palliser, in the Formidable, was three miles or more to leeward, and as the way in which he handled his ship seemed to show a disposition to increase that distance, Keppel, desiring to unite his squadron to his own, signalled to Palliser to chase to windward. Finding an action inevitable, D’Orvilliers, to preserve his line of battle unbroken, caused his fleet to wear; but that and some other evolutions threw them into great disorder, and brought them nearer to the enemy whom their chief object was to avoid. These manœuvres had occupied nearly four hours. At last, a little before noon, Keppel made the signal to attack, and Sir Robert Harland, who commanded the van division, led the fleet gallantly into battle, passing along the French line, receiving their fire without returning it till he came up to their leading ships. Keppel followed with the centre, in like manner reserving his fire till he got alongside the French admiral himself, whom he had marked for his own especial antagonist, and was soon joined by Palliser and his squadron. For nearly two hours both fleets were hotly engaged. The loss of life was lightest in ours; but, from the French practice of aiming chiefly at the rigging, many of our ships were far more crippled than any of theirs. Keppel’s own flag-ship, the Victory, had received great damage; and five more of our ships were so much disabled that the admiral was not altogether without apprehension of losing some of them. Palliser’s ship, the Formidable, had suffered as severely as any, and Sir Hugh had been the first to quit the line. When the battle had lasted nearly two hours, with a view of enabling him to renew the action, and also of protecting the crippled ships, Keppel made the signal to wear. Harland and his division obeyed; but Palliser took no notice of the signal, making no attempt to renew the action himself, and, as was afterwards alleged, by his example preventing the rest from going to the admiral’s support. Later in the afternoon, Keppel sent a frigate to him with an express order to bear down; but the sun went down, and it was not till daylight the next morning that the Formidable again took up the station assigned for her. But long before daylight all hope of renewing the battle was past. The lights of the enemy had been visible to our men all night; but, when day broke, it was discovered that they proceeded from only three ships. D’Orvilliers had stolen away with his main body, and, to prevent any suspicion of his flight from occurring to the British admiral, he had left three of his fastest sailers to keep up the same lights that were shown by the flag-ship, with instructions to set all sail and rejoin him as soon as daylight should reveal to the English the delusion that had been practised. Once more Keppel chased for an hour or two, and then, finding his efforts to overtake the enemy perfectly fruitless, he returned to Plymouth to repair the damage he had received.
“No ship was taken on either side, the number of our killed and wounded did not amount to above three-fourths of the loss sustained by the French; but the question of who were the victors was most clearly determined by a proof far more incontestable than any such minute calculation. The flight of the French, for their course on the 28th can be called by no other name, acknowledged their defeat in the most forcible manner. But, after having made such efforts to fit out a sufficient fleet, the British nation was not contented with a victory which required arithmetic and logic to prove it to have been one. Murmurs soon began to be heard, which presently assumed the definite shape of complaints that Palliser, by his disobedience to his commander’s signals, had prevented the renewal of the action, and by so doing had enabled the French to escape. In his official despatch Keppel was so far from having complained of Palliser’s behaviour, that he expressly named him as, “by his spirited conduct, having deserved much commendation.””
Before proceeding further, however, it should be here stated in fairness to the Count D’Orvilliers, (whom Keppel himself, in his defence, does not blame,) that Mr. Yonge seems to have taken rather a severe and incorrect view of the Count’s conduct in evading an engagement: D’Orvilliers, on the contrary, had great reasons for avoiding a battle, and his retreat was really a success. Another writer, the author of an excellent “British Naval Biography,” to whom I am much indebted in this article, puts the point very clearly, thus:
“It must not be attributed to any want of spirit in D’Orvilliers that he thus obstinately declined a battle. The motives of both commanders exactly corresponded with the different lines of conduct they pursued. Our East and West India convoys, of immense value, were on their return home, and hourly expected. The position maintained by the French fleet was extremely favourable for intercepting those convoys in the course they were expected to hold; and from the situation of the hostile fleets, and the state of the wind, they might have been captured in the English admiral’s sight, without a possibility of his preventing it. On the other hand, Keppel’s fleet effectually cut off that of his adversary from the port of Brest. It was, therefore, no less the object of Keppel to bring the enemy to an immediate action, than it was that of D’Orvilliers to avoid it.”
It was so, in fact, understood by the British public, who felt, at once, that the French had gained a great advantage, and that this action of July, 1778, had not been of that bold and decisive character which the country was used to expect from the navy.[16] The event gave rise to much animadversion, and at last was discussed by the newspapers and periodicals of the day with furious animosity. Party feeling embittered the question; for though Admiral Keppel was employed on account of his ability and experience, he was hostile to the then administration, so that any attempt to disparage him was attributed to the malevolence of the government.
In the House of Commons, of which both Admirals Keppel and Palliser were members, a motion was made for an inquiry, whereupon Admiral Keppel rose, and gave an account of his conduct from the time he assumed the command of the fleet. He declared, “That if he was again to go over the business of the 27th of July, he would conduct himself in the same manner. He said, everything he could do against the enemy had been done; but observed, at the same time, that the oldest and most experienced officers would discover something in every engagement, with which they were previously unacquainted; and he acknowledged that that day had presented something new to him.” Sir Hugh Palliser defended himself with much warmth, and accused Keppel of inconsistency in having officially commended his conduct, and in now wishing to insinuate that he had neglected to perform his duty. To this the admiral replied, “That the official praise which he had bestowed on all the officers under his command, to obviate discord, did not oblige him to authenticate statements which would impeach himself; but now, when called upon to speak out, he would inform the House, and the public, that the signal for coming into the Victory’s wake, was flying from three o’clock in the afternoon till eight in the evening unobeyed; at the same time he did not charge the vice-admiral with actual disobedience, because he was fully persuaded of his personal bravery, and believed that if any inquiry was considered necessary that he would be able to justify himself.” This altercation led to a great deal of mutual recrimination between the two admirals, until at length Sir Hugh Palliser, on the 9th of December, delivered in an accusation to the Board of Admiralty, of which he was himself one of the lord commissioners. This accusation consisted of five separate charges against Keppel, for misconduct and neglect of duty in the action of the 27th of July; and the Board immediately ordered the admiral to be tried by a court-martial.
On the 7th of January, 1779, the signal was made for all the admirals and captains of His Majesty’s fleet to come on board the Britannia in Portsmouth harbour.
Then the Judge-Advocate General, Sir Charles Gould, LL.D., read the order sent by the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Thomas Pye, admiral of the white, to hold the court-martial, dated the 31st of December, 1778, signed Sandwich, T. Buller, Lisburne: and for adjourning to the Governor of Portsmouth’s house.
The court-martial consisted of the following members:—
President, Sir Thomas Pye, Kt., admiral of the white; Mathew Buckle, vice-admiral of the red; John Montagu, vice-admiral of the red; Mariot Arbuthnot, rear-admiral of the white; Robert Roddam, rear-admiral of the white; Captains Mark Milbank (afterwards an admiral), Francis Samuel Drake (afterwards an admiral and a baronet), Taylor Penny, John Moutray, William Bennet, Adam Duncan (afterwards an admiral and a viscount, the hero of Camperdown), Philip Boteler, and James Cranston.
Pursuant to the Admiralty order, the court adjourned to the house of the Governor of Portsmouth, and there the trial was held.
Keppel appeared before the court attended by a galaxy of friends; among them were some of the most illustrious personages in the kingdom, viz., the Dukes of Cumberland, Richmond, and Bolton; the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earls of Effingham and Albemarle, Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Keppel’s counsel was Erskine—the Hon. Thomas Erskine, the future Lord Chancellor, then in the first year of his call to the bar, and already becoming famous as an advocate.
The proceedings commenced by the President desiring the Judge-Advocate, Sir Charles Gould, to read the charge, which was as follows:
“A charge of Misconduct and Neglect of Duty against the Honourable Admiral Keppel, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1778, in divers instances undermentioned.
“I. That on the morning of the 27th of July, 1778, having a fleet of thirty ships of the line under his command, and being then in the presence of a French fleet of the like number of ships of the line, the said admiral did not make the necessary preparations for fight, did not put his fleet into a line of battle, or into any order proper either for receiving or attacking an enemy of such force; but, on the contrary, although his fleet was already dispersed and in disorder, he, by making the signal for several ships of the vice-admiral of the blue’s division to chase to windward, increased the disorder of that part of the fleet, and the ships were, in consequence, more scattered than they had been before; and whilst in this disorder, he advanced to the enemy, and made the signal for battle.
“That the above conduct was the more unaccountable, as the enemy’s fleet was not then in disorder, nor beaten, nor flying, but formed in a regular line of battle, on that tack which approached the British fleet (all their notions plainly indicating a design to give battle), and they edged down and attacked it whilst in disorder. By this unofficer-like conduct a general engagement was not brought on, but the other flag-officers and captains were left to engage without order or regularity, from whence great confusion ensued; some of his ships were prevented getting into action at all, others were not near enough to the enemy, and some from the confusion, fired into others of the king’s ships, and did them considerable damage; and the vice-admiral of the blue was left alone to engage singly and unsupported. In these instances the said Admiral Keppel negligently performed the duty imposed upon him.
“II. That after the van and centre divisions of the British fleet passed the rear of the enemy, the admiral did not immediately tack and double upon the enemy with those two divisions, and continue the battle; nor did he collect them together at that time, and keep so near the enemy as to be in readiness to renew the battle as soon as it might be proper; but, on the contrary, he stood away beyond the enemy to a great distance, before he wore to stand towards them again, leaving the vice-admiral of the blue engaged with the enemy, and exposed to be cut off.
“III. That after the vice-admiral of the blue had passed the last of the enemy’s ships, and immediately wore and laid his own ship’s head towards the enemy again, being then in their wake, and at a little distance only, and expecting the admiral to advance with all the ships to renew the fight, the admiral did not advance for that purpose, but shortened sail, hauled down the signal for battle; nor did he at that time, or at any other time, whilst standing towards the enemy, call the ships together, in order to renew the attack, as he might have done; particularly the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, which had received the least damage, had been the longest out of action, were ready and fit to renew it, were then to windward, and could have bore down and fetched any part of the French fleet, if the signal for battle had not been hauled down, or if the said Admiral Keppel had availed himself of the signal appointed by the thirty-first article of the fighting instructions, by which he might have ordered those to lead who are to lead with the starboard tacks on board by a wind, which signal was applicable to the occasion for renewing the engagement with advantage after the French fleet had been beaten, their line broken, and in disorder. In these instances he did not do the utmost in his power to tack, sink, burn, or destroy the French fleet that had attacked the British fleet.
“IV. That instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as in the preceding articles is alleged, and as he might and ought to have done, the admiral wore and made sail directly from the enemy, and thus he led the whole British fleet away from them, which gave them the opportunity to rally unmolested, and to form again into a line of battle, and to stand after the British fleet: this was disgraceful to the British flag, for it had the appearance of a flight, and gave the French admiral a pretence to claim the victory, and to publish to the world that the British fleet ran away, and that he pursued it with the fleet of France, and offered it battle.
“V. That on the morning of the 28th of July, 1778, when it was perceived that only three of the French fleet remained near the British, in the situation the whole had been in the night before, and that the rest were to leeward, at a greater distance, not in a line of battle, but in a heap, the admiral did not cause the fleet to pursue the flying enemy, nor even to chase the three ships that fled after the rest; but, on the contrary, he led the British fleet another way, directly from the enemy.
“By these instances of misconduct and neglect a glorious opportunity was lost of doing a most essential service to the State, and the honour of the British navy was tarnished.”
The trial lasted thirty-two days, and the evidence was very extensive and very minute; but, after all was heard, it left the affair much as stated by Mr. Yonge in his account of it. The following incidents from the testimony adduced may be read with interest.
Captain Marshall, of the Arethusa frigate, the first witness called, stated in answer to the question, whether Admiral Keppel conducted himself unbecoming a flag-officer; “No, as God is my judge!”
Captain Sir William Chaloner Burnaby, Bart., of the Milford, in his evidence, informed the court, that when he first perceived the French fleet, the afternoon of the 23rd, they were to eastward of our fleet, nearly a-head, or rather leeward, standing towards us, and appearing to be in great disorder; that, the Milford having received orders from the admiral to reconnoitre the enemy, he made towards them. That at half past four he tacked and stood towards the Victory, the French fleet nearly then beginning to form a line a-head, seeming to direct their course to leeward of our fleet, and very little from the wind. About half past eight o’clock the British admiral made signal for the fleet to bring to, and, to the best of his recollection, it continued in that situation all night. Upon further interrogations it appeared from Sir William that the French fleet were all that day forming in line of battle; that on the 25th and 26th the weather was squally, with fresh gales, that occasioned such a northwest swell as is usual with such winds; that they kept the weather-gauge of us all the time, generally observing their line of battle, and rather gained upon our fleet, sometimes carrying a pressing sail, at other times under an easy sail, for the better perfecting their line of battle; and that during all that time, had they been ever so much disposed to attack our fleet, they could not have done it without disadvantage, as they could not, without risk, fight their lee lower-deck guns, whilst we could fight our weather lower-deck guns. Sir William was cross-examined by Admiral Keppel as to the vice-admiral’s situation and conduct after the engagement; when it appeared, that from the natural superiority of the Victory over the Formidable in sailing, and the damage the latter had sustained, Sir Hugh Palliser could not accompany the admiral; but that he did not see him make any signal of his disability.
In the course of the admiral’s questions to Sir William he asked, did I not pursue with a press of sail, conformable to my worst sailing ships, to close and get up, until the moment I brought them to battle, except the two times after the 24th that I made the signal for the line? Sir Hugh objected to this as a leading question.
Admiral Keppel: “I desire I may not be interrupted by the accuser. I am trying for my life, and for my honour, which is dearer, and I hope for the protection of the court.” Soon after he said, “I would have fired at the French if they had not fired at me.” Sir William Burnaby concluded by saying, Admiral Keppel always pressed sail, and gave every proof of a great desire of bringing the French to battle.
Captain Digby, of the Ramillies, was called: Sir Hugh Palliser began to interrogate him with regard to the business of the 23rd, when Admiral Keppel begged the Court to take notice, that, for the purpose of shortening, if possible, the length to which he saw the trial would necessarily extend, if they still went over the same ground, and questions were repeatedly asked which he had admitted, he again told them that he admitted that the French fleet put themselves into order of battle when we discovered them. When Captain Digby mentioned, that from squally weather there was a swelling sea, and was asked whether the ships could then fight their lower-deck guns; he said, he could not have fought all his.
Admiral Montagu: In both articles of the charge, Admiral Keppel is charged with running away from the French fleet. Did you that day see him run away from them, instead of advancing to renew the engagement, as he might and ought to have done, which are the words expressed in the charge?
The charge was then read, and an objection started by Sir Hugh Palliser to the question, as contrary to law. Upon which several members of the court-martial said, “We do not care sixpence in this case for the law; we are come here to do justice, and hope, in God’s name, it will be done.”
Admiral Montagu: If Admiral Keppel ran away, Captain Digby did so too; and I suppose every part of the fleet followed their leader. Did you that day run away from the French fleet?—No.
Captain Hood, of the Robuste, was called upon and examined. Admiral Arbuthnot asked him if the admiral had thought fit to have renewed the attack when the French line was broke, could you have obeyed his signal and gone down to the enemy in the condition you were in?—I could not.
Admiral Montagu: From their relative situation, as you have described them, do you think the British admiral was running away from the enemy?—At that time there was no appearance of a flight.
Did the admiral run away any other time?—There was nothing in his conduct at any time which indicated, in the most distant manner, a flight. In the morning he pursued them.
Captain Allen, of the Egmont, was called, and he was finally put these questions. Sir, was it not more proper and prudent in the admiral to lay to, and repair his disabled ships before he renewed the attack, than to have returned to the engagement immediately?—Assuredly it was.
Then, sir, upon the whole did it appear to you, as an old experienced officer, that Admiral Keppel did by his conduct, either on the 27th or 28th of July, tarnish the honour of the British navy?—No; and I should not take upon me to say thus much, if I had not been forty years at sea, and three-and-thirty years an officer. I look upon it, the admiral did much honour to, instead of tarnishing, the British navy.
One circumstance showed very strongly the animus of Sir Hugh Palliser. It was discovered in the course of the trial, that some leaves had been taken out of the log book of the Formidable, containing the work of the 26th, 27th and 28th July, and the master of the Formidable was required to attend to explain.
Now such a witness should not be interfered with before coming to court by the prosecutor; yet that Sir Hugh Palliser did so interfere, appears by the following incident. Vice-admiral Palliser to the President: Sir, the cutting leaves out of the Formidable’s log-book, is a fact of which I was totally ignorant, until it was perceived by a member of this court; nor could any person be more astonished at it than myself. It is my most anxious wish to have this matter fully investigated; and, for that purpose, I have ordered the master of the Formidable, and the mate who made the entries, to attend here this morning; and, that they may be more strictly interrogated upon the matter, I desire that they may be examined by the court and Admiral Keppel, without any previous question from me.
Mr. Forfar, the master of the Formidable, being then called and sworn, and his former oath read to him, respecting the originality of the log-book, Admiral Keppel observed, that his reason for wishing to trouble the court the preceding day, when he requested the master of the Formidable might be immediately interrogated respecting that alteration, was to prevent any intermediate communication between him and others upon that subject; he, therefore, desired to know who was the person who first acquainted him, that the court had discovered any extraordinary circumstance relating to the book; and whether, and with whom, he had any conversation on that subject before the rising of the court the evening before? The witness answered, that he had heard a woman mention it to another in a shop where he had been; that it was between one and two o’clock, at that time, and he immediately came to the witnesses’ room that he might be ready to attend the court if he should be called; that in his way, he met the master of the Foudroyant, who told him he thought he would be wanted on that business; that he spoke to no other person till he came into witnesses’ room, where he saw Captain Walsingham, who told him he supposed he was come about the log-book; that he had no other conversation about it, till after the court broke up, when he conversed upon it with Captain Bazeley, at his lodgings, next door to the vice-admiral’s; shortly after which he went to Sir Hugh Palliser’s house.
Sir Hugh Palliser here observed, that in order to save the court trouble, he readily admitted that he had not only conversed with the witness before on the subject, but had interrogated him very strictly indeed on the subject. The master of the Formidable then made a very lame explanation as to the cutting out of the leaves in question.
The evidence being concluded for the prosecution, Admiral Keppel addressed the court in his defence, in a speech, in the composition of which he is said to have been assisted by his illustrious friend, Edmund Burke. Keppel spoke as follows:—
Sir,—After forty years spent in the service of my country, little did I think of being brought to a court-martial to answer charges of misconduct, negligence in the performance of duty, and tarnishing the honour of the British navy. These charges, sir, have been advanced by my accuser. Whether he has succeeded in proving them or not, the court will determine. Before he brought me to trial, it would have been candid in him to have given vent to his thoughts, and not, by a deceptions show of kindness, to lead me into the mistake of supposing a friend in the man who was my enemy in his heart, and was shortly to be my accuser. Yet, sir, after all my misconduct; after so much negligence in the performance of my duty; and after tarnishing so deeply the honour of the British navy, my accuser made no scruple to sail a second time with that man who had been the betrayer of his country. Nay, during the time that we were on shore, he corresponded on terms of friendship, and even in his letters he approved of what had been done, of the part which he now condemns, and of the very negligent misconduct which has since been so offensive in his eyes!
Such behaviour, sir, on the part of my accuser, gave me little reason to apprehend an accusation from him. Nor had I any reason to suppose that the State would criminate me. When I returned, His Majesty received me with the greatest applause. Even the first lord of the Admiralty gave his flattering testimony to the rectitude of my conduct, and seemed with vast sincerity to applaud my zeal for the service. Yet, in the moment of approbation, it seems as if a scheme was concerting against my life; for, without any previous notice, five articles of a charge were exhibited against me by Sir Hugh Palliser, who, most unfortunately for his cause, lay himself under an imputation of disobedience of orders at the very time when he accused me of negligence. This, to be sure, was a very ingenious mode of getting the start of me. An accusation exhibited against a commander-in-chief might draw off the public opinion from neglect of duty in an inferior officer. I could almost wish, in pity to my accuser, that appearances were not so strong against him. Before the trial commenced, I actually thought that my accuser might have some tolerable reason for his conduct. But from the evidence even as adduced to account for the behaviour of the honourable gentleman in the afternoon of the 27th of July; from that evidence, I say, sir, I find that I was mistaken. The trial has left my accuser without excuse, and he now cuts that sort of figure which I trust in God all accusers of innocence will exhibit!
I have observed, sir, that the opinions of officers of different ranks have been taken. I trust that the court will indulge me in the liberty in the evidence for my defence. Some have refused to give their opinions. I thought it strange, as plain speaking and a full declaration are the best of evidences in a good cause.
I would wish, sir, the court to consider that in all great naval, as well as military operations, unless the design be fully known, the several manœuvres may have a strange appearance. Masters have been called to give their opinions on the higher departments of command. Higher authorities should have been taken. Such authorities are not scarce; for I am happy to say, there never was a country served by naval officers of more bravery, skill and gallantry, than England can boast at present. As to this court, I entreat you, gentlemen, who compose it, to recollect that you sit here as a court of honour, as well as a court of justice, and I now stand before you not merely to save my life, but for a purpose of infinitely greater moment—to clear my fame.
My accuser, sir, has been not a little mistaken in his notions of the duty of a commander-in-chief, or he never would have accused me in the manner he has done. During action, subordinate officers either are, or they ought to be, too attentive to their own duty to observe the manœuvres of others. In general engagements, it is scarcely possible for the same objects to appear in the same point of view to the commanders of two different ships. The point of sight may be different. Clouds of smoke may obstruct the view. Hence will arise the difference in the opinions of officers as to this or that manœuvre, without any intentional partiality. Whether I have conceived objects in exact correspondence with the truth—whether I have viewed them unskilfully (or as my accuser has been pleased to term it, unofficer-like), these are matters which remain to be determined. I can only say, that what Sir Hugh Palliser has imputed to me as negligence, was the effect of deliberation and choice. I will add, that I was not confined in my powers when I sailed; I had ample discretion to act as I thought proper for the defence of the kingdom. I manœuvred; I fought; I returned; I did my best. If my abilities were not equal to the task, I have the consolation to think that I did not solicit, nor did I bargain for the command. More than two years ago, in the month of November, 1776, I received a letter from the first lord of the marine department, wherein he observed, that, owing to motions of foreign courts, it might be necessary to prepare a fleet of observation. My reply to this letter was, That I was ready to receive any command from his majesty, and I begged to have the honour of an audience. This request was complied with. I was closetted, and I told the king I was willing to serve him as long as my health would permit. I heard no more till the month of March 1778, at which time I had two or three audiences, and I told his majesty that I had no acquaintance with his ministers, but I trusted to his protection and zeal for the public good. Here were no sinister views; no paltry gratifications; I had nothing—I felt nothing, but an earnest desire to serve my country. I even accepted the command in chief with reluctance. I was apprehensive of not being supported at home. I foresaw that the higher the command, the more liable was I to be ruined in my reputation. Even my misfortunes, if I had any, might be construed into crimes. During forty years’ service, I have not received any particular mark of favour from the crown. I have only been honoured with the confidence of my sovereign in times of public danger. Neither my deficiencies, nor my misconduct, were ever before brought forward to the public. And it is now somewhat strange, that so well acquainted as my accuser must have been with my deficient abilities, it is strange, I say, sir, that he should be the very person who brought me the message to take the command upon me! Nay, further, sir, he brought that message with great seeming pleasure! There was, or there was not, reason at that time to doubt my ability. If there was reason, how could my accuser wish me to accept a command for which I was disqualified? If there was not any reason to doubt my professional abilities sixteen months ago, I have given no reason why they should since be called in question. When I returned from the expedition, I did not complain of anything. I endeavoured to stop all murmurings. I even trusted the first lord of the Admiralty in the same manner as I would have done my most intimate friend. This might be imprudent—it might be dangerous; but, sir, I am by nature open and unguarded, and little did I expect that traps would be artfully laid to endeavour to catch me on the authority of my own words.
It was in the month of March, 1778, that I was told a fleet lay ready for me to command. When I reached Portsmouth, I saw six ships ready, and, on viewing even those with a seaman’s eye, I was not by any means pleased with their condition. Before I quitted Portsmouth, four or five more were ready, and I will do the persons in office the justice to say, that from that time they used their utmost diligence in getting the fleet ready for service.
On the 20th of June, I sailed with twenty ships of the line, and very fortunately I fell in with the Belle Poule, and other French frigates, and the letters and papers found on board them were of material service to the state. Captain Marshall distinguished himself with the greatest honour. I confess that when I fell in with those frigates, I was at a loss how to act. On the one hand, I conceived the incident to be favourable to my country; and, on the other, I was fearful that a war with France and all its consequences might be laid to my charge. For anything I can tell, this may be the case. It may be treasured up to furnish another matter for future accusation. To this hour I have neither received official approbation, nor censure for my conduct. With twenty ships of the line I sailed. Thirty-two ships of the line lay in Brest water, besides an incredible number of frigates. Was I to seek an engagement with a superior force? I never did, nor shall I ever fear to engage a force superior to the one I then commanded, or that I may hereafter command. But I well knew what men and ships can do; and, if the fleet I commanded had been destroyed, we must have left the French masters of the sea. To refit a fleet requires time. From the situation of affairs, naval stores are not very soon supplied. Never did I experience so deep a melancholy as when I found myself forced to turn my back on France! I quitted my station, and my courage was never put to so severe a trial.
I was permitted to sail a second time, without receiving official praise or blame for the part I had acted. These were discouraging circumstances. But they did not disturb my temper. My principal object was to get ready for sea with all possible haste. I was surprised on my return to be threatened with the fate of Admiral Byng, and I was still more surprised to be charged with cowardice.
With thirty ships of the line I sailed early in July. The French admiral sailed from Brest with thirty-two ships. I believe that, when the fleets came in sight of each other, the French were not a little surprised to see me so strong. I desire not to throw the slightest imputation on the courage of the French admiral. I believe him to be a brave man, and one who had some particular reasons for the line of conduct he pursued. I was determined, if possible, to bring the French to battle, as I had every reason to think that their having avoided an engagement, when it was for four days in their power to attack me, was owing to their expecting some capital reinforcements. I therefore thought that the sooner I could engage them the better, especially as I knew that the principal fleets of our trade were daily expected in the channel, and if the French fleets had been permitted to disperse without an action, our East and West India fleets might have been intercepted, the convoys might have been cut off, and the stake of England might have been lost. I beg leave to mention, that in the reign of King William, the gallant Admiral Russell was two months in sight of a French fleet, and he could not possibly bring them to action. My being in sight of the French fleet four days before the engagement will not, therefore, appear quite so extraordinary as it has been represented. Had it not been for the favourable change of wind on the morning of the 27th of July, I could not have brought the French to action when I did.
I am exceedingly sorry, sir, that the Admiralty have refused me the liberty of producing my instructions. In all former courts’-martial the instructions and orders have been sent with the charge to the members of the Court. As it has been denied in this instance, I must, and do, submit.
Although on the 27th of July I fought and beat my enemy, and compelled him to take shelter by returning into port, yet the effect did by no means answer my wishes. I rushed on to re-attack my enemy. Why I did not accomplish my design will be seen in the evidence I shall produce. I might, it is true, have chased the three ships which were visible on the morning of the 28th of July, but with very little prospect of success. I, therefore, chose to return to Plymouth with my shattered fleet, to get ready for sea again, not, however, forgetting to leave two ships of the line to cruize for the protection of our trading fleets, which, thank God! all arrived safe.
On my return, sir, I most cautiously avoided to utter a syllable of complaint, because it might have suspended our naval operations, which at that time would have been highly dangerous. I could not think of attending to a court-martial when greater objects were in view.
With respect to the second edition of the Formidable’s log-book, it appears to have been fabricated rather for the purpose of exculpating the prosecutor than to criminate me. I shall, therefore, pass it over, and permit the gentleman to make the most of such an exculpation. I cannot, however, be so civil to the alterations and additions in the log-book of the Robust. Captain Hood’s conduct must have struck the court, as I believe it did every person, except the prosecutor, with astonishment.
A great stress, sir, has been laid on my letter to the Admiralty. There is a passage in it where I seemed to approve the conduct of every officer in the fleet. The court will observe, that I was not in my letter to inform all Europe, that a vice-admiral, under my command, had been guilty of neglect, whilst there remained a possibility of excuse for his conduct. As to courts-martial, one very bad consequence will, I am sure, result from this trial; it will terrify a commander-in-chief from accepting a commission, if he should be liable to be brought to trial by every subordinate officer.
“As I have touched on my letters, I will just observe, sir, that the most disagreeable task that I ever experienced was that of writing my letter of the 30th of July. However, if I wrote ill, I am confident that I fought well, and the destruction of the trade of France was evident from the number of rich captures which were made, a number far exceeding anything ever known in so short a period! His Majesty noticed this in a speech from the throne....”
The admiral then proceeded to reply seriatim and in detail to the five articles against him, and having concluded, called his witnesses, who established his complete exculpation, if, indeed, there could have been anything to explain or clear in his conduct. Among these witnesses was the Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland; and Captain Jervis, the future hero of St. Vincent, who emphatically said, “I cannot boast of a long acquaintance with Admiral Keppel; I never had the honour to serve under him before, but am happy in this opportunity to declare to the court, and to all the world, that, during the whole time the English navy was in sight of the French fleet, he displayed the greatest naval skill and ability, and the boldest enterprise, on the 27th of July, which, with the promptitude and obedience of the Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, will be subjects for my admiration and imitation as long as I live.”
The proceedings of the court-martial concluded on February 11, 1779, by an honourable acquittal of Admiral Keppel; the court unanimously deciding that the charge exhibited against him was malicious and ill-founded; it having appeared that the admiral, so far from having, by misconduct and neglect of duty on the days alluded to, lost an opportunity of rendering an essential service to the State, and thereby tarnishing the honour of the British navy, behaved himself as became a judicious, brave, and experienced officer.
The court did, therefore, unanimously and honourably acquit Admiral Augustus Keppel of the several articles contained in the charge exhibited against him, and he was fully and honourably acquitted accordingly.
The President, on the acquittal being announced, addressed himself to the admiral in the following words, delivering to him his sword at the same time:—
“Admiral Keppel, it is no small pleasure to me to receive the commands of the court I have the honour to preside at, that in delivering to you your sword I am to congratulate you on its being restored to you with so much honour, hoping ere long you will be called forth by your sovereign to show it once more in the defence of your country.”
The concourse of people that surrounded the court was immense. As soon as the sentence was pronounced an exclamation of joy burst forth in repeated peals, which was immediately communicated to the crowd without, and soon became general throughout the town and the whole nation by general illuminations.
In the “Gentleman’s Magazine” for Feb. 1779, the following paragraphs show the great sensation created by the acquittal:—
“Thursday, Feb. 11.—About eleven o’clock at night, the news having arrived of the acquittal of Admiral Keppel, a riotous mob, to testify their zeal on the occasion, suddenly assembled, and did a great deal of mischief, by breaking the windows of those houses that were not illuminated, and entering the houses, and destroying the furniture of some gentlemen, against whom the popular cry had been raised, particularly of Lord North, Lord Germaine, Lord Mulgrave, Sir Hugh Palliser, Captain Hood, and some others; but on the appearance of the military, and some of the leaders being apprehended, they dispersed, without attempting to rescue those who were in custody.
“Friday, Feb. 12.—At a Court of Common Council held at Guildhall, a motion was made, and unanimously agreed to, That the thanks of the court be given to the Hon. Augustus Keppel for his spirited conduct during the action of the 27th of July last, for the protection given by him to trade, &c., &c.
“Another motion was at the same time made, That the freedom of the city be presented to Admiral Keppel, in a box made of heart of oak, richly ornamented, and embellished with gold, &c., which motion was likewise agreed to.
“Sunday, Feb. 14.—Admiral Keppel’s flag was hoisted on board the Victory at Spithead.
“Thursday, Feb. 18.—Admiral Keppel received the thanks of the House of Commons. He also received the thanks of the House of Lords then sitting.
“Friday, Feb. 19.—Admiral Keppel attended the levee at St. James’s, and was graciously received by His Majesty.
“Saturday, Feb. 20.—Admiral Keppel dined, by invitation, at the London Tavern. His carriage was drawn by sailors through the city, and the illuminations were more general in the evening than ever was known.”
The trial of Sir Hugh Palliser by court-martial seemed a necessary consequence of the acquittal of Keppel. Palliser was accordingly tried at a court-martial held on board the Sandwich at Portsmouth. The investigation lasted from April 12 to May 5, 1779, and the result was, that though the court blamed Palliser for not having made known to his commander how the Formidable had been so crippled by an explosion, that Admiral Keppel’s signals could not be attended to, yet the court found that Sir Hugh’s conduct had been in many respects highly exemplary and meritorious, and in general terms acquitted him. Despite of this, the popular feeling ran strongly against Sir Hugh Palliser, and though a brave and experienced officer, he never found favour with the public again. He resigned, in 1779, his seat in the House of Commons, his appointment as a lord of the Admiralty, and all his other official employments. He, however, eventually became Governor of Greenwich Hospital, and an admiral of the White. He died at Greenwich the 19th March, 1796.
Admiral Keppel remained a popular man to the day of his death. The admiral, when the party of the Marquess of Rockingham came into power, in 1782, was made first lord of the Admiralty, and a privy councillor; and, on the 22nd April, 1782, he was created Viscount Keppel of Elvedon, in the county of Suffolk. He continued, with a slight intermission, first lord of the Admiralty till 1784, when, soon after, he retired into private life, where his constant amiability and unaffected cheerfulness won him to the last the affection and cordial attentions of all around him. He died of gout in the stomach on the 2nd October, 1786, at his seat, Elden Hall, Suffolk, and, as he was never married, his peerage expired with him; but the noble family to which he belonged still flourishes high in rank and well-merited reputation. The admiral’s grand nephew is now head and representative of the house, as sixth Earl of Albemarle.
Edmund Burke, in his famous “Letter to a Noble Lord,” thus refers to Admiral Keppel:
“No man lives too long, who lives to do with spirit, and suffer with resignation, what Providence pleases to command, or inflict; but, indeed, they are sharp incommodities which beset old age. It was but the other day that, on putting in order some things which had been brought here on my taking leave of London for ever, I looked over a number of fine portraits, most of them of persons now dead, but whose society, in my better days, made this (Beaconsfield) a proud and happy place. Among these was the picture of Lord Keppel. It was painted by an artist worthy of the subject (Sir Joshua Reynolds), the excellent friend of that excellent man from their earliest youth, and a common friend of us both, with whom we lived for many years without a moment of coldness, of peevishness, of jealousy, or of jar, to the day of our final separation. I ever looked on Lord Keppel as one of the greatest and best men of his age; and I loved and cultivated him accordingly. He was much in my heart, and I believe I was in his, to the very last beat. It was at his trial at Portsmouth that he gave me this picture. With what zeal and anxious affection I attended him through that his agony of glory, what part my son took in the early flush and enthusiasm of his virtue, and the pious passion with which he attached himself to all my connections; with what prodigality we both squandered ourselves in courting almost every sort of enmity for his sake, I believe he felt, just as I should have felt such friendship on such an occasion. I partook, indeed, of this honour, with several of the first, and best, and ablest in the kingdom, but I was behindhand with none of them; and I am sure that if, to the eternal disgrace of this nation, and to the total annihilation of every trace of honour and virtue in it, things had taken a different turn from what they did, I should have attended him to the quarterdeck with no less good will and more pride, though with far other feelings, than I partook in the general flow of national joy that attended the justice that was done to his virtue. Pardon, my lord, the feeble garrulity of age, which loves to diffuse itself in discourse of the departed great. At my years we live in retrospect alone; and, wholly unfitted for the society of vigorous life, we enjoy, the best balm to all wounds, the consolation of friendship, in those only whom we have lost for ever.”