OF

VICE-ADMIRAL CALDER.

The trial of that distinguished naval commander, Sir Robert Calder, Bart., Vice-Admiral of the White, differed from those of Byng, Sackville, and Keppel, in this, that it was not set on foot by an angry or partial Government, but arose entirely from the over sensitiveness of the gallant admiral himself, who could not submit to some unfavourable remarks which were made on his conduct for not pushing to the utmost the victory he had gained. He had defeated, in a great naval encounter, the combined fleets of France and Spain; but he had not completely crushed the enemy. Unfortunately, this occurred in the very centre of Nelson’s triumphs, when not only that hero, but the whole British people might, to use Napoleon’s term, be called “the spoilt children of victory.” Calder, it was admitted, had acted with courage and sagacity; but he had not shown the peculiar—the almost supernatural daring of Nelson: hence the general murmur. Nelson himself told him not to mind the outcry, but to fight on. He unwisely did not follow the advice, but called for a court-martial, and brought upon himself a sad and unforeseen result. Before coming to the affair, a word or two of Calder’s previous career is necessary. He was a man of good birth and ancient lineage, being the second son of Sir James Calder, third Baronet of Muirtoune, the head of a very old family in Morayshire. He was born at his father’s house at Elgin, the 2nd July, 1745, and, when fourteen years of age, was a midshipman in the Royal navy. He rose in his profession with slow but well-earned promotion, until he was looked on as one of the bravest and safest officers of his day. He won his earlier laurels under Kempenfelt, Roddam (his brother-in-law), and Howe; and his conduct at the battle of St. Vincent obtained for him knighthood, and subsequently, in 1798, a baronetcy. Such was the seaman whose next victory was to be the cause of his undoing. Of the actual naval action and its consequences in bringing about the trial, I take the following lucid account from that excellent manual “British Naval Biography:”

“Calder was selected, in 1805, by Admiral the Hon. (afterwards Sir) William Cornwallis (the illustrious Marquess Cornwallis’s youngest brother), who then commanded the Channel fleet, to blockade the harbours of Ferrol and Corunna. The force entrusted to him on this occasion was very inadequate; for, although there were then five French ships of the line and three frigates, and five Spanish line-of-battle ships and four frigates, all ready for sea, in these ports, yet he had only seven sail allotted to him; these, indeed, were afterwards increased to nine; but although he repeatedly requested two frigates and some smaller vessels, they never were sent to him. He, however, retained his station, notwithstanding the manœuvres of the Brest fleet; and on being joined by Rear-Admiral Stirling, on the 16th of July, with five sail of the line from before Rochfort, together with a frigate and a lugger, he proceeded to sea, for the express purpose of intercepting the French and Spanish squadrons from the West Indies, which were supposed to consist of no more than sixteen capital ships. Soon after this the combined fleet, of twenty sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, were descried; while the English force amounted to no more than fifteen ships of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger.^[21]

“Although the disparity on this occasion was sufficiently startling, Sir Robert did not hesitate in determining to bring the enemy to action. This battle, which gave rise to so much discussion, occurred in lat. 43° 30′ north, and long. 11° 17′ west, or about 40 leagues from Ferrol, on the 22nd of July. The British Vice-Admiral formed his fleet in compact order, and made a signal to attack the centre of the enemy; upon which the Hero, of 74 guns, that led the van squadron, fetched close up under the lee of the combined fleet, so that when our headmost ships had reached the enemy’s centre, their vessels tacked in succession, which obliged Sir Robert to perform the same evolution. The battle that immediately followed lasted upwards of four hours, and the enemy, notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers, and every advantage of wind and weather, lost two large Spanish ships, the Rafael, of 84, and the Ferme, of 76 guns.

“A heavy fog had prevailed during the greater part of the day; and a short time after the engagement commenced, it became so dense, that the English commander was scarcely able to see his ships ahead or astern, by which he was prevented from following up his advantage. This, in all probability, saved the enemy from total defeat. As it was, Sir Robert did not judge it prudent to hazard his fleet under such circumstances; and afraid, perhaps, of risking the advantage he had already acquired, he brought-to, in order to cover his prizes. The French and Spanish fleet could have renewed the engagement, during the two days that followed, having the advantage of the windward, and the British repeatedly, by hauling on the wind, incited them to the conflict, but this M. Villeneuve as constantly declined (and thus reserved himself for a worse fate at Trafalgar). On the 24th the wind changed, by which the British had the weather-gauge; but Sir Robert Calder, not thinking it advisable to assume offensive measures, the two hostile fleets separated.

“The vice-admiral was not only conscious that he had done his duty in this affair, but also merited the approbation of his country. He had kept the sea with a very inadequate force, instead of returning into port; he had successfully blockaded a greatly superior fleet for nearly five months; and at sea, he had fought a battle, and captured two large ships, under circumstances where not to be defeated was equal to the honour of a victory. The advantage lay so wholly on his side that the adversary, although repeatedly menacing a farther trial, had been content to forego the opportunity, and at last to sheer off. All this was rightly appreciated by his commander-in-chief, Admiral Cornwallis, who sent him back to Ferrol on the 17th, with twenty sail of the line. But, unfortunately, a different estimate of these circumstances was formed at home. The nation had lately been pampered with naval victories; the Lords of the Admiralty murmured; and, because the enemy had not been completely worsted, it was alleged that the honour of the British flag had been sullied. Bitter representations to this effect were set forth in the public prints; and when these reached the vice-admiral, their effects on his honourable spirit may be easily imagined. He immediately demanded a public trial from the Lords of the Admiralty; and, in spite of the solicitations of Nelson, who besought him to remain, and share in those approaching triumphs of the fleet by which every calumny would be refuted, he returned to Spithead in the Prince of Wales, on board of which a court-martial assembled on the 23rd of December, 1805.”

The officers who sat on the court-martial were George Montagu, Admiral of the White, and Commander of His Majesty’s ships and vessels at Portsmouth and Spithead, President. Vice-Admirals: John Holloway, Bartholomew Samuel Rowley, and Edward Thornborough. Rear-Admirals: Sir Isaac Coffin, Bart., and John Sutton. Captains: James Bissett, Robert Dudley Oliver, John Irwin, James Athol Wood, John Seater, the Hon. Thomas Bladen Capel, and John Larmour. M. Greetham, Deputy-Judge Advocate of the fleet, conducted the prosecution.

The court being opened, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder being called in, entered, attended by the Deputy-Marshal of the Admiralty.

The Order for the trial, dated the 15th of November, 1805, and directed to George Montagu, Esq., Admiral of the White, and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty’s ships and vessels at Portsmouth and Spithead, was read, and was as follows:—

By the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.—Whereas Sir Robert Calder, Bart., Vice-Admiral of the Blue, hath, by his letter to our Secretary, dated the 30th of September last, requested, for the reasons therein mentioned, that an inquiry may be made into his (the said vice-admiral’s) conduct, on the 23rd of July last, the day after his engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain, or, upon the whole, or such part thereof (when in presence of the enemy) as shall appear for the good of His Majesty’s service, and for enabling him to give his reasons publicly for his conduct on that occasion:

And whereas we have thought fit, in compliance with the vice-admiral’s request, and for the reasons mentioned in his said letter, that a court-martial shall be assembled for the purpose above-mentioned, and also for inquiring into the whole of the said vice-admiral’s conduct and proceedings on the said 23rd of July last, and into his subsequent conduct and proceedings until he finally lost sight of the enemy’s ships: And to try him for not having done his utmost to renew the said engagement, and to take or destroy every ship of the enemy, which it was his duty to engage: We send you herewith, Sir Robert Calder’s above-mentioned letter of the 30th of September last, and do hereby require and direct you to assemble a court-martial, as soon as the witnesses deemed necessary to be examined on this occasion shall be ready, which court (you being President thereof) is hereby required and directed to inquire into the conduct and proceedings of the said Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, with His Majesty’s squadron under his command, on the said 23rd of July last, and also into his subsequent conduct and proceedings, until he finally lost sight of the enemy’s ships, and to try him for not having done his utmost to renew the said engagement, and to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which it was his duty to engage accordingly.

Given under our hands, the 15th of November, 1805.

After the Members of the Court and the Deputy Judge-Advocate of the fleet were severally sworn, the President then said: Sir Robert Calder, one of your witnesses, Captain Prowse, is absent, are you willing that the court should proceed without him, or would you wish the trial to be postponed? And Sir Robert Calder answering that he wished the trial to proceed, his letter of the 30th of September to the Secretary of the Admiralty, desiring the inquiry, was then read, and was as follows:—

“Sir,—Having learnt with astonishment, yesterday, by the ships just arrived, and by letters from my friends in England, that there has been a most unjust and wicked endeavour to prejudice the public mind against me as an officer, and that my conduct on the 23rd of last July, in particular, has been animadverted on, in the most unjust and illiberal manner; for such it must be deemed, having been done at a time when I was absent abroad, employed in the service of my king and country.

“I must, therefore, request you will be pleased to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to grant an inquiry into my conduct on the 23rd July last, or upon the whole, or such part of it (when in presence of the enemy), as shall appear to their lordships, for the good of His Majesty’s service, and for the purpose of enabling me to give my reasons, publicly, for my conduct at that time, and to refute such unjust, illiberal, and unfounded assertions, when I trust I shall make it appear to the satisfaction of my King, country, and friends, that no part of my conduct and character, as an officer, will be found deserving of those unfavourable impressions, which, at present, occupy the public mind, being conscious that everything in my power, as an officer, was done for the honour and welfare of my king and country, after a very mature investigation of all the existing circumstances, and the very critical situation I was placed in, with the squadron I had the honour to command, at the time alluded to.

The trial then proceeded: the witnesses were, of course, chiefly the admirals and captains who had acted under him in the engagement. The point at issue was brief, and simply this: Did or did not the admiral do his best to renew the battle which had already gone in his favour? The witnesses for the prosecution inferred, rather than positively said, he did not; the witnesses for Calder, to a man, asserted that a renewal of the fight was beyond his power.

The following are the mainly pertinent and interesting portions of the evidence for the prosecution:—

Rear-Admiral Charles Stirling, who in “the Glory,” shared in the action, showed in his testimony a bias against Calder. He was asked:—

Q. Did the vice-admiral make any signal, or show any disposition to endeavour to renew the action?

A. I have before stated, that it appeared to me, that the admiral’s object was to keep company with the crippled ships on that day; and I saw no other signal indicative of an intention to renew the combat, after he had asked, if any of the ships wanted to lay to.

Q. Did the vice-admiral take any steps to direct the British fleet to bear up after the enemy on the 24th?

A. The British fleet continued standing from the enemy from the time I before mentioned that we were.

Q. Could the British fleet have pursued the enemy with advantage on the 24th, they steering to the southward and by east, and the wind being N. and by E.?

A. I don’t know any objection to the British fleet following the enemy, if the admiral had thought proper to do so.

Q. Did the vice-admiral at any time on the 24th show any disposition to renew the action?

A. I think that question answered by the preceding one.

Court.—That is a specific question.

A. We continued, as I said before, to steer from the enemy.

Q. Did the vice-admiral, according to your remarks and observations, do everything that might have been done to renew the action, and to take and destroy every ship which it was his duty to engage?

A. We never attempted to renew the action, or laid our heads towards the enemy, as I have said before; it appeared to me the admiral’s object was to cover the crippled ships.

Court.—At the time the British fleet bore down to the crippled ships, in what state was the Windsor Castle?

A. She appeared to have lost her fore-top-mast, and not able to make sail.

Q. What other ships of the British fleet were unable to keep company with the vice-admiral, had he endeavoured to bring the enemy to action?

A. I don’t know that any other ship was disabled.

Sir R. Calder cross-examined Admiral Stirling thus:

Q. Did you receive a letter from me, on service, after the action?

A. Yes; I had two letters from Sir Robert Calder, after the action, on service, of different dates.

Q. Did the first give any reason, and what, for standing to the northward, with the Windsor Castle and prizes.

A. I have the letter here.

Court.—That will be most satisfactory.

The letter was then read.

“My dear Sir,—Permit me to return you my most heartfelt thanks for your unremitting attentions, and for the very gallant support you rendered me during the whole of the action on the 22nd instant. Had the weather been favourable, and we could have seen to have made the necessary signals, to have availed ourselves of some of the mistakes of the enemy, I am fully convinced we should have made the victory much more complete. I was obliged to stand to the northward thus far, in order to cover the Windsor Castle, and the two captured ships. I think they are now safe from the combined, as well as the Rochefort squadron, and I am going back to Cape Finisterre, in hopes of seeing Lord Nelson; if I do not, I shall proceed off Ferrol, to see if any favourable opportunity should offer, when I may hope to attack the enemy with advantage. Wishing us all possible success,

Sir Robert Calder produced a letter, and said, is this the answer to that letter?

A. It is not the answer, but is written in reply. I sent, by the same conveyance, a letter to the vice-admiral on public service.

Sir Robert Calder.—You will observe they are not of the same date—one is the 24th, the other the 25th.

The letter from Rear-Admiral Stirling was then read.

“My dear Sir,—I thank you much for your letter of yesterday; and can assure you, with great truth, I meant, and do mean to give you all the support in my power.

I hope you made a good tale to please John Bull, for you had a good subject to write on; and I think you have convinced Mons. Bonaparte that he cannot always get to sea and home again with impunity.

A. I should not have written so to my commanding officer, on public business: that was a private letter.

A conversation took place about the reading the public letter.

Sir Robert Calder.—“I have no wish that any paper should be withheld; but, if the rear-admiral has any objection, I do not wish this should be read.”

Rear-Admiral Stirling.—“I have no objection.”

The letter was then read.

“My dear Sir,—I congratulate you on the capture of the two Spaniards from a force so very superior to that opposed to it, and I think, if the three ships, which at one time showed a disposition to support them, had followed the intention, the consequence might have been decisive.

“The great object I had in view was to obey your orders, by keeping in a compact line, whilst the signal for that purpose remained in force, and therefore, as the Raisonable closed with you, my captain took care that nothing could pass between her and this ship.

“On the surrender of the Spaniards, I directed the Warrior to send and assist in taking possession, and afterwards sent similar orders to the Thunderer, as there was no knowing, from the thickness of the weather, what might otherwise be the consequence, if your attention was confined to the van. I likewise ordered the Egyptienne, when I got sight of her, to get the prizes on the same tack with us, and to tow them to leeward of our line, which orders will, I hope, meet with your approbation. I know not why there was a separation in the night. Captain Linzee went in pursuance of his instructions, and rejoined me before the morning.

“We had only one man killed, and four wounded; the fore-yard was grazed, which we have fished; and what was otherwise hit, was not of any consequence.

“I have great pleasure of bearing testimony to the zeal of Captain Warren and his officers, and feel much confidence from the good conduct of the crew belonging to the ship where my flag is flying, if our good fortune should again lead us against the foes of our country.

Rear-Admiral Stirling.—I believe that letter was sent to the admiral on the 25th, and I had the honour to wait upon him in the afternoon, by his permission; and to the best of my recollection that was my reason for not returning an official answer. I do not recollect any other communication with the admiral, from about midnight of the 22nd.

Q. Did I not always place the British squadron between the enemy and the Windsor Castle and prizes, when they were in tow?

A. The British fleet was always between them.

Q. Was not the British squadron always placed by me between that of the enemy and the port of Ferrol, while the enemy remained in sight?

A. The British fleet was nearer to Ferrol than the enemy, till they crossed our stern on the 24th.

Q. When they crossed our stern could the enemy have fetched Ferrol?

A. I do not think they could, as we had the wind.

Court.—What distance was the British fleet from Rochefort, on the morning after the action?

A. I don’t know; the chart will tell. By my master’s reckoning, Cape Finisterre bore S.E. and by E. forty leagues.

Rear-Admiral George Martin, who was captain of the Barfleur in the action, was asked,—

Considering the wind, and the relative situation of the two fleets, during the 23rd of July, could the British fleet have neared the enemy, and renewed the engagement?

A. The enemy being rather abaft the beam, the British fleet would have neared the enemy had they tacked. But whether they could have renewed the engagement, I cannot say. That must, in great measure, have depended on the enemy, they being to windward.

Q. Did the vice-admiral make any signal, or show any disposition to renew the action on that day?

A. No.

Sir Robert Calder put in the following paper, which was read:—

“I admit I did not show any such disposition, except by hauling my wind when the enemy bore down, as by doing so I must have separated myself from the crippled ships and prizes.”

Rear-Admiral Martin was further asked,—

Did the vice-admiral, from your remarks and observation, do everything in his power, that he might have done, from the morning of the 23rd, till you lost sight of the enemy, to renew the engagement, and to take and destroy every ship which it was his duty to engage?

A. I consider I have answered that question by saying on neither day did he stand towards the enemy.

Sir Robert cross examined Admiral Martin:—

Q. Could I have pursued the enemy on the morning of the 24th, without separating the rest of the squadron from the Windsor Castle and prizes, and from the frigates which had them in tow?

A. Certainly not, without separating from the prizes; and not under a press of sail, without separating from the Windsor Castle.

Q. Did I not always place myself between the enemy and the Windsor Castle and crippled ships, while in tow?

A. It appeared to me to be the intention of Sir Robert Calder to keep company with them, from the time of the action, till they separated by signal.

Q. You understood that for their protection?

A. Certainly.

Q. Was not the British squadron always placed by me between the enemy and the port of Ferrol, as long as the enemy remained in sight?

A. We certainly were between them; but whether the position was taken for that purpose or not, I cannot say.

Captain Philip Charles Durham, of the Defiance; Captain Henry Inman, of the Triumph, who were also both in the action, were the other two principal witnesses; their testimony did not add much to the weight of the prosecution. After their evidence was given, the court adjourned to Thursday, the 26th of December, 1805, when Sir Robert Calder delivered in his defence, and requested that it might be read by a friend (Mr. Gaselee),^[22] and the court intimating their consent, the same was read. It opened thus:—

“Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court,—I appear before you in a singular, I may almost say an unprecedented, situation. Having served my king and country, not only without reproach, but, I may add, with some degree of reputation, for upwards of forty-six years, during which I have been more than once honoured with marks of approbation from my sovereign; having for the last ten months been employed on a most severe and critical service, without once being in port; and having in the course of it, with a very inferior fleet, forced a superior one of the enemy, who had the advantage of wind and situation, into action, and obtained a decisive victory over them, I felt myself impelled to solicit the present inquiry, for the purpose of vindicating my honour and my character from a variety of injurious and unfounded aspersions which have been cast upon me, in consequence of the not having renewed the engagement during the two days that the enemy afterwards remained in sight. The consciousness of my having done my duty, would, however, have induced me to treat these aspersions with contempt, had they not become so general that I was apprehensive that silence on my part would be construed into an acknowledgment of their truth, and an admission of my own misconduct; I found myself, therefore, under the necessity of applying to the Lords of the Admiralty, to order an inquiry into my conduct, that I might be enabled to state publicly the reasons which actuated it throughout, and to refute the illiberal and unfounded assertions which had been made against me. To this they have been pleased to assent; and although, in a subsequent letter of the 10th of November to that which accompanies the order for your assembling, I requested that the court might be empowered ‘to inquire into the whole of my conduct, even prior to my falling in with the enemy, while in their presence, and subsequent thereto,’ they have thought it right to confine it to the 23rd of July, and my subsequent conduct and proceedings, until I finally lost sight of the enemy’s ships, and to direct me to be tried for not having done my utmost to renew the engagement, and to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which the charge asserts it was my duty to engage. I consider this, therefore, as a declaration by their lordships, that this is the only part of my conduct upon which any particle of doubt can by possibility attach, or of which any explanation can be requisite. At the same time, however, I cannot but lament that the inquiry is so limited; as it prevents my giving evidence of the circumstances of the action, which I have no doubt I should have proved to have been such as to add to the reputation of the British navy.

“As to defending myself against this charge, I trust I shall be able to satisfy the court and the public, that the not renewing the engagement, if it was practicable to have done it, was not only justifiable, but the most proper and prudent course, under all the circumstances, to be adopted; and that the attempting to force a renewal of the action, might not only have endangered the safety of my own fleet, but eventually that of the country itself; I shall request the indulgence of the court, to be permitted to enter fully into all the circumstances, and to lay before them the particular situation in which I was placed, the orders I had from time to time received, and the reasons which induced me not to attempt a renewal of the action; confident that when I have done so, all the prejudices that have been hitherto entertained, will be dissipated, and that by your judgment I shall be restored to the good opinion of my country,—that country for which I have bled, and for which I have conquered.

“Before, however, I enter into the particular statement, permit me to make an observation or two on the specific charge, which is the principal object of your inquiry. It does not range itself precisely within any of the Articles of War, though it in part adopts the language of one of them. It assumes as a principle, that it was my duty to renew the engagement, and to endeavour to take or destroy every ship of the enemy.

“I am ready to admit, that it is so much the duty of an officer to engage the enemy wherever he meets with them, that it is incumbent upon him to explain satisfactorily why he does not; but, in making that explanation, it is not necessary for him to prove the physical impossibility of doing so. It may be possible, and yet there may be very many reasons why he should not. Indeed, the absurdity of a contrary position is such, that it would be an idle waste of time to trouble the court with many observations upon it.

“They will, however, permit me to observe, that mine is not the only instance in which a British fleet has laid in sight of that of the enemy without renewing the engagement.

“In proof of this assertion, if it be necessary, I need only recal to your memory, out of many others, the example of two very great and gallant officers, who after obtaining most brilliant victories over the enemy, did not think themselves justified in bringing them a second time to action, although they were in sight of them fully as long as I was. The two meritorious officers to whom I allude are, Earl Howe, in the action of the 1st of June, 1794, and Earl St. Vincent, in that of the 27th of February, 1797. Of the latter, I am competent to speak from my own knowledge, having had the honour to serve under his lordship as captain of the fleet in that engagement.

“Of the propriety of the conduct of these noble lords, in both instances, no doubt has at any moment been entertained by any body. They certainly exercised a sound discretion upon that occasion; but it may not be improper for me to remark, that, although the advantages they had acquired were certainly superior to mine; that mine was a situation in which it was in every respect more necessary to exercise that discretion, which, in every case, must be vested in the commander of a squadron, to judge of the propriety or impropriety of offering battle to a superior fleet. In the instances above-mentioned there was no other force to contend with, no other quarter from which an attack was to be apprehended, than the fleets which had been already engaged. In mine, it behoved me to be particularly on my guard against the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, both which, I had reason to believe, were out, and one of which appears to have been actually at sea, and to which the squadron opposed to me might easily have given notice of their situation, as will be hereafter more fully stated.

“With these observations I shall dismiss this part of the case for the present, and proceed to lay before the court a statement of the facts, to which I am to request their serious attention.”

The Vice-Admiral then went into a complete detail of his conduct prior to, at, and after the action. He thus referred to the actual battle:—

“On the 22nd of July, about noon, the combined squadrons came in sight. Their force, consisting of twenty sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, a much greater force than, as I before stated, Admiral Cornwallis supposed them to consist of. And it appears, from Lord Gardner’s letter to me of the 6th of July, that when seen off the Diamond Rock, at Martinique, on the 16th of May, they consisted of sixteen sail of the line, and six frigates.

“My force consisted of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, the Frisk cutter, and Nile lugger.

“Notwithstanding this superiority, and notwithstanding they had the advantage of the wind, I forced them to action. The general result of it you are already acquainted with. As it is not particularly the object of your inquiry, it is unnecessary to take up your time with observations upon it.

“Amidst the numerous prejudices that have assailed me, I have never yet heard the slightest insinuation to my disadvantage, either as to the mode of the fleet being carried into, or conducted in action. The victory certainly was ours, and most decisively so. I have only to lament that the weather did not afford an opportunity of making it more complete. Such was the valour and intrepidity of my second in command, and of every officer and man of my squadron, that, but for the weather, I am satisfied it would have been so. As it was, there are but few instances, and those of modern date, in which even equal numbers have been so successful....”

His defence concluded thus:—

“The question before you is a great and momentous one,—it affects every officer who has been, or at any time may be, in a situation of command. Miserable, indeed, must be their condition if they are to be censured for the fair and honest exercise of the discretion necessarily resulting from such a situation. I have ever felt, that in my case, I have exercised it wisely and beneficially; I still feel so, and were I again placed in the same situation, I should act in the same manner; unless this court, putting themselves in the situation I then was, and considering all the circumstances that at that time presented themselves to my consideration, and the various objects to which my attention was necessarily directed, shall tell me I have acted erroneously. This I trust they will not do.

“If, in the discussion of this question, I may be allowed to look to subsequent events, they, I think, will fully justify the line of conduct I adopted. By it I was enabled, after receiving a reinforcement, to pursue the combined squadrons to Cadiz, and thereby perhaps to have laid the foundation of that glorious victory (Trafalgar) which we have so recently celebrated. Believe me, gentlemen, the circumstance of having, by the various calumnies which have been spread, been put under the necessity of soliciting the present enquiry, and thereby been prevented from being a sharer in the glories of that day, has been no small addition to the various sufferings I have undergone.

“These sufferings, I trust, will now have had their period, and the opinion of this court will, I flatter myself, confirm me in that estimation with the profession and the public, which I have for so many years enjoyed, and to restore me unsullied that fair fame and reputation which has on this occasion been so cruelly and unjustly attacked.”

In support of the defence, the Gazette and several official letters were read, approving his conduct throughout the encounter. Nine officers, the Hon. Captain Gardner, the Hon. Captain Legg, Captain Boyles, Captain Lechmere, Captain Brown, Captain Cuming, Captain Griffiths, Captain Elphinstone-Fleming, and Lieutenant Warrand, and the Rev. John Souter, chaplain of the Prince of Wales (Admiral Calder’s ship), all witnesses of the engagement, spoke strongly in favour of the Vice Admiral, and bore out the view that he could not renew the engagement. The evidence of each is so nearly alike that I need here only give the statement of one or two.

In Captain Lechmere’s examination Sir Robert Calder asked:—

Q. Did the enemy ever chase or make any attempt to force me to action on the 23rd of July?

A. No.

Q. Could I have forced the enemy to action on the 23rd of July, if they had chosen to avoid it?

A. No.

Q. Did the enemy appear to you to have sustained any considerable damage to their masts and yards?

A. None in their masts. They shifted a top-sailyard or two, and that, I believe, was the utmost.

Q. Was the British fleet always kept between the enemy and Ferrol as long as they continued in sight?

A. Till the afternoon of the 24th we were always nearer Ferrol, than the enemy was.

Q. Could they then have fetched Ferrol?

A. Certainly not, the wind was then N.E. and by E.

Q. If I had gone towards the enemy on the 24th, could I have overtaken them, if they had chosen to avoid me, without approaching so near the shore between Ferrol and Cape Finisterre, as to have enabled them to have communicated by land signals with Ferrol?

A. No.

Captain W. Cuming, of the Prince of Wales, was asked by Sir Robert Calder:—

Q. As you were near my person during the whole time of the action of the 22nd, was any part of my conduct to be attributed to fear, or a want of zeal for his majesty’s service?

A. Most certainly not.

Court.—Captain Cuming, what number of the British ships appeared to you, on the morning of the 24th, incapable of sailing in line-of-battle or order of sailing?

A. I imagine the whole, except the Windsor Castle, might have been formed in line-of-battle.

Q. If the Windsor Castle had been taken in tow, considering the relative situation of the two fleets, could the British squadron have renewed the action on the 24th, the enemy declining so to do?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Did the vice-admiral decline the action, either on the 23rd or 24th, if the enemy had been inclined to renew it?

A. He did not.

Sir R. Calder.—Mr. President, I conceive Captain Cuming to be the only person competent to speak to the question I put to him, or I should have no difficulty in submitting the same to every captain in the fleet.

Notwithstanding this testimony, and to the surprise of most present and the public generally, the court came to an adverse decision. Its judgment was this:—

“The court is of opinion, that the charge of not having done his utmost to renew the said engagement, and to take or destroy every ship of the enemy, has been proved against the said Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, that it appears that his conduct has not been actuated either by cowardice or disaffection, but has risen solely from error in judgment, and is highly censurable, and doth adjudge him to be severely reprimanded; and the said Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly.”

The Gentleman’s Magazine of the time thus records the effect of this judgment upon Calder:

“Upon the sentence being pronounced, Sir Robert Calder appeared deeply affected—he turned round, and retired without a word. He was accompanied by a great number of friends, and, on descending from the deck of the Prince of Wales into his barge, scarcely lifted up his head, which was apparently bowed down by the weight of the sentence upon him. He is in his sixtieth year; forty-six of which he has passed in the service of his country.”

This judgment of the court-martial has been since, by most naval writers, looked on, if not as quite erroneous, at least as extremely severe. One circumstance made people the more regret it. It was passed at the very time when there lay, encircled by a halo of victory, in Greenwich Hospital, awaiting a State ceremonial, the dead body of Nelson, who before he himself annihilated at Trafalgar the very admirals and some of the very vessels Calder encountered, had openly approved of Calder’s conduct. The public soon veered in Sir Robert’s favour, and the sentence did not prove popular. It was spoken against in Parliament, and it was everywhere felt that a true and valuable British commander had been hardly dealt with. Restitution was subsequently proferred to Calder in the appointment, which he accepted, of admiral in command at Plymouth. But the trial broke his spirit, and it was remarked that he never was the same energetic man again. His amiability, social manners, and sound good sense, however, lasted to his death, and during his final retirement he continued to experience the greatest respect and attention not only from the Admiralty, but from a host of friends and from persons of all rank and station. He died at Holt, near Bishops-Waltham, Hants, on the 31st Aug. 1816; and as he left no issue by his wife, Amelia, daughter of John Mitchell, Esq., of Bayfield, Norfolk, his own baronetcy became extinct. The baronetcy of his family, however, continues, and is now held by his nephew, Sir Henry Roddam Calder, the fifth Bart. of Muirtoune.