Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from necessity, or some things from chance, has been a question disputed amongst the old philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity. But the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity and chance, namely, freewill, is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity. For St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never useth the term of freewill; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of him that runneth or willeth. But for some ages past, the doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will of man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God, nor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for aught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous, atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop was not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle.

But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the many obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to write this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge, but also against my will, published by one that found means to get a copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this controversy.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining them to one.”

Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, “without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like, then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in the decision of the question universal.

He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or not.” And I allow it also for well stated so.

Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this, “Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is not: he says there is.

Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, “proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand them not.

Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will suspendeth its act, (Rid est, the will willeth not); the understanding proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.

Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the doing of it?”

Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the will determine itself?”

Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace, which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?”

Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,”will,” I agree with the Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him. And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And thus much for the state of the question.

THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.

The arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four fountains. 1. From authorities. 2. From the inconveniences consequent to either opinion. 3. From the attributes of God. 4. From natural reason.

The authorities are of two sorts, divine and human. Divine are those which are taken from the holy Scriptures. Human also are of two sorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to have been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most commonly received opinions in the world.

His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able; but his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to Scripture and reason they be consonant, and no further.

And for the arguments derived from the attributes of God, so far forth as those attributes are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their significations be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; but where they are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I hold them not for arguments, but for oblations; not for the language, but (as the Scripture calls them) for the calves of our lips; which signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood.

The places of Scripture that make for me are these. First, (Gen. xlv. 5): Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life. And again (verse 8), So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God.

And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. 3): I will harden Pharaoh’s heart. And concerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, (Deut. ii. 30): The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate.

And of Shimei that did curse David, David himself saith, (2 Sam. xvi. 10): Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David. And (1 Kings, xii. 15): The King hearkened not to the people, for the curse was from the Lord.

And Job, disputing this very question, saith, (Job xii. 14): God shutteth man, and there can be no opening: and verse 16: The deceived and the deceiver are his: and verse 17: He maketh the Judges fools: and verse 24: He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way: and verse 25: He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man.

And of the King of Assyria, God saith, I will give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. (Isaiah x. 6.)

And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.

And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman to the house of Israel, God saith thus: When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; because thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in his sin. (Ezek. iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, yet he that falleth dieth in his sin: which shows that God’s justice in killing dependeth not on the sin only.

And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him.

And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, &c.

And again, those Christians to whom Peter and John resorted after they were freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man, praising God for the same, say thus: Of a truth against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. (Acts iv. 27, 28.)

And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy: and verse 18, 19, 20: Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that disputest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?

And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): Who maketh thee differ from another? and what hast thou that thou hast not received? and 1 Cor. xii. 6: There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all: and Eph. ii. 10: We are his workmanship created in Jesus Christ unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them: and Philip. ii. 13: It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do, of his good pleasure.

To these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations; and all the places wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all these it is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man.

A second sort of places there be, that make equally for the Bishop and me; and they be such as say that a man hath election, and may do many things if he will, and also if he will he may leave them undone; but not that God Almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every act of the will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, as in the Bishop’s opinion; though he use those places as arguments on his side.

The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live: and (Ecclesiasticus xv. 14): God in the beginning made man, and left him in the hand of his counsel: and verse 16, 17: He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand to whither thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be given him.

And those places which the Bishop citeth: If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it, or to make it void, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): Chuse ye this day whom you will serve, &c. But I and my house will serve the Lord: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12): I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do: and (Isaiah vii. 16): before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good. And besides these very many other places to the same effect.

The third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As Isaiah v. 4: What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?

And Jeremiah xix. 5: They have also built the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind.

And Hosea xiii. 9: O Israel, thy destructiondestruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help.

And 1 Tim. ii. 4: Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth.

And Eccl. xv. 11, 12: Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he hath caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, sinful man. And many other places to the like purpose.

You see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and the third sort of texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified, is impossible.

The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts, interpret the first sort thus; the words of Joseph, It was not you that sent me hither, but God; they interpret in this manner: It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it; it was God that sent me and not you; as if the selling were not the sending. This is Suarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, whether the selling of Joseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission. If it did, then that selling was necessitated beforehand by an eternal permission. If it did not, how can there be attributed to God a foreknowledge of it, when by the liberty of human will it might have been frustrated? I would know also whether the selling of Joseph into Egypt were a sin? If it were, why doth Joseph say, Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither? Ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? If it were no sin, then treachery and fratricide is no sin.

Again, seeing the selling of him consisted in these acts, binding, speaking, delivering, which are all corporeal motions, did God will they should not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he permit barely, and neither will nor nill corporeal and local motions? How then is God the first mover and cause of all local motion? Did he cause the motion, and will the law against it, but not the irregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion and law being existent, the contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent?

So these places, He hardened Pharaoh’s heart, he made Sihon’s heart obstinate, they interpret thus: “He permitted them to make their own hearts obstinate.” But seeing that man’s heart without the grace of God, is uninclinable to good, the necessity of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God’s permission, that is, from his withholding his grace, as from his positive decree. And whereas they say, He wills godly and free actions conditionally and consequently, that is, if the man will them, then God wills them, else not; and wills not evil actions, but permits them; they ascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good or bad.

Now to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret the first.

It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call the commandments and exhortations and other significations of the will, by the name of will; though the will be an internal act of the soul, and commands are but words and signs external of that internal act. So that the will and the word are diverse things; and differ as the thing signified, and the sign. And hence it comes to pass, that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians God’s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging the very will of God, which they call his counsel and decree, to be another thing. For the revealed will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be sacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And his revealed will to Jonas, that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days; but not his decree and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand, but may afterwards by the event; for from the event we may infer his will. But his revealed will, which is his word, must be foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our actions.

Therefore, where it is said that God will have all men to be saved, it is not meant of his will internal, but of his commandments or will revealed; as if it had been said, “God hath given commandments, by following of which all men may be saved.” So where God says, O Israel, how often would I have gathered thee, &c., as a hen doth her chickens, but thou wouldest not, it is thus to be understood: “How oft have I by my prophets given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou hadst been gathered,” &c. And the like interpretations are to be given to the like places. For it is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose to save all men, that any man could be damned; because it were a sign of want of power to effect what he would. So these words, What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done: if by them be meant the Almighty power, might receive this answer: “Men might have been kept by it from sinning.” But when we are to measure God by his revealed will, it is as if he had said, “What directions, what laws, what threatenings could have been used more, that I have not used?” God doth not will and command us to inquire what his will and purpose is, and accordingly to do it; for we shall do that, whether we will or not; but to look into his commandments, that is, as to the Jews, the law of Moses; and as to other people, the laws of their country.

O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help: or as some English translations have it, O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, &c., is literally true, but maketh nothing against me; for the man that sins willingly, whatsoever be the cause of his will, if he be not forgiven, hath destroyed himself, as being his own act.

Where it is said, They have offered their sons unto Baal, which I commanded not, nor spake it, nor came it into my mind; these words, nor came it into my mind, are by some much insisted on, as if they had done it without the will of God. For whatsoever is done comes into God’s mind, that is, into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of the future action, and that certainty an antecedent purpose of God to bring it to pass. It cannot therefore be meant God did not will it, but that he had not the will to command it. But by the way it is to be noted, that when God speaks to men concerning his will and other attributes, he speaks of them as if they were like to those of men, to the end he may be understood. And therefore to the order of his work, the world, wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no man could order it by design, he gives the name of will and purpose. For that which we call design, which is reasoning, and thought after thought, cannot be properly attributed to God; in whose thoughts there is no fore nor after.

But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to err. If it had not been, say not thou, but “think not thou,” I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be said; first, because St. Paul forbids it: Shall the thing formed, saith he, say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me so? Yet true it is, that he did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to be honourable, and we judge nothing honourable but what we count so amongst ourselves; and because accusation of man is not honourable, therefore such words are not to be used concerning God Almighty. And for the same cause it is not lawful to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall not be done; for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it. Therefore neither of them is to be said, though one of them must needs be true. Thus you see how disputing of God’s nature which is incomprehensible, driveth men upon one of these two rocks. And this was the cause I was unwilling to have my answer to the Bishop’s doctrine of liberty published.

And thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the Scriptures; which whether it favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by the reader. And now I come to compare them again by the inconveniences which may be thought to follow them.

First, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, that all things come to pass by necessity, is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun.

Secondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish all consultations, arts, arms, books, instruments, teachers, and medicines, and which is worst, piety and all other acts of devotion. For if the event be necessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we do, and whether we sleep or wake.

This inference, if there were not as well a necessity of the means as there is of the event, might be allowed for true. But according to my opinion, both the event and means are equally necessitated. But supposing the inference true, it makes as much against him that denies as against him that holds this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds for as certain a truth, what shall be, shall be, as what is, is, or what has been, has been. And then the ratiocination of the sick man, “If I shall recover, what need I this unsavoury potion? if I shall not recover, what good will it do me?” is a good ratiocination. But the Bishop holds, that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover. Therefore it follows from an opinion of the Bishop’s, as well as from mine, that medicine is superfluous. But as medicine is to health, so is piety, consultation, arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, every one to its several end. Out of the Bishop’s opinion it follows as well as from mine, that medicine is superfluous to health. Therefore from his opinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such ratiocination were not unsound), that piety, consultation, &c. are also superfluous to their respective ends. And for the superfluity of laws, whatsoever be the truth of the question between us, they are not superfluous, because by the punishing of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the cause of justice in a great many.

But the greatest inconvenience of all that the Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion, is, “that God in justice cannot punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone.” It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone; but instead of punishment if he had said affliction, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those that can sin, and yet not for sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel that was born blind, for the manifestation of his power which he hath over his creature, no less but more than hath the potter over his clay to make of it what he please? But though God have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning. But what infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be after this life eternally in torments and never die? Or how is it certain there is no second death, when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth the Scripture say that a second death is an endless life? Or do the Doctors only say it? Then perhaps they do but say so, and for reasons best known to themselves. There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life, to give with it sickness, pain, torments, and death; nor in him that giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice also. And thus much in answer to the inconveniences that are pretended to follow the doctrine of necessity.

On the other side from this position, that a man is free to will, it followeth that the prescience of God is quite taken away. For how can it be known beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that will of his proceed not from necessary causes, but that he have in his power to will or not will? So also those things which are called future contingents, if they come not to pass with certainty, that is to say, from necessary causes, can never be foreknown; so that God’s foreknowing shall sometimes be of things that shall not come to pass, which is as much to say, that his foreknowledge is none; which is a great dishonour to the all-knowing power.

Though this be all the inconvenient doctrine that followeth free-will, forasmuch as I can now remember; yet the defending of this opinion hath drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions, and made them make use of an infinite number of insignificant words; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, that God doth so concur with the will of man, that if man will, then God concurs; which is to subject not the will of man to God, but the will of God to man. Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out, when I come to my observations upon the Bishop’s reply. And thus far concerning the inconveniences that follow both opinions.

The attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his justice, as that God cannot be just in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated to do. To which I have answered before, as being one of the inconveniences pretended to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On the contrary, from another of God’s attributes, which is his foreknowledge, I shall evidently derive, that all actions whatsoever, whether they proceed from the will or from fortune, were necessary from eternity. For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come to pass, cannot but come to pass, that is, it is impossible it should not come to pass, or otherwise come to pass than it was foreknown. But whatsoever was impossible should be otherwise, was necessary; for the definition of necessary is, that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas they that distinguish between God’s prescience and his decree, say the foreknowledge maketh not the necessity without the decree; it is little to the purpose. It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was foreknown by God, was necessary: but all things were foreknown by God, and therefore all things were necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknowledge from decree in God Almighty, I comprehend it not. They are acts co-eternal, and therefore one.

And as for the arguments drawn from natural reason they are set down at large in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply; which how well he hath answered, shall appear in due time. For the present, the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, must either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, without any other cause; for certainly to will is impossible without thinking on what he willeth. But it is in no man’s election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on. And this I take to be enough to clear the understanding of the reader, that he may be the better able to judge of the following disputation. I find in those that write of this argument, especially in the Schoolmen and their followers, so many words strangers to our language, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them, as that a man’s mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing. And as things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon the abyss, tohu and bohu, that is to say, confusion and emptiness; so are their discourses.