After having shown that morality has need of a supernatural support, you have reason to expect, that I should explain the intimate and immediate relation which unites religion to the love of virtue, and the observance of order. I will endeavour, then, to discuss this important question; and in order to arrive at the truth, I shall follow first the course of those simple sentiments and natural thoughts, which guide the mind and the heart of man, in every climate and country under heaven.

It is easy to unite all the moral legislation, and the entire system of our duties, by means only of the idea of a God.

The universe, notwithstanding its magnificence and its immensity, would be a mere nothing, if its Supreme Author had not peopled it with intelligent beings, capable of contemplating so many wonders, and of receiving happiness from them; but the faculties with which we are endowed, consciousness of possessing them, and the liberty to act, all announce to us that we are united to a grand combination, that we have a part to take on the vast stage of the world.

The most simple reason, that which resembles instinct, would have been sufficient to enable us to take care of the body, and to have concentred us in ourselves; more would not have been necessary for those who have so little to do. Thus, when I see that the mind is susceptible of continual improvement, when I see that men enjoy the power of assisting each other, and of communicating their ideas, in a manner so much superior to other animals; when I fix my attention on our social dispositions, and on all the relative qualities which compose our nature, I cannot avoid thinking, that we have a plan of conduct to follow towards others, and that in our pilgrimage on earth we must be circumspect, having obstacles to conquer, sacrifices to make, and obligations to fulfil.

Men then appear to be led to religion by the most excellent gifts of nature, and by all that they have in them of the sublime; but we ought to remark, as a singular resemblance, that their wants also, and their extreme weakness, lead them to the same object.

Whatever may be my emotions, when I reflect on the present imperious laws to which I am obliged to submit, and when I recal to mind the grandeur and magnificence which I have been a witness of, I raise continually my soul towards the Sovereign Director of events, and am led by instinct, as well as by a rational sentiment, to address my prayers to Him. It appears to the unfortunate, when they view so many wonders which their understanding cannot grasp, that so little is wanting to guard them from the dangers which threaten them, they implore the commiseration of Him whose formidable power bursts from all sides. But, while they admire and adore, they must imitate His perfections, and not expect mercy when they show none. Purity of heart only can render an intercourse with the Supreme Being interesting; and prayers are merely a solemn kind of mockery, when they do not produce virtue and forbearance, when they do not render us kindly affected to each other; our very state of dependence, our wants and weaknesses, should bind us to those beings who equally share the blessings so liberally bestowed, and have the same evils to endure. Thus discontent, the fear of futurity, the anxiety caused by misfortunes, all the sentiments, which engage men to disturb social order, take another character, or are at least sensibly modified; when, from their first suffering, they can elevate their wishes to God, but dare not do it, with a heart sullied by criminal intentions.

It is not only prayer which leads us to religion; another communication with the Supreme Being, gratitude, produces the same effect. A man, persuaded of the existence of a sovereign power, and who gladly connects with the divine protection his success and happiness, feels, at the same time, a desire to express his gratitude; and not being able to do any thing for him who bestows all, he seeks to form an idea of the perfections of that Supreme Being, in order to comprehend the system of conduct most conformable to his attributes. At first, what reflections possess our mind, what emotions agitate our souls, when we contemplate the universe? When we respectfully admire that magnificent harmony, which is the incomprehensible result of an innumerable multitude of different powers: struck with this vast whole, where we discover an agreement so perfect, how is it possible for us to avoid considering order as a distinct mark of the wisdom and of the design of Omnipotence? And how is it possible for us not to think, that we render him the most worthy homage, at the time we make use of the free intelligence which he has endowed us with. Then in the composition of a social structure, a work which has been entrusted to us, we shall try to penetrate the ideas of wisdom and order, of which all nature presents such a grand example; then, in establishing the relations which unite men, we shall carefully study the laws of moral order, and we shall find them all founded on the reciprocation of duties, which submit to a regular movement different jarring personal interests. In short, the idea of a God, Creator, Regenerator, and Preserver of the Universe, by invariable laws, and by a train of the same causes and the same effects, seems to call us to the conception of a universal morality, which, in imitation of the unknown springs of the natural world, may be as the necessary tie of this succession of intelligent beings, who always, with the same passions, come to pass and repass on the earth, to seek, or to fly, to assist, or to hurt each other, according to the strength or the weakness of the knot which unites them, and according to the wisdom or inconsistency of the principles which direct their opinions.

The attentive study of man and of his nature ought to contribute to confirm in us the idea which we have just pointed out. We cannot, in fact, consider the prodigious difference which exists between the minds and characters of men; we cannot fix our attention on the length to which this difference may be carried, by the perfectibility of which they are susceptible; we cannot, in short, reflect on a like constitution, without being induced to think, that the counterpoise of these extraordinary means of force and usurpation must proceed from reason, from that singular authority which only can establish, between men, relations of justice and convenience, proper to maintain an equilibrium and harmony in the midst of so many disparities: it is thus, that respect for morality seems evidently to make a part of the general view and primitive idea of the Supreme Disposer of the universe. And what pleasure shall we not find in the persuasion, that the cultivation of virtue, that the observance of order, offers us the means of pleasing our Divine Benefactor! It is by that alone that we can hope to concur, however feebly, in the execution of his grand designs; and in the centre of so many blessings, surrounded by so many signs of a particular protection, how highly ought we to value this means of communication with the Author of our existence? Thus, then, the homage of adoration and gratitude which we render to the Deity, leads us to a sentiment of respect for the laws of morality; and this sentiment, in its turn, serves continually to maintain in us the idea of a Supreme Being.

Independent of the reflections which we have just presented, morality, considered in all its extent, has need of being strengthened by this disposition of the soul, which makes us interested in the happiness of others; and it is besides, in one of the most glorious perfections of the Deity, that we find the first model of this precious sentiment. Yes, we cannot deny it: either our existence proceeds from no cause, or we owe it to the goodness of the Supreme Being. Life, some will say, undoubtedly is a mixture of pains and pleasures: but, if we are candid we shall confess, that those moments, when it ceases to appear to us a benefit, do not often occur in life: in youth, existence is thought the greatest blessing, and the other seasons of life offer pleasures less animated, certainly, but which agree better with the progress of our understanding, and the increase of our experience.

It is true, that in order to free ourselves from a sentiment of gratitude, we often think that we would not accept of a renewal of life, on condition of our running over a second time our career, and returning step by step in the same track. But we should consider, that we do not fix a just value on the benefits which we have received; for when we take a retrospective view of life, we see it stripped of its two principal ornaments, curiosity and hope; and it is not in this state that it was given to us, and that we have enjoyed it.

It is, perhaps, not in our power to replace ourselves, by contemplation, in the situation where the imagination made our chief pleasure, a slight breath has easily effaced it from our memory: it is evident that we enjoy life, because we look forward with affright to the moment when we shall be forced to renounce it; but, as this happiness is composed of present pleasures, and those which we anticipate, we cease to be good judges of the value of life, when this future prospect is not presented to our eyes, but under the form of the past; for we know not how to appreciate, with a languishing recollection, that which we have loved in the moment of hope.

Physical evils are not either the end or the condition of our nature, they are its accidents: the happiness of infancy, which shows in its primitive purity the works of the Deity, visibly point out the goodness of the Supreme Being; and how can we avoid believing, that we owe our origin to a benevolent design, since it is a desire of happiness, which has been given to serve as the motive of all our actions? We should indeed speak well of life, if we had not corrupted its comforts by artificial sentiments, which we have substituted instead of nature; if we had not submitted so many realities to pride and vanity; if, instead of assisting each other to be happy, we had not employed our thoughts to make others submit to us. Undoubtedly there are some sufferings annexed to our existence, as in the natural world there are apparent defects. Let us employ our minds on the most exalted subjects, and we shall no longer be a prey to envy and discontent.

It is on the consideration of detached events; it is in some particular circumstances, that we raise doubts about the goodness of God; but we immediately discern it when we compare particulars which wound us, with the great whole of which they make a part; we discover then, that the misfortunes which we are so quickly offended with are a simple appendage of a general system, where all the characters of a beneficent intelligence are evidently traced. It is necessary then to view the whole of life to discover the intention of the author of nature; and in meditating in this manner, we shall return always to a sentiment of respect and gratitude. This simple idea is very extensive in its application; it seems to me, above all, that it serves to console us under the ills of life; the man who is penetrated by it can say to himself, the transitory evil to which I am subject, is perhaps one of the inevitable effects of this universal harmony, the most noble and the most extensive of all conceptions. Thus, in the moments when I bemoan my fate, I ought not to think myself forsaken, I ought not to accuse Him, whose infinite wisdom is present to my view, Him whose general laws have so often appeared to me a visible expression of real goodness.

It is in vain, some will say, it is in vain that you would wish to make us attend to these considerations; we only remark, that our earthly happiness is at least inferior to that which our imagination so readily forms the picture of; and we do not perceive, in such a disposition, the union of perfections which ought to be ascribed to the Supreme Being.

This objection is presented under different forms in the writings of all the enemies to religion; and they have drawn consequences, sometimes against the goodness of God, his power, his wisdom, and justice. It is necessary, clearly to explain this difficulty, to be in a state to form to ourselves an idea of the perfection of an Infinite Being; but in all our attempts, we only carry to the extreme every quality which we conceive; instead of that, perfection in the works of the Creator, probably consists in a kind of gradation and harmony, the secret of which we cannot either embrace, or penetrate; and we ought still more to be on our guard, when we form any conception of the essence of the Deity, as by confining ourselves solely to reconcile his sovereign power with his perfect goodness, we should never fix the boundary when these two properties will be in an equilibrium: for after having exhausted every supposition, we might still ask, why the number of rational beings is not more extended? We might ask, why every grain of sand is not one of those beings? why there is not a number equal to that infinite divisibility of which we form the idea? In short, from extreme to extreme, and always in arguing on the sovereign power, the least inanimate atom, the least void in nature, would appear a boundary to the goodness of the Supreme Being. We see then to what a point we may wander, when we abandon common sense for the vague excursions of a metaphysical spirit.

I think, if no other proofs could be found, the power of God would be sufficient to demonstrate his goodness; for this power informs us every instant, that if the Supreme Ruler of the World had intended the misery of rational beings, he would have had, to fulfil this intention, means as rapid as numerous. He needed not have created worlds; nor have made them so convenient and beautiful; a terrific gulph, and eternal darkness might have been sufficient to collect together those unfortunate beings, and make them feel their misery. Let us not dwell on these gloomy subjects, let us follow a just emotion of gratitude; we shall be eager then to render homage to that indelible character of love and goodness which we see stamped on all nature. An unknown power opens our eyes to the light, and permits us to view the wonders of the universe: it awakens in us those enchanting sensations which first point out the charms of life; it enriches us with that intellectual gift which re-assembles round us past ages, and the time to come; it confers, in an early hour, an empire, by endowing us with those two sublime faculties, will and liberty; in short, it renders us sensible to the real pleasure of loving and being beloved; and when, by the effect of a general plan, of which we have but an imperfect conception, it spreads here and there some difficulties in the road of life; it seems to wish to soften them, by showing us always the future through the enchanting medium of the imagination. Could it be then without any interest or goodness, that this magnificent system was conceived, and preserved by so many superb demonstrations of wisdom and power? What should we be in the sight of the Eternal, if he did not love us? We do not adorn his majestic universe, or lend to the dawn its magnificent colours; neither have we covered the earth with a verdant carpet, or bid the celestial bodies revolve in the immense expanse; he asked not counsel of us—we should be nothing in his eyes, if he was indifferent to our gratitude, and if he took not any pleasure in the happiness of his creatures.

In short, were we to turn our attention from so many striking proofs of the goodness of God; were they to be effaced from our memory, we should still find, in the recesses of our heart, a sufficient evidence of this comfortable truth, we should perceive that we are good and affectionate, when not perverted by passion; and we should be led to think, that such an inclination in beings who have received every thing, must necessarily be the seal of their Divine Author. In order to exalt this sentiment, we must refer it continually to the idea of a Supreme Being; for there is, we doubt not, a correspondence of instinct and reflection between our virtue and the perfections of him who is the origin of all things; and provided we do not resist our natural emotions, we shall perceive from those very perfections all that is sufficient to excite our worship and adoration; above all, whatever is necessary to serve as an example for our conduct, and to afford principles of morality.

I ought now to examine some important objections; for why should I fear to present them? a love for systems and opinions ought not to exist, in treating a subject on which so many have expatiated, and which belongs equally to all men. Though we are allowed, when seeking truth eagerly, to wish to find it united to the sentiments which form our happiness, and the principles which are the foundation of public order.

We admit, say some, that there are many perfections peculiar to the Supreme Being, the study and knowledge of which ought to serve to sustain the laws of morality; but one of the essential properties of the divine essence oversets the whole structure, it is prescience: for, as God knows beforehand what we are to do, it follows, that all our actions are irrevocably determined; and thus man is not free. And, if such is his condition, he deserves neither praise nor censure; he has no means of pleasing or displeasing the Supreme Being, and the ideas of good and evil, of virtue and vice, are absolutely chimerical. I shall, at first, make a very simple reply to this objection, but a very decisive one: it is that, if against appearances you should happen to persuade me, that there now exists an absolute contradiction between the liberty of man and the prescience of the Deity, it is on the nature and extent of this prescience that I shall raise my doubts; for, forced to choose, I should rather mistrust the judgment of my own mind, than that of an internal persuasion. It is by these same considerations, that it will always be impossible to prove to men that they are not free: we could only succeed with the assistance of reasoning, and reasoning being already a beginning of art, a kind of exterior combination of reflections, this means, in some measure out of us, would not have power to eradicate a sentiment which seems the first that we are conscious of.

We soon discover the limits of our faculties, in the efforts which we make to acquire a just idea of the divine prescience: we can very well suppose, that God foresees with certainty what we only conjecture about, and in extending without end the bounds which occur to our mind, we shall proportion in our imagination, the knowledge of the Creator to the immensity of space, and to the infinity of time; but beyond these vague ideas we shall err in all our speculations. How is it possible, that men, who know not even the nature of their own souls, should be able to determine the nature of prescience? How is it possible, that they can know whether this prescience is the effect of a rapid calculation of him, who embraces at one glance the relation and effects of every moral and natural cause? how can they discern, whether this prescience, in an Infinite Being, is distinct from simple knowledge? How can they know whether that Being, by a property beyond our conception, does not exist before and after events, whether he is not, in some manner, the intellectual time, and whether our divisions of years and ages, would not disappear before his immoveable existence and eternal duration.

It results, however, from these considerations, that on account of our extreme ignorance we cannot accurately define prescience; but we are reduced to examine whether this prescience, considered in a general manner, is incompatible with the liberty of man.

This opinion, I think, should not be adopted. Prescience does not determine future events, for the mere knowledge of the future makes not the future. It is not prescience which necessitates the actions of men, because it does not change the natural order of things; but all future events are fixed, whether foreseen or not; for constraint and liberty conduct equally to a positive term: thus, all that will happen is as immutable as that which is past, since the present was the future of yesterday, and will be to morrow the past. It is then abstractedly certain, that an event, either foreseen or not, will take place some time; but if liberty is not contrary to this inevitable certainty, how would it be more so, because their exists a Being who is acquainted previously with the precise nature of events? We may then say, with truth, that the knowledge of the future is no more an obstacle to liberty, than the remembrance of the past; and prophecies, like histories, are only recitals, whose place is not the same in the order of time; but not having any influence on events, do not constrain the will, cannot enslave the sentiments, or subject men to the law of necessity.

We will confess, however, that if prescience was founded on the possibility of calculating the actions of men, like the movements of an organized machine, liberty could not exist; but then it would not be prescience which opposed this liberty, it would be because we are automatons; for with such a constitution we should be without liberty, were even the Supreme Being not to have any knowledge of futurity.

It is in vain, in order to convince us we are not free, that some would represent us as necessarily submitting to the impulse of various exterior objects; comprehending, among those objects, every thing that is subtle in moral ideas, and uniting them under the general name of motives, and giving afterwards to these motives a physical force which we are bound to obey; but to be free, is it necessary that we act without motives? then man would be indeed evidently a piece of mechanism. It is certain, that we are, in all our actions, determined by reason, taste, or a cause of preference; but it is our mind which comprehends these various considerations, which weighs, compares, and modifies; it is our mind which listens to the counsels of virtue, and which replies to the language of our passions; it is in order to enlighten itself that it borrows from the memory the succours of experience; it is then our mind which prepares, composes, and improves every thing which we term motives, and it is after this intellectual labour that we act. There is too much order, unity, and harmony in our thoughts, to allow us to suppose them the mere effect of exterior objects; which, under the form of ideas, come without order to impress themselves on our brain; and until we are made acquainted with the works of chaos, we shall believe with reason that every where there is that unity, that order; that there is a faculty capable of re-assembling every thing that is scattered, and uniting to one end all that is mixed without design.

As soon as we are impelled to believe, that there is a master of all our perceptions, and that we feel this master act, how is it possible not to be certain that it is our mind which acts? It is then, in breaking loose from its operations, that we are stripped of our liberty, and that we at length suppose that our will is the necessary consequence of all exterior objects, as if it were the colours, and not the painter, which produced a picture. However, if we secure our mind from that dependence to which some wish to reduce it, our actions will not obey these irresistible emotions; for if they grant that we have liberty of thought, we have free will.

We ought to consider our senses as messengers, which bring to our mind new subjects of reflection; but they are in such a manner subordinate to the sublime part of ourselves, that they act only under direction; sometimes the ruling principle commands them to bring representations of the beauties of nature, to examine assiduously the registers of the human mind, to take the rule and the compass, and render an exact account of that which it desires to know with precision; sometimes they are taught to acquire more power, and when the soul wishes to communicate with men, when it wishes to address posterity, it orders them to perpetuate in indelible characters all that it has maturely combined, all that it has discovered, and all it hopes to add to the treasures of our knowledge. Is it not the master rather than the slave of our senses, or the blind play of their caprice?

There is besides another observation, which seems to contrast with the absolute empire, that some are willing to grant to exterior objects over the powers of our soul; for it is in the silence of meditation that the action of our mind is not interrupted: we experience that we have the power of recalling past ideas, and that we can connect those ideas with the prospect of the future, and to various imaginary circumstances of which we compose this picture; our reflection is then the result, but not the work of those exterior objects we are acquainted with. These two words, work and result, which in some acceptations have a great resemblance, have here very different meanings; and it is only in confounding them, that the objection against the existence of our liberty is favoured. We cannot form any judgment, without previously discussing every argument proper to throw a light on the subject; and the result of such enquiries determines our will; but these enquiries are themselves the work of our mind.

In short, all the degrees which lead to the end of our intellectual researches, are simple antecedents, and not absolute motives: there is, in the operations of our mind, as in every thing which is not immoveable, a train of causes and effects; but this train does not characterize necessity more than liberty.

In restoring thus to our soul its original dignity, do you not perceive, that we approach nearer to nature, than in adopting those systems and explications which assimilate our intellectual faculties to the regular vibrations of a pendulum? or would you like better still to compare them to those little balls which go out of their niches to strike our brain, which by various ramifications, produce that shock which impels our will? I see, in all this, only childish figures, put in the place of those names which indicate at least, by their abstraction, the indefinite extent of the ideas which they represent, and the respect they merit. It is easy to call a motive a little moving ball; it is easy to call uncertainty or repentance the combat of two of these balls, till the arrival of a third forms a determination; and the concurrence of many to the same point excites, in us, an impetuous passion: but who sees not that, after having endeavoured to debase the functions of the mind by these wretched comparisons, the difficulty remains undiminished?

In short, if the meditations and the researches of our minds, on the existence and the nature of our liberty, presents us only impenetrable clouds and obscurity, is it not singular, that in the midst of this darkness we should reject all the information of our instinctive sentiments, which only can clearly explain every thing that we in vain search for by other means? What would you say of a man born blind, who would not be directed by the voice? We are assuredly better instructed in the constitution of our nature by our feelings, than by metaphysical arguments! they compose an internal part of the essence of our soul; and we ought to consider them, in some measure, as a sally of the incomprehensible formation, whose mysteries we cannot penetrate. Such a doctrine, which came to us from a divine hand, is more deserving of confidence than the interpretations of men. There are secrets which philosophers try in vain to explain, all their efforts are useless to represent by comparison, that which is alone and without resemblance.

One would think, that nature, guessing the false reasoning which would mislead us, has purposely bestowed an inward conviction of the existence of our free will, in composing our natural life of two movements very distinct: one depends on a necessity, whose laws we are not acquainted with, and do not govern; whilst the other is entirely submitted to the government of our reason. Such a comparison would be sufficient to convince us, if we sought merely for the truth.

When Spinosa desired to throw contempt on our instinctive perceptions, he said, it is the same as if a weather-cock, at the very moment it was the plaything of the winds, believed itself to be the cause, and consequently that it had free will. What signifies such an argument, unless it is to prove, that it is possible to suppose a fiction so perfect, that it would apparently be equivalent to a reality? But I would ask, by what foolish design of an intelligent being, or even by what fortuitous assemblage of blind nature, is it that man should have every moment a will precisely conformable to his actions, if there is not a real correspondence between every part?

We could oppose to the hypothesis of Spinosa another argument, which would lead to a conclusion absolutely contrary; that is, if the most apparent liberty may be only a fiction, by a particular concurrence of our will with an action ordained; it is also incontestible, that were we to suppose the existence, or simple possibility of a free-will, we could not have a different idea of it, than that which we have already; and the liberty of God himself would not appear to our thoughts under any other form. It is very essential to remark, that when we reflect about our faculties, we with ease imagine a superior degree of intelligence, of knowledge, of memory, of foresight, and of every other property of our understanding; liberty is the only part of ourselves to which our imagination cannot add any thing.

I shall not pursue other subtle arguments, which have been produced, to corroborate my opinion; it is not to some men, but to all, that I desire to speak, because I wish to be universally useful: I shall then always dwell on the principal reflections, whenever they appear to me sufficient to influence the opinion of sound minds, and to fix them on those important truths which are the surest foundation of public happiness. Self-love might induce many to follow a question as far as it would go, and vainly glory in spinning it out; but self-love, applied to profound meditations, is itself a great subtilty.

Let us examine other arguments used to combat principles which we have established. It is in vain, some will say, to endeavour to prove the existence of a God, as a real support of the laws of morality; all this system will fall to pieces, if we are not informed, at the same time, in what manner this God rewards and punishes.

I shall observe, at first, that such an objection cannot make a very deep impression, but when it is connected in our minds with some doubt of the existence of a Supreme Being: a question that I shall not yet treat; for supposing an internal conviction of this last truth, supposing, in all its force, the idea of a God present to our thoughts; I ask, whether in order to please Him, we should not have need of knowing precisely the period when we could perceive distinct signs of his approbation and beneficence? I ask, again, whether, to avoid incurring His displeasure, it would be equally necessary for us to know how, and in what manner, He would punish us? Undoubtedly not: for in taking a comprehensive view of the rewards and punishments which may proceed from a Supreme Being, struck with His grandeur, and astonished by His power, the vague idea of infinity would obtrude; and this idea, so awful, would suffice to govern our sentiments, and fix our principles of conduct. We should be careful not to propose conditions to Him who has drawn us out of nothing, and we should wait with respect for the moment, when, in His profound wisdom, He may think proper to make us better acquainted with His attributes. Men may say to each other, secure my wages, I want them on such a day, I demand them on such an hour; they barter things of equal value, and during a short space of time; but in the intercourse of man with the Deity, what a difference!—The creature and the Creator—the child of dust and the source of life—a fleeting moment and eternity—an imperceptible atom and the Infinite Being!—our understanding is struck by the contrast! How then should we adapt to such disproportions the rules and notions which we have introduced into our trivial transactions? You require that in order to feel the desire of pleasing the Supreme Being, He should every moment bestow gifts on those, who, by their sentiments and actions, appear worthy of his goodness; and, to inspire the fear of offending Him, you wish that, without delay, He would let His vengeance crush the wicked. Certainly you would be scrupulous observers of His will on such conditions, for less stable hopes and fears detain you servilely near a monarch; and I may venture to say, that you would be equally attentive to the Ruler of the World, if, in order to reward or punish you, he was to alter the laws of nature.

But do we not, you may add, see that God does not interfere in any manner to direct things here below: you do not perceive Him; but do you more clearly discover the power which gives life and motion? It is not because He does not exist, but because He is above the flight of your mind. We do not know what to say to a man who rejects the opinion of the existence of a God; for without that guide all our ideas are wandering, and have not any other connexion but that of the wildest imagination; but if you grant that the world had an origin, if you suppose a God, creator and preserver, what arguments would you use to induce us to believe that this God has no relation to us; that He does not take any notice of us, and that He is thus separated from the offspring of His intelligence and love? You add, vice is every where triumphant, an honest man often languishes in despondency and obscurity; and you cannot reconcile this injustice with the idea of a Divine Providence! One may at first deny the assertion which forms the basis of this reproach, or dispute at least the consequences that are drawn from it: these ideas of triumph and abasement, of splendour and obscurity, are sometimes very foreign to the internal sentiments, which only constitute happiness and misery; and for my part, I am persuaded, that if we take for a rule of comparison, not some particular situation, or some, scattered events, but the whole of life, and the generality of men; we shall then find, that the most constant satisfactions attend those minds which are filled with a mild piety, firm and rational, such as the pure idea of the Deity ought to inspire; and I am equally persuaded, that virtue, united to this piety, which knows how to soften every sacrifice, is the safest guide in the path of life. Perhaps, ignorant as we are of our nature and destination, it is not our interest that uninterrupted rewards should excite us to virtue; for if this virtue were our title and hope with God for the present, and the time to come, we ought not to desire that it should degenerate into an evident calculation, into a sentiment bordering on selfishness. It would then be very difficult to give a proper definition of liberty, if, by the effect of rapid justice, a constant proportion of good and evil, accompanied every determination of our mind; we should then, morally as well as physically, be impelled by an imperious instinct, and the merit of our actions would be absolutely destroyed.

I mean by all this to ask, what would be our merit or demerit, if our life is only for an instant, and if nothing is to follow? The persuasion of the existence of a God, without a certainty of the immortality of our soul, cannot impose any obligation; but the real connexion between these two ideas is too frequently overlooked.

Undoubtedly, left to our understanding, this word certainty is not made for us, or at least it is not applicable to our relation with the Deity, and to the judgment we form of his designs and will. We are too far removed from the High and lofty One, who inhabiteth eternity, to pretend to measure His thoughts by our bounded views. They are covered with a veil, and we always obscurely discern that which is hid in the depths of His wisdom: but the more this God, whom we adore, escapes by His immensity from our conceptions, the less have we a right to limit His perfections, in order to refuse Him the power of transporting our existence beyond the narrow circle submitted to our view; and I know not how it would be possible to persuade us, that this action of the Deity would surpass in grandeur the creation of the world, or the formation of animated beings: the habit of observing a great wonder may weaken our astonishment, but should not eradicate our admiration.

We cannot reach, but by reflection, to those events of which the future is still the depository; but if every thing which surrounds us attests the grandeur of the Supreme Being; if the mind, in its meditations, without terror, approaches the confines of infinity, why mistrust that he can perform in favour of men, a magnificent union of Omnipotence and perfect goodness? Why reject, as an absurd confidence, the idea of another existence? We see, without astonishment, the feeble chrysalis force its way from the tomb it wove for itself, and appear under a new form. We cannot be anticipated witnesses of the perpetuity of our intelligence; but its vast extent would appear to us, were we not familiarized with it, a greater phœnomenon than duration.

In short, why do I resist an idea of a continuation of existence, since I am forced to give credit to my birth? There is a greater distance from nothing to life, than from life to its sequel, or renewal under a new form: I am clearly acquainted with the commencement of existence, I know death only by conjecture. We now enjoy the light and blessings brought to us by a beneficent heavenly Teacher; could it be, that he alone would be a stranger to his own glory and virtues? I cannot say, why this contrast makes an impression on me; but it is among the number of superficial ideas which occur to my mind, when I reflect on this subject.

A comforting thought still strikes me, the natural order of the universe appears to me a finished system: we perceive a perfect regularity between the revolution of the heavenly bodies, an invariable succession in vegetable life, an almost incredible precision in that immense quantity of volatile particles submitted to the laws of affinity; and think every thing in its right place, and that all fulfil exactly their destination in the grand and complete system of nature.

But if we turn afterwards our attention on the multitude of beings inferior to men, we shall discover also, that their action is as complete and conformable in every respect to the faculties they are endowed with, since they are governed by an imperious instinct. Full of these ideas, struck with astonishment at the appearance of an harmony so general, have we not just grounds to presume, that man, transported into infinite space by his intelligence; that man, susceptible of improvement, and continually combatting obstacles; that man, in short, this most noble work of nature, only commences in this sublunary world his race? And, since all which composes the material order of the universe appears to us in an harmony so admirable, ought we not then to conclude, that the moral order in which we perceive some things vague and not determinate; that the moral order is connected with another life more sublime and more astonishing than the other parts of creation, and will one day be ultimately developed? This singular disproportion between the harmony of the physical and apparent confusion of the moral world, seems to announce a time of equilibrium and completion; a time when we shall all know its relation with the wisdom of the Creator, as we already perceive the wisdom of His designs, in the perfect agreement of the innumerable blessings on sature with the present wants of man, and every other animated creature.

The grandeur of the human mind is indeed a vast subject of reflection; this marvellous constitution seems to remind us perpetually of a design proportioned to such a noble conception; it seems almost unnecessary that God should have endowed the soul with such noble faculties for such a short life as ours, to fulfil its limited plans and trivial pursuits: thus every thing authorizes us to carry our views further; were I to see such men as Columbus, Vesputius, Vasco de Gama, in a ship, I should not suppose that they were mere coasters.

Some try to destroy our hopes, by endeavouring to prove, that the soul is material, and that it ought to be assimilated to every thing which perishes before us; but the forms only change, the vivifying force does not perish; perhaps the soul resembles it, but with this difference, that as it is composed of memory, reflection, and foresight, it exists only by a series of consequences, which forms the distinct attributes and particular character of its essence: it follows then, that it cannot be generalized like the blind force which animates in a universal manner vegetation; but that every soul is in some measure a world to itself, and that it ought to preserve separately an identity of interest, and consciousness of preceding thoughts. Thus, in this system, the corporeal body, which distinguishes us to the eyes of others, is only the transitory habitation of that soul which is not to die; of that soul susceptible of continual improvement, and which, by degrees we can have no idea of, will probably approach insensibly to that magnificent period, when it will be thought worthy of knowing more intimately the Author of Nature.

How can we conceive the action of the soul on our senses, without a point of contact? and how conceive that contact, without the idea of matter? For it is only by experience we are acquainted with the necessity of it to occasion a motion; and without that previous knowledge, the rapidity with which one body sometimes strikes another, could only have been represented by the length of time necessary for its approach to it: however, if we had not any metaphysical knowledge of the cause of motion, and if experience only guided our judgment in this respect, why resist an idea that there is within us a faculty which acts of itself? the intimate feeling which we have of it, is certainly an argument for its existence. We cannot, besides, maintain, that a like property may be opposite to the nature of things; since if we adopt the system of the creation of the world, this property may proceed, like all others, from the Divine Power; and if we admit, on the contrary, the irreligious opinion of the eternity of the universe, there must have been from eternity a general movement without impulsion, without exterior contact, or any cause out of itself; and the action of our souls might be subject to the same laws.

The idea of the necessity of a contact, to effect a movement, would never have occurred, if we had bounded our observations to the influence of our ideas on our determinations, and the influence of those determinations on our physical being. In short, the laws of attraction and repulsion are subject to great exceptions; which exceptions may serve to support the system of the spirituality of the soul. We may be allowed to say, that there exists a vacuum in the universe, since, without this vacuum, there could not have been any motion? It is known that this motion depends on the laws of attraction but how can attraction act through a vacuum, unless it is by a spiritual force, which acts without contact, and notwithstanding the absolute interruption of matter? It is then this force, or its equivalent, that I may adopt to define the cause of the impressions of which our souls are susceptible.

Let others explain, in their turn, by what material communication, the sight of a few immoveable characters, traced on insensible marble, disturbs my soul. It is very easy to comprehend by what mechanism the eye distinguishes these characters; but there ends the physical action, for we cannot attribute to that action, the general power of producing sensations in the mind, since, perhaps, many other men may consider the same characters, without receiving any impression.

It is very possible, that our intellectual preceptions have not any connection with motion, such as we conceive it. Our interior nature, which we distinguish by the name of immaterial, is probably subject to laws very different from those which govern nature in general; but as we are obliged to apply to the mysteries of our souls, those expressions which serve to delineate or to interpret the phœnomena submitted to our inspection; these expressions, and their continual use, have insensibly habituated us to certain opinions, about the causes and developement of our intellectual faculties. It is thus that, after having used the words motion, rest, agitation, and action, to discriminate different affections of our souls, of which we know very little, we have afterwards assimilated them, foolishly, to our moral nature, to all the ideas which were represented by these denominations; and even death itself, of which we have not any clear knowledge, but by the dissolution of our physical being; death, an image borrowed from things which are under the inspection of our senses, has not, perhaps, either relation or analogy with the nature and essence of our spirit; all these are incomprehensible secrets, not mixt with any thing we are acquainted with.

We act, in this respect, like men born deaf, who apply to sounds those terms which they were accustomed to use, to express the sensations the other senses produced.

I shall only add another observation to the ideas on which I have just dwelt: perhaps we should never have thought of applying the words which express action and motion, to all the operations of our souls, if we had not at first divided our spiritual being into a great number of dependencies, such as attention, reflection, thought, judgment, imagination, memory, and foresight; and if afterwards, in order to render intelligible the variable relations of these abstract parts of our mind (these parts of a unit which we have taken to pieces, though it composed that single being ourself) we had not been obliged to have recourse to some plain expressions, like those of action, motion, attraction, and repulsion; but this familiar use of these expressions, in order to explain the accidents of our intellectual system, very much resembles the use which we make of X in Algebra, to express unknown terms.

In short, were we to submit the action of our souls to the laws of a particular movement, forming one of the dependencies of the great one, we should still have to explain the cause of the consciousness that we have of this action, which Atheists refuse to nature itself, at the very moment they make it the God of the Universe. Were reasoning able to subject all the operations of our mind to the impressions of external objects, we could not rank under the same laws, that consciousness which we have of our existence, and of the different faculties of the soul. This consciousness is not an effect, or the production of any known force, since it has been always in us independent of any external object, consequently we cannot investigate it. The conception of the existence of our souls, is as incomprehensible to us as that of eternity; what a profound thought, which even our imagination cannot embrace!

Let us admit, however, for a moment, that all the operations of our souls are determined by some impulsion, whatever it may be, we shall still be struck with the absolute difference which exists, according to our knowledge between the regular movements of matter, and the almost infinite and unaccountable emotions of our hearts and minds; so variable and so differently modified, that the attention is lost in the examination of them. And after having vainly endeavoured to conceive the union established between our thoughts and exterior objects, we have still to form an idea of the actions of these thoughts on themselves, their progression and connection; our mind led astray, lost in such a meditation, leaves us only a consciousness of our weakness, and we feel, that there is an intellectual altitude which the human faculties can never reach.

We distinguish, in a single character which our judgment can decypher, an absolute difference between soul and matter: we cannot avoid representing the latter as infinitely divisible, whilst, on the contrary, all the efforts of our imagination could never divide that indivisible unit which composes the soul, and which is the sovereign over our will, thoughts, and all our faculties^[5].

But if we examine again, under another appearance, the properties of matter, we know not how to assimilate to them the emotions of our soul; for we distinctly feel those emotions, let their number be ever so numerous, when even they act together and terminate in the same center, which is that Indivisible Being before alluded to; whereas matter, by an essential property, cannot, in the same instant be pressed or struck in several manners, unless it is in parts which have a tendency to different centres.

There is not then any resemblance between the impressions that our souls receive, and the various effects which may be attributed to the action of all the material substances of which we can form any conception: they are always connected with the idea of space and extent; but that centre, where all our perceptions meet, that Judge, who dictates laws in the internal empire, whose revolutions we only know, that last Director of our will, this Indivisible Being, at the same time our friend and master, is not to be found in any compounded idea; and this unity so simple, ought necessarily to convince us, that nothing which is submitted to the dominion of our senses, can serve as a type of the idea which we are to form of the soul.

We discover the traces of this truth, when we fix our attention on the comparisons with which our spiritual unit, our identical self, is continually occupied: we imagine it seated on a throne, listening, and examining the various reasons which ought to determine its action; we see it, like Nero, yielding sometimes to Narcissus, and sometimes to Burrhus; but at the same time we distinctly perceive all the counsellors, all the flatterers, all the enemies which surround it; we never remark but a single master in the midst of the tumult and the intrigues of this court.

Whilst our soul then is thrown into motion by contemplation, and by the imperceptible modification of a fugitive idea, as well as by every thing which is opposed to material action, why should we not suppose that it is purely intelligent and spiritual? It must be confessed, that sometimes our corporeal infirmities influence our minds; but this relation is not a proof of identity, since our body may be an instrument entrusted to our soul, one of the organs which it is to make a transitory use of. The continuity of existence, considered abstractedly, certainly is in the universe a simple and natural state; and the temporary existence is perhaps the only one which is heterogeneous and accidental; the soul seems too noble to be assimilated to the latter state, it may exist in a different manner when joined to a material substance, but that connection does not make it lose its original essence.

It is to be acknowledged, that it is through the medium of our senses we know all the force of our existence; and that they are those parts of our mixt being which strike us most during a little while; and it is perhaps by a law of the same kind that we see men, engrossed by a great passion, entirely strangers to every other moral affection; but, why should it be contrary to the nature of things, that the soul, once stripped of its terrestrial cloathing, should be acquainted with the nature of its existence, and at the same time perceive those truths which now are obscured by clouds. An innate fire languishes a long time unknown in a rough stone, that stone is struck, and we see issue out a splendid light; this is perhaps a faint picture of the state in which our soul is when death breaks its fetters.

In short, in a matter so obscure every supposition is admissable, which assures us that the soul is not on earth in a state of enchantment, or in a kind of interruption of its ordinary existence. All that we see of the universe is an assemblage of incomprehensible phœnomena; and when we wish to discover the conclusion, through the aid of the ideas most on a level with our intelligence, we wander perhaps from truth; since, according to appearances, it is in the depths of infinity that it reposes.

I doubt, whether we can allow the authority of those metaphysical arguments which are made use of to defend the spirituality of the soul to be decisive; but they are sufficient to repulse the different attacks of materialists. The most evident opinion to me is, that we are too weak to comprehend the secret we search for. We have, according to our petty knowledge, divided the universe into two parts, spirit and matter; but this division serves only to distinguish the little we know from that which we have no knowledge of; there is perhaps an infinite gradation between the different properties which compose motion and life, instinct and intelligence; we can only express the ideas conceived by our understandings, and the general words which we make use of, serve only to detect the vain ambition of our mind; but with respect to the universe, in considering its immensity, we shall find, that there is sufficient space for all the shades and modifications we have no idea of. We confess, that it is the connection between our physical powers and intellectual faculties, and the action that they seem to have on each other, which nourishes our doubts and anxieties; but without this relation, without the appearance of our fall, all would be distinct in the fate of man, all would be manifest. It is then, because that there is a shade in the midst of the picture, which continually catches our attention, that we have need to collect the light of the mind and the feelings, in order to see in perspective our destiny; and it is from this motive that we find it necessary, above all, to be penetrated with the idea of a God, and to search for, in his power and goodness, the last explication which we want.

There is, in the judgments of men, a contrast which I have often been struck with. Those people, who, at the sight of the immensity of the universe, at the view of the wonders in the midst of which they are placed, fear not to attribute to our intellectual faculties the power of interpreting and understanding every thing, and even the capacity of attaining almost to the hidden secrets of our nature; these same people are nevertheless most eager to strip the soul of its true dignity, and the most obstinate in refusing it spirituality and duration, and every thing else which can exalt it.

But happily, these refusals or concessions fix not our fate: the nature of the soul will always be as unknown as the essence of the Supreme Being; and it is one of the proofs of its grandeur, to be wrapped up in the same mysteries which hide from us the universal spirit. But there are simple ideas and sentiments, which seem to bring along with them more comfort and hope than metaphysical arguments.

We cannot profoundly meditate on the marvellous attributes of thought; we cannot attentively contemplate the vast empire which has been submitted to it, or reflect on the faculty with which it is endowed, of fixing the past, approaching the future, and bringing into a small compass the expanded views of nature, and of containing, if I may use the phrase, in one point the infinity of space, and the immensity of time; we cannot consider such a wonder, without continually uniting a sentiment of admiration to the idea of an end worthy of such a grand conception, worthy of Him whose wisdom we adore. Shall we, however, be able to discover this end, in the passing breath, in the fleeting moments which compose life? Shall we be able to discover it in a succession of phantoms, which seem destined only to trace the progress of time? Shall we, above all, perceive it in this general system of destruction? and ought we to annihilate in the same manner the insensible plant, which perishes without having known life; and the intelligent man, who every day explores the charms of existence? Let us not thus degrade our fate and nature; and let us judge and hope better of that which is unknown. Life, which is a means of improvement, should not lead to an eternal death; the mind, that prolific source of knowledge, should not be lost in the dark shades of forgetfulness; sensibility and all its mild and pure emotions, which so tenderly unite us to others, and enliven our days, ought not to be dissipated as if it were the vapour of a dream; conscience, that severe judge was not intended to deceive us; and piety and virtue are not vainly to elevate our views towards that model of affection, the object of our love and adoration. The Supreme Being, to whom all times belong, seems already to have sealed our union with futurity by endowing us with foresight, and placing in the recesses of our heart the passionate desire of a longer duration, and the confused sentiment which it gives of obtaining it. There are some relations still obscure, some connections between our moral nature and futurity; and perhaps our wishes, our hopes, are a sixth sense, a faint sense, if I may be allowed to express myself so, of which we shall one day experience the satisfaction. Sometimes also I imagine, that love, the most noble ornament of our nature, love, sublime enchantment, is a mysterious pledge of the truth of these hopes; for in disengaging us from ourselves, transporting us beyond the limits of our being, it seems the first step towards an immortal nature; and in presenting to us the idea, in offering to us the example of an existence out of ourselves, it seems to interpret by our feelings that which our minds cannot comprehend.

In short, and this reflection is the most awful of all, when I see the mind of man grasp at the knowledge of a God; when I see him, at least, draw near to such a grand idea; such a sublime degree of elevation prepares me, in some manner, for the high destiny of the soul; I search for a proportion between this immense thought and all the interests of the world, and I discover none; I search for a proportion between these boundless meditations and the narrow picture of life, and I perceive none: there is then, I doubt not, some magnificent secret beyond all that we can discern; some astonishing wonder behind this curtain still unfurled; on all sides we discover the commencement of it. How imagine, how resolve the thought, that all which affects and animates us, all which guides and captivates us, is a series of enchantments, an assemblage of illusions? The universe and its majestic pomp would then have been only destined to serve as the theater of a vain representation; and such a grand idea, so magnificent a conception would have had for an object a mere dazzling chimera. What would then have signified that mixture of real beauties and false appearances? What had signified that concourse of phantoms, which, without design or end, would be less admirable than a ray of light, destined to enlighten our abode? In short, what had signified in men that union of sublime thoughts and deceitful hopes? Guard us from giving credit to such a supposition! Is it to Him then, whose power has not any limits, that we dare to attribute the artifices of weakness? Should we have seen every where order, design, and exactness, as far as our understanding can reach, and as soon as we are arrived at the utmost boundary of our faculties, should we stop the views of the Supreme Intelligence, and imagine that all is finished, because futurity is unknown? Alas! we endure but a moment, and we presume to know the past and the future! But grant us only the idea of a God; do not deprive us of our confidence in Him; it is in relying on that grand truth, that we shall be able to guard our hopes against all the metaphysical arguments which we are not immediately prepared to answer.

Would you object, that hope is not sufficient to determine men to the observance of morality, and to subject them to the sacrifices which the practice of virtue seems to impose? What then attracts them, in all the bustle of life, unless it is hope; what is it that renders them greedy of honour and of fortune, unless it is expectation? And when they obtain the object of their wishes, they have frequently only the imaginary advantages hope created. Why then would you ask for a demonstrated certainty, in order to devote yourself to all the researches which the human mind can conceive to be the most grand, the most worthy of an ardent pursuit? On the contrary, the most trifling degree of expectation should become a motive of encouragement. And what is it, of all our interests, which could be put in competition with the most fugitive idea, with the slightest hope of pleasing the Master of the World, and maintaining the intercourse which seems to be indicated by our natural sentiments, and by the first perceptions of our minds?

I would wish to go still further, and I would demand, not of all men, but of some at least, if, were even this life to be their only heritage, they would think themselves freed from the desire of pleasing the Sovereign Author of Nature. The moment that is given us to know and admire Him, would it not still be a blessing? We celebrate the memory of those princes who have done good to men; are we not to do the same with Him to whom we are indebted for our existence; to Him who has contrived, if I may be allowed to say so, the various enjoyments we are so unwilling to detach ourselves from? Shall we dare, weak and ignorant as we are, to measure the wisdom, and calculate the power of our Benefactor, and rashly reproach him for not having done more for us? This would be the language of ingratitude. But, as I have shown, our sentiments have not been put to this test; and it is on more liberal terms that we have been admitted to treat with the Supreme Being: He has surrounded us with every thing that can encourage our expectations; He allows us, by contemplation, to attain almost a knowledge of his perfections; He lets us read them in that collection of glory and magnificence which the universe displays; He permits us to perceive his power and goodness, infinity and happiness; and by that succession of ideas he has guided our wishes and our hopes. How grand is the contemplation of the Eternal, they who have sensibility can tell! But this idea should be very early implanted in the human heart, it is necessary that it should be connected with our first feelings, that it should rise by degrees, in order to gain strength before men are thrown into the midst of that world which boasts of being freed from childish prejudices; left, hurried along by its levity, they follow every day a new master, and render themselves the slaves of pleasure and vanity.

And that which is to maintain, amongst men, the principles first inculcated, is public worship, an idea as beautiful as simple, and the most proper to vivify all that is vague and abstract in reasoning and instruction: public worship, in assembling men, and in turning them without public shame to their weaknesses, and in equalising every individual before the Master of the world, will be, in this point of view a grand lesson of morality; but this worship, besides, habitually reminds some of their duty, and is for others a constant source of consolation; in short, almost all men, astonished and overwhelmed by the ideas of grandeur and infinity, which the appearance of the universe, and the exercise of their own thoughts, present to them, aspire to find repose in the sentiment of adoration which unites them in a more intimate manner to God, than the developement of their reason ever will.

We should guard ourselves carefully from despising the emotions of piety, which cannot be separated from its advantages; and philosophers themselves know not how far they would go, when they try to reduce the interests of men to the narrow circle of demonstrated truths: that which we perceive confusedly, is more precious than all we have a certain knowledge of; that which we anticipate, is of more value than the blessings scattered round us. Thus, we should be miserably impoverished, if they could retrench from the various comforts which we shall never possess, but through the aid of the imagination. However, if we take this imagination as a guide and encouragement, when we are engaged in the pursuits of fortune and ambition, and if the wise themselves find that to be good which serves to nourish our passions, why would you reject it, when, simply more grand and more sublime in its object, it becomes the support of our weaknesses, the safeguard of our principles, and the source of our most interesting consolations?

It is the part of legislators to study these truths, and to direct towards them the spirit of laws, and the uncertain course of opinions. How honourable is it for them to be called to form the august alliance which is to unite happiness with morality, and morality with the existence of a God!