The obstinate resistance of the Allies at Masaya was due mainly to the fact that they had received a reinforcement of about eight hundred Guatemalans the very day they were attacked. It was these Guatemalans who had been placed in the plantain patches a few hours after they reached Masaya; and ignorant of the effects of American rifles they had kept their ground longer than any other portion of the allied force would have maintained it. During the three days’ fighting, however, the fire had been taken from the new men of Belloso; and his losses had been such that it was supposed he would scarcely be able to move without fresh troops. Hence Walker imagined the evacuation of Granada might be effected without any interruption from the enemy. He had, however, determined to destroy as well as abandon Granada; and as this duty required skill and firmness, he decided to intrust the task to Henningsen.

Preparations for the retreat from Granada were begun on the 19th. The sick and wounded in the hospital were placed on a steamer for transportation to Omotepe Island. In order to make the movement as rapid as possible, both the lake steamers, the San Carlos and La Virgen, were engaged for the service. On the 20th Walker repaired to Virgin Bay with the view of having all ready for a march to San Jorge or to Rivas, after the destruction of Granada. He supposed that the government property and stores would be at Virgin Bay on the 21st or the 22d, at latest: but several causes delayed the movement. There was a great deal of property scattered through Granada, belonging to officers and soldiers, and each one tried to save everything he owned. Besides, as soon as the idea got abroad that the town was to be destroyed the work of plunder began, and liquor being abundant, nearly every man able to do duty was more or less under its influence. Henningsen found it impossible to restrain the passions of the officers, and these, in turn, lost all control over their men. On the 22d, however, Fry had removed the women and children, as well as the sick and wounded, to the island, and had with him a guard of about sixty men. Henningsen had removed most of the ordnance stores to the steamer, and was proceeding with the destruction of the city. As the burning went on the excitement of the scene increased the thirst for liquor, and soldiers thought it a pity to waste so much good wine and brandy. In spite of guards and sentries, orders and officers, the drunkenness went on, and the town presented more the appearance of a wild Bacchanalian revel than of a military camp. Of course, Belloso soon knew the state of affairs at Granada, and on the afternoon of the 24th the town was attacked by the Allies.

At Virgin Bay the Infantry of Markham and of Jaquess were in a very disorganized condition. It being the close of the rainy season there was much fever in the camp; and the contrast between the quarters at Granada and at Virgin Bay, as well as the scarcity of vegetables in the rations at the latter point, depressed the spirits of the officers no less than of the soldiers. There were some choice men who seemed more cheerful at the prospect of difficulty and danger and privation; but such organizations are rare in every time and among every people. They are, unfortunately, the exceptions and not the rule.

To add to the general gloom, on the morning of the 23d, news came from San Juan del Sur that the schooner Granada had gone out of the harbor to engage a Costa Rican brig, and the people of the town had watched the fight by the flashes of the guns, until a broad bright light, accompanied by a loud noise as of thunder, led them to suppose one of the vessels had been blown up. Couriers arrived at Virgin Bay from time to time during the night of the 23d, announcing it as the general impression at San Juan that Fayssoux had blown up his schooner rather than let her fall into the hands of the enemy. This report, while it shows the opinions held by the people as to the inevitable result of a conflict between a vessel of the size of the Costa Rican brig and the little schooner, also indicates the idea they had formed of the character of the commander of the Granada. The failure of the schooner to enter the harbor during the night confirmed the impression of the townspeople; and at Virgin Bay few, besides the general-in-chief, doubted the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the light and the explosion.

On the morning of the 24th, however, the schooner was seen coming into port, and although her deck seemed covered with more than her complement of men, she cast anchor as usual in the harbor. In a little while the news spread that it was the enemy’s vessel which had been blown up the night before. The log of the schooner for the 23d tells the story thus: “Commences with light breezes from the N. and E., and pleasant. At 4 P.M. saw a sail off the harbor; hove up anchor, and stood out to her. At 5h. 45m. she hoisted Costa Rica colors. At 6, within four hundred yards of her; she fired round shot and musketry at us. At 8 we blew her up. At 10 we had taken from the sea her captain and forty of her men. Her name was Once de Abril, Capt. Antonie Villarostra; crew, 114 men and officers; guns 4, 9 lbs. calibre. The captain states that he was about surrendering when she blew up. All were lost and killed but those that I picked up. I had one man, Jas. Elliot, killed; Mathew Pilkington dangerously wounded, Dennis Kane seriously, and six others slightly. Light breezes; stood in for the harbor.”

The simplicity of the narrative reveals a feature in its author’s character; but it needs the commentary of the schooner’s size, and crew, and armament, to make its fall force felt. The Granada was about seventy-five tons burden, and had on board during the action with the Once de Abril twenty-eight persons all told, and among them were a boy and four citizens of San Juan. She carried two six-pound carronades, and had not more than 180 rounds of ball and canister. No wonder the people on shore imagined that a fight of two hours at close distance (for they knew, they said, Fayssoux would bring the brig to close work), had disabled the Granada to such an extent as to induce her commander to blow her up.

The destruction of the brig was caused by a ball fired into her from the schooner, the shot probably striking some iron or caps in the magazine. The Costa Ricans, however, and the people of Nicaragua, imagined it was effected by some new missile the Americans had invented. Many of the prisoners were badly burned; and they appeared grateful and somewhat surprised at the care the surgeons bestowed on their wounds. The captain was badly hurt, but after some time his burns were healed, and passage was given him on the steamer to Panama. The prisoners who could walk were soon released, and passports were given them for Costa Rica. When they reached home their reports did much to correct the prejudices the Moras had created against the Americans; and the released prisoners were finally silenced by the orders of the government. None of them, however, could ever be forced to march to Nicaragua.

The day after the action with the Once de Abril, Fayssoux was promoted to the rank of captain, and the estate of Rosario, near Rivas, was bestowed on him for the signal services he had rendered the republic. The result of this first sea-fight with the enemy, the disparity of numbers and guns, as well as the decisive character of the contest, gave new life to the men at Virgin Bay. Even the mean quarters and scanty rations of the village were, for a while, forgotten in the new glory the Granada had won for the red star flag of Nicaragua. And when, late in the evening of the 24th, news came that Henningsen was attacked at Granada, it did not interrupt the cheerfulness inspired by the success of the schooner off San Juan.

About three o’clock in the afternoon of the 24th the Allies attacked Henningsen at three points almost at the same moment.⁠[4] One body of the enemy appeared in the Jalteva, another on the side of the San Francisco church, while a third body attacked the Guadalupe church on the street leading from the main Plaza to the Playa of the Lake. Major Swingle with a few cannon-shot soon caused the force in the Jalteva to disappear; while O’Neal resisted the advance of the enemy on the side of San Francisco. At the Guadalupe, however, the Allies were more successful. They not only gained possession of the church of Guadalupe, but also commanded the church of Esquipulas, about half way between the former and the Plaza. Thus a small body of men at the fort and on the wharf engaged in sending freight aboard of the steamers were entirely cut off from Henningsen and the main body of Americans.

Soon after the enemy appeared around Granada Lieut. O’Neal had fallen; and his brother Calvin, half frantic from the loss, called on Henningsen to permit him to charge the enemy forming near the church of San Francisco. The Allies were between four and five hundred strong; but O’Neal, in his fury, thought not of numbers, and every other feeling was drowned in grief for a brother’s death. At a convenient moment the general gave him thirty-two picked Rifles and let him loose on the enemy. O’Neal, barefooted and in his shirt sleeves, leaped on his horse, and calling on his Rifles to follow, dashed into the midst of the Allies as they formed near the old church. The men, fired by the spirit of their leader, followed in the same fierce career, dealing death and destruction on the terrified foe. The Allies were entirely unprepared for O’Neal’s sudden, dashing charge, and they fell as heedless travellers before the blast of the simoom. The slaughter made by the thirty-two Rifles was fearful, and so far were O’Neal and his men carried by the “rapture of the strife” that it was difficult for Henningsen to recall them to the Plaza. When they did return it was through streets almost blocked with the bodies of the Guatemalans they had slain. This charge well closed the fighting on the first day of the attack.

At daybreak on the 25th, Henningsen had concentrated his force and was able to ascertain his real strength. He had only 227 men capable of bearing arms, and was encumbered with 73 wounded and 70 women, children, and sick persons. Twenty-seven had been cut off on the wharf, while Capt. Hesse with 22 men had been lost, either killed or taken prisoners, at the Guadalupe church. Henningsen had also seven guns and four mortars; but his supply of ammunition for these was so short as to make them of much less service than they might have been. This force was, during the night of the 24th, concentrated near the Plaza, and it held the adobe houses on each side of the principal street leading from the main square by the churches of Esquipulas and Guadalupe to the lake. A breastwork was built from the parish church on one side of the mouth of this street to the guard-house on the other side; and the Americans were also partially protected from the enemy by the burning buildings around and near the main Plaza.

During the 25th, Henningsen, while repelling the advances the enemy were constantly attempting to make, pushed on toward the Esquipulas, driving the Allies from the huts and small houses of the neighborhood; and in the afternoon he succeeded in getting possession of the church. The hot embers had prevented the enemy from occupying Esquipulas; but they had loopholed several huts near, and thus, for some time, kept the Americans from getting possession. After a second charge, however, the Allies were driven from their barricades in the brush as well as from the huts they held; and thus the way was open for the advance of the Americans toward Guadalupe. The losses during the day were small; and the wounds slight.

On the 26th, all the houses on the Plaza were destroyed, except the church, the guard-house, and one or two others. Still the operations were delayed by the too free use of liquor; and it was difficult to get work done at the time and in the way it was ordered. The general commanding found himself unable to keep together a sufficient force to aid in the attempts he made against the Guadalupe church. In the efforts to gain this point much of the slender supply of shot and shell were exhausted without making any impression on the defences of the enemy; and the Americans, on the contrary, were somewhat discouraged by the success of the Allies in knocking away the works they hastily built. About sunset Henningsen gave up the attempt on Guadalupe, with a loss of sixteen killed and wounded. In addition to this loss several officers had been hurt during the day at different points; and Col. Jones had received a wound which kept him on his back for many weeks afterward. Fortunately, after this, the supply of brandy in the American camp was scanty; and the allied soldiers having got some of the liquor left in the town, it is probable, that Belloso found difficulty in managing its distribution.

Soon after giving up the attempt on Guadalupe, Henningsen heard heavy firing, as he supposed toward the north; and then prolonged shouts coming apparently from the same direction. He fancied, at the time, it might be a relieving force, which had been landed to the north of the town; but it was really the firing and shouts of the Allies at the attack they made on the men at the old fort, which had been partially destroyed for the purpose of building a wharf. This point was held for two days by the captain of police, Grier, assisted by some twenty-five of his men and of other civil employees of the government. On the evening of the 25th, Walker hearing no news from Granada after the attack, took the steamer San Carlos, which anchored off the wharf early on the morning of the 26th. The general-in-chief seeing the red-star flag flying on the parochial church, and the smoke of the burning houses constantly rising in new directions, inferred that Henningsen, not having completed the destruction of the town at the time of the attack, was delayed on the Plaza more through choice in the complete execution of orders, than by any necessity the Allies had imposed. But perceiving the importance of holding the fort for Henningson’s ready communication with the lake, Walker sent to the wharf in order to ascertain the state and the wants of its defenders. Grier sent word that his men were in good spirits, confident of holding the position, and that all they wished was, after a while, some provision and ammunition. At dark, a boat was sent from the San Carlos to the wharf with the articles required; but then the aide, who went in the boat, reported, on his return, that the spirits of the men were failing. The change was due to the desertion of a young Venezuelan, Tejada, who had been released from chains by the Americans, on the 13th of October, 1855. The consciousness that their exact number and condition were reported to the enemy by Tejada, made the men nervous of an attack on the fort. By their courage and skill in the use of their weapons they had given the Allies the idea, that they were much stronger than they really were; but now, the deserter, by destroying the delusion of the enemy, also destroyed the confidence of drier and his men.

Scarcely had the aide-de-camp returned to the San Carlos before the heavy firing Henningsen heard on the evening of the 26th was also heard aboard of the steamer. The frequent flashes of discharging small arms formed a circle of fire around the wharf, and the deep, prolonged volleys of musketry, so distinct from the short, sharp crack of the rifle, told that the enemy were doing most of the work; nor were the shouts from the shore such as come from the lusty lungs of defiant or triumphant Americans. In a short time, too, a man swam to the steamer, and saying he had escaped from the wharf, told the story of its capture by the allies. The deserter, Tejada, had not only given the number of Grier’s men to the enemy, but had also pointed out how the wharf in the rear of the Americans might be reached with a large iron launch on the beach. At the same time Grier was assailed in the rear, a large force attacked him in front, and, paralyzed by the combined assault as well as by the number of the enemy, the Americans were nearly all killed or wounded, and taken prisoners without a serious struggle. Well does the conduct of these men, before and after the desertion of Tejada, illustrate the oft-repeated remark of the great captain, “that in war the moral is to the physical as three to one.”

On the 27th, Henningsen moved his wounded from the parochial church, and the difficulty with which the labor was begun shows the indisposition of his force to do any work except fighting. Some of the Jamaica negroes, who had been at work on the lake steamer, and were caught in the town accidentally, were of service for fatigue duty; nor were prisoners from the guard-house entirely useless. After the wounded had been removed, a few hundred pounds of damaged powder were put under one of the towers of the church, and all the houses remaining on the Plaza were fired. The enemy tried to press on the Americans as they left the main square, but they were kept back by a few riflemen in the church towers until Henningsen was ready to withdraw. When all was prepared, the Americans abandoned the Plaza, and as they retired put a match to a train reaching the damaged powder under the church. The fire reached the powder, blowing the tower high into the air just as the too eager enemy were crowding into the Plaza, of which they had so long strove to get the mastery.

The town was now almost entirely destroyed, and Henningsen having got his force completely together, determined to make another attempt on the Guadalupe church. He was now able to control sixty good men for the assault, and the spirits of his command were raised by the success of previous operations. Besides the sixty riflemen for the attack, there were twenty-four artillerymen at the three six-pounders, and after seven rounds from each of the guns, rapidly fired into the Guadalupe, the Rifles rushed to the assault. But the enemy had abandoned the church before the Americans reached it, and thus the most important point between the Plaza and the Lake was carried without the loss of a single man. Immediately the wounded, ammunition, stores, and guns, were moved to the Guadalupe, and Major Henry was ordered, with twenty-seven men, to take possession of two huts in the low ground between the church and the lake.

Henry forthwith executed the order, and soon reported that, from appearances, he expected an early attack by the enemy. He also advised the abandonment of one of the huts, adding that he could hold the other during the night. Henningsen urged him to hold the single hut as long as possible, and promised reinforcements; but the confusion of the move to the Guadalupe not being yet over, only ten riflemen, with Col. Schwartz and his howitzer, could be sent to Henry’s assistance. Nor was it long after dark when the enemy, under the shade of the thick plantain walks and mango trees, crept up toward the huts, with the hope of surprising the Americans. But a vigilant eye was watching their movements, and Henry, sending a few rifle shots among them, discovered their position and strength by the answering volleys of musketry. Then the howitzer threw its canister into the allied ranks, spreading death and confusion among the numerous body attacking Henry’s position. The enemy were driven back with severe loss.

After this repulse of the Allies Henningsen re-organized his force and found it stronger than he had supposed. He formed forty of the best men into a main guard, holding them in reserve for immediate and urgent use. A company of fifteen were detailed to guard the doors and windows of the Guadalupe church; while twenty were selected for the defence of the enclosure in the rear. Ten men were assigned to each of the six guns at the church, and besides these it was found there were yet thirty to spare. The latter were formed into a lower main guard and sent to report to Henry at the hut in the low ground. It will thus be seen that the fighting men, then for duty, numbered two hundred and ten.

Nor was the increase of strength by the new and more efficient organization the only added force Henningsen now had. The men recovering from the effects of debauchery in the town and seeing the necessity for laborious effort were more willing to work than they had hitherto been. During the night of the 27th, they worked with a vigor which surprised their commander, and by daybreak of the 28th, they had finished an adobe breastwork the general had scarcely hoped to see completed. Major Swingle, by his industry and intelligence, did much to forward the labors of the men, and it would have been difficult for Henningsen to find a man more capable than Swingle of directing the execution of any orders he might issue. But the concentration of the force at the Guadalupe, while it enabled Henningsen to complete an organization whereby his men were more readily handled, had its inconveniences and dangers. The crowding together of more than three hundred persons, many of them sick and wounded was calculated to affect the health of the camp; and the exposed nature of the ground where Henry was posted, commanded as it was by several points in the hands of the enemy, made it impossible to move non-combatants thither until it was properly entrenched.

On the 28th the enemy, under cover of a flag of truce, sent into the American camp a renegade by the name of Price, together with an aide of Zavala, bearing a letter to “the commander-in-chief of the remains of Walker’s forces.” This letter invited the commanding officer, for humanity’s sake, to surrender himself and soldiers prisoners-of-war, promising them safety and passports to leave the country. Price, too, at his entrance into the camp urged the men to give up their arms as they were surrounded by three thousand of the Allies, but Price was immediately arrested and silenced, and a defiant reply to their insulting invitation was forthwith despatched to the leaders of the hostile forces. The aide was evidently sent as a spy, for he entered without being blindfolded or duly introduced, and Henningsen showed his contempt for the Allied leaders by telling the officer he might pass through his camp and observe all his defences.

The enemy, finding it was necessary to use more vigorous means than words in order to get the Americans out of the positions they held, made several efforts to regain the church of Guadalupe. At three o’clock in the afternoon of the 28th, they tried to storm the church, but were repulsed with severe loss. Then at eight the same evening they attempted to surprise the position. The night was dark, and a large force got within eighty yards of the breastwork in the rear of the church before they were discovered. Major Swingle with two six-pounders poured canister rapidly into the approaching columns, and the blaze of the enemy’s musketry showing their position, the guns were used with deadly effect. In a short time the Allies were again repulsed, and without the waste of rifle caps, now becoming scarce in Henningsen’s camp. Several other faint attacks were afterward made on the church, but it was clear that the officers of the Allies could not drive their soldiers to an assault.

The entrenchments near Henry’s position were not sufficiently advanced to admit of the removal of the sick and wounded until the 1st of December. In the meanwhile cholera and typhus broke out in the Guadalupe. The crowded state of the church, the numbers of sick and wounded, and the bad air from the decaying bodies of the enemy’s dead, tended to produce sickness; and the tendency was increased by the exposure to night air and rains. The camp was now subsisting on mule and horse meat with small rations of flour and coffee; but this diet, sufficiently wholesome, had little to do with the disease which appeared. The Allies also perished in large numbers by cholera and fever; yet they had an excellent quality and great variety of subsistence. Among the allied officers who died of cholera was the commander of the Guatemalan forces, Gen. M. Paredes. His death left Zavala in command of the Guatemalan contingent.

The cholera was a more fearful enemy to the Americans than any by which they were surrounded. Hence it was important to hasten the removal of the sick and wounded to the entrenchments in the low ground; and after they left the Guadalupe disease diminished and the cholera almost entirely disappeared. About seventy men remained in the church; but its garrison was gradually reduced to thirty rifles under the command of Lieut. Sumpter Williamson. His steady courage and cheerful spirits made him competent, even with the small force at his disposal, to hold the position against any attempts of the enemy; and it was always easy for Henningsen, in an emergency, to strengthen him with fresh men.

But the cholera did not leave until it had taken off some of the most useful persons in the American camp. Among these was Mrs. Bingham, the wife of Edward Bingham, the actor. While the disease was worst in the Guadalupe, she had been constantly employed in the care of the sick; and her unwearied kindness and attention had probably enabled many to overcome the fatal epidemic. But she was herself finally seized and carried off by the disease in a few hours.

After moving the main part of his force to Henry’s position, Henningsen endeavored to work his way to the lake while keeping open his communications with Williamson in the church. For several days the enemy strove constantly to interrupt these communications. But all their attempts failed; and while the Americans held their ground against the enemy, the ordnance officers were increasing the supplies of ammunition. Major Rawle, one of the original fifty-eight, was possessed of untiring industry; and Major Swingle was fertile in resources and most ingenious in all mechanical contrivances. They made round shot by piling up small pieces of iron in sand hollowed on a six-pound ball, and then pouring lead over the iron pieces so as to hold them together. Thus the effective strength of the artillery was much increased; and the general was enabled to count on it as a means for breaking through the enemy’s lines in case such a step became necessary or advisable.

On the 8th Zavala sent another letter to Henningsen, imploring him to surrender, and saying that he need expect no assistance from Walker, as the steamers had arrived at San Juan del Sur and San Juan del Norte without bringing any passengers for Nicaragua. But the Nicaraguan general did not condescend to give a written reply to the Guatemalan officer. He merely sent the message that he could parley only “at the cannon’s mouth.” The men now began to be discouraged at the frequent appearance of the steamers on the lakes without the landing of a relieving force; and the enemy not moving it was necessary to send the Americans to attack some indigo vats on their right to keep them from dwelling on the condition in which they were placed by the Allies. The provisions were nearly exhausted; and the men had commenced discussing among themselves the necessity of breaking through the enemy’s lines, when, on the morning of the 12th, the steamer, La Virgen, again appeared off the port.

While the retreat from Granada was thus embarrassed by the large and constantly recruited force the Allies had brought against Henningsen, the troops in the Meridional Department were not prepared to relieve their beleagured comrades. Walker was almost constantly on the lake, watching the progress and attempting to ascertain the position of Henningsen; and when, at intervals, he returned to Virgin Bay, he usually found the force there nervous and apprehensive of an attack from Cañas and Jerez who then held Rivas. Jaquess, commanding at Virgin Bay, had more knowledge of tactics than of other branches of the military art more important in the operations of irregular war; and he permitted the most alarming reports as to the strength and resources of the enemy to be circulated in his camp. His men were worn out by heavy guard duty, and all the spirit was taken out of them by being kept in a state of constant anxiety and watchfulness.

Nor was the camp at Omotepe, whither the main hospital of the army had been temporarily removed, in a less uneasy mood than the Infantry at Virgin Bay. Fry had some sixty men capable of duty, and there were with him several efficient officers. It was impossible for the enemy, in any numbers, to reach the island, even if they had been able to spare the force from the position they held. But there were constant rumors of barges passing from San Jorge to Omotepe with arms for the use of the Indians on the east side of the island. Knowing well that but few of the Indians on Omotepe could be used against the Americans, even if the Allies had been able to furnish them all with arms, Walker felt confident that no serious attack could be made on the little village where the hospital had, for the time, been fixed.

On the morning of the 2d of December the general-in-chief went aboard of the lake steamer, with a view of visiting Granada. Just before the anchor was hove, a courier from San Juan del Sur announced the arrival of the Orizaba with eighty men for Nicaragua. The steamer was getting under weigh when a small canoe, with three men in it, approached the vessel from the direction of Omotepe. The men from the canoe were taken aboard the steamer, and they reported that the Americans on the island had been attacked the night previously by a large body of Indians. The tale of these three persons was indistinct, but as they had been out during the night and were shivering from exposure to the damp, chilly air, it was more charitable to impute the confusion of their story to cold than to fear. The steamer was forthwith ordered to the island, and the general-in-chief took the most intelligent of the three fugitives to the cabin and dosing him with a half-tumblerful of whiskey, tried to get out of him the true state of affairs at Omotepe. All he could get out of the man was that every soul on the island, sick and wounded, women and children, had probably been murdered. The cowardly fellow was not ashamed to live and tell the tale.

As the steamer approached the island one of the large iron launches used by the Transit Company for loading freight and passengers was seen drifting in the lake, without sail or rudder, and filled with a crowd of men, women, and children, in all varieties of dress and humor. It was some comfort to see that everybody on the island was not killed; though the forlorn condition of the launch’s passengers was well fitted to excite pity and compassion. Among them, two or three ladies who had been delicately brought up, bore their trials and sufferings with more patience than the stoutest men; while some of the women, viragos in appearance, as soon as they were safely aboard the steamer, loosened their tongues and gave free play to their long-restrained feelings. Soon the steamer anchored off the village where Fry was quartered; and he immediately reported that the Indians had attacked the Americans merely to get a chance of rifling their trunks, and that they had disappeared not long after daylight. Some of the men capable of bearing arms, and even some officers, had disgraced themselves by deserting women and children, as well as the sick and wounded, at the first alarm. Two or three of these men, as they might by courtesy be called, escaped to the main land before the passengers by the Orizaba left Virgin Bay; and thus the report was sent to the United States that all the people of Omotepe had been massacred by the Indians.

Leaving the island and going to Granada, Walker remained there only long enough to see that Henningsen had reached the huts half way between the Guadalupe and the lake; then, returning to Virgin Bay, he proceeded to organize the new men who had arrived from California on the Orizaba. The spirits of Jaquess’ men had been revived by the arrival of these fresh recruits; and in a short time the main portion of the troops at Virgin Bay were ready for a march to San Jorge. On the afternoon of the 3d December, the Americans occupied San Jorge, without any opposition from Cañas, then at Rivas with some seven or eight hundred men. The sick at Virgin Bay, as well as the army stores and government property collected there, were carried to San Jorge on the lake steamers; and the fine air of that village, together with the improved quarters and rations, diminished the sick list and increased materially the effective force of the several companies.

When nearly the whole American strength in the Meridional Department had been concentrated at San Jorge, the hospital at Omotepe, together with the women and children there, were removed to the main land. Many of the native women and families had followed the army in its retreat from Granada, and many of these were supplied with quarters and rations by the proper officers of the Nicaraguan forces. The trunks and chests of most had suffered from the foray the Indians made on the island; but the delightful air of the isthmian December rendered the loss less severe than might be imagined.

In the meanwhile the steamer from New-Orleans arrived at San Juan del Norte with nearly two hundred and fifty passengers for Nicaragua. On the afternoon of the 6th these persons reached Virgin Bay; and on the morning of the 7th they arrived at San Jorge. They were mostly under the direction of Lockridge, who had gone to the United States during the previous summer to encourage emigration to Central America. A small company of these men, commanded by Captain G. W. Crawford, was assigned to the Rangers; while the remainder were organized into a new corps, called the Second Rifles, (the old Second Rifles being dissolved,) and placed under the command of Major W. P. Lewis. Crawford’s company were, for the most part, supplied with saddles and revolvers they had brought from the United States; and the rifle, commonly called Mississippi, was issued to them. Major Lewis’ men were armed with Minié muskets.

Lockridge had brought to San Jorge about 235 men; and these, together with the men from California, raised the number of recruits to more than 300. The men from California were, for the most part, distributed into two companies, commanded respectively by Capt. Farrell and Capt. Wilson. Farrell was ordered to report to Waters for duty with the Rangers; while Wilson was attached to the new command of Lewis. These fresh men were in good spirits, and all anxious to see some fighting. Nor had they long to wait for active service. Sanders was ordered to take Higley’s company, the strongest of Lewis’s command, and proceed to Granada with a view of ascertaining Henningsen’s position. It was supposed that Henningsen had probably been able to reach the lake; and if such were the case, Higley’s company would suffice to aid his embarkation. But Sanders returned and reported that Henningsen appeared not to have advanced further than the position he held between Guadalupe and the beach on the 2d; and it was certain that he was altogether unable to communicate with the lake shore. Rumors also came by the way of Nandaime, through native channels, to the effect that the Americans were suffering from disease and famine in the church of Guadalupe.

Accordingly on the 11th, Higley’s and Wilson’s companies were ordered to report to Waters; and these, together with Leslie’s, Farrell’s, and Crawford’s companies of Rangers, formed a body of 160 men. Waters soon had his men embarked on the steamer La Virgen; and the general-in-chief accompanied the command. Besides the Rangers and the two companies of Rifles, several volunteers requested leave to act under Waters. Lockridge appeared anxious for action; and although no definite rank was assigned him, he was, for the occasion, placed next in command to the chief of the Rangers. Early on the morning of the 12th, the steamer was anchored off Granada, out of range of the enemy’s shot; and the officers were instructed to keep the men carefully concealed in the lower part of the vessel. During the day, the positions of the enemy were as far as possible observed; and the anxiety of the Allies to prevent a landing, was proved by their parading soldiers in numbers along the beach. These soldiers would march and counter-march; and the effort was manifest to arrange them in such a manner as to make them appear more numerous than they really were.

Between eight and nine o’clock in the evening, the steamer quietly and with all her lights covered, moved up the lake to the same point where the Democrats landed on the night of the 12th of October, 1855. This point was more than a league from the fort and wharf of Granada; and the depth of water was such as to allow the steamer to approach near the shore. The disembarkation was immediately begun; and when the first boat reached the beach, a picket of the enemy fired a single volley and fled. In about two hours the whole force was ashore; and Waters received orders to proceed to the relief of Henningsen, keeping as close as possible to the beach, in order not to lose his power of communicating with the general-in-chief who remained aboard the steamer. Then the La Virgen withdrew, and resumed as nearly as possible the anchorage she held during the day.

Not long after the steamer anchored off the wharf, and near midnight of the 12th, the long lines of fire from small arms followed by the reports of heavy volleys of musketry and answered by quick and angry retorts from the rifles announced that the conflict of Waters with the enemy had begun. Then the flashes and the reports ceased; but in a short time the fires again appeared and the sounds yet louder and more distinct told that the bold chief of the Rangers was driving the enemy before him. For several minutes the flashes and the reports were even fiercer and heavier than before; but they soon ceased, and their sudden cessation again told the tale of the yet advancing Americans. Soon after the last firing was heard, a noise from the water, crying as if for help, announced a messenger with news. A small boat was let down, and in a few moments a dusky form was seen scrambling over the rail of the steamer. At first Walker was apprehensive the news might be from Waters, and, it being dark and the messenger not a white man, the general-in-chief commenced his questions in Spanish. But the answer was English, and spoken in the thick broken accents of a Kanaka boy who had come to Central America on the Vesta in 1855. Kanaka John had been for several hours in the water, and bore, in a sealed bottle, a note from Henningsen, giving information of the state of his force and indicating certain signals to be made in case a landing was attempted. The signals were made as soon as the note was read; but they were not seen by those for whom they were intended.

After landing Waters proceeded along a narrow strip of land with the lake on his left and a lagoon on his right. As he approached a point where the lagoon reaches within thirty or forty yards of the lake, he was fired on by the enemy, who were stationed behind a barricade they had built from one body of water to the other. The heaviness of the volleys showed that the Allies were in force; and the Americans for a moment wavered. Waters had ordered Leslie to assault the barricades with his company; but his men hesitated, and some confusion arising, Leslie took the first who offered and leading them up to the barricades drove the enemy from their position. The march toward Granada was resumed; but when Waters reached a place called the “coal pits” he was again arrested by a large body of the Allies. The numbers of the enemy were greater than at the first barricade; the position, however, was not so good and they were soon driven from it by the vigorous charge of Higley and his company.

Waters, as he approached the town, turned to the right in order to gain the Tipitapa road which passes over higher ground than that nearer the lake. About daybreak he had gained the suburbs and was approaching some small cane huts when he again received the fire of the Allies. The enemy were behind strong barricades; but Capt. Crawford, passing with his company to some rising ground on the right, was enabled to turn the left flank of the Allied lines. A prisoner taken at this point gave Waters such information as decided him to proceed at once to the Guadalupe. He was encumbered with thirty wounded and it became an object to join Henningsen without further loss. Leslie was, therefore, sent in advance to advise Henningsen of Waters’ approach; and thus early in the morning of the 13th the Americans in the Guadalupe were strengthened by the entrance of the force landed the night previously.

It was well for Henningsen that Waters arrived; for the commissary stores of the former were nearly exhausted, and, as fearful a plague as cholera, desertion, had begun to thin his enfeebled ranks. Even after Waters’ arrival, the difficulties of Henningsen’s position were not slight. But the vigorous fighting of the Americans during the night had impressed the Allies with an exaggerated idea of their strength; and Belloso was discouraged by the fierceness with which his barricades had been assailed. He began to think that wood and earth were no safe protection from the soldiers who had carried three well-defended positions in the course of almost as many hours; and the movements of his force soon showed his weakness and irresolution. The fort was abandoned, and the sheds built on it were set afire. Of course, as soon as Henningsen discovered the fort was given up by the enemy he took possession of it; and thus, without further difficulty, communication with the steamer was established.

Preparations were immediately made for embarking the whole command on the La Virgen. The number of sick and wounded made the movement slow; and the men for duty were exhausted, some by their long fatigues and exposures, and others by the march and actions of the previous night. Of the 419 under Henningsen when Granada was surprised, 120 died of cholera and typhus, 110 were killed or wounded, nearly 40 deserted, and 2 were made prisoners. Of Waters’ force, 14 were killed and 30 wounded. Leslie was unfortunately shot in the head after he reached the Guadalupe, and his death was a loss not easily repaired, for his services as a scout were inestimable. Lieut. Tayloe, who was absent, by leave, from his post at San Carlos, had obtained permission to march with Waters, and he fell at one of the barricades outside the town.

It was near two o’clock on the morning of the 14th before everything was aboard the steamer. At leaving, Gen. Henningsen stuck up on a lance the words “Aqui fué Granada”—“Here was Granada”; and these were well calculated to re-kindle the passions of party, not yet extinct among the old Legitimists and Democrats. While the voice of one party was that of wailing and woe, at the loss of its cherished city, the other party could not suppress its feelings of triumph and exultation. Nor has the destruction of Granada failed to call forth censure elsewhere than in Central America. It has been denounced as an act of vandalism, useless in its consequences to the authority which ordered it. As to the justice of the act, few can question it; for its inhabitants owed life and property to the Americans in the service of Nicaragua, and yet they joined the enemies who strove to drive their protectors from Central America. They served the enemies of Nicaragua in the most criminal manner; for they acted as spies on the Americans, who had defended their interests, and sent notice of all their movements to the Allies. By the laws of war, the town had forfeited its existence; and the policy of destroying it was as manifest as the justice of the measure. It encouraged the Leonese friends of the Americans, while it gave a blow to the Legitimists from which they have never recovered. The attachment of the old Chamorristas to Granada was strong and peculiar. They had for their chief city a love like that of woman; and even after years have passed tears come to their eyes when they speak of the loss of their beloved Granada. And well did it become them to have such affection for the town; because it furnished them with the resources which enabled them to maintain power, and to keep under the excitable passions, as they called them, of the Leonese Democrats. The destruction of Granada was, therefore, a long step toward the destruction of the Legitimist party; and thus the Americans of Nicaragua were able to cripple their most bitter and consistent foe.

As the steamer left her anchorage a strong north-easter rose, and the vessel was obliged to seek the shelter of Omotepe, and to lie for several hours under the lee of the beautiful volcano which springs, as it were, from the waters of the lake. When the wind fell the La Virgen ran across to San Jorge, and everything was soon got ashore. The enemy at Rivas, hearing of the relief of Henningsen, and fearful of the artillery now at the disposal of the Americans, stealthily abandoned the place, and marched hastily to join Belloso at Masaya. On the morning of the 16th the Americans were again in possession of Rivas.