The mainspring of Abdel Kader’s strength at this epoch lay in the Beni Amers and the Hashems. Taking strong detachments from these tribes, he approached the town. Its population was divided into two parties, Turks and Kolouglis. The latter (descendants of Turkish and Arab parents) occupied the citadel. The Arabs were commanded by Noona, who has been already mentioned. Abdel Kader summoned the latter to surrender. He refused. The resistance which he offered was, however, quickly overcome; for while Abdel Kader assaulted him on one side, the Kolouglis opened fire on him from the citadel.
When the town of Tlemsen was won, Abdel Kader treated its inhabitants with the greatest consideration. He had hoped that the Kolouglis would acknowledge him. But, secure in their stronghold, they rejected all his overtures. They consented, however, to maintain with him a friendly intercourse. Having no artillery wherewith to reduce them, he accepted the compromise, and installing one of his lieutenants as governor of the town, returned to Mascara.
On the road he received tidings of his father’s death. Mehi-ed-deen had lived long enough to see his favourite son embarked in that career which he fondly hoped would be the prelude to his country’s freedom and independence. The bereaved son was deeply afflicted by the loss of a parent who had from his infancy lavished on him all the endearments of love and affection, who had always treated him as a bosom friend and companion, and to whose influence he in truth owed his high position. But, so far from having time to indulge in the temporary retirement from public affairs which his grief demanded, he was barely able to follow his father’s remains to the grave.
Desmichels had just taken Arzew and Mostaganem. Abdel Kader had thus not a moment to lose. It was imperative on him to make every endeavour to nullify this extension of French dominion in the province of Oran. On the 2nd of August, 1833, he was under the walls of Mostaganem, and led an assault against it. Desmichels, leaving the garrison to defend itself, immediately returned to Oran. He hoped that the presence of Abdel Kader at Mostaganem would leave him free to carry out successfully an incursion he had long contemplated.
On the 5th of August, the day after his arrival in Oran, consequently, he sent a force of 3,000 cavalry and infantry and three field-pieces to attack the Douairs and Zmelas, two tribes who were doing the French irreparable injury by the activity with which they were enforcing the blockade established by Abdel Kader. On the 6th, at daybreak, the column came upon the Arab encampments. The artillery opened, the infantry moved on at the double, the cavalry charged.
The Arabs, surprised, bewildered and stupefied, made but a straggling and ineffectual defence. Finally they decamped, leaving their herds and their flocks, and many women and children, in the enemy’s hands. Suddenly their retrograde movement appeared, to the astonishment of the French, to be stopped; their numbers, as if by enchantment, to be increased; their attitude to have become offensive. Abdel Kader had arrived.
Divining his adversary’s intention in leaving Mostaganem, he had ceased to superintend the siege in person, and had rushed to the point more directly menaced. He came up at the critical moment. It cost him little to turn the tide of battle. The French infantry beat a rapid retreat, some in hastily-formed squares, some in broken file; the cavalry maintained a flying flight; the artillery alone did good service. Anticipating an easy conquest, the French had not brought provisions. They were now driven from their spoil. The pangs of hunger and thirst assailed them. The scorching sun blazed over their heads. The Arabs presently enveloped them on all sides.
“Fire the plains!” cried Abdel Kader. Instantly hundreds of horsemen galloped off, and lighted the dry herbs and brushwood extending behind the French rear. The unfortunate soldiery, retarded in their march by the wounded, whom they nobly refused to abandon, had to tread on burning cinders and wade through sheets of flame. Human nature sank beneath the trial. Many flung away their arms. Some were suffocated; others, in their despair, threw themselves frantically on the ground, eager to part with their lives, of which the Arab yataghans soon relieved them.
Desmichels had been apprised by some fugitives of the disasters which had befallen the expedition. The whole garrison of Oran was promptly turned out to rush to the rescue. The troops barely reached the ground in time to save their comrades from utter annihilation.
Abdel Kader, in the full flush of victory, returned without delay to hasten on the siege of Mostaganem. It is difficult to say whether most admiration should be bestowed on the boldness of his design, or on the courage and perseverance which so nearly accomplished it. Abdel Kader had no siege artillery; he possessed only infantry and cavalry. The infantry had already made themselves masters of the suburbs, and were attacking one of the forts close to the sea. A French brig galled them with its fire. The Arabs stripped, swam off, holding their muskets over their heads, and attempted to board it. They were driven off; but the fearless audacity thus displayed shows how much may be achieved by Arabs when commanded and inspired by a spirited leader. Abdel Kader had commenced sapping. The sap reached the foot of the walls. An explosion effected a breach. The order for a general assault was given. The Arabs, led on and animated by the voice and example of their Sultan, rolled on like a mighty wave, and like a wave, dashed and receded. The French, lining the tops of the wall on either side, poured in such a flanking fire on the assailants, that after a desperate struggle they were hurled back in confusion. Abdel Kader, finding his last resource exhausted, raised the siege and returned to Mascara.
Though Abdel Kader had already done sufficient to justify and secure the confidence of his immediate companions in arms, and (despite the jealousies of certain chiefs) to centre on himself the hopes and good wishes of all the tribes within the province of Oran, yet the force of circumstances had compelled some of the latter, however anxious to rally round his standard, to submit to the invaders.
The Douairs and Zmelas, constantly exposed, by their vicinity, to the incursions of the French, had suffered losses which the pardonable instincts of nature had induced them to repair by an apparently friendly accommodation with an enemy whom they inwardly detested. Strangers to that spirit of self-abnegation which true patriotism requires, they had consented to purchase a momentary tranquillity by accepting French protection. By a treaty with Desmichels they had established themselves under the French flag, in the valley of Miserghin, three leagues distant from Oran.
The lofty policy of Abdel Kader could ill brook such a glaring violation of the clear and unequivocal injunctions of the Koran. That sacred volume neither countenanced nor admitted the principle of expediency. To conquer or to die, sword in hand, for the Faith, was its uncompromising and inexorable dogma. Zealous interpreter and dauntless defender of that soul-inspiring mandate in all its heroic greatness, Abdel Kader made it his imperative duty to uphold it with ceaseless and untiring vigilance, and to visit its slightest infraction with unsparing rigour.
Independently of this superior and all-sufficient consideration, he well foresaw that if vicinity to the enemy was to be made the pretext for submission, and hardship and suffering the signal for treason, the views which he entertained for the working out of the salvation of his country would speedily be dissolved, his plans for its regeneration become illusory, and his utmost efforts for their realisation abortive. He knew that the edifice he was so laboriously erecting, thus breached at its very base, would crumble away like a rope of sand.
He considered, consequently, that to condone, to overlook, or to excuse such weakness, whatever the plea advanced, would be tantamount to abandoning the trust which had been solemnly committed into his hands, and the task which he had sworn to accomplish. The alternative presented to him might be ungracious, it might be painful; but, calm and unshaken in the purity of his conscience, firm and confiding in the goodness of his cause, he accepted it.
Whilst maintaining a bold front to the enemy, it might become incumbent on him so to act as to become an object of terror rather than of love, to hundreds, perhaps thousands, of his own countrymen. His severity might be called oppression, his exactions and punishments might be stigmatised as tyranny. But at whatever cost to the sufferers, at whatever detriment to his own popularity, he determined to make it understood and felt throughout the tribes, as a policy indispensable to the common welfare, that in him alone was vested the prerogatives of making peace, or signing conditions; he resolved, therefore, to impress on the minds of all the tribes, that if any accepted terms from the French on their own account, their last and heaviest account would be with him. The Douairs and Zmelas in due time experienced this correcting discipline.
1833.
The enthusiasm excited in France by the taking of Algiers was of short duration. A revolution had overthrown the dynasty of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, under whose auspices the conquest had been achieved. The dark cloud of hatred and execration which enveloped the departed tyranny, threw its ominous shadow over the glories of that brilliant feat of arms.
Willingness to abandon the fruits of a triumph obtained under such circumstances became the prevalent feeling. In the French Chambers a large party denounced the contemplated occupation of Algeria as costly and useless. Some suggested that the sea-coast towns should be held, not so much with views of aggrandisement, as from a desire of saving the national honour.
None understood, and few troubled themselves to investigate, the nature of the country which was the subject of debate. All knew that Algeria was a nest of pirates, that the governors were barbarous Turks, and that the government were degraded Arabs. But what was the condition of the interior, what were the manners, customs, and social characteristics of the people, what kind of government would best replace the one which had been overthrown, what system of administration should be adopted, no one attempted duly to consider. On all these points the ignorance and indifference was complete.
Fluctuating in its plans, and unwilling to release its grasp, the French ministry, at an early period, reduced its army in Algeria to 10,000 men. For a long time afterwards, all its measures were marked by weakness and indecision. In the space of six years, no less than ten governor-generals were sent over to experimentalise on new theories of legislation. The thread of official experience was constantly broken by the arrival of successive neophytes in the art of governing. Each new actor appeared on the stage with his peculiar crotchets, which he crudely endeavoured to carry into execution.
In the autumn of 1830, Marshal Clausel, the Governor-General, proposed to entrust the provinces of Oran and Tittery to princes of the family of the Bey of Tunis, on the condition of their becoming vassals of France. He gave Oran, accordingly, to Prince Sidi Achmet, for an annual tribute of one million francs. The prince, uncertain as to his reception by the Arabs of that province, prudently sent before him a deputy, named Heir-ed-deen, to feel the way. This functionary, on his arrival, found the city nearly deserted, and the magazines void of provisions.
Nevertheless, he proceeded to feel his ground. He issued a proclamation to the Arabs, giving them the most flattering assurances of his future intentions. They were told that the French had not the slightest desire to interfere with their established usages and customs; that they would confine themselves to the occupation of the sea-coast towns; and that the tribes in the interior should be governed by native chiefs of their own selection. Some Arab sheiks, seduced by these promises, came in, and received pelisses, and other marks of honour. They returned to their tribes, but to become objects of ridicule. The plan proved utterly abortive. It neither awakened hopes, nor dispelled fears. After a few weeks, the agent of the prince withdrew.
To the immense advantages which accrued to him from the fluctuations and failures which embarrassed the councils of the French government, Abdel Kader was daily adding those solid results which arose from his own energy and courage. The fruits of the impulse which he had imparted to his countrymen were becoming more apparent. Confidence, if not victory, followed everywhere in his train. The Arab character was developing long-concealed virtues from its inmost depths. Patience, constancy, perseverance, concentration of purpose, and a spirit of union, had all been summoned to the surface under the presiding genius of Abdel Kader.
His principal care was to get rid of all the causes likely to endanger the common weal, or to disturb his general line of action. The edict which he had issued, forbidding all commercial transactions with the French, had borne heavily on some of the tribes, who had long been accustomed to trade with the towns now in French possession. The fruits of a traffic exercised from generation to generation, and the enormous profits actually reaped, were advantages not easily foregone. But, by the influence of certain Marabouts, who, by the order of Abdel Kader, were moving constantly amongst them, more patriotic feelings were made to prevail. The Arabs ceased to frequent the French markets.
The system of blockade enforced by Abdel Kader had a telling effect on the French garrisons. They depended almost entirely on the Arabs for the necessaries of life. The sea brought them little or nothing, and only at rare intervals. Hence the nervous anxiety, leading to acts of violence, with which, like birds of prey, they scented and pounced upon their food in the interior. Whilst Desmichels was revolving in his mind in what manner he could, without lowering his dignity, bring about negotiations with Abdel Kader, and relieve him from his pressing wants and necessities, there occurred an event which opened the door to a transaction.
Towards the end of October, 1833, an Arab, named Kudoor, of the Borgia tribe, came to Arzew and sold some cattle. On his departure he asked the French commanding officer to give him an escort, as he dreaded the Sultan’s scouts, whom he knew to be on the look-out. An escort of four horsemen was given him. At the distance of about a league from the town the escort was attacked by a large force of Arabs. One man was killed; the three others were taken prisoners and carried to Mascara.
Desmichels, only too happy to have a plausible pretext for writing to Abdel Kader, now addressed him the following letter:—
“I do not hesitate to make the first advances to you. My position, strictly speaking, does not allow me to do so, but humanity compels me. I reclaim the liberty of those Frenchmen who, while engaged in escorting an Arab, fell into an ambuscade. I cannot suppose that you will make their release dependent on conditions, since, when by the fate of war some of the Zmelas and Gharabas were not long since brought in to me, as prisoners, I at once sent them back to their tribes, without any stipulation, and treated them, moreover, with the greatest kindness.
“If, therefore, you wish to be considered a great man, I hope you will not be behind me in generosity, and that you will immediately release the Frenchmen who are now in your power.”
Abdel Kader returned the following reply:—
“I have received the letter, in which you express your hope that the prisoners to whom you allude will be liberated. I understand its contents. You tell me that, notwithstanding your position, you have consented to make me the first advances. It was your duty to do so, according to the rules of war. Between enemies, each has his turn: one day the chances are for you, another for me. The mill turns for both, and always crushing new victims.
“As for myself, when you have taken prisoners, I never troubled you with reclamations in their behalf. I was pained, as a man, for their unhappy fate; but, as a Mussulman, I looked upon their death, if it occurred, as a new life. You tell me that your Frenchmen were employed to protect an Arab. That is no reason with me. Protectors and protected were alike my enemies; and all Arabs who are found with you are bad believers, ignorant of their duty.
“You boast that you gratuitously liberated some of the Gharabas and Zmelas. That is true. But you surprised men who were living under your protection, and who were actually supplying your own markets. Your troops robbed them of all they had. If, instead of falling on those who were doing you a service, you had advanced beyond your lines; if you had attacked men who were anxiously waiting for you, such as the Beni Amers and the Hashems, then you might, with justice, talk of your generosity, had you taken prisoners from them, and set them free.
“Then you would have deserved the praises you claim for yourself for having pillaged the Zmelas, and setting about the report that I had fallen into your hands. When you march two days beyond the walls of Oran I hope we shall behold each other; and then it will be seen which of us will remain master of the field.”
This haughty challenge would, under other circumstances, have aroused in the breast of the French general the loftiest feelings of chivalry. The drums would have been beat, the trumpets sounded, the standards fluttered, and the Arab champion would have been swiftly summoned to the test. Desmichels retorted by again attacking and plundering the Douairs and Zmelas. Abdel Kader was amongst the Beni Amers when he heard of the incursion.
He was instantly at the head of 5,000 cavalry, and rushed to the rescue. With slackened reins and thundering hoofs, the Arab horse traversed a distance of fifty miles in less than three hours. Not more than one-half of the men, on his arrival, were fit for duty. But with these troops Abdel Kader charged. The French, utterly confounded by this unexpected apparition, hastily retreated, abandoning the women and children, whom they had taken with them, as hostages. Fresh troops come up to their relief, with more pieces of artillery; but, despite the galling fire to which he was exposed, Abdel Kader followed up the enemy, and hovered round them, to the very outskirts of Oran.
On his return to the Arab encampment he ordered the Douairs and Zmelas to prepare for immediate departure from a spot where temptations to transgress his edict were constantly held out to them, and where they were as continually exposed to vile and cruel assaults. He marched them off, with all their flocks and herds, and located them on a large plain behind Tlemsen.
Desmichels, paralysed by the boldness and ubiquity of his redoubtable foe, and finding his resources failing, his supplies cut off, and famine ready to swoop down on his men, saw no alternative before him but evacuation or peace. In this dire necessity he thus appealed to Abdel Kader:—
“You will never find me deaf to any sentiments of generosity, and if it would be convenient to you to grant me an interview, I am quite ready to consent, in the hope that we may be able, by the most sacred and solemn treaties, to stop the effusion of blood between two peoples destined by Providence to live under the same dominion.”
Abdel Kader seeing his adversary in the attitude of a suppliant, affected indifference. He left the letter unanswered. At the same time he employed a Jew, named Mordecai Amar, his agent at Oran, to pacify the French general with excuses, if any complaint were made as to his silence, and to suggest the advisability of more explicit and categorical propositions. After a month had transpired, Desmichels penned a third dispatch:—
“Not having received any answer to the letter I lately wrote to you, I prefer supposing that it has never reached you, to imagining that you have not chosen to give it your attention.”
The general terminated his reasonings by imploring for peace as follows:—“If you wish to maintain the exalted position to which circumstances have raised you, in my opinion you could not do better than accept my invitation, in order that the tribes may devote themselves to the cultivation of their lands, and enjoy the fruits and the blessings of peace, under the shadow of treaties binding us firmly together.”
The young and victorious Sultan, with this document in his hand, could now show his subjects that the enemy had been the first to crave for a suspension of hostilities. There was no occasion for any further delay, and he sent the following answer:—
“I have received your letter, and fully understand its contents. It gives me great satisfaction to find that your sentiments agree with mine. I feel quite assured of your loyal intentions; and you may feel assured that any engagements into which we may enter shall be faithfully observed on my part. I send you two superior officers of my army—Miloud ibn Arasch and Ould Mahmoud. They will confer, outside Oran, with Mordecai Amar, and will make known to him any proposition. If you accept them, you can send him on to me, and then we will draw up a treaty, which shall obliterate the hatred and enmity now severing us from each other, and replace them by an indissoluble friendship. You may count upon me, for I have never been unfaithful to my word.”
The proposed interview took place February 4, 1834. The Jew Amar was accompanied by the whole of the French staff. A long discussion ensued on various propositions made by Desmichels. The Sultan’s agent, Ibn Arasch, then left, saying he would report what had passed to his master, and return. He took with him a paper containing a draft of the propositions, but without the general’s signature.
On the 25th, Ibn Arasch returned to Oran, bearing this draft, approved and sealed by Abdel Kader, with another paper, containing the propositions of Abdel Kader. He was instructed not to deliver the former until the latter had been signed and sealed by Desmichels. Abdel Kader conceived that these documents, mutually exchanged, would constitute the Treaty. Their substance was as follows:—
Conditions of General Desmichels.
“1. Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from this day.
“2. The religion and usages of the Mussulmans shall be respected.
“3. French prisoners shall be given up.
“4. The markets shall be free.
“5. Every French deserter shall be given up by the Arabs.
“6. Every Christian travelling in the interior shall be furnished with a passport sealed with the seal of Abdel Kader’s consul, and that of the General.”
Conditions of the Sultan Abdel Kader.
“1. The Arabs shall be at liberty to buy and sell powder, arms, sulphur; in a word, everything necessary for war.
“2. The commerce of the port of Arzew shall be under the jurisdiction of the Prince of the Faithful. No cargoes shall be shipped except in that port. Mostaganem and Oran shall merely receive such articles of merchandise as are necessary for the wants of their inhabitants. To this there shall be no opposition. Those who wish to ship goods must repair to Arzew.
“3. The General shall give us up all deserters in chains. He shall not harbour criminals. The general commanding at Algiers shall have no power over Arabs who may come to him with the consent of their chiefs.
“4. No Mussulman shall be prevented returning home when he wishes.”
To the paper containing these conditions of Abdel Kader, Desmichels, who dreaded nothing so much as the breaking off of the negotiation, at once affixed his seal and signature. The former naturally thought that, by virtue of the 2nd Article, he had secured a monopoly of commerce.
On the 26th February, 1834, Desmichels proposed to Ibn Arasch, that a homogeneous treaty should be drawn up, embodying the substance of both documents, but stating the French conditions more at large. Ibn Arasch made no difficulty, never conceiving for a moment that such a document could be intended to abrogate the conditions already conceded to his master, in the paper which had just been signed and sealed by the general. Hence arose the “Treaty of Desmichels,” which afterwards gave rise to so many difficulties and complications.
Treaty of General Desmichels, February 26, 1834.
“The General commanding the French troops in the town of Oran, and the Prince of the Faithful, Sidi-il-Hadj Abdel Kader-ibn-Mehi-ed-deen, have decided on the following conditions:—
“Art. 1.—Hostilities shall cease between the French and the Arabs from this day. The General commanding the French troops and the Emir Abdel Kader will neglect nothing to maintain that union and friendship which ought to exist between two peoples, destined by God to live under the same dominion. To this end, representatives on the part of the Emir shall reside at Oran, Mostaganem, and Arzew; and, to prevent collisions between the French and the Arabs, French officers shall reside at Mascara.
“Art. 2.—The religion and usages of the Arabs shall be respected.
“Art. 3.—All prisoners shall be immediately given up, both on one side and the other.
“Art. 4.—Freedom of commerce shall be complete and entire.
“Art. 5.—Military men belonging to the French army, who desert their colours, shall be brought back by the Arabs. In like manner, all Arab malefactors, who, to avoid punishment, fly from their tribes and seek refuge with the French, shall be immediately seized and delivered over to the Emir’s representative, in the three maritime towns occupied by the French.
“Art. 6.—Every European, having occasion to travel in the interior, shall be furnished with a passport countersigned by the representatives of the Emir, and approved by the General in command, in order that they may find assistance and protection throughout the province.”
These conditions, written in parallel columns of Arab and French, were signed and sealed by both parties. Nothing is said in this treaty of a monopoly of commerce. But Abdel Kader had his bond, and was content. Desmichels, proud of what he considered a diplomatic triumph, hastened to send the grateful tidings of a peace to the French ministry, and allowed himself to indulge in the following strain:—
“I have to announce to you the submission of the province of Oran, the most considerable and warlike of the regency. This great event is the result of the advantages which have been obtained by the troops of my division.”
Abdel Kader might well repose on his laurels. He had compelled his enemy to sue for peace; he had made his own terms; he paid no tribute; his territory was not limited; the French general had acknowledged his independence by offering him the power to appoint and receive consuls. The French were to load at one port alone, and were to submit to his tariff.
In virtue of the monopoly secured to him by his own terms, Abdel Kader now issued orders, prohibiting the Arabs from selling corn, or barley, or agricultural produce, of any kind whatever, to Christians, whether native or foreign. His agents were declared to be the sole authorised buyers and sellers, and by them the prices in the markets were to be fixed.
The French merchants at Arzew complained loudly to Desmichels of the restriction. Abdel Kader appealed to his bond. Desmichels affected to ignore it. He adhered to his homogeneous treaty, in which commerce was declared free. Abdel Kader agreed to the test, but contended that though the market places (or sook) were free, he had the sole right of supplying them.
One of the French merchants, acting upon the view of the question, as put forward by the French general, bought a large quantity of corn and barley from an Arab of the tribe of Hamian. The agent of Abdel Kader went over and seized it. The merchant complained to the French local authorities, but he was told that no interference could be tolerated with the regulations of the Emir.
Desmichels, embarrassed with fresh complaints, and pressed for explanation by General Voirol, the governor-general, to whom all this misunderstanding was utterly incomprehensible, adopted a middle course. He declared that the authorisation given to the Emir to make a monopoly of grain, extended only to the grain raised on his own private property. Abdel Kader ridiculed the subterfuge. He knew nothing of the exclusive interpretation which Desmichels chose to put upon his treaty; he only knew that he had the General’s seal and signature to a document granting him a monopoly; and this monopoly he was determined to enact. The French were not in a position to dispute his verdict; and he carried his point.
Abdel Kader, free at length from external molestation, devoted his earnest attention to the internal affairs of his kingdom. Difficulties and trials were yet before him. Jealousy of his successes on the part of some, envy at the eminence he had attained on the part of others, insinuations malevolently propagated by his rivals, and readily entertained by the fanatical party, that he had betrayed the sacred cause by making peace with the infidels—all combined, as disturbing elements, to affect, more or less, the stability of his government.
But his retort was ready. To the taunting demand, “Where is now the leader of the Djehad—where the lofty tone which breathed nothing but battle and defiance, and invoked death rather than submission?” he replied by calmly pointing to the French garrisons, confined to the walls on which their cannon was planted; to the plains freed from infidel marauders; to the cities unmolested by Frank invaders; and, more than all, to a treaty, dictated at his sword’s point, which now, for the first time in the lapse of ages, gave good warranty for hopes of Arab freedom, and which promised to be the basis of Arab independence.
1834.
Abdel Kader now entered on the task of organisation. He trusted but little to the pacific professions of the French, and looked on the present cessation of hostilities merely as an armed truce. He resolved, consequently, to make use of the breathing time thus afforded, in maturing his plans, husbanding his resources, and preparing for future battles. Declaring the Djehad to be only suspended, not abandoned, he issued his usual edict for the collection of the war-tribute, consisting of the ashur, or tenth of all agricultural produce, and the zekka, or tax on cattle.
To his astonishment, the most faithful of all his tribes, his most zealous adherents, the very men who had been the guardians and supporters of his nascent power, and by whose aid he had been enabled to inflict his most deadly blows, refused obedience. The Beni Amers asserted that cessation of impost was, in their eyes, the legitimate consequence of cessation of war.
Abdel Kader hesitated not a moment. The Beni Amers must be attacked. Writing to Mustapha-ibn-Ismail at Tlemsen, he ordered him to prepare the Douairs and Zmelas for instant action. That old and wily leader of the Turkish Maghzen, desiring nothing better than to have an opportunity of falling on his old and mortal enemies, and rejoicing in the prospect of plunder, joyfully accepted the summons, and boastfully enlarged on the loyalty of his tribes. An unexpected incident turned the tide of events.
As Abdel Kader was preaching one Friday, as was his wont, in the mosque of Mascara, his eye lighted on some of the Beni Amer Sheiks. Suddenly turning the stream of his eloquence, he thus apostrophised them:—“Were not you, O Beni Amers, the first to call me to the post I now hold? Were not you the first to implore me to establish a regular government, which should inspire the good with confidence, and the wicked with terror?
“Did you not solemnly pledge your lives, your properties, and all that you held most dear and sacred, to assist and strengthen me in the arduous task? And will you be the first to abandon the common cause, the first, by your example, to countenance and encourage conspiracies against the very government you invoked? How can any government be carried on without taxes, how maintained without the cordial union and support of all?
“Think you that the smallest coin of the tribute which I demand, will ever be appropriated to my personal or family expenses? You all know that my paternal property suffices for my own needs. What I demand is what the law of the Prophet renders it imperative on you, as good Mussulmans, to give; and in my hands, I solemnly swear, it will be held as a sacred trust, for the triumph of the faith!”
Moved by this frank appeal, the Beni Amer Sheiks demanded a conference. The throng pressed around them. All ranks and ages joined their entreaties to effect an accommodation. Thus surrounded, the Sheiks advanced towards their young Sultan, and kissed his hand. In the name of their tribe, they promised to pay the tribute. Orders were forthwith despatched to Mustapha to suspend his march on the Beni Amers.
Three days afterwards, a horseman came riding in at full speed, to say that Mustapha had, notwithstanding, commenced an attack. Abdel Kader, hastily gathering together such horsemen as were within reach, galloped off to the scene of action.
On arriving, he sent word to Mustapha to withdraw. On his refusal to obey the order, Abdel Kader advanced to charge his recalcitrant chief. A few only of the Beni Amers followed. After a desperate skirmish, Abdel Kader had the mortification to see his men dispersed, and flying before superior numbers. A handful of men alone remained to rally round his person. Animated by the example of their chief, they fought with desperation. Nearly all were killed, or dismounted. At last, after performing prodigies of valour, Abdel Kader, his burnous riddled with bullets, and his horse covered with wounds, cut his way through the hostile ranks which closed him in, and galloped back to Mascara. He reached it late at night—alone.
Abdel Kader defeated by the Arabs! The news spread like wildfire. In an instant all slumbering rivalries were aroused. Sidi-il-Aribi raised the standard of revolt. El Gomari, and the Beni Engad, prepared to join Sidi Hamadi, the Governor of Tlemsen, who entered into correspondence with Mustapha.
The tidings of these defections, so far from oppressing the soul of Abdel Kader with despondency, only nerved him with fresh vigour. The Hashem Gharabas, the Mejahers, the Beni Abbas, were staunch. The Beni Amers had confirmed the adhesion given in by their Sheiks, at Mascara. He could wield a force of 15,000 cavalry. With a large proportion of these he at once took the field.
Mustapha had led off the Douairs and Zmelas to their old campaigning ground near Oran, in the hopes of propitiating the French, and getting their support. To his disgust, he was warned by the latter of the consequences which would ensue if he persisted in rebelling against Abdel Kader, the ally of France.
Desmichels had found out by bitter experience, the impossibility of conquering the province of Oran, with such forces as his government had placed at his disposal. The plan of raising up a native power to supply this deficiency, and to assist in extending the French dominions, either as vassals or allies, seemed to him to afford the easiest method for escaping from a serious dilemma. He was dazzled by the great and commanding qualities displayed by Abdel Kader, and always took a pleasure in extolling his heroism, his prowess, and even his generalship. He seemed almost to envy and covet his glory.
Desmichels was known to have frequently declared that he would make the young Arab Emir all powerful, from the frontiers of Morocco to the frontiers of Tunis. No doubt this declaration was made with the mental reserve that the gallant chief should only be so as the vassal of France. Abdel Kader, fully understanding the profitable tendency to himself of this exuberant admiration, cared not to dispel an illusion which marvellously promoted his own designs. He was secretly bent, however, on preserving a perfectly independent position, and on confining his allies to their counting-houses on the sea-coast.
Mustapha having been thus kept in check, Abdel Kader fell with his whole force upon Sidi-il-Aribi, enveloped him in a crushing defeat, and took him prisoner. At the same time he inflicted on the rebellious tribes a signal chastisement, and collected all the arrears of tribute. Flushed by this victory, he now sought out Mustapha. He met him on the plains of Mahraz, July 13, 1834. The battle between the hostile chiefs raged for some hours with alternate success. At last, both sides, worn out with fatigue, and fainting with the heat, drew breath.
Abdel Kader seized the moment to send some Marabouts through the enemy’s ranks, to offer terms. Mustapha, fearing an attack from the French, who had advanced as far as the camp of Miserghin, and were in observation, was nothing loath to listen to any propositions which might relieve him from his perilous situation. Though declining a personal meeting with Abdel Kader, he sent him his charger in token of reconciliation.
Abdel Kader now marched upon Tlemsen. His appearance before that town, with all the prestige of victory, at once annihilated the intrigues of which that place had been the focus. His faithless lieutenant, Sidi Hamadi, was seized and imprisoned, but afterwards generously pardoned, although not allowed to retain his post. This was conferred on Noona, who after his late defeat had fled to Morocco, and had returned, bearing letters of recommendation from the Moorish Sultan.
Abdel Kader entered Mascara in triumph. Two events had occurred during his absence, which materially aided him. El Gomari, chief of the Beni Engad, had been tried before a tribunal, and shot; and Sidi-il-Aribi had died in prison. Freed from these rivals, and unimpeded by internal faction, he was again at liberty to carry out his measures of general administration.
The province of Oran was divided into two great districts, and placed under khalifas, or lieutenants. That of the east, subdivided into seven agalicks, and having Mascara as the seat of government, was placed under the command of the Sultan’s brother-in-law, Mustapha-ibn-Tamy. That of the west, with Tlemsen for its capital, was entrusted to Bou Hamadi. Every tribe was held responsible for the peace and good order of its locality. Weekly reports were required, as to the amount of cattle, beasts of burden, and horses fit for service in each agalick. A Cadi, appointed by the Sultan, and paid out of the public treasury, was sent to each of the tribes, to administer justice.
A body of regulars was raised, consisting both of cavalry and infantry. The latter were drilled and instructed by French non-commissioned officers, who had been allowed to offer their services for that purpose. Cannon-foundries, powder-mills, and manufactories of small arms, were established and superintended by European artisans. The Arabs wondered at these strange and novel proceedings. They felt that a new order of things had suddenly fallen on them.
This, together with the vigilance with which crimes were detected, and the certainty and severity of its punishment, soon had its effect on the community. The entire province, which eighteen months previously had been a prey to every kind of anarchy and confusion, now enjoyed the most thorough tranquillity. So complete was the feeling of security which existed in all parts, that, to use the favourite Arab illustration of the perfection of good government, “A girl might have travelled the length and breadth of the land with a casket of diamonds on her head, without fear of molestation.”
Abdel Kader’s fame had now spread through Algeria. It was generally felt, that a man had arisen who had not only shown himself capable of preserving order within, but who, by his skill and daring, had succeeded in imposing conditions on the infidels from without. The eyes of all the well-disposed naturally turned towards one who had achieved such signal results.
The inhabitants of Medea and Miliana, the principal towns in the province of Tittery, sent deputations to Abdel Kader, begging him to do for their province what he had already done for the province of Oran. Had he been free to act on his own inspirations, forty-eight hours would not have elapsed before he had been on the march in compliance with their request. The invitation was not only flattering to his pride, as showing the influence his name exercised over parties utterly unknown to him, but offered—what in his eyes was its strongest inducement—a further opening for the prosecution of the great object he had in view, the establishment of a widely-extended Arab nationality.
The Treaty of Desmichels in no way precluded him from entering Tittery; for that treaty had not confined him within any prescribed limits. Still he was not disposed to undertake the enterprise without first ascertaining how such a step would be viewed by the French authorities. Contenting himself, therefore, for the present, with replying to the deputations, that he required time to consider their demands, he proceeded to fathom the thoughts of Count D’Erlon, the new Governor-General, on the momentous topic. The recent arrival of that personage gave him an opportunity of broaching the delicate question without appearing to make it a special subject of negotiation.
Under the garb of a letter of felicitation to the general on his appointment, the following feeler was adroitly put forward:—“The Kaid, Miloud ibn Arasch, will give you every particular about us. I have instructed him to ascertain your views as to the best manner of establishing tranquillity in all the districts, whether maritime or in the interior, along the coasts between Algiers and Oran, and in the plains and the mountains, from Tlemsen and Mascara, up to Medea and Miliana.”
Count D’Erlon had come to assume the arduous and responsible duties which now devolved upon him, without any clear instructions, and without any additional force. The French government, still uncertain as to its European relations, had neither money nor troops to spare for the prosecution of an Algerian war on a great scale. A vague idea possessed it that Abdel Kader was the ladder by which the French were to scale the heights of the Atlas. To keep on good terms with this influential chief was, consequently, at this period, a cardinal point of French policy.
Accordingly, the reply of Count D’Erlon to Abdel Kader consisted of vague generalities, and Was altogether couched in such terms, that the latter had every ground to believe no measures would be taken to oppose his proposed step if he only had the boldness to take it. Still he felt the necessity of having his actual rights confirmed by the new Governor-General before assuming new ones; and to this end he sent the document containing his own terms, which had been duly signed and sealed by Desmichels, as above related, to the Count, for his perusal.
D’Erlon, to whom even the existence of such a document was unknown, as it had never been notified to the French Government, was thunder-struck. Here was a French general, who had taken upon himself to sign a secret treaty, giving solid and exclusive advantages to an enemy whose hostility had not been disarmed, and whose friendship was doubtful. His representations to the French ministry relative to this extraordinary procedure were such, that they were speedily followed by the recall of Desmichels from Oran.
At the same time he thus gave his opinion to Abdel Kader on the subject:—“I would wish you to observe, that General Desmichels had no power or jurisdiction, except in the province of Oran, and that he could in nowise make any stipulations as regards any other part of the regency. Even by giving the widest interpretation to the Treaty made between you and him, in February, 1834, you can have no pretensions beyond the province of Oran, limited as it has been by the sovereign power of France.
“My desire for the present is, that you should not cross the lower Cheliff, towards the east. If you govern the territory you now possess according to Mohammedan laws, and with strict justice, we shall be friends; but we cannot allow you to enter the province of Tittery. What passes there is my concern. I am not at war with its inhabitants; I have no fixed project of making establishments at Blidah and Bouffarick, but whenever I think it for the interest of France to do so, I shall allow no one to embarrass me.”
Abdel Kader paused for the present before such an interdict. Besides, disturbances amongst the Flittas, in the valley of the Cheliff, excited against him by the sons of Sidi-il-Aribi, called for his immediate presence in that direction.
While engaged in appeasing these troubles, he was surprised by the information that a certain Hadj Mousa, a shereef from the Sahara, had entered Medea, and had been warmly received by a large portion of the population. After waiting for a time to see what steps would be taken by the French Governor-General, and finding that no opposition to the assumptions of this adventurer was offered on the part of Count D’Erlon, Abdel Kader determined to exercise full liberty of action. If a shereef from the desert might snatch a province, why not he? Fortune is the friend of the bold, and the world is for him who will seize it. He dashed across the Cheliff, and marched on Medea, followed by all the cavalry contingents of Oran, two battalions of regular infantry, and four pieces of cannon. Cæsar had crossed the Rubicon.
Hadj Mousa came out to meet him, prophesying that God would give him the victory, and that the cannon of Abdel Kader would not go off. Abdel Kader replied that if, indeed, his cannon did not go off, he would acknowledge a divine interposition, and withdraw. The battle was gained, and the prophet and pretender was completely defeated. Abdel Kader took possession, amidst general exultation, of the province of Tittery, and appointed Khalifas at Medea and Miliana.
General Trezel, who had replaced Desmichels at Oran, proposed to reply to this movement of Abdel Kader by seizing Mascara. D’Erlon temporised. He was neither authorised nor prepared to commence hostilities. He even condescended to treat with Abdel Kader in the very town he had occupied in direct violation of his prohibition. Captain St. Hippolyte was sent to him, bearer of the following draft of a treaty:—
1. Acknowledgment of the sovereignty of France.
2. Precise definition of the power of the Emir, which is to be exercised in the province of Oran alone, bounded on the east by the Cheliff, from its mouth to its confluence with the Wady Riou, and by the river of that name up to Godjidah.
3. Right of French and all Europeans to travel in the province of Oran.
4. Entire freedom of commerce in the interior.
5. Engagement on the part of the Emir not to export, except in ports occupied by the French.
6. Tribute to be paid by Abdel Kader, and hostages to be given by him. The tribute to be considered a mark of his acknowledgment of French sovereignty.
A treaty which thus abrogated, by a stroke of the pen, all the rights and privileges his own good sword had obtained, might apparently have been regarded by Abdel Kader as an insult or a defiance. But, in reality, it was the result of his own diplomacy. He had learned to appreciate the value and importance of the power to make treaties. He knew that this power implied an independent position, whether for proposing or accepting terms. Already a French general had, by treaty, acknowledged and confirmed his right to an independent sway, had saluted him as Emir, and Prince of the Faithful, or Sultan.
Negotiations once opened with the new Governor-General might lead to similar concessions. What the nature of the propositions, presented to him in the first instance, might be, was to him a matter of supreme indifference. What he wanted, and what he earnestly urged his agent at Algiers to obtain from D’Erlon, was a treaty. He trusted to the chapter of accidents to mould any fresh negotiation to his own wishes.
The employment of well-paid spies introduced him into the most secret councils of the French authorities. Able and crafty agents, accredited to the responsible heads of the French administration, in its various centres of action, were made the means of promoting his views and advancing his interests. These agents were instructed to gain the confidence of all important personages; to be always about them on some pretence or other; to be constantly extolling their master’s merits; and enlarging on his talents for administration; to speak loudly of his extraordinary influence in the country; and, finally, to insinuate the immense advantages which would accrue to France by having such a pioneer in the path of conquest.
A Jew, of the name of Durand, had performed all these functions, at Algiers, with rare ability. He had easily contrived to get the ear of D’Erlon. He was consulted by him in all affairs of moment connected with the internal government of the regency. He had gradually impressed him with a favourable opinion of his master; and he succeeded, finally, in drawing him into the current of credulous expectation with regard to the conduct of Abdel Kader, which had carried away more than one of his predecessors. In the meantime, he had wormed out of him the foregoing treaty, and was commissioned to accompany the bearer of it to Medea.
There, though the treaty met with very little ceremony or attention, the bearer of the treaty received the most striking marks of friendship and hospitality. A grand review was held; and the French envoy gazed with dubious admiration on the nucleus of an Arab army. He was invited to accompany the Sultan on a tour of inspection about to be made through the provinces of Tittery and Oran. The offer was accepted; and Captain St. Hippolyte and the Jew Durand figured conspicuously in the royal suite.
Abdel Kader made the most of his time. Purposely going into those districts which had recently shown symptoms of disaffection, or were wavering in their allegiance to him, he secretly enjoyed the impression made on the tribes by the French uniform. What, they thought, must be the power of a chief who had made the infidels his vassals, and who could, no doubt, at any moment summon their armies to march to the support of his throne? Any resistance to such a potentate would be mere madness. Unqualified submission was their best and only alternative.
On reaching Mascara, fresh tokens of politeness and cordiality awaited the distinguished guests. On the third day after their arrival, Abdel Kader put his own treaty into their hands. It was to this effect:—
1. The provinces which are under the dominion of the Prince of the Faithful, and which are in submission, shall remain dependent on him. In like manner the country which the Governor-General actually holds shall remain under his dominion.
2. Whenever the Emir shall think fit to appoint or to remove the Governors of Medea and Miliana, he will inform the Governor-General, that he may take note of the fact; and also make those functionaries the medium of any dispatch or communication he may have to convey to him.
3. Freedom of commerce for all. The Arabs shall be respected in the markets by the French, and the French by the Arabs, in all the provinces under the dominion of the Emir.
4. The Prince of the Faithful shall buy at Algiers, through his agent, everything he requires in the shape of mortars, muskets, powder, and sulphur.
5. The Emir shall give up to the French all deserters; and the Governor-General will act similarly towards the Emir.
6. If the Emir projects a tour towards Constantine or elsewhere, he will inform the Governor-General of his intention and of his motive for doing so.
A treaty so ridiculously contrasting with the one sent for his acceptance by the French Governor-General, and which, so far from limiting his power, proposed to allow him to leap at one bound, from the gates of Oran to those of Constantine, and to make the French themselves the complaisant approvers of this encroachment, was certainly one which the Prince of the Faithful never expected to see accepted.
Perfectly comprehending, however, the exaggerated importance attached to his friendship and support by the French Government, and relying on the efficacy of those secret influences he had hitherto so successfully employed, Abdel Kader was not without hopes that by a strenuous and even overstrained assumption of right, and a bold avowal of design, dimly suggestive of reserved strength, he might at all events procure such a treaty as should enhance the advantages he actually possessed, strengthen his position, enlarge his sphere of action, and still further dispel the clouds which yet obscured the brilliant vista of glory lying before him.
Up to this time he had succeeded in almost all he had undertaken. His faith in his mission, always strong and unshaken, now possessed his mind with the strength of a religious conviction. By inspiring all around him with a like confidence and belief, this faith became to him an instrument of power. His past success was accepted as a sure omen of future triumphs. A French officer, about this time, advised him, out of honest sympathy and regard, not to be presumptuously confident. “What!” replied Abdel Kader, “it is but three years since I was simply one of my father’s five sons, and obliged to mount and equip myself from the enemy’s spoils. You see what I am now; and you tell me not to have confidence in myself!”
1835.
Count D’Erlon visited Oran in the month of June, 1835. Abdel Kader wrote to compliment him on his arrival, and anxiously awaited overtures. The Governor-General was desirous of inviting him to a personal interview. Trezel firmly and successfully pointed out the impolicy of such a step. He maintained that, so far from Abdel Kader being willing to see, much more to aid in, the extension of French dominion in Algeria, he was, in fact, adroitly making the French Government the instrument for his own exaltation, and that to enter into closer relations with him would be tantamount to an approval of his late conduct.
Such, indeed, was the indignation of that uncompromising soldier at the facility with which Abdel Kader was achieving his own ends at the expense, as he conceived, of French honour, and to the great scandal of French common sense and discrimination, that he had more than once been tempted to march against him on his own responsibility. D’Erlon, on the contrary, strongly impressed by this time with the importance and necessity of Abdel Kader’s support, would not hear of any steps being taken that might possibly lead to a rupture; and on returning to Algiers, ordered Trezel carefully to cultivate his friendship and alliance.
Such, however, in a short time, became the state of affairs in the province of Oran, that Trezel had only before him the choice of two courses—either to submit to Abdel Kader’s dictation, and await his sovereign pleasure in all things connected with the interior, or to place himself in such a position as to be enabled to act independently.
The Douairs and Zmelas had resumed a friendly intercourse with the French. Abdel Kader threatened to take them back forcibly to Tlemsen. Those tribes, rather than abandon their crops and be deprived of a profitable traffic, at once demanded French protection. Trezel granted their request; and, hearing that Abdel Kader’s officers were engaged in harassing them with forcible measures—seizing their cattle and carrying off some of their Sheiks—he sent a brigade to their camping ground near Miserghin. On the 16th June, 1835, a treaty, containing eleven articles, was signed by both parties, in which the Douairs and Zmelas were declared French subjects.
Abdel Kader was still desirous to avert hostilities, and even so anxious to avoid any pretext which might lead to them, that he had issued strict orders that no Arab was, under any circumstances, to fire on a Frenchman except in self-defence. He therefore simply wrote to Trezel, strongly protesting against a step which he looked on as a glaring infraction of the treaty of Desmichels, by which the French engaged not to harbour refugees from the tribes, and to send back Arab deserters.
Trezel answered him that he was quite willing to abide by that treaty; but argued that the word “deserter” applied only to individuals, and could never have been intended to extend to whole tribes who preferred French rule to his. Viewing the sense of the treaty in that light, he said, he could never deprive the Douairs and Zmelas of the rights they had obtained.
This notification drew from Abdel Kader the following letter:—
“You know the conditions which Desmichels made with me before you came to Oran, and to which you yourself promised to adhere. By those conditions, every Arab who commits a misdemeanour or crime, and flies to you for refuge and protection, is to be sent back to me, even when it is a question of more than one individual. How much stronger becomes my claim on this point, when it is a question of whole tribes deserting and going over to you!
“The Douairs and Zmelas are my subjects; and according to our law, I have a right to do with them as I please. If you withdraw your protection from them, and let them obey me, as heretofore, it is well. If, on the contrary, you persist in breaking your engagements, recall at once your consul from Mascara; for even should the Douairs and Zmelas enter within the walls of Oran, I will not withdraw my hand from them until they repent and atone for their fault. Moreover, my religion prohibits me from allowing a Mussulman to be under the dominion of a Christian. See what suits you best; otherwise the God of Battles must decide between us.”
Trezel could only reply to such a tone by the sound of cannon. Indeed, hostilities had, in some degree, already begun. A few days previously, the French cavalry, being short of forage, had cut down the crops of the Hashem Gharabas. Abdel Kader, on hearing of this irruption on his family tribe, had moved up 2,000 horse and 800 foot to their vicinity, near the river Sig. Trezel now determined to attack this force before it assumed any greater development. On the 26th of June, 1835, he led out a column for that purpose, consisting of 5,000 infantry, a regiment of Chasseurs d’Afrique, 4 mountain pieces, and 20 waggons for provisions, besides the ordinary ambulance.
Shortly after entering the wood of Muley Ismail, the leading companies opened fire on what they conceived to be a straggling party of the Arabs. The fire was vigorously returned. Presently cavalry appeared. It was Abdel Kader’s advanced guard, coming from the Sig. In a few minutes the French were furiously attacked in front and on their flanks.
The suddenness of the onset, the thickness of the wood, and the undulating nature of the ground, which tended to conceal the real number of the enemy, combined with the shouts and cries by which the Arabs sought to magnify their number, all contributed to shake the steadiness of the French column. In vain were certain changes in its formation attempted: the rear battalions ordered to close up, the centre compacted, and the cavalry thrown out. In a short time the whole body was thrown into confusion, the cavalry was driven in, and the infantry and artillery were only able to fire their discharges at random.
For a while the Arab attack seemed to relent. The French now broke from their ranks. The provision waggons were seized and emptied; the wine casks were staved in. All eat and drank ravenously. At length, by the greatest exertions on the part of the officers, some sort of order was restored, and an onward movement was effected. The banks of the Sig were reached about sunset; and there the French column encamped in solid square.
Fortunately for the French, the main body of Abdel Kader’s army, approaching by forced marches from Tlemsen, had been obliged to halt for a short repose some two leagues higher up the stream. The French, for that night, had a respite. At dawn of day, Trezel commenced a retreat; but Abdel Kader had not been inactive. By a rapid night march he had succeeded in placing himself on the enemy’s line of communication with Oran. Trezel was in no condition to fight his way, and took the direction of the seaport town of Arzew. Knowing the difficulties of a direct movement in that point—part of the intervening country being almost impassable to waggons and artillery carriages—he determined to turn the Hamian Mountains, and to emerge on the plain of Arzew by the defile of the Habra, where that river Habra changes its name to that of the Macta.
Abdel Kader, seeing the direction the French were taking, at once devised their object. If he could only occupy the defile of the Habra before they reached it, he knew they would be at his mercy. But the distance was too great for infantry to accomplish in time to effect his object. Selecting a thousand horsemen, he ordered each rider to mount a foot soldier behind him, and gallop to the spot. This lucky inspiration was crowned with complete success. The French, after patiently toiling across the plain of Ceirat, harassed all the way by the Arab cavalry, entered the defile about mid-day.
To their surprise they found the slopes on either side of them bristling with arms. As they proceeded, huge pieces of rock were hurled down upon them. While the French skirmishers were occupied during two hours in bravely but slowly opening a way, Abdel Kader with his whole army closed in upon them from behind. Their rear guard, fearing to be cut off, pushed on confusedly to the front.
Part of the ambulance and artillery took ground to the right, and got swamped in a marsh. The artillerymen cut their traces and fled. Regiments got intermingled. Companies and sections of companies rushed here and there for places of shelter or escape. Luckily for them, the Arabs were too much occupied in plundering and stripping and slaying the wounded, to follow them into the nooks and corners in which they had sought for refuge. Many, trying to swim the river, were carried away by the stream and drowned. Night came on. The crushed and mutilated mass dropped away towards Arzew in disjointed fragments of helpless and bewildered fugitives.
The Arabs knew no bounds to their exultation. Shouts of joy resounded, and the glare of torches flashed to and fro in the defile all through the night. An aerial spectator might have seen one part of it occupied with busy architects. Drawing near, he would have seen something growing up from the ground, like a pyramid. Bending down and listening, he would have heard frantic cries of “more heads, more heads!” A closer inspection of this work of art would have revealed to the astonished gaze hundreds of French heads, piled up promiscuously.
Abdel Kader rode towards the place about midnight. He reined up, and paused for awhile in silent and painful contemplation. His soul revolted at the ghastly trophy. For the moment he was powerless; but as he passed on, he resolved in his mind that this should be the last of such barbarities.
Such was the terrible episode of the Macta. France was electrified at the news of the disaster. The nation, with one accord, demanded investigation, punishment, and vengeance. D’Erlon was recalled; the brave but unfortunate Trezel was replaced by General D’Arlanges. Marshal Clausel was sent to inaugurate a new era in what was now called the African colony of France; but his new weapons were destined to break in his hands.
In the session of 1835, M. Thiers spoke powerfully in the French Chambers on the subject of the system which had, up to that time, been pursued in Algeria. “It is not colonisation,” he said. “It is not occupation on a large scale; it is not occupation on a small scale. It is not peace; it is not war. It is war badly made.” Roused by this taunt, so bitterly justified by the late deplorable event on the Macta, the French Government at last threw some energy into its mode of action, augmented the army in Algeria, ordered the vigorous prosecution of the war with Abdel Kader, and decreed the occupation of Mascara. It was thought that the seizure of his capital would bring the aspiring young Sultan to terms.
Marshal Clausel arrived at Algiers August 10th, 1835. A pompous proclamation which he issued boastfully announced the speedy submission of the whole regency. A map was at the same time published, showing the colony divided into beylicks, with the names of the native beys appointed to govern them. Abdel Kader was held to be a thing of the past, or, if existing, to be easily disposed of.
This highly satisfactory arrangement, however, never extended beyond the domain of imagination. The marshal’s military deeds were destined to contrast awkwardly with his military dreams. Expeditions to Medea, to Miliana, to Cherchell, all returned with sad tales of humiliation and reverse. “In two months,” he had ostentatiously declared, “the Hadjouts shall cease to be.” The marshal theorised; Abdel Kader performed.
His Khalifa at Miliana descended, by his orders, into the Metija with 5,000 cavalry and infantry, rallied these very Hadjouts, swept the plains of Algiers of all the French colonists, and blockaded Algiers itself. On the other hand, D’Arlanges and the garrison of Oran were reduced to the greatest straits. They were little more than prisoners of war. Abdel Kader had almost realised his threat that not a bird should fly over the towns occupied by the infidels without his leave.
The French everywhere writhed in their fetters. The army breathed fury and indignation, and almost mutinied. From the general to the drummer, all loudly demanded to be led out against the daring and successful Arab who was thus setting them at defiance and enveloping them in the toils of his fearless and enterprising genius. On the 21st of November, 1835, Clausel went to Oran, and prepared to take the field with 12,000 men.
Abdel Kader was already on the alert. His available force, to meet the coming shock, was 8,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry, and four pieces of cannon. With these he proposed to check, harass, and perhaps scatter, the French army on its line of march. To defend Mascara never entered into his plan; his was not a siege power.
Clausel quitted Oran November 27th. The wood of Muley Ismael was passed, and the fording of the Sig effected without opposition. As the column drew near to the Habra, the Arabs were seen moving in a parallel direction along the adjacent heights. Abdel Kader was watching the moment when a break in the French lines would offer him a favourable point of attack. Clausel, penetrating this intention, halted, closed up, and, making face to his right, advanced against the Arabs, in échelons of battalions from his left.
Abdel Kader refused battle. Leaving his adversary to enjoy the barren fruits of his change of front, he pushed on rapidly, and placed himself across the main road leading to Mascara. His left was posted on an eminence, where he placed his artillery; his right was protected by a wood. His selection of ground would have done honour to a European general.
An able commander may seize a strategical point in such a manner as to decide the fate of a campaign. He may overbear, and even turn to a good account, obstacles apparently insuperable, by tactical skill; he may make time and space subservient to his designs; but he cannot give irregulars the firmness requisite to hold the part assigned to them in a regular order of battle. It was the fate of Abdel Kader to discover now, that, in attempting to realise the theories of European military science in the open field, and on a given ground, with the levies under his command, the elements he wielded were below the requirements of his genius.
Four chapels, dedicated to Sidi Embarek, were occupied by his advanced posts. These the French quickly drove in. The Arab cavalry charged in various places; but they were broken and dispersed by shells and rockets. Abdel Kader directed in person the fire of his artillery. Some well-directed shots had thrown a French brigade into confusion. Immediately he led on his infantry against it. Animated by his presence, his Arabs and Kabyles went in valiantly. But they measured themselves in vain against the courage and obstinacy of French infantry. The struggle on their part was desperate but fruitless, and they retreated in confusion.
The French had in the meantime, and after some hours’ hard fighting, possessed themselves of the wood on the right of the Arab position, whilst their artillery had pushed well up the main road. The Arabs abandoned the field at all points. Abdel Kader vainly endeavoured to preserve some order in the retreat. That night, his regular infantry disbanded. Of the cavalry of the tribes, some went to their homes; others hurried off to Mascara, and began to plunder the place. He himself withdrew to Cachero, his family property, about two leagues beyond that town.
The army of Abdel Kader had melted away like a wreath of snow. It was evident that the French would soon be in Mascara. Tlemsen might even fall into their hands in a brief space of time. Whole tribes, as a probable consequence, would seek safety by submission. Some of his chiefs, on whom Abdel Kader most relied, had already deserted him. His case seemed to be hopeless. But he calmly awaited the time when the panic should subside; he felt assured that it would be only transient. He was mortified and indignant at the stain which had been put upon his fame and reputation by the weakness and pusillanimity of some, and the treason of others. Yet he never uttered an invective or a reproach.
The few followers who remained with Abdel Kader anxiously endeavoured to read his thoughts. The alarmists he re-assured; the faint-hearted he encouraged; to his mother, who, with womanly tenderness and compassion, now approached him to pour words of comfort and consolation in his ear, he calmly replied, taking her hand in his, “Women, mother, have need of pity, not men.”