What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding from intellect, and unfolding itself into light? What other can we assert it to be than that which is the most simple and the most known of all the conceptions contained in this science? What therefore is this? “The one, says Parmenides, if it is the one will not be many.” For it is necessary that the many should participate of the one; but the one does not participate of the one, but is the one itself. Neither is that which is primarily one participable. For it would not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor that which is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate. The one therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist primarily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in the intelligible place of survey, as we are taught in the second hypothesis. The one, therefore, entirely transcends an order of this kind, and is the cause of it. For the not many, is not privation, as we have said, but the cause of the many. This, therefore, Parmenides does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but as a thing most manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the opposition as it were of the many to the one. But employing this he takes away that which follows; and he takes away that which is posterior to this by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does, after the same manner. And at one time indeed, he assumes the elements of the demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time from those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order of Gods, as we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which connectedly contains and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt cause. But this order is called by him in the second hypothesis parts and a whole. These therefore he denies of the one employing the many for the purpose of distinguishing the subjects and the one. For, as he says, that which is a whole and has parts is many; but the one is beyond the many. If, therefore, the one transcends the intelligible simplicity, but whole and that which has parts proceed from it in order to become the bond of the whole of this distribution, is it not necessary that the one should neither be a whole, nor be indigent of parts? And I think it is through this transcendency that the one presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods, and that it produces this order, but in an exempt manner.

In the third place after these, we may survey the order which is allotted the boundary of the intellectual and at the same time intelligible Gods, proceeding from the one, and may behold the one perfectly expanded above it. For this order indeed subsists from the second genera, and from the intellectual wholeness of the genera. But the one, as has been demonstrated, is exempt according to cause from this wholeness. The one therefore has neither beginning, or middle, or end, nor has it extremes, nor does it participate of any figure. For through these Gods, the before mentioned order of Gods becomes apparent. Whether therefore, there be a perfective summit, or what is celebrated as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination converting the end of these divinities to their beginning, the one is similarly beyond every triple distribution. For the one would have parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind. But it has been demonstrated that the one unically subsists prior to the many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one negation of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of the last order. Besides this also, he shows that the one has no extremity. But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately from this he likewise shows that the one is unreceptive of all figures.

Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these, and receiving a tripartite division, and must demonstrate that the one transcends these also. For such is the one, says Parmenides, since it is neither in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and not one. And if it were in itself it would entirely comprehend itself in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended, it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. The discourse therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that the one will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence the one being perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.

Moreover, the one likewise generates the second intellectual order, being unmingled with it. For the one neither stands still, nor is moved. It participates therefore of neither of these; but being similarly exempt from both, it at the same time transcends the middle orders of the intellectual progression of the Gods. For if it were moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality, or local motion. But it is not possible that the one can be changed in quality; for being thus changed it will be not one, and will fall off from a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be locally moved. For it is impossible that it should be moved in a circle, because it would have parts, viz. middle and extremes. And if it changed one place for another it would be partible. For it would be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that place to which it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved. For if it were wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in consequence of partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased its motion. But if the one stands still, it is certainly necessary that it should abide in the same thing. But it has been demonstrated that the one is no where. Hence it is neither in itself, nor in another thing. In no respect therefore is the one moved, or does it stand still, which things [viz. motion and permanency] particularly belong to the middle order of intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis. For the first God produces this order also, being exempt from it.

In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last order of intellectuals, proceeding from the one, and subordinate to it. For in this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at the same time the one subsists prior to both these. For different is said to be different both from itself and from other things. And in a similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things. But the one is not indeed different from itself, because that which is different from the one will be not one. And it is not the same with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is the one different from other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not the one. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor is the one the same with itself. For if the one and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one by participating of the many. But if the one and sameness are essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to the one, it should become a passive one, and not that which is primarily one. If however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad, it is evident that the one existing beyond this also supernally unfolds it into light, and places over the wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For from hence other things primarily receive a communication with the one which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by the one.

But after the intellectual Gods, the ineffable transcendency of the one arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, the one in the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uniformly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore, Parmenides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in the same manner as dissimilitude is that which is passive to difference. Parmenides therefore demonstrates that the one transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according to similitude and dissimilitude.

What therefore remains after this? Is it not evident that it is the multitude of the mundane Gods? But this also is twofold, the one being celestial, but the other sublunary. Of these, therefore, the genus which revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the greater and the less. But in the sublunary genus the equal is allotted a difference in multitude from the celestial equality, but the unequal is again divided by the power of the more and the less. According to another genus therefore of the divine orders, there will be a monad and a duad, but above indeed, they are allied to the one and to sameness, and beneath to multitude, and the intellectual cause of difference. Hence the one transcends all these. For the equal indeed every where consists of the same parts. By what contrivance therefore is it possible that the nature which at one and the same time is exempt from sameness, and the difference which is associated with it, should participate of equality and inequality?

Besides all these divine orders therefore we must intellectually survey the genera of deified souls, and which are distributed about the Gods. For in each of the divine progressions and in the progressions also of souls, the first genus presents itself to the view connascent with the Gods; since both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region divine souls receive the division of the Gods into the world, as the Athenian Guest in a certain place demonstrates. The psychical extent therefore, is characterized by time, and by a life according to time. But the peculiarity of divine souls is shown by Parmenides to consist in their being younger and at the same time older both than themselves and other things. For revolving always according to the same time, and conjoining the beginning with the end, as at one and the same time proceeding to the end of the whole period they become younger, but as at the same time circulating to the beginning of it, they become older. All their ages however, perpetually preserve the same measures of time. Again, there is sameness in them and difference, the former indeed preserving equality, but the latter inequality, according to time. The one therefore subsists prior to divine souls, and generates these also together with the Gods. We now therefore come to the end of the whole distribution of more excellent natures; and the cause of all intelligibles at once unfolds into light the genera that follow the Gods, and that are triply divided by the three parts of time. But this cause is demonstrated by the intellectual projections of Parmenides to be also exempt from these. For that which is beyond all time and the life which is according to time, can by no contrivance become subservient to the more partial periods of time.

That which is the first of all things therefore, unfolds into light all the Gods, divine souls, and the more excellent genera, and is neither complicated with its progeny, nor multiplied about them; but being perfectly exempt from them in an admirable simplicity, and transcendency of union, it imparts to all things indifferently progression and at the same time order in the progression. Parmenides therefore beginning from the intelligible place of survey of the first intellectual Gods, proceeds thus far, according to the measures of generation, giving subsistence to the genera of the Gods, and to the natures that are united to and follow the Gods,[159] and perpetually evinces that the one is ineffably exempt from all things. But again, from hence he returns to the beginning, and imitating the conversion of the whole of things, separates the one from the highest, viz. from the intelligible Gods. For thus especially we may survey the transcendency of the one, and the immense difference of its union from all other things, if we not only demonstrate that it is established above the second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that it subsists prior to the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner conformable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety of words, but through intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing according to intellect, and asserting that the one is above essence, and being characterized by the one. For this assertion was not collected from the preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods themselves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends that all knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the ineffable of that God who is beyond all things. For after scientific energies, and intellectual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Parmenides referring the whole of his discussion, concludes the first hypothesis, suspending indeed all the divine genera from the one, but evincing that the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the participation of intelligibles and sensibles, and in an ineffable manner giving subsistence to the participated monads. Hence also, the one is said to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.